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ABSTRACT	
From its emergence to its expansion, intellectual property (IP) has not been 
isolated from trade. However, in the late 1970s, business interests in the United 
States (US) exerted powerful pressure, leading to IP norms becoming 
increasingly trade-centric. Hypothesis of this thesis is that such trade-centric IP 
norms, encouraged and formed by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and subsequent TRIPS-plus rules pursued 
by the two most active actors, the US and the European Union (EU), fail to 
achieve the intended purposes of IP protection. This normalization of trade-
centric regulation also creates conflict with a range of economic, social and 
cultural values that have significant human rights implications. The goal of this 
thesis is to: (a) critically examine this predominance of trade in contemporary 
IP norms; and (b) provide a counter framework for IP policy reform. It seeks to 
do this by juxtaposing the theoretical and empirical aspects of IP norms against 
human rights.  
This study will pursue to prove the hypothesis by conducting case studies on 
two free trade agreements (FTAs) enacted by South Korea with the US and the 
EU. The thesis concludes that, on the whole, the context of human rights 
provides a just counter framework that can unify the diverse range of issues. 
This is more so given that human rights are strengthened by international 
consensual norms institutionalised by intergovernmental organisations and 
supported by transnational advocacy networks. Nevertheless, this thesis 
advocates that an overemphasis on state and individuals in the human rights 
discourse needs to be challenged by taking into account the dominance of 
global economic regulations, the prevailing role of non-state actors, and the 
culturally relative nature of IP. 
5 / 335 
 
TABLE	OF	CONTENTS	
Abstract ........................................................................................................ 4 
Chapter 1. Introduction ........................................................................... 13 
1-1. Background and Context of the Research ............................................. 13 
1-2. Definition of Key Concepts and Scope of Discussions ..................... 18 
1-2-1. Intellectual Property ................................................................................. 18 
1-2-2. Human Rights ............................................................................................. 24 
1-3. Research Questions, Chapter Structure and Methodologies ......... 26 
Chapter 2. Trade Dimension of Intellectual Property ....................... 29 
2-1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 29 
2-2. Historical Layer ................................................................................................... 29 
2-2-1. Mercantilist Trade Policy and Patent Customs Era .................... 30 
2-2-2. Trade Relatedness in the Patent Custom Period ........................ 33 
2-2-3. Trade Relatedness since the Nineteenth Century ...................... 37 
2-2-4. Trade Concerns Reflected in the Early Patent Statutes ........... 40 
2-3. Diversity Layer ..................................................................................................... 42 
2-3-1. Non-Existence of Patent in Eastern Asia ........................................ 43 
2-3-2. Non-Existence of Copyright in Chinese History .......................... 45 
2-3-3. Non-Existence of Copyright in Korean History ............................ 48 
2-4. International Political Economy Layer ...................................................... 51 
2-5. Substance Layer ................................................................................................. 55 
2-6. Outcome Layer ................................................................................................... 61 
2-7. Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 66 
Chapter 3. Human Rights Dimensions of Intellectual Property ..... 69 
3-1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 69 
3-2. Historical Landscape of Intersection between Human Rights and 
6 / 335 
 
Intellectual Property ................................................................................................... 70 
3-2-1. Emergence of the Right to Science and Culture in UDHR and 
ICESR ............................................................................................................................. 71 
3-2-2. Long Period of Ignorance ..................................................................... 82 
3-2-3. Debating on Conflict or Non-Conflict between IP and Human 
Rights ............................................................................................................................ 85 
3-2-4. Co-existence or Reconciliation Approach ...................................... 89 
3-3. Protection Side of the Right to Science and Culture ........................ 93 
3-3-1. Author ............................................................................................................ 93 
3-3-2. Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production ............................... 99 
3-3-3. Moral and Material Interests ............................................................. 101 
3-3-4. Obligation and Implementation ...................................................... 105 
3-4. Dissemination Side of the Right to Science and Culture .............. 108 
3-4-1. Right to Take Part in Cultural Life .................................................. 108 
3-4-2. The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its 
Applications ............................................................................................................ 114 
3-5. Norm Setting Process .................................................................................... 120 
3-6. Human Rights Model of IP ......................................................................... 123 
3-6-1. New Balance and L&E .......................................................................... 123 
3-6-2. Liability Rule for the Protection of Material Interests of 
Authors ..................................................................................................................... 125 
3-6-3. Right to Invention .................................................................................. 129 
3-7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 135 
Chapter 4 Case Study: the Korea-US FTA ......................................... 139 
4-1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 139 
4-2. Negotiation and Implementation of KORUS ....................................... 141 
4-2-1. A Brief Chronology ................................................................................ 141 
4-2-2. Deals on IP ................................................................................................ 143 
4-2-3. Discussion and Analysis ...................................................................... 148 
4-3.  General Provision of KORUS ..................................................................... 151 
7 / 335 
 
4-3-1. Obligations under KORUS .................................................................. 151 
4-3-2. Discussion and Analysis ...................................................................... 151 
4-4. Copyright ............................................................................................................. 152 
4-4-1. Reproduction Right and Temporary Storage ............................ 152 
4-4-2. Term of Protection ................................................................................ 158 
4-4-3. Restoration of Expired Rights of Neighbouring Rights ........ 160 
4-4-4. Protection of Technological Measures ......................................... 162 
4-4-5. Three-Step Test and Fair Use ........................................................... 165 
4-5. Patent .................................................................................................................... 167 
4-5-1. Patentable Invention .................................................................................. 167 
4-5-2. Revocation of and Opposition to Patent .................................... 170 
4-5-3. Patent Term Extension ......................................................................... 174 
4-5-4. Grace Period ............................................................................................. 176 
4-6. Pharmaceutical Products and TRIPS-plus Protection ...................... 177 
4-6-1. Data Exclusivity ........................................................................................ 177 
4-6-2. Patent-Approval Linkage .................................................................... 177 
4-7. Enforcement ....................................................................................................... 194 
4-7-1. General Remarks ..................................................................................... 194 
4-7-2. Civil Enforcement ................................................................................... 196 
4-7-3. Administrative Enforcement .............................................................. 200 
4-7-4. Criminal Enforcement ........................................................................... 204 
4-7-5. Online Enforcement: Shutting Down Internet Sites ................ 210 
4-8. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 213 
Chapter 5. Case Study: the EU-Korea FTA ........................................ 218 
5-1. Introduction ........................................................................................................ 218 
5-2. Negotiation History and Strategies of the EU and Korea ............. 219 
5-2-1. Progress of Negotiations .................................................................... 219 
5-2-2. Implementation of the EU-Korea FTA ........................................... 222 
5-2-3. Strategies of EU for IPRs in the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with Korea ............................................................................................................... 223 
8 / 335 
 
5-2-4. Strategies of Korea for IPRS in the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
with EU ...................................................................................................................... 225 
5-2-5. Discussion and Analysis ...................................................................... 226 
5-3. Principles and Objectives of the IPR Chapter of the EU-Korea FTA
........................................................................................................................................... 229 
5-3-1. Lack of Balancing Consideration and Legitimacy .................... 229 
5-3-2. Transfer of Technology and Its Effectiveness ............................ 230 
5-3-3. NT, MFN and Unequal Coalition Effect ........................................ 231 
5-4. Copyright ............................................................................................................. 233 
5-4-1. General Remarks ..................................................................................... 233 
5-4.2. Term of Protection ................................................................................. 233 
5-4-3. Right to Communication to the Public and Remuneration 
Right of Performers and Phonogram Producers ................................... 236 
5-4-4. Ban on Retransmission of Television Signal over the 
Internet ..................................................................................................................... 240 
5-4-5. Artists’ Resale Right .............................................................................. 242 
5-5. Patent, Public Health and Protection of Pharmaceutical Products
........................................................................................................................................... 243 
5-5-1. General Remarks ..................................................................................... 243 
5-5-2. Public Health and Doha Declaration ............................................. 244 
5-5-3. Patent Term Extension to Compensate Delay in Drug 
Approval Process .................................................................................................. 246 
5-5-4. Data Exclusivity ........................................................................................ 247 
5-5-5. Patent-Approval Linkage .................................................................... 255 
5-6. Enforcement of IPRs ....................................................................................... 257 
5-6-1. TRIPS-plus and “Cut-and-Paste” of EU Laws ........................... 257 
5-6-2. Civil Enforcement and Injunction against Intermediaries .... 258 
5-6-3. Criminal Enforcement and EU-Plus Models ............................... 260 
5-6-4. Online Enforcement: Intermediary Liability and Prohibition of 
General Obligation to Monitor ...................................................................... 267 
5-7. Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 278 
9 / 335 
 
Chapter 6. Conclusion ........................................................................... 281 
6-1. Research Questions and Main Findings of the Study ..................... 281 
6-2. Merits and Limits of Human Rights Discourse ................................... 284 
6-3. Limitations and Future Research .............................................................. 287 
	
  
10 / 335 
 




A2K  Access to Knowledge 
ACTA  Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
CESCR  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Communities 
DSU  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the    
   Settlement of Disputes 
EPC  European Patent Convention 
EPO  European Patent Office 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural  
Rights 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
IFPI   International Federation of Phonographic Industry 
GSP  Generalized System of Preferences 
ISP  Internet Service Provider 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement 
PMS  Post-Marketing Surveillance 
RCEP  Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
TPA  Trade Promotion Authority 
TPM  Technological Protection Measures 
TPPA  Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
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TRIPS Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights of 15 April 1994 
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
USTR United States Trade Representative 
WCT WIPO Copyright Treaty 
WIPO World Intellectual Property Organization 




‘Berne Convention’ Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works 
‘DMCA’                        Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, Pub. L. 105-
304 Stat., 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
‘e-Commerce Directive’  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and  
of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of 
information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market. 
‘InfoSoc Directive’ Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society  
‘Rental Directive’ Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 12 December 2006 on rental right and 
lending right and on certain rights related to copyright 
in the field of intellectual property (codified version) 
‘Rome Convention’ Rome Convention for the Protection of performers, 
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Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting 
Organizations 
  




Growing number of academic literatures discuss intellectual property (IP) in 
terms of human rights. What has made the long-isolated two regimes meet each 
other? How can or should the idea of human rights affect the IP regime? Human 
rights discourse of IP was invoked by trade-centric IP norm, which has 
historical roots in domestic changes within the United States (US) during the 
late 1970s and the early 1980s.  
For about 75 years before that era, the culture of IP in the US could be 
described as an anti-patent environment, “characterized by vigorous anti-trust 
enforcement and judicial attacks on the scope and validity of patents”.1 The 
shift started in 1980 when the US Supreme Court, in its Dawson Chem. Co. 
decision,2 placed the public policy of supporting patent rights on equal footing 
with the public policy supporting free competition, leading to the end of anti-
trust dominance over patent law.3 Moreover, under the slogan of “anything 
under the sun that is made by man”,4 the Court expanded the patentable subject 
matter to living organisms in Chakrabarty case5 and computer programme in 
Diehr case.6 Also an unintended, contingent event played a significant role in 
the judicial shift toward stronger IP protection: the creation of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuits (CAFC) in 1982. This new judiciary venue, 
originally aimed to address the problem of uneven application of patent law in 
                                                      
1 Sell, 2003, p. 66. 
2 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co. 448 U.S. 176 (1980). 
3 Sell, 2003, pp. 66-67; Gallini, 2002, p. 133.  
4 This phrase was coined by Judge Giles S. Rich when he took part in the two-
person committee to amend the US Patent Act of 1952. Judge Rich led, at his age of 
90s, the notorious State Street decision upholding patentability of a business 
method invention (State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Grp., Inc., 
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). For critical analysis on how the “anything under 
the sun” sentence departed from the original context of legislative history and was 
misapplied by courts to overly expand the patentable subject matter, see Oddi, 
2002; and CCIA, 2008. 
5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
6 Diamond v. Diehr 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
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the various circuit courts. However, it resulted in the unintended consequence 
of strengthening the economic power of patents by raising damage awards and 
upholding patent validity. The legislative branch, in 1981, also took part in this 
movement by enacting the Bayh-Dole Act,7 with a purpose of stimulating 
commercialization of publically sponsored research. The Bayh-Dole Act was a 
congressional reaction to the fear that the US might lose its supremacy in IP 
dependent industries against its international competitors.8 These judicial and 
legislative shifts paved the way for the “pro-patent” era and created 
environment that is more favourable to private sector’s efforts to link IP and 
trade. 
By successfully politicising IP protection, US business interests (patent and 
copyright industries) pressed their domestic policy makers to link IP protection 
to trade in the US Trade and Tariff Act and regional trade pacts such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative.9 Responding to the IP lobby and buying the concept of trade-based IP 
protection, the US congress adopted new amendments in the Trade and Tariff 
Act of 1984. The amendments identified acts, practices or policies of foreign 
countries as “unreasonable”, when they deemed denying “fair and equitable 
provision of adequate and effective protection of IP rights” even though the act, 
practice or policy in question did not violate “the international legal rights of 
the US.”10 In addition, the revised provisions permitted private sectors to 
petition the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to 
investigate IP practices of foreign trade partners and gave USTR an authority to 
initiate a so-called Section 301 action on its own motion. Further, the 
amendment first linked the IP protection to the non-reciprocal trade concessions 
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program.11 
Aiming at the newly industrialised countries, the new trade gun was first fired 
                                                      
7 Pub. L. 96-517, December 12, 1980. 
8 Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 163. 
9 For the origins and development of the trade-based approach to IP in the US, see 
Sell, 2003, in particular chapter 4. 
10 Sell, 2003, pp. 85-86. 
11 Sell, 2003, p. 86. 
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against South Korea and Brazil. In fall 1985, the USTR initiated investigation 
under Section 301 which led to a bilateral negotiation with South Korea. The 
bilateral talk carried implicit threat of trade sanction upon South Korea if 
negotiation failed.12 In July 1986, after about ten-month negotiation, the South 
Korean government acquiesced, accepting almost all of the US demands. As a 
result, all of the Korean IP laws were comprehensively amended at the end of 
1986. These amendments included introduction of product patent, copyright-
like protection for phonogram producers, sui generis protection for computer 
programs, extension of protection terms of patent and copyright, reduced 
domestic discretion to remedy patent misuse, and strengthened criminal 
sanctions on IP infringers. The Korean commitment also contained highly 
controversial measures that were applied, through administrative actions rather 
than legislative rules, only to the US industries for patent protection of 
pharmaceutical products and sui generis protection of computer program. At 
that time, strengthening IP protection was widely perceived as contrary to 
Korean economic interests, and therefore the amendments were considered as 
conceding to the US in a humiliating manner.13 
The economic coercion from the US, such as threat of trade retaliation on 
Korean exports and loss of benefits under the GSP, was a key weapon in 
obtaining South Korea’s surrender to the new regulations. Another significant 
factor was the weak political position of the Korean government. At that time, 
South Korea was governed by a military junta under Chun Doo-Hwan. Fear of 
losing its weak political legitimacy made the South Korean government more 
receptive to the demands of the US, which was regarded as “a blood alliance” 
by the majority of Korean people. Unlike South Korea, Brazil refused to alter 
its policy on the pharmaceutical patent. This led to actual trade retaliation by the 
US under section 301 in 1988.14 
The 1984 amendment of the US Trade Act was insufficient to make the US 
industries satisfied. They continued to lobby their congress to further strengthen 
                                                      
12 Ryan, 1998, p. 75. 
13 Morin & Bannerman, 2015, p. 227. One Japanese scholar, Nakayama Nobuhiro 
portrayed the result as the US’ capturing spoils from a victim after a military 
victory. 
14 Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002, p. 104. 
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the Trade Act, resulting in the 1988 amendment. The 1988 amendment 
institutionalized the participation of the private sector in the process and 
obligated the USTR to annually identify IP priority countries and self-initiate 
investigation of priority countries within thirty days of identification.15 
Following the passage of the 1988 legislation, the USTR had to annually review 
the IP laws, policies and practices of trade partners and classified them 
according to its assessment into three groups: Priority Watch Countries (for 
those that USTR deemed to have the most onerous or egregious policies with 
the greatest adverse impact on US IP holders or products); Priority Watch List 
(for countries that did not provide adequate IP protection and enforcement or 
market access for US persons relying on IP protection); and Watch List (for 
countries that USTR believed merited bilateral attention to address underlying 
IP problems).16 While the Special 301 provision was highly condemned by 
international communities and legal experts, including a General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) panel, it has been quite effective because it put trade 
partners under the potential threat of trade sanction whenever they were listed 
on the Report.  
The strategy of linking trade and IP did work. Between 1985 and 1995 at least 
eighteen developing countries revised their laws to provide stronger patent 
protection.17 The ongoing unilateral pressures and increased bilateral trade 
agreements incorporating strong IP protection and enforcement provisions 
provided momentum for the establishment of the Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) within the World Trade 
Organization that took effect in 1995.  
Since the TRIPS Agreement, ratcheting up the standard for the protection and 
enforcement of IP has continued through bilateral and regional trade 
agreements. These trade agreements pushed by the US and the EU included 
TRIPS-plus provisions that were designed to impose more stringent substantive 
rules of IP protection and enforcement than those mandated by the TRIPS 
Agreement, to eliminate the flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement, and 
                                                      
15 Sell, 2003, p. 92. 
16 Deere, 2009, pp. 49-50. 
17 Deere, 2009, p. 51. 
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to introduce new provisions for the IP protection and enforcement that were 
failed to obtain at the TRIPS negotiation table. Under the premise that “strong 
IP protection is good and stronger IP protection is better”,18 the business 
interests and their backed industrialised states view the TRIPS Agreement as “a 
floor, not a ceiling”.19 Facing challenges by emerging economic powers such as 
Brazil, China, India, South Korea and Taiwan, the US and the EU have 
conceived strong IP protection at home and abroad as the only way to sustain a 
competitive advantage.20 They also employ strategies of “forum proliferation”21 
to push the TRIPS-plus agenda, which focuses on the enforcement of IP. The 
advocates of the maximalist IP protection have bypassed the traditional 
multilateral forum and sought to reinforce the protection and enforcement of IP 
through bilateral, regional or plurilateral trade agreements such as the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), 
and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)22. 
The continuous push for the TRIPS-plus agendas created a new actor, or an 
agency in the jargon of ‘critical realism’.23 Such an actor includes two groups. 
One group consists of IP experts who have an administrative power in domestic 
patent or copyright policies. They collaborate with narrow set of professionals 
such as IP lawyers and scholars who support the maximalist IP protection. This 
group is different from the private business sectors who had initially pushed for 
the adoption of TRIPS, in that it governs the policy-making process and holds 
control of institutions that are crucial in the interaction of structure and agency. 
                                                      
18 Benkler, 2006, p. 317. 
19 Sell, 2010a, p. 2. 
20 Ruse-Khan, 2009, p. 60. 
21 May, 2006, p. 93. 
22 RCEP was formally launched in November 2012 for regional pact between ten 
member states of ASEAN and their six FTA partners (Australia, China, India, Japan 
and South Korea).  
23 Critical realism, emerged in the context of the post-positivist crises in the natural 
and social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s, is a series of philosophical positions on 
a range of matters including ontology, causation, structure, persons, and forms of 
explanation, and is concerned with the nature of causation, agency, structure, 
relations and the implicit or explicit ontologies we are operating with (Archer et al. 
(2016)). 
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The other group is one who opposes or resists the trade-centric IP norms. It 
includes those who are adversely affected by the trade-centric IP regime and 
have a focus on the public interests with regard to IP. Just as the trade-centric IP 
regime was a product of “structured agent”,24 this resistance group was also 
shaped by the new structure established by the TRIPS and TRIPS-plus regimes. 
The movement resisting TRIPS emerged from sectors in which TRIPS had a 
harsh impact: patenting on medicine, agricultural products and software. As the 
IP maximalist norms expanded in scope and breadth, the opposition groups that 
were initially dispersed in their own sectors began to understand that they were 
doing something in common. They have developed overlapping agendas and 
coordinated actions.25 Most of them are not anti-IP, but rather, anti-
expansionists.26 They do not see the global IP norms as trade rules and seek 
reforms of maximalist IP norms by using different languages such as free 
culture, cultural environment, public domain, distributive justice, development, 
right to access, anti-censorship, and human rights.  
In these alternative frameworks, the language of human rights looks powerful. 
An alternative IP frameworks based on human rights is argued to provide a 
fertile ground to restore balance in the contemporary international IP law,27 or 
to offer a “framework treaty” for weaker actors in global regulatory system.28 
The extent to which the idea of human rights can provide a comprehensive 
counter framework for those who seek fundamental reform of contemporary IP 
norms still awaits further studies. 	
1-2.	Definition	of	Key	Concepts	and	Scope	of	Discussions	
1-2-1.	Intellectual	Property	
The term “intellectual property” is widely used in both academics and practices, 
and has acquired international acceptance. While most of the national laws do 
                                                      
24 Sell, 2003, pp. 24-30. 
25 Coombe, 1998. 
26 Silbey, 2010, p. 219. 
27 Shaver 2009, p. 9. 
28 Drahos 2005, p. 3. 
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not define IP itself,29 multilateral and bilateral international agreements contain 
definitional provisions. However, these provisions do not define the notion or 
essential nature of IP. Instead, they simply enumerate various categories of 
legal rights. For instance, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
Convention and the TRIPS Agreement just list items included in an IP 
catalogue such as copyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial 
designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, and certain undisclosed 
information.30 Most of TRIPS-plus bilaterals follow this ‘catalogue model’ for 
the definition of IP.31  
The ‘catalogue model’ of the trade-related IP treaties having no clear 
borderlines of IP have played a role to open a door for more extensive 
protection of IP.32 Further, the non-restrictively enumerated catalogue model of 
IP treaties provides their member states with a certain freedom to create novel 
subject matter of IP and leads to a convergence of IPRs toward safeguarding an 
investment,33 rather than protecting individual’s creative efforts. 
Why has there been no clear conceptual definition of IP in IP treaties? The pre-
history of WIPO may provide some clues for the answer. In a nutshell, the 
precursor body of WIPO adopted the word ‘intellectual property’ for an 
                                                      
29 This is because there are few national laws dealing with all categories of IPRs. 
Some exceptions are found in French Code of Intellectual Property (Code de la 
propriété intellectuelle (version consolidée au 17 mars 2017, having no definitional 
provision), Japanese Basic Law on Intellectual Property (Law No. 122 of 2002, 
referring to various categories of IP which broadly include other property that is 
produced through creative activities by human beings and other technical or 
business information that is useful for business activities), and Korean Framework 
Act of Intellectual Property (enacted in 2007, defining IP as broadly encompassing 
knowledge, information, technology, the expression of thoughts or feelings, the 
indication of business or goods, varieties of organism or genetic resources and other 
intangibles created or discovered by creative activities, experience, etc. of human 
beings, the value of property of which may be realized). 
30 Article 2(viii) of the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and Article 1(2) of TRIPS (“For the purpose of this Agreement, the 
term “intellectual property” refers to all categories of intellectual property that are 
the subject of Sections 1 through 7 of Part II”). 
31 See, for instance, Article 10.2(2) of the EU-Korea FTA and Article 18.1(1) of 
TPP. By contrast, the US FTAs indirectly encompass almost all categories of IPRs 
(Article 18.1:6). 
32 Hilty, 2016, p. 187. 
33 Westkamp, 2005, pp.  97-100. 
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“umbrella term”34 to combine two distinguished legal rights - industrial 
property and copyright -, and the ambiguous nature of industrial property 
contributed to the catalogue model of IP definition. 
Precursor body of WIPO is the United International Bureaux for the Protection 
of Intellectual Property, best known as its French acronym BIRPI.35 BIRPI was 
established in 1893 by merging the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1883) and the Berne Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1886) under a single secretariat.36 In 1974, the WIPO, which was 
established by the Stockholm Conference in 1967, became a specialized agency 
of the UN.37 
Although many are confused, BIRPI did not start with the title containing the 
term IP. Originally, the “PI” in BIRPI stood for industrial property and the 
name was changed to intellectual property in the mid-1950s.38 Before that, 
“industrial property” and “property in literary and artistic works” had been 
commonly used; whereas the term “industrial property” was predominantly 
used to refer to rights on inventions, trademarks and industrial designs, the 
phrase “property in literary and artistic works” was interchangeably used by 
“intellectual property” or “copyright”.39 From nineteen fifties, the concept of 
intellectual property gained in popularity,40 and understood as covering both 
                                                      
34 Nard, Barnes & Madison, 2008, p. 2. 
35 Bureau Internationaux réunis pour la protection de la propriété intellectuelle. 
36 Bogsch, 1992, pp. 7-8; May, 2007, p. 19 (explaining that members of Rome and 
Berne Conventions realized that they have significant commonalities and felt it 
would be sensible to develop a joint secretariat, and that the establishment of BIRPI 
represent the beginning of the international period of IP protection). 
37 For the factors enabling WIPO, rather than UNESCO and ILO, to become such 
an agency, see Marx, 2010, pp. 188-190, and for the process of WIPO’s becoming 
UN special agency, see Halbert, 2006, pp. 259-273 and May, 2017. 
38 Halbert, 2006, p. 257; Bogsch, 1992, p. 8. 
39 Bogsch, 1992, p. 8. During the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century, the term 
“intellectual property” had been used to mean copyright in French, Italian and 
Spanish domestic jurisprudence (Hughes, 2012, pp. 1304-1316). The Spanish IP 
law of 1879 stated that “intellectual property comprises … the scientific, literary or 
artistic works that can be born by any means” (Vallés, 2009, p. 104). 
40 Halbert, 2006, p. 257. By contrast, Hughes explains that practices of using the 
term “intellectual property” was not consistent in 1950s (2012, p. 1300). 
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industrial property and copyright.41  
The ambiguity and difficulty in defining the concept of IP stems mainly from 
the vague nature of its component; industrial property. The industrial property is 
ambiguous because the term “industry” in a broad sense can embrace “all sorts 
of human labor” and industrial property may include “very dissimilar kinds of 
interests and rights”.42 Therefore, it was impossible for founders of WIPO to 
provide an absolutely uniform legal concept that could embrace all of the subset 
rights categorized as industrial property, leading to the ‘catalogue model’ of IP 
definitional provision in the existing IP treaties.  
In responsive to growing importance of social, economic and cultural aspects of 
IP from 1990s, many scholars have tried to theorize IP.  William Fisher outlined 
four dominant theoretical literatures on IP: (1) utilitarianism (based on the 
Bentham’s ideal of “the greatest good of the greatest number”); (2) natural law 
or labor theory (having a place in a Lockean justification); (3) personality 
theory (grounded on Kantian and Hegelian philosophy); and (4) social planning 
theory (inspired from Jefferson and early Marx’s thoughts).43 Yet, IP is still 
hard to be justified on one theory, 44 and there is no single justification, either 
philosophical or economical, adequate to encompass the various categories of 
IP.45 While some say that the common factor to categorize IP is the existence of 
property on immovable or intangible objects,46 “property protection over 
                                                      
41 Bogsch, 1992, p. 8. Previously, those rights were variously termed as 
“incorporeal rights” or “incorporeal property”, “intellectual rights,” or “intellectual 
property” (Ladas, 1975, p. 2). 
42 Ladas, 1975, p. 1. Prior to Paris Convention, the notion of industrial property was 
much broadly understood. Participants of the International Congress on Industrial 
Property held at Paris in 1878, precursor of Paris Convention, discussed “all matters 
relating to patents, trademarks, designs and models, photographic work, trade 
names, and industrial rewards” (Ladas, 1975, p. 61). 
43 Fisher, 2001, pp. 169-173. He viewed that, among these, predominant reliance by 
judges, legislators and lawyers was on the utilitarian theory of IP. 
44 Menell, 1999, p. 163 (“none of the traditional or even emerging rationalizations 
for intellectual property rights fully or satisfactorily account for all intellectual 
property regimes”); Oguananam, 2009, p. 105. 
45 Cornish & Llewelyn, 2007, p. 3 (“There is no single generic term that 
satisfactorily covers them [patent, copyright, trademarks] all”). 
46 Leaffer, 1990, p. 2. 
22 / 335 
 
intangible things”47 or “creations of the minds”,48 others point out the negative 
nature of conferred right, that is, a right to stop others from doing something.49 
Such commonality, however, cannot explain the existence of an inherent 
tension within IP, a tension between protection and diffusion (or 
dissemination).50 For instance, protection of trademark, one of the central items 
in IP catalogue, against an unauthorized use has no bearing on the diffusion of 
symbolic information conveyed by a trademark or on encouragement of 
trademark creation.51 Wider dissemination of a trademark is not a policy 
objective of trademark laws. The same line of argument is applicable to the 
undisclosed information, or trade secret. The purpose of legal protection of 
trade secret is neither to encourage more production of trade secret nor to 
promote its wider use. Therefore, the tension between protection and diffusion 
does not exist in trademark and undisclosed information. 
The inherent tension of IP between protection and dissemination arises from the 
basic framework of Anglo-American “utilitarian, result-oriented focus”52 of IP. 
The utilitarian agenda is a governing concept of trade-centric IP norms,53 
reinforced by natural law justification.54 Based on the utilitarian theory of 
                                                      
47 Bently & Sherman, 2009, pp. 1-2. 
48 WIPO, 2003, p. 2. 
49 Cornish & Llewelyn, 2007, p. 6. 
50 This tension is widely acknowledged by scholars: Fisher, 2001, p. 169 (tension 
between “the power of exclusive rights to stimulate the creation .. and … 
widespread public enjoyment of those creations”); Sell, 2003, p. 15 (tension 
between creation and diffusion); Fink & Elliott, 2008, p. 215 (tension between 
protecting IP and diffusion); Nard, Barnes & Madison, 2008, p. 13 (tension 
between “the promotion of creative and technologic expression and the 
dissemination of and access to its fruits”); Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, p. 
118 (tension or balance between the interest of IP owners and users and the larger 
community); Wallot, 2016, p. 236 (tension or balance between rewarding the IP 
owners and the public’s right to access to information); and Syam & Tellez, 2016, 
p. 15 (tension between protection and access). 
51 By contrast, Manta (2016) argues that trademark law also has an incentive 
function for a trademark creator in addition to widely accepted three functions of 
source identification, advertising and guarantee of quality. 
52 Nard, Barnes & Madison, 2008, p. 12. 
53 Bashir, 2013, p. 65 (arguing that it’s because of the economic dominance of 
developed countries). 
54 For an argument that the Lockean and utilitarian accounts are complementary 
23 / 335 
 
incentivizing innovation and creation, patent and copyright laws create artificial 
scarcity of creative production. Due to its nature of public good (non-rival and 
non-excludable nature) of the subject matter of patent and copyright, 
“excludability needs to be artificially constructed”, and “by making knowledge 
property, IPRs are designed to make it temporarily excludable and generate a 
market for it”.55 In this sense, IPRs are essentially a form of government 
regulation and “designed to artificially replicate scarcity where it would not 
otherwise exist”.56 Utilitarian approach views IP a tool to achieve a certain end, 
rather than an inherent right,57 but the tool is never a mere tool, it always 
modify the goals.58 
The inherent tension of IP is the main entrance for the idea of human rights to 
intervenes in the IP dialogue. For this reason, this thesis will focus on two 
categories of IP in which the tension between protection and dissemination is 
inherent - patents and copyrights. This focus is also relevant to human rights 
protection of IP. Patent and copyright are all about creation, and the creation is 
a bridge that connects human rights and IP. The international human rights laws 
recognize some attributes of IP as human rights mainly because of the existence 
of personal link between creative productions of individuals and their human 
dignity.59 However, the degree of the personal link between authors and their 
creative productions for the human rights protection is not the same in patent 
and copyright, implying that the extent to which human rights protection for 
authors and inventors is differing. In the case of copyright, the personal link is 
easily established. Yet, inventors can only claim human rights protection so far 
                                                      
rather than competing (for providing a full justification of IP), see, Kenneally, 2014. 
The US Supreme Court confirmed this by holding that “the economic policy behind 
the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction 
that it is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Scientific and useful Arts” (Marer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
55 Archibugi & Filippetti, 2015, pp 484, 488. 
56 Lemley, 2015, p. 506. 
57 Drahos, 1999, p. 5. 
58 Gibson, 2006, p. 3. 
59 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 2 and ¶ 13. 
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as their inventions have a strong personal link.60 
Despite its importance in the discussion of IP and human rights, traditional 
knowledge will not be touched upon in this study. In its expansive version, 
discussion of IP protection of traditional knowledge covers ‘creative 
production’ such as traditional cultural expression, expression of folklore, and, 
on the basis of terminology of WIPO, “know-how, skills, innovations, practices, 
and knowledge”.61 However, the rationale for IP protection of traditional 
knowledge is different from that of patent and copyright protection and from the 
human rights protection of moral and material interests of creators. The 
protection of traditional knowledge is justified for corrective justice, freedom 
right of community, and identify of community.62 Positive protection of 
traditional knowledge is not justified by utilitarian incentive for the creation of 
traditional knowledge. 
1-2-2.	Human	Rights	
While a number of international, regional and national laws recognize human 
rights, this thesis focuses on two codes of international human rights laws, 
namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
Both Article 27 of UDHR and Article 15 of ICESCR contain what is called here 
the ‘right to science and culture’.63 The only regional human rights system 
recognizing this right is the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man of 1948. 
                                                      
60 UN Patent Report of 2015 (A/70/279), ¶ 34. 
61 Farah & Tremolada, 2015, p. 464. 
62 Preventing commercial misappropriation (Operational Directives for the 
Implementation of the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
Cultural Heritage, ¶ 117; Munzer, 2012, pp. 59-60 (suggesting two components 
consisting of corrective justice argument for indigenous people: compensatory 
justice (a moral analogues of money damages at law); and restorative justice). 
63 The term ‘right to science and culture’ was coined by Shaver and Sganga in 2009 
and has been widely used by scholars and international human rights bodies, in 
particular by the UN Special Rapporteur (for cultural rights) in her two consecutive 
reports, UN Copyright Reports of 2014 (A/HRC/28/57) and UN Patent Report of 
2015 (A/70/279).  
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Among five categories of human rights (civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights), the right to science and culture is classified as cultural rights. In 
another categorisation, the structure of UDHR is described as a temple founded 
on four pillars: the first one of the civil and personal rights; the social rights that 
belong to the individual in his and her relationships with the groups they 
participate; political right exercised to contribute to the formation of 
government institution or to take part in the decision-making process; and right 
exercised in the economic and cultural area.64 The right to science and culture 
finds its place on the fourth pillar, but it is, as are most of other human rights, 
interlinked with the rights belonging to other pillars. 
The right to science and cultural is multidimensional, encompassing both 
individual self-development and enabling institutions that facilitate the 
advancement of science for the public good and benefit of all through free 
individual participation.65 It is also linked to freedom, and “people’s sense of 
their own self-respect and identity”.66  
The notion of the right to science and culture is in its early stage, but it is 
generally understood as containing three components: right to the protection of 
moral and material interests resulting from his or her works (called “Author 
Clause” here); the right to take part in cultural life; and the right to enjoy the 
benefits of scientific progress and its application (called ‘dissemination side’ 
collectively for the latter two).67 ICESCR expands further than UDHR the right 
to science and culture to cover states’ obligations to take measures necessary for 
the conservation, development and diffusion of science and culture, and for the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.68 
From the holistic approach of human rights, the right to science and culture 
needs to be discussed in full consideration of its interrelationship with all other 
human rights. However, for the purpose of this study, the intersection of human 
                                                      
64 Claude, 2002, p, 21-22. 
65 Plomer, 2015, p. 34. 
66 Stamatopoulou, 2008, p. 37. 
67 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 4. 
68 Article 15(2) and (3) ICESCR. 
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rights and IP will be discussed with focusing on the normative contents of, and 
state’s obligation imposed by the right to science and culture. This concentrated 
focus of study is both meaningful and purposeful in a sense that the right to 
science and culture is the most closely interlinked to IPRs, and can provide a 
possibility for alternative model for production and distribution of creative 
knowledge and information. This implies that other categories of human rights 
which have been widely discussed by scholars and international legal 
institutions in connection of IP regime and human rights such as the right to 
health, the right to food, the right to education, the right to free speech are not 
touched upon in a great detail.  
Another reason that this thesis focuses on the right to science and culture is its 
allowance of inclusive approach to IP. In the traditional discussions on the 
intersection of IP and human rights, IP has been treated as extraneous to human 
rights, and when an encounter between human rights and IP takes place, 
solutions to address conflicts between two have been suggested by subjecting IP 
to external human rights pressures.69 The virtue of holistic approach with 
focusing on the right to science and culture right is that it enables us to embrace 
IP as an internal variable in the analysis of the relationship between human 
rights and IP. 
1-3.	Research	Questions,	Chapter	Structure	and	Methodologies	
The hypothesis of this thesis is that contemporary IP norms are trade-centric, 
fail to achieve their intended purposes, and bring about conflict with a range of 
economic, social and cultural values that have significant human rights 
implications. This thesis assumes that the idea of human rights can provide a 
counter-framework to the trade-centric IP norms. After testing this assumption, 
this thesis seeks to provide a counter-framework to the trade-centric IP regime, 
particularly an alternative IP model that can be drawn by exploring human 
rights-related aspects of IP and case studies on trade-centric IP norms. For this 
purpose, this thesis examines the process in which the IP regime has become 
trade-centric, and identifies the nature of conflict arising between the trade-
                                                      
69 For an explanation of this conflict resolving approach in the context of freedom 
of expression and copyright, see Drassinower, 2015, p. 203. 
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centric IP regime and human rights. From this analysis, this thesis offers a 
theoretical and practical basis for a paradigm shift of the existing IP norms from 
trade-centric to human rights-friendly. This is conducted by both theoretical and 
empirical studies.  
For the theoretical study, Chapters 2 and 3 examine both the trade dimension 
and human rights dimension of IP. The trade dimension of IP is investigated in 
Chapter 2 from the vantage point of several academic fields, most notably, 
history, cultural diversity, international political economy, and international 
laws. By investigating both the historical development in which trade made a 
connection with IP in Western Europe and the origin of non-existence of the IP 
concept in Eastern Asia, Chapter 2 seeks to reveal the fact that trade has no 
inevitable causal link to the IP protection. It also puts the contemporary trade-
centric IP regime in a historical moment to uncover the process in which the 
trade-centric IP agenda went global by the strategic behaviour of a handful of 
private sectors, revealing why and how such a trade-centric agenda fails to 
achieve intended purposes of IP protection.  
Chapter 3 then goes on to examine the extent to which IP has implications in 
terms of human rights. This requires in-depth study on the meaning of the right 
to science and culture contained in UDHR and ICESCR. The protection of 
creator’s moral and material interests by Author Clause can only be properly 
understood when its inherent limitations and negotiation history are fully 
examined. Inherent limitations of Author Clause, and, in turn, of IP protection, 
stems from the holistic nature of human rights. The moral and material interests 
protected by Author Clause is not a stand-alone right. Rather, they are 
intrinsically interrelated to other more fundamental components of the right to 
science and culture: the right to participate in cultural life; and the right to 
benefit from scientific advancement. Based on the redefined meaning of the 
right to science and culture, Chapter 3 also submits proposals for a paradigm 
shift from existing trade-centric IP norms toward a human rights-friendly model 
for the production and dissemination of creative production. The proposed 
framework includes: (1) a new model of balance striking between protection 
and dissemination of intellectual production; (2) a norm change from a property 
rule to a liability rule for the protection of intellectual production; and (3) a 
conceptual and practical shift for the protection of invention in line with the 
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author’s right enshrined in the right to science and culture. 
The theoretical study of two dimensions of IP (trade- and human rights-
dimension) is predominantly based on a bibliographical research. The primary 
source of data comes from books, articles, journals, and official documents of 
international organizations. The collected data is processed and analysed in 
relation with the central questions of this study as described above. 
For empirical studies of the intersection of IP with human rights, this thesis 
picks two of the strongest trade-centric approaches to IP: the US-Korea FTA 
(KORUS); and the EU-Korea FTA. They will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5 
to analyse how and why two dimensions of IP – trade and human rights 
dimensions – are reflected or missing, and to assess their impacts on the right to 
science and culture. The reason behind this choice is two folds.  
First, the US and EU are the most relevant actors in shaping the trade-centric IP 
norms and FTAs they pushed contain the strongest provisions for the IP 
protection and enforcement, having significant human rights implications. 
Second, there have been few studies on these two FTAs, especially on the 
impacts assessment from the human rights perspective. So far, the contracting 
parties (Korea, the US, and the EU) have conducted assessments predominantly 
in terms of economic impacts. Unlike the US and Korea, the EU carried out a 
broader analysis on FTAs in economic, social and environment context.70 
Recently, the EU started, pursuant to EU’s 2012 Strategic Framework and 
Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, to conduct a human right impact 
assessment of trade agreements. In particular, EC is carrying out an ex post 
evaluation study on the EU-Korea FTA, which includes analysis of impacts on 
sustainable development and human rights, due to be completed during the 
fourth quarter of 2017. However, for the human rights impact assessment, only 
five narrowly-defined sectors were chosen and IP-related sectors were 
excluded.71 
                                                      
70 This includes the Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment of the EU-Korea FTA 
of 2008 (http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/december/tradoc_141660.pdf), 
actual focus of which was exclusively economic impacts on Korea and EU, and the 
social and environmental impact assessments were highly limited. 
71 Those five sectors are: automotive sector; consumer electronic goods; agricultural 





This Chapter examines the trade dimension of IP in five different but correlated 
contexts: history; diversity; international political economy; substantial rules; 
and outcome. By investigating the trade dimension of IP from vantage point of 
diverse fields, it aims at revealing the fact that trade has no inevitable causal 
link to the IP protection. It also puts the contemporary trade-centric IP regime in 
a historical moment to uncover the process in which the trade-centric IP agenda 
has been going global by strategic behaviour of a handful of private sectors. 
This Chapter also reveals why and how such a trade-centric agenda fails to 
achieve the intended purpose of IP protection. 
2-2.	Historical	Layer	
From its emergence to its expansion to, initially Europe, then colonies and 
finally the world, IP has never been isolated from trade.72 Patent emerged in the 
late Medieval Italian cities as a part of trade policies and spread to Western 
Europe. The emergence of copyright was also a product of the state control of 
the book trade. However, this does not mean that trade itself is a decisive factor 
for the emergence and development of IP. Nor has the relationship between 
trade and IP been formed and developed in a linear fashion. If trade is defined 
as activities of “buying and selling or of exchanging goods or services between 
people or countries”.73 we will find ourselves inundated with examples of such 
activities everywhere in human history. The questions then to be asked are: 
which social forces account for the emergence of the concept of IP and its 
                                                      
sector; environmental goods and services; and postal sector (European 
Commission. (2016). Evaluation of the implementation of the Free Trade 
Agreement between the EU and its Member States and the Republic of Korea 
(Inception Report). p. 75. Retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/october/tradoc_155014.pdf). 
72 Drahos, 2002, p. 176 (“The connection between trade and IP is hardly new. It has 
always been there”). 
73 Balaam, 2008, p. 16. 
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expansion to the present-day trade-centric IP norms.  
Broadly speaking the progress of IP is intimately linked to the movement of 
capitalism74 and the free market system. Like the complicated history of 
capitalism, the history of IP cannot be explained as developing in a series of 
stages with regular progression from one phase to the next.75 Various factors 
have affected the development of IP. Political structure (Medieval city states 
and modern nation states), social position and role of private sectors in 
production (craft guilds, publisher’s guilds and manufacture industries), 
ideology (mercantilism, possessive individualism, lazier faire and neo-
liberalism), and some contingent events (The Crusades, the Black Death, and 
the Watergate scandal) have influenced the development of IP. Inspired by the 
Coxian critical theory, May and Sell explain the history of IP as a process of 
triangular interactions among three factors such as material capabilities, 
institutions and ideologies.76 This Chapter does not intend to examine all of the 
social forces that contributed to the emergence and development of IP. Instead, 
it focuses on two aspects: the extent to which trade has been related to IP in its 
history; and how the trade concerns are reflected in the early patent customs and 
statutes. 
2-2-1.	Mercantilist	Trade	Policy	and	Patent	Customs	Era	
It is widely accepted that the concept of IP emerged from Renaissance Italy. 
The Medieval Italian city states such as Venice, Florence and Genoa had 
practices of granting patent privileges upon those who introduced new trade 
into the territories. In Venice, a few patent privileges were granted in the 
thirteenth century and this practice had steadily grown by the fifteenth 
century.77 There are numerous explanations of how this “patent custom”78 arose 
                                                      
74 Rubin & Klumpp, 2012, p. 213 (“the overall trend in intellectual property 
protection is broadly correlated with the rise of capitalism”). 
75 Braudel, 1992, p. 621. 
76 May & Sell, 2006, p. 106. 
77 Long, 1991, p. 875. 
78 The term “patent custom” refers to a period that preceded patent-statute era. Such 
term was coined by Prager (1961, pp. 310-311) and discussed by Walterscheid 
(1993) and Meshbesher (1996, p. 601, f.n. 33). 
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from the Italian city states. Mandich, claiming the priority of Venice in 
recognizing the right of inventors, links the early patent privilege to the grants 
on mining.79 Long ascribes the rising of patent custom era and the enactment of 
the Venetian Patent Statute of 1474 to the guilds’ regulation and their 
distinctive culture recognising craft knowledge as an intangible property.80 May 
and Sell suggest public policy to control the guilds and strategic choice of the 
city government for the development of competitive advantage and effective 
economic organisation.81 What is shared in common among those writers is the 
mercantilist economic policy.  
At base, the mercantilist economic policy is an economic nationalism that 
pursued trade surpluses primarily directing towards an excess of exports over 
imports.82 The rise of the mercantile system is related to the rise of trade and 
competition between towns that developed during the twelfth century, which 
was in turn influenced by the increasing use of money and a new form of 
production by freemen, rather than serfs. Of the freemen, skilled artisans 
created voluntary associations called guilds. This was not only for their own 
sake: the municipal authorities, the feudal lords, and the kings all found it 
desirable to get the craftsmen together in groups.83 The authorities granted the 
craftsmen the right to form a guild and to have a monopoly of their trade and in 
return the guild submitted to taxation, regulation, and control. In the end, the 
guild usually became an association of the workers in a given craft, enjoying a 
legal monopoly, responsible to the government, and subject to it.84 The early 
patent privileges were not different from such grants by the municipal rulers. 
The Italian practices of granting patent privileges spread to continental Europe 
and eventually to England during the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. But for 
several hundred years from the enactment of the Venetian Patent Statute in 
1474, patent grants remained privileges rather than legal rights. In England, 
                                                      
79 Mandich, 1948, pp. 171-174. 
80 Long, 1991. 
81 May & Sell, 2006, p. 71. 
82 Prager, 1944, p. 721. 
83 Clough & Cole, 1952, p. 28. 
84 Ibid, p. 29. 
32 / 335 
 
France, Germany and the Netherlands, the Venetian legal experiment did not 
inspire them to develop institutions of legal right on invention up until the late 
eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries.85 Many historians and legal 
scholars consider the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 in England as the first 
modern patent law recognizing the right of inventors.86 But this is, at best, an 
overstatement. The Statute of Monopolies did not change the legal position of 
inventors and in a legal sense it did not usher in a new era of patent 
legislation.87 Even with the Statute of Monopolies, patent privileges still 
remained subject to royal discretion and inventors or importers of foreign 
technologies did not have legal right on invention.88 It was not until the end of 
the eighteenth century or the early nineteenth century when the modern sense of 
patent laws were enacted89 and manufacturing industries and inventors started to 
use patent rights in a strategic way.90 During the long-lasting patent custom 
period, mercantilist doctrines achieved political dominance and trade became a 
key source of revenue of absolutist nation states.91 The custom of patents, 
                                                      
85 This statement may encounter disagreements. For instance, Pohlmann argues that 
the extended and continuous practice of granting patent in Saxony and the Imperial 
City of Nuremberg became by 1600 a rule of legally binding customs (1961, pp. 
122-126). But he denied the Venetian Statute of Patent of 1474 provided inventors 
with a right to a patent (ibid, p. 121 f.n. 3). 
86 Mossoff, 2001, pp. 1272-1273. North & Thomas, 1973, pp. 148, 155 (“the Statute 
of Monopolies of 1624 … embodied in law a patent system to encourage any true 
innovation” and was “the creation of the first patent law to encourage innovation”) 
87 Meshbesher, 1996, p. 602; Bracha, 2005, p. 16 (“The Statute of Monopolies and 
the common law did not attempt to establish a patent system. Nor did they create 
anything that could even be called patent law”); May & Sell, 2006, p. 75 (“It would 
be a mistake to assume that a fully fledged modern patent system emerged with the 
Statute of Monopolies”). 
88 Federico, 1929, pp. 303-304 (“The Statute of Monopolies did not change the 
position of inventors. They did not have a right to a patent and the Statute did not 
confer upon him any such right. He was still in the position of a humble petitioner 
of the king’s grace”). 
89 The legislation records support this statement: patent laws were enacted in 
England in 1851, in France in 1791, in the US in 1793, in Austria in 1820, Russia in 
1812, Prussia in 1815, Belgium and the Netherlands in 1817, Spain in 1820, 
Bavaria in 1825, Sardinia in 1826, the Vatican State in 1833, Sweden in 1834, 
Württemberg in1836, Portugal in 1837, and Saxony in 1843 (Machlup & Penrose, 
1950, pp. 2-3). 
90 Epstein, 1998, pp. 703-704; MacLeod, 1991, p. 90.  
91  The mercantilism ended by the triumph of the free traders and the era of British 
free trade, which can probably be dated from the mid-nineteenth century (Held et 
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though its effectiveness was questionable as discussed below, survived as a 
form of mercantilist policies. 
2-2-2.	Trade	Relatedness	in	the	Patent	Custom	Period	
The patent privileges were intended to play a role in mercantile trade policy for 
achieving trade surpluses. Such a role could be accomplished in two ways: 
introducing new trade from outside, and encouraging local production of new 
industry.  
Of these encouraging the introduction of new trade from outside was the 
primary concerns of those who granted the patent privileges. During the 
fourteenth century patents were privileges granted upon one who brought new 
techniques into a sovereign’s territory and rulers sought to attract and retain 
artisans in their territory.92 Therefore, it is not a coincidence that most of the 
early patent privileges were granted to foreigners. For instance, a Venetian 
patent as early as 1416 was granted to someone from the Greek island of 
Rhodes, who introduced a Byzantine practice into Venice, and another patent 
grant of 1444 was also conferred upon Antonio Marini of France.93 This was 
also the case in most of the pre-modern Europe. For example, majority of patent 
grants in England in the sixteenth and during much of the seventeenth centuries 
were for patents of importation.94 So the term “inventor” in the English Statute 
of Monopolies of 1624 denoted those who actually contributed to the 
introduction of new art, not the first finder out or discoverer of useful arts95. 
In this regard, the trade relatedness of the early patent privilege refers to a cross 
border mobility of artisans, i.e., an inward flow of craftsmen. The movement of 
craftsmen took place in three ways. First, there might be permanent 
immigration of master artisans and the temporary migration of journeymen. 
Both were functional consequence of the guild system, which imparted skills 
                                                      
al., 1999, p. 154). 
92 May & Sell, 2006, p. 109. 
93 Mandich, 1960, p. 379. 
94 Walterscheid, 1993, p. 777. 
95 Hulme, 1900, p. 151. 
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that increased the masters’ and journeymen’s mobility.96 But this type of 
technical diffusion was limited to within areas that were institutionally, 
economically, and culturally similar.97 Second, artisans might escape religious 
persecution, economic hardship, epidemic or warfare and move to other 
territories.98 A third route for the artisan mobility was financial or legal 
inducement and protection from guild obstruction. The patent privileges were 
part of the third form of encouraging the cross-border mobility of artisans. 
How were the patent privileges effective for the enhancement of the cross-
border mobility of artisans? The historical records show that the actual 
contribution of patent privileges to the enhancement of the labour mobility was 
modest. The structure and regulation of medieval and early modern guilds may 
explain why it was modest. The regulation of guilds was extremely restrictive in 
the movement of members.99 Further, costs in transportation and cultural 
differences between regions might hinder the movement of craftsmen. For this 
reason, most of the early patent privileges were combined with other incentives 
such as tax exemptions, “jobs, pensions, titles, and cash rewards” which were 
more common than patents for rewarding inventors.100 Further, the most 
significant premodern incentive to invention was a capacity to capture the rent 
which was provided by a technical secret, not by patents.101 Relying upon 
secrecy or individual contracts to control inventions was also true in England up 
until the late nineteenth century when high cost in obtaining and enforcing 
                                                      
96 Epstein, 1998, 702. 
97 Epstein, 2004, p. 385. 
98 Kohn, 2008, pp. 4-5 (explaining “The wars and persecution of the sixteenth and 
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patents was largely reduced by the Patent Reform Act of 1852.102  
This also explains why the early patent privilege did not confer a monopoly 
power over certain trades or industries: it was a sort of a passport or 
franchise.103 In case of England, the early privileges at least since the reign of 
Edward III (1327-1377) were short of an exclusive monopoly, offering 
protection and franchises to the inventor or introducer of new trade.104 The 
earlier grant, as Patterson puts it, was “no more than passports”,105 providing the 
Crown’s protection for foreigners and a license to practice their trade in spite of 
guilds and other similar limitations and restrictions.106 The non-exclusive 
privilege underwent a change under the Tudor Dynasty (1485-1603) by 
incorporating “monopoly clauses” in the grants.107 Notably, Queen Elizabeth I 
(1533-1603), during whose reign the English patent custom rooted and 
flourished, granted patent monopolies to lure foreigner artisans for the purposes 
of attracting the superior continent technologies.108 However, her prerogative109 
was consistently abused, which led to The Case of Monopolies.110 
Apart from the cross-border movement of craftsmen, the patent privileges might 
have contributed to the mobility within the territory, i.e., mobility of those who 
were not members of guilds. Actually, in Venice in 1736 only 32 percent out of 
over 10,000 master artisans were enrolled in guilds.111 Further, the pre-modern 
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craftsmen were organized into craft guilds mostly in large town, not in villages 
and small towns.112 This type of artisan movement is associated with the 
aforementioned second role of patent privileges. 
The second role of patent privilege relates to the domestic innovation and local 
dissemination of technology. Many writers claim that the early patents grants 
were a kind of the public policy to provide incentives to unveil secrecy that was 
kept by members of craft guilds and to encourage wider dissemination and use 
of the uncovered technologies. Theoretically this might be true. But historically 
and economically this is unwarranted in two ways.  
First, the presumption that the technological information will be widely 
disseminated if it is revealed ignores the information cost and learning cost of 
technological information. In the late medieval and early modern ages, 
technological information was not something shared by treatises. The technique 
was tacit and practical knowledge, which was embodied in those who possessed 
it and could be conveyed only person to person by example.113 Epstein points 
out that the costs in the application of technological knowledge, in premodern 
manufacture “arose from the largely implicit nature of technical knowledge, 
which created the need for one-on-one training”.114 This explanation also 
supports the premise of the early patent privilege that technological innovation 
had to be transferred by travelling craftsmen and engineers. Therefore, in 
preindustrial Europe, most technical progress came from the diffusion of better 
technology to more and more producers, not from new inventions.115 
Second, the conventional wisdom does not fit with the structure and practice of 
guilds. Technological information was shared among guild members and 
keeping secrecy within them was a primary tool to capture rent in competition 
with others. In this regard, the question whether guilds were harsh rent-seekers 
and thus anti-innovative can be raised. The role of the guilds, although their 
influence differed across cities and states, was crucial in the development of 
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patent. They were main source of production and technological innovation and 
primary interest groups in connection with the patent privileges. Most scholars 
assert that guilds monopolized trade and manufactures, which means they were 
largely anti-innovative. Recently, however, few scholars questioned this 
assertion. For instance, Epstein criticises the prevailing view as misrepresenting 
the function of guild and its technological consequences,116 and Richardson, 
with focusing on England, explains such an assertion is myth.117 
This is not to deny the positive effect of the early patent privileges on 
technological progress. The question to be explored here is whether the effect of 
patent privileges was enough to the technological innovation as intended by the 
patent granters. 
2-2-3.	Trade	Relatedness	since	the	Nineteenth	Century	
The craft guilds and feudal privileges were abolished by laws in the eighteenth 
and the nineteenth centuries across Western Europe,118 but the patent privileges 
did not face the same fate. It was the manufacturers who began to use patent 
grants in strategic ways between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries. This led to the change of the trade relatedness of patent. Explanations 
for the increasing use of patent during this period are not consistent among 
historians. Dutton (1984) and Sullivan (1989) explain that the phenomenon 
corresponded to the increase of inventive activities.119 By contrast, MacLeod 
viewed the strategic use as combination of emerging capitalism, business cycles 
and an increasing awareness of benefits of patent monopoly.120 
During the nineteenth century, manufacturing interests tried to reform the patent 
system. As MacLeod puts it, they played a major role in shaping the patent 
system.121 Their main concerns were the costs in acquiring, protecting and 
enforcing patents and the uncertainty in judicial decisions. This provoked 
                                                      
116 Epstein, 1998. 
117 Richardson, 2004. 
118 Polany, 1944/2001, pp. 74-75. 
119 Dutton, 1984; Sullivan, 1989. 
120 MacLeod, 1988, Ch. 8. 
121 MacLeod, 2004, p. 14. 
38 / 335 
 
debate around the justification of patent between patent advocate groups and 
patent abolitionists. In this debate, the concept of IP in general, patent in 
particular, was considered to be in direct conflict with the notion of free 
trade.122 Therefore, in England, select committees of Parliament proposed the 
complete abolition of patent protection and in Germany trade associations and 
chambers of commerce submitted reports recommending reform or abolition of 
the patent law123. The advocates of free trade were confronted with groups 
consisting of engineers, inventors, patent lawyers and industrialists with vested 
interests in patent protection. The debate, which ended with defeat of the 
abolitionists, led to two changes that are associated with the trade-relatedness of 
patent.124 First, the idea of property in knowledge was accepted among 
governments, policy makers and commercial interests, and the romantic notion 
that justifies natural rights in individual creations was challenged by 
utilitarianism.125 Second, agreements on IP between several nations emerged. 
Still IP was regarded as a restriction to trade, but such restriction was no longer 
regarded as problematic so long as it served the national interests and was 
applicable to foreign nations.126  
The agreements on IP between nations were initially pursued by way of 
bilateral treaties.127 Two major conventions were adopted in the late nineteenth 
century: the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883 
(Paris Convention) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works of 1886. These conventions are described as the start of 
international IP agreements.128 But it would be more accurate to call them 
“plural” or “regional” pacts for they lacked something that can be called 
international at least in terms of the number of participants. The original 
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signatories to the Paris Convention of 1883 were merely eleven including nine 
European and two Latin American countries.129 Moreover, the Latin American 
countries dropped out of the club shortly after the signing and a half of the 
initial signatories including three European countries (the Netherlands, Serbia 
and Switzerland) did not have a national patent system.130 It was not until mid-
twentieth century when the number of members increased to what can be called 
an international accord.131 The Berne Convention emerged and developed in a 
radically different way from the Paris Convention. Like the Paris Convention, it 
was drawn up in 1886 as a “small treaty”132 signed by ten countries.133 The 
Berne convention was a product of 28-years efforts of European authors and 
artists, inspired by Victor Hugo. However, unlike the Paris Convention, a 
competing regional agreement, i.e., the Treaty on Literary and Artistic Property 
gave birth in 1889, which was the first step of a so-called “Pan-American” 
copyright system.134 Up until the TRIPS Agreement, the international copyright 
system has been split into two regional systems.135 
The Paris and Berne Conventions are based on two principles: minimum level 
of protection and national treatment. However, the principle of minimum 
protection was different from the TRIPS Agreement in a sense that the Paris 
and Berne approaches did not intrude upon national sovereignty. They merely 
reflected a “consensus position”. In other words, the Conventions were a 
codification of the existing practice of signatories.136 The national treatment 
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principle, which became persisted to date, was to ensure the same protection in 
a member state without discriminating foreign creators. 
By the middle of twentieth century, many developing countries joined the Paris 
and Berne Conventions. Here, we can see an interesting analogy between the 
developments of the middle of twentieth century (1960s) and of the early 
history of Western Europe. The primary reason that several developing 
countries joined the international patent treaty and adopted patent policies was 
expectations to promote technological transfer from industrialised countries. 
However, as seen below in Section 2-6 “Outcome Layer”, the policy objectives 
of the developing countries hardly to be accomplished. 
It was not until 1980s that IP came to be strongly linked to trade issues and 
substantive provisions for the IP protection and enforcement came to be 
governed by trade regimes. This is discussed in Section 2-4 in terms of 
international political economy. 
2-2-4.	Trade	Concerns	Reflected	in	the	Early	Patent	Statutes	
The trade concerns were reflected in the early patent statutes in various forms. 
At least four are worth discussion, which include the concept of inventor, the 
notion of novelty, the working clause and the term of protection. 
As discussed earlier, an inventor in the early patent statutes refers to one who 
introduces a new trade or industry into the territory.137 In this regard, Bracha 
claims that new technology or discovery of anything was included in patent 
privileges “only because it bears resemblance to that of the importer of a new 
trade”.138 Whether the introducers actually discover or invent does not matter. 
Consequently, any person who first imported the device could, under the 
Venetian Patent Statute of 1474, get a patent as well as a true inventor, and this 
was neither unique nor a new opening: it was a codification of prior practices.139 
This was also true in England. Contrary to the literal meaning of the text, the 
“true and first inventor” of “new manufactures” in the Statute of Monopolies of 
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1624 recognized the first introducer of a foreign invention as an inventor. In this 
sense, the notion of inventor is inseparable from the concept of novelty. That is, 
although no new invention was involved, patents were legally sound on the 
count of novelty so long as no such industry was then operating in England.140 
Even when an already-known industry had not been worked in England within 
recent memory, the novelty was not denied.141  
Also, “any new and ingenious device” in the Venetian Statute embraced a 
device imported from foreign territories providing the device had not been 
made in Venice. The French story is not so different from the English and the 
Venetian ones at least in connection to the notion of novelty and inventor. The 
modern French patent system was established according to the laws of 1791 and 
1844. The Revolutionary Assembly intended to avoid the abusive patent grants 
and to create a distinction with the past by introducing the natural right of the 
inventor to obtain property rights in patent on the premise that “every discovery 
or invention, in every type of industry, is the property of its creator; the law 
therefore guarantees him its full and entire enjoyment”. In reality, however, 
many features of the ancien régime survived the Revolution: for instance, the 
first introducer of an invention covered by a foreign patent would enjoy the 
same “natural rights” as the patentee of an original invention or improvement.142 
The US had developed the novelty rule in a quite different way from its 
European counterparts. When the first US Patent Act of 1790 was discussed, 
one of the debates was the patents of importation. While several influential 
government officials, such as George Washington and Tench Coxe, favoured 
the importation patents, there were voices who strongly opposed to them.143 
Richard Wells argued that Americans should not be deprived of the advantage 
of imitating the English invention. At the last, the opponents of importation 
patents prevailed in the House, and importation patent became prohibited.144 
The US, geographically isolated from Europe and having abundant natural 
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resources, had less incentive to provide the carrot of patent for encouraging 
immigration of skilled artisans from the Europe.145 This had two important 
implications. First, where foreign inventors did not seek US patents, Americans 
had free access to the benefits from foreign technology. Second, American 
inventors had a great incentive to create useful improvements in borrowed 
technology (for which a patent could be granted) rather than simply acquiring 
monopolies over existing inventions from overseas.146  
The third element of trade concerns that were reflected in the early patent is the 
working clause. As the primary goal of the patent customs was the actual 
practice of new trade, the requirement of local working was strict. Rather than 
the disclosure of secret, the furtherance of trade through the effective 
introduction of a new technique or industry was primarily demanded, and the 
patenting of mere improvements was avoided.147 When the trade had not been 
actually performed in a certain period of time, the grant was revoked. For 
instance, in France, the patent holder had to put the invention into practice 
within two years from the initial grant.148  
Lastly, the duration of patent was determined on the basis of period that local 
artisans are trained in the new techniques. According to Machlup, “the 14-year 
of the English patents after 1624 was based on the idea that two sets of 
apprentices should, in 7 years each, be trained in the new techniques”.149 The 
term of protection of patent had this historical precedent.150 
2-3.	Diversity	Layer	
Increase of production, rise of trade and existence of private actors having 
interests to seek rent from trade were important in explaining the emergence of 
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the notion of IP and its institutionalization in Western Europe. Yet, they were 
not determining factors dictating the outcomes. This can be supported by the 
experiences of societies other countries than Western Europe. This section 
explores the Eastern Asian history on the lack of IP. The “diversity” here does 
not simply refer to differences between cultures and societies. Rather, this 
section aims to discover the origin of non-existence of IP in societies other than 
Western Europe. Saying that IP is a Western European concept or ‘a child of 
the European Enlightenment’151 is not to argue that the notion of IP lacks 
philosophical or cultural grounds for universal validity. The main purpose of 
this section is to put IP in a historical moment and to see “a continuing process 
of historical change” and “clarify a range of possible alternatives to the 
prevailing order”.152 
2-3-1.	Non-Existence	of	Patent	in	Eastern	Asia	
In premodern Eastern Asia, especially in China, the technological advancement 
surpassed the Europe during the Middle Ages,153 and commercial trade was 
flourishing and mainly controlled by private groups, as did by merchant guilds 
in the Renaissance Europe. Further, the economic growth in China was most 
significant in period when the early patent emerged in the Western Europe. 
Moreover, many conditions, which were considered as precursors for the 
emergence of capitalism in Western Europe, existed in China. Those conditions 
include an elimination of the conscription of labour, tax reform allowing 
farmers to use money rather than grain to pay their duties, population growth 
which in turn promoted urban growth, creation of the biggest cities in the world, 
and the introduction of money and the development of credit, which stimulated 
trade, both nationally and internationally.154 Then, why did not the concept of 
patent emerge in China? Economic structure, political organization and 
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geographical conditions may shed some lights on this question.155 
With regard to the economic structure, China has long maintained an irrigation-
agricultural economy. The traditional Chinese society valued agriculture highly 
and the development of industry and commerce was dispersed.156 The agrarian 
nature of the society regarded profit-seeking as unethical and believed that 
mercantile activities did not increase state wealth and power.157 Therefore, the 
government held control on trade and commerce. Production of important 
goods having social benefits and luxury products were dominated or controlled 
by government.158  
As for the political organization, China had a bureaucratic structure. The 
government officials selected through the national civil examination represented 
the interests not of their own group but those of the state and its people. This is 
a significant difference from England, where the parliamentary system allowed 
the property-owning elite to further the interests of their own class by 
representing them as beneficial to the country as a whole.159 The Chinese 
merchant class was not able to rise to power, thereby lacking the political means 
to influence the government over the importance of commerce and industry.160 
Further, in contrast to Europe there was little competition among governments 
in China which meant little pressure for government to be more conducive to 
economic development and growth.161 However, according to Shao, this does 
not indicate less economic development or growth. Rather, China, unlike the 
pre-modern England and Germany, had a little motivation to attract foreign 
technologies because China applied a multiple mechanism which enabled 
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government to stimulate and attract most of the important inventions and their 
diffusion across the giant territory.162 
The geographical condition for the account of the non-existence of patent in the 
pre-modern China is related to the effectiveness of legal right to monopoly 
inventions. The Chinese imperial state tried to sustain its power to control 
economic activity and directly managed many manufacturing enterprises.163 
Despite the imperial’s stringent policy imposed over trade and commerce, its 
effect was doubtful.164 
2-3-2.	Non-Existence	of	Copyright	in	Chinese	History	
The invention of mechanical press in Korea and China predates the Gutenberg’s 
invention of movable type in the 1450s, at least 400 years.165 Then it would be 
reasonable to ask why China and Korea have not incubated the conception of 
copyright.166 
Many scholars claim that the lack of IP in Eastern Asia (mainly Chinese 
culture) was largely due to philosophy and culture.167 One of the most 
influential works on this perspective was presented by William Alford. He 
argues that Confucian culture prevented the IP protection from emerging in 
China.168 Others add that “Chinese culture still seems to have trouble valuing 
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intangible assets”.169 
Confucianism, having its root between the sixth BC to the third BC,170 has 
greatly influenced the Chinese society up until early twentieth century as well 
as other East Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. Confucian 
thought largely revolves around the concept of rén (仁),171 which can be 
translated into “benevolence”, “humaneness”, “compassion”, or “loving 
others”. Rén is a moral value based upon harmony with other people and thus 
the Confucianism emphasizes the relationship with others. This can be 
demonstrated by a practical rule, called the Golden Rule: “What one does not 
wish for oneself, one ought not to do to anyone else”. For the harmonious 
society and community, Confucius called attention to the relationships between 
the ruler and the subject, the parent and child, husband and wife, and the elder 
and the younger. This moral principle was injected into not only political 
philosophy that aims at substituting government by virtue for government by 
force,172 but also learning by individuals. Learning self-restraint involves 
studying and mastering li, the ritual forms and rules of propriety through which 
one expresses respect for superiors and enacts his role in society in such a way 
that he himself is worthy of respect and admiration. Thus, Confucius himself 
represented his teachings as lessons transmitted from antiquity. Specifically, he 
claimed that he was “a transmitter and not a maker” and that all he did reflected 
his “reliance on and love for the ancients”.173  
The conflict of Confucian philosophy with the Western concept of IP is said to 
come from this tradition. To Alford, emphasis on the relationship with the past 
posed a dilemma such as ensuring a broad access to the common heritage of all 
Chinese and this function of the past militated against thinking of the fruits of 
intellectual endeavour as private property.174 Accepting Alford’s analysis, many 
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writers posit that the Confucianism led “the Chinese to value unencumbered 
access to the knowledge of the past” and development of property in knowledge 
failed to produce the same results found in Venice and Western Europe during 
the fifteenth century.175 Put differently, East Asian’s cultural basis, 
Confucianism, has been totally against the notion of IP.176 
Recently the predominance of philosophy and culture in explanation of the non-
existence of IP concept in Asia was challenged by scholars. They point out 
other factors than the Confucian philosophy and culture to explain why the 
institution of IP in general, the copyright system in particular did not blossom in 
China. Among others, Ke Shao criticized Alford as neglecting other historical 
conditions and overemphasizing the significance of the past or tradition.177 That 
is, the question of non-existence of IP in pre-modern China is hardly to be 
reducible to a philosophical element and Alford’s analysis is disparaged as a 
cultural determinism. “Material conditions” and “institutional changes” in the 
Coxian triangular terms as discussed in Section 2-2 did matter. 
As a material capability, Mun suggests the feature of Chinese characters and the 
structure of printing industry. Chinese characters are based on logograms, each 
has independent and complete meaning.178 This implies that type-cutting and 
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type-setting are labour-intensive and time-consuming. In addition, some 
Chinese characters consist of pictograms, i.e., they hold a graphic nature and its 
visual appeal has given rise to the elevated status of calligraphy. Mun goes on 
to say that this feature of Chinese characters made a woodblock printing more 
suitable than metal movable type.179 Also, such feature is argued to have 
dictated the structure of printing industry during the Song Dynasty (960-1279). 
In contrast with metal movable type printing, which required high costs in such 
as casting, storage, special machine and technical skills, the woodblock printing 
by which the texts on sheets of paper were pasted on the blocks entailed less 
initial investment cost. Therefore, according to Mun, popularity of woodblock 
printing in China was an obstacle to the large-scale and industrialized printing 
press and made the printing industry less risky, thereby little motivation to 
develop a market-oriented production system, which was a vital factor in the 
emergence of the modern copyright institution in England during the sixteenth 
and the seventeenth centuries.180 
2-3-3.	Non-Existence	of	Copyright	in	Korean	History	
The material conditions of Chinese printing industry, which stem from the 
feature of Chinese characters, are hardly to be generalized. The development of 
metal movable type in Korea provided a strong counter-argument. Before 
Korean alphabet was invented in 1440s and became official script in the late 
nineteenth century, Chinese characters were used for written language in Korea. 
However, the feature of Chinese characters such as logograms and pictograms 
was not conditional factor for the proliferation of woodblock printing. There are 
at least three reasons.  
First, technology for metal movable type was already matured in Korea by the 
twelfth century, and hence the advantages of woodblock printing did not make 
economic sense in Korea. According to De Vinne, a key to the invention of 
movable type printing is a type mold,181 which requires a plate of metal strips 
and a metal rod to hold them in place. The movable metal type was invented in 
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Korea in the first half of the thirteenth century and the mold-casting method of 
producing fonts was based on their experience with minting bronze coins, 
bronze casting of bells and statutes.182 In this respect, the movable type printing 
was a new form of application of the existing metalworking techniques.183 
Therefore, it is not coincidence that by sometime around 1234, artisans of 
Goryeo Dynasty (918-1392) had printed cast type twenty-eight copies of 
Sangjong Yemun (detailed and authentic code of rituals) on Kanghwa Island, 
where the Goryeo government took refuge to resist the Mongolian invasion,184 
and the earliest extant book printed with movable metal type was a product of 
Goryeo.185 The metal movable type printing was of most value when a large 
number of copies were desired. The development of the Korean metal type was 
a response to the heavy demands for various types of books, both religious and 
secular.186 Also the relative scarcity of appropriate hardwoods comparable to 
the pear wood and jujube used in China was one account of the wide use of 
metal movable type printing in Korea. Yet, the need to recover the destroyed 
collection of books was greater.  
Second, historical events of Mongolian invasions and the resultant political 
condition incentivized the invention and the use of metal movable type printing 
in Goryeo. Before the Mongolian invasion, the Goryeo society published and 
distributed huge volumes of Chinese Classics and Buddhist canons.  Since the 
tenth century, the Goryeo Dynasty, following the Chinese model, adopted a 
gwageo system, a national examination system to recruit government officials, 
and Buddhism was national religion. For this purpose, the woodblock printing 
was widely used because for instance with one woodblock around 50,000 
copies could be printed.187 From 1231, Mongol forces attacked the Goryeo 
Dynasty for three decades. During the war, the royal collection of books and 
                                                      
182 Christensen, 2006. 
183 Sohn, 1997, p. 4. 
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woodblocks containing the complete set of Buddhist canons were burned. When 
the huge number of book collections was destroyed and the Chinese Song 
Dynasty was under the control of the Mongols, the Goryeo Dynasty was forced 
to find out a new way of printing for various books of limited copies. 
Woodblock printing did not fit with these demands because, for instance, the 
Buddhist canon requiring around 80,000 blocks could not be recovered by the 
woodblock printing. The bronze movable types were durable and each of them 
could be rearranged to print new books. For this reason, the printing of the 
Goryeo transitioned from woodblock to metal movable type printing by the late 
twelfth century. Yet this did not mean an end of woodblock printing. While the 
metal movable type printing was employed for books of low demand and 
relatively low quality, the woodblock printing remained to be used for high 
demand books (such as genealogical records, portraits and maps of tombs). This 
practice continued by the early twentieth century.188 
Third, the central control of printing industry was sustained in Korea. Metal 
production was totally controlled by the governmental for metal could be used 
in producing arms and coins, which were crucial in national security and control 
of economy. Woodblock printing was not different. The earliest official date for 
Korean typography under the central government control was the starting of the 
“Department of Books” in 1392, which was responsible for the casting of type 
and the printing of books.189 Also by 1403 the government’s type foundry was 
established.  Private publishing industries emerged during the seventeenth or 
the eighteenth centuries but their main copies were printed with woodblock and 
targeted genealogical records for gentry and rich farmers and novels and other 
works written in the Korean alphabet for ordinary people.190 Even so, the 
civilian contribution was limited as the casting and printing was still under the 
governmental control.191  
This early Korean structure of publishing industry and government central 
control of printing is contrasted with Chinese history. The imperial government 
                                                      
188 Shon, 1997, p. 5. 
189 Carter, 1955, p. 224. 
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of Song Dynasty relinquished, since the Xi Ning period (1068-77), its 
monopoly on printing of canonical texts, and thus it is said that the government 
control of publishing lasted for short period and limited.192 Although the pre-
modern Chinese government had sufficient motive to control the publishing 
industry, the Chinese printing industry was de-centralized differently from the 
early Korean industries as well as from the English industries.  
2-4.	International	Political	Economy	Layer	
The international political economy (IPE) focuses on the international 
relationship of states, markets, and societies to analyse how their political 
reactions shape a global system through which economic interactions are 
expressed. One of the key features of the IPE is the network of economic and 
political institutions designed to promote free trade and capital flows.193 As 
Susan Stranger observes, the network of economic and political interactions is 
the outcome of “human decisions taken in the context of manmade institutions 
and sets of self-set rules and customs”.194 The central question of this section is 
why a particular course of action of ratcheting up the protection and 
enforcement of IP, especially TRIPS and TRIPS-plus, was selected from among 
different options.195 
The public choice theory or rational choice theory explains the globalization of 
IP norms as rational choice by the actors (states and private actors). Landes and 
Posner suggest two kinds of asymmetry for the account of the unrelenting 
expansion of IP. The first asymmetry occurs in the value between creators and 
copiers of IP.  If the cost of copying or free-riding exceeds the cost in creating 
IP, the creators of IP do not need to rely on institutional measure for the 
protection of IP. But the technological advancement does not allow this 
situation by reducing the cost of copying, thereby an inherent asymmetry exists 
“between the value that creators of IP place on having property rights and the 
value that would be copiers place on the freedom to copy without having to a 
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license”.196 Therefore, the IP holders rationally choose to take part in collective 
actions to revise upward the standard of protection and enforcement of IP. 
Then, continuous, inexorable pressure to strengthen the IP rights might be 
always rational to the IP holders. However, in theory, such pressure cannot go 
beyond a certain level because IP holders have to use IP created by others. So, 
the level is to be determined by equilibrium between the value and cost of 
stronger IP protection, which might even “align the interest of IP holders with 
that of society as a whole”.197 The second asymmetry that explains the non-
stopping expansion of IP comes from the unevenness with regard to the private 
benefits from recognizing versus denying IP. To Landes and Posner, this refers 
to the absence of serious opposition to the IP expansionism as exemplified in 
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.198 But this does not mean the 
private versus public value of IP: the tension lies in between private value of IP 
and private value of public domain.199 The first asymmetry is extended to the 
international context in terms of mercantilism. They argue that “a nation that 
has a comparative advantage in producing IP is more likely to favor IP rights 
than one that does not”.200 
The public choice theory can be internationalized in another model. In this 
model, the choice of developing countries in the TRIPS negotiation was rational 
because they expected benefits from the transfer of technology from IP 
exporting countries and potential expanded access to market to the 
industrialized countries. For instance, Scotchmer claims that the trade-off of IP 
protection in national context between benefit (the increased innovation) and 
cost (deadweight loss on innovations) needs to be modified in international 
context, especially the TRIPS accords, taking into account of an outflow of 
profit to foreign investors.201 This assertion draws on the collective action 
problem or “prisoners’ dilemma”. In this model, it is assumed that if a country 
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‘A’ strengthens IP protection in its territory, the benefits for the world as a 
whole will increase because the stronger IP protection of the country ‘A’ 
encourages more innovations not only in the country ‘A’ but also in other 
countries partly because of the national treatment principles being applied to all 
of the countries. However, the country ‘A’ cares only about the benefits and 
costs that accrue domestically, not paying attention to the benefits of consumers 
and innovators of other countries.202 This argument holds not only for the 
country ‘A’, but symmetrically for other countries. As a result, countries would 
choose less protection than that maximizes aggregated global welfare and that 
they harmonize one.203  
Also, Sykes applies the collective action problem to developing countries in a 
similar way. According to him, although the strong patent protection across the 
developing countries would stimulate valuable research, each country may be 
tempted not to afford patent protection in the hope to reap full benefits from 
weak or no patent protection (e.g., lower domestic drug prices).204 Therefore, 
the cost will be borne by all of the developing countries and the behavior of 
each developing country leads to the under-protection of patent. The TRIPS 
Agreement solves this problem by obligating every member countries to 
provide minimum standards, in particular no shortening of patent life. By 
committing them in this way, the member countries, both industrialised and 
developing, are better off than they were free to choose their policies.205 
The models footing on the public choice theory can be criticized as 
overemphasizing the material or economic interests for the motivation of action. 
Also, the public choice approach has a limitation in that the post-TRIPS 
mobilization against stronger IP standards, such as A2K movement, cannot be 
explained. Another way to explain the globalization of trade-centric IP norms is 
focusing on macro level structure. In this model, the structural change of global 
capitalism empowers transnational capitalist classes to build, in cooperation 
with economically dominant nations, the global norms that serve their interests. 
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The global IP rule, represented by TRIPS, is an inexorable tide mandated by the 
structural forces. However, we need to be cautious about the structural 
determinism. The structural forces played a vital role in the formation of the 
contemporary IP norms but they did not determine every outcome. To reveal 
the limit of the structural determinism, Susan Sell compares the TRIPS 
Agreement with other WTO pacts. The General Agreement on Trade in Service 
(GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) 
were pushed by the same private groups in the same structural context. Yet the 
private sector failed to achieve its objectives in GATS and TRIMS, differently 
from its achievement in the TRIPS Agreement.206  
This observation invites us to pay more attention to the role of agents. However, 
the agents-based micro-level explanation is also imperfect because it may lead 
us to an ahistorical analysis and make us to ignore the feature of “structures that 
give a framework for action and that form the actions”.207 For the full 
understanding of the emergence of the global IP norms, agents and their mutual 
interaction with structure are to be examined. The notion of “structured agency” 
is the key in explaining the emergence of TRIPS Agreement, but also for the 
understanding of post-TRIPS movements: the TRIPS-plus and its backlash. 
Drawing on the critical realism, in particular the morphogenetic perspective of 
Margaret Archer, Sell explains the concept of structured agency as mutually 
constructive relationship between agents and structure.208 Two pre-TRIPS 
structural (and material) changes - the development of new technologies and the 
increasing value of IP - altered agents’ interests and made certain agents 
particularly efficient. At the same time, four aspects of the structural changes of 
global economy (globalisation of finance, internationalization of production, 
changing role of technology, and politics of deregulation) led to institutional 
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change, first in the US and then in the international organisations. Saying that 
the structural changes empower certain agents (i.e., IP dependent industries) 
does not mean that such agents can do anything. While structural factors can 
“determine a given potential for transformation, they may not be capitalized 
upon by those with the power to do so, or the deployment of considerable 
power may not actually produce transformation”.209 Therefore, agents’ framing 
skill, the organizational form of the agents, and interaction of agents with 
institution become important.  
2-5.	Substance	Layer	
The trade-centric IP norms yield changes in the substantive provisions for the IP 
protection and enforcement. These changes have been incorporated in TRIPS 
and TRIPS-plus regimes in three forms.  
First of all, two principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), the national treatment principle (NTP) and the most favoured nation 
(MFN) principle, became major pillars of global IP norms. The protection of IP 
within the meaning of these principles is so broad to include “matters affecting 
the availability, acquisitions, scope, maintenance and enforcement of IP rights 
as well as those matters affecting the use of IP rights” contained in TRIPS.210 
The NTP in TRIPS is based on a “no less favourable” standard rather than an 
“equivalent treatment” standard that is reflected in “the same protection” of the 
Paris Convention (Article 2(1)) or the “same rights” of the Berne Convention 
(Article 5(2)). This may result in more protection for foreigners,211 and the 
negotiation history shows that the “no less favourable” standard was a reflection 
of drafters’ concerns that the strict “equivalent treatment” might eliminate the 
need for an MFN provision.212 The MFN principle, one way to accomplish the 
trade liberalization,213 is incorporated into TRIPS as “a new element” in the 
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international IP framework,214 and requires in Article 4 that “with regard to the 
protection of IP, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by 
Members to the nationals of all other Members”. Whether the MFN principle of 
TRIPS is applied to bilateral FTAs is not self-evident. In the light of the fact 
that the exceptions to MFN enumerated in Article 4(d) of TRIPS do not include 
differential IP treatment within arrangements negotiated after TRIPS, the 
bilateral or regional pacts having TRIPS-plus rules seem to be subject to the 
MFN principle.215 
The second change is the incorporation of maximalist IP concept into TRIPS 
and TRIPS-plus provisions. The expansion of protectable subject matter, the 
extended term of protection, the curtailment of national discretion on the 
limitations and exceptions of IP, and the reinforced enforcement of IP are 
typical ingredient of the maximalist IP concept.  
The TRIPS Agreement extends copyrightable subject matter to computer 
programs and compilations of data (Article 10).216 Two WIPO “Internet 
Treaties”217 introduce significant TRIPS-plus obligations, which include: 
limited rental rights for authors (WCT Article 7); a distribution right for author 
(WCT Article 6); a widened reproduction right (Agreed Statement concerning 
WCT Article 1(4)); an introduction of communication right that allows the 
author to control whether his works can be made available over the Internet 
(WCT Article 8); and new rights for authors to protect their technological 
protection measures (TPM) and to prevent any modification of rights 
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management information contained in works (WCT Articles 11 and 12).218 
Patent protection is also extended to all fields of technology without 
discrimination (Article 27(1)). Therefore, software, pharmaceutical product, 
food and life form become eligible for patent protection.219 Moreover, under 
Article 28(1)(b) of TRIPS, right of process patent is extended to cover the 
product obtained directly by that process. Some US FTAs further extend the 
patentable subject matter to new uses or methods of using a known product,220 
and foreclose the exclusion of patent for plants.221 Further, the FTAs driven by 
the US and the EU introduce new form of exclusivity on data submitted for 
marketing approval of pharmaceutical products,222 and a plant protection 
product.223  
While the term of copyright protection for authors remained constant by TRIPS, 
the term of the protection for phonogram producers is extended by TRIPS 
(Article 14(5)) from twenty years of the Rome Convention to at least fifty years 
from the fixation date. The EU and US FTAs extend the term of copyright 
protection to seventy years plus author’s life.224 Concerning the patent 
protection, TRIPS obligates Members to ensure at least twenty years from the 
filing date (Article 33) and this term of patent protection is further extended by 
US FTAs in two ways. The first form of extension is based on the US Hatch-
Waxman Act which provides for extension for delays in the marketing approval 
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process.225 The second extension also stems from the US domestic law226 and 
provides for compensation for the delay in granting a patent.227 
The TRIPS Agreement restricts Members’ discretion to legislate the limitations 
or exceptions to copyrights by expanding the three-step test of the Berne 
Convention, which applies to the reproduction right, to all forms of copyright 
(Article 13).228 Under Article 30 of TRIPS, exceptions to patent rights should 
meet four or three steps test and compulsory license of patented invention has to 
follow complicated conditions set forth in Article 31. The compulsory license of 
patented invention in TRIPS follows a “ground approach” rather than a 
“condition approach”, which is confirmed in Paragraph 5(b) of the Doha 
Declaration: “Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted”. Such 
discretion is restricted by US FTAs, limiting the grounds to certain cases such 
as public non-commercial use or national emergency or where compulsory 
license is necessary to remedy anticompetitive practices.229  
For the enforcement of IP, TRIPS contains civil, administrative and criminal 
procedures and remedies. Although the scope of IP enforcement in TRIPS is 
broad and reflects the proposals of industrialised countries,230 the standard of IP 
enforcement is relatively weak. Difference in national legal systems is taken 
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into account and fair and equitable measures are to be ensured. In particular, 
Article 41(5) provides that the IP enforcement provisions do not “create any 
obligation to put in place a judicial system for the enforcement of IP rights 
distinct from that for the enforcement of law in general”. Further, many 
provisions are not outright obligatory, giving judicial authorities to take certain 
actions without obligating the authorities to do so. In addition, while some 
provisions are mandatory in certain circumstances, many provisions are 
optional.231 However, these optional provisions become mandatory and those 
concerns on the national difference and the procedural justice are removed by 
the US and EU FTAs. Further the US and EU FTAs create new rules on the IP 
enforcement, which include a statutory damage rule, a camcorder provision, a 
website shutting down provision and reinforced intermediary liability rules. 
Third, a dispute settlement mechanism is the most striking feature of TRIPS. 
One of the key motivations for the most industrialised countries to drive TRIPS 
is the lack of effective international dispute settlement procedures in the 
international IP agreements administrated by the WIPO. Article 64.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement refers disputes under TRIPS to general WTO provisions as 
set out in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU).232 The DSU has an adjudicatory procedure including 
appellate review and effective trade sanctions.233 This means that any countries 
that fail to comply with the obligations set forth in TRIPS may face trade 
retaliation authorized by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. The dispute 
settlement machinery having such a trade “teeth” as well as a TRIPS 
compliance monitoring system by the TRIPS Council has been strategically 
used by IP industries to implement the TRIPS provisions.234 
However, TRIPS does not ensure a full application of DSU. TRIPS negotiators 
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placed, in Article 64(2), a five-year moratorium of what is known as a “non-
violation dispute”, under which a WTO Member may initiate a dispute 
settlement process even when another Members does not violate an agreement. 
The non-violation complaint is allowed on the grounds that any benefit one 
Member expects from the agreement is nullified or impaired or that the 
attainment of any objective of the agreement is being impeded as the result of 
(a) the application by another Member of any measure, whether or not it 
conflicts with the provisions of the agreement, or (b) the existence of any other 
situation.235 The moratorium of non-violation dispute on TRIPS shows that the 
substantial difference between TRIPS and other WTO agreements such as the 
GATT or the GATS: there is no balance of rights and obligations in TRIPS that 
is similar with the one resulting from the exchange of scheduled tariff 
concessions and commitments on trade in service.236 Another concern that made 
negotiators reluctant to allow the non-violation dispute in connection with 
TRIPS is its potential impact on policy authority of Member states.237 
Reflecting these concerns, the TRIPS Council has regularly extended the 
moratorium every two years, and in 2015 agreed to further extend the 
moratorium until 2017’s WTO Ministerial Conference, which is scheduled to 
take place in Buenos Aires from 11-14 December.238 However, some US FTAs 
try to undermine such policy concern by introducing non-violation dispute 
provisions. For instance, Article 21.2(c) of the US-Australia FTA allows 
dispute resolution proceedings to be commenced where legitimate expectations 
have been nullified, which provoked concerns that it would undermine 
Australian measures to amend drug pricing mechanism.239 
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2-6.	Outcome	Layer	
According to a theory of international law, outcomes reflect both power and 
norms result. In turn, these outcomes modify norms and reallocate power.240 As 
discussed in the previous Section 2-4, the pre-TRIPS explains how the weak 
norms triggered strong power to mobilize the outcomes, and the post-TRIPS 
shows how it reallocated power relations with regard to IP. This section 
examines the outcome of the post-TRIPS IP norms with focusing on two points: 
the intended purposes of IP protection; and technical transfer from IP exporting 
countries to IP importing countries. 
The purpose of IP is to encourage creative activities and wider dissemination of 
knowledge and creative expression. For this purpose, the IP regime provides a 
temporary legal right to exclude others from using the product of IP. Therefore, 
the aim of IP can be accomplished through a balance striking work between 
protection and diffusion in consideration of broader public policy. TRIPS 
incorporates these balance and public policy concerns in Article 7, which 
requires the protection IP to “contribute to the promotion of technological 
innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual 
advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner 
conductive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations”. Also, the principles of TRIPS expressed in Article 8 are to ensure 
the member states to “adopt measures necessary to protect public health and 
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to 
their socio-economic and technological development”.  
These concerns, which were reflection of voices of developing countries during 
the TRIPS negotiation, are distinctive in a sense that they have no equivalent 
provisions in other international IP instrument such as the Paris and Berne 
Conventions241. They also provide a guideline of how the member states 
implement the agreement and the WTO dispute resolution bodies render a 
decision. Yet their effectiveness is restrictive in that they are expressed in the 
form of exceptions and lack substantive, operational clauses. Further, the 
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measures that member states can take under the principles of Article 8 are 
limited to the case where such measures are consistent with the provision of the 
TRIPS Agreement. Most of the TRIPS provisions consist of mandatory rules for 
the IP protection and enforcement. Therefore, for instance, even when it is 
necessary to protect public health, member states can neither waive the patent 
protection of certain medicine nor curtail patent protection to a period less than 
twenty years from the patent filing date.242 This is why some scholars criticize 
the balance and public policy concerns expressed in the provisions for the 
TRIPS objectives and principles are merely “window-dressing”. Taking for 
example, in Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case, the European Commission 
argued that Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS are declaratory and the interests 
mentioned in those Articles must not be drawn on again in interpreting other 
provisions (in this case Article 30) since this would involve taking the values 
mentioned in Articles 7 and 8 into account twice over (¶ 7.25). While the panel 
expressly decided against this argument of the EC, he drew neither on Article 7 
nor on Article 8 during the interpretation of Article 30.243 
In this regard, the balance embedded in the TRIPS Agreement needs to be 
assessed at a substantially different angle. The balance is, as Barbosa and Chon 
point out, struck between developing countries abandoning national autonomy 
to keep “unduly low levels of IP protection” and benefits from “market access 
and technology transfer”.244 Thus, for the evaluation of the outcome of TRIPS, 
the expected benefits from market access and technology transfer become 
significant.245 
Technology transfer246 and its relationship with the level of IP protection has 
                                                      
242 Because of this “compatibility clause”, Article 8 is described as not a proper 
exception to the protection of IP provided in TRIPS (Brand, 2009, p. 197). In 
contrast to the compatibility clause of TRIPS, Article XX of GATT 1994 and 
Article XIV of GATS lack a corresponding compatibility clause, and thus become 
proper exceptions. 
243 Keßler, 2009, pp. 185-186. 
244 Barbosa & Chon, 2007, p. 90. 
245 The significance of technology transfer was one of the reasons for the need to 
conclude TRIPS. As early as in 1992, the GATT secretariat offered the reason: “the 
protection of IP is a factor in technological progress: it can encourage technology 
transfer between countries, leading to investment and jobs” (GATT, 1992, p. 17). 
246 There is no clear consensus on the meaning of the transfer of technology, but the 
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been always controversy among economists. If we narrow the question of 
technology transfer to the flow from technologically advanced countries to 
developing countries, theoretically there are positive and negative sides. The 
positive side includes the incentive to innovate and appropriability of 
innovation. The introduction of new products, information, and creative 
activities are long term dynamic gains from the increased incentive to 
innovate.247 The appropriability of innovation would help foreign firms to invest 
into developing countries and license the innovation. The negative influence on 
diffusion into the developing countries comprises increasing cost of accessing 
technological information. 
Net effect of stronger IP rights on the international diffusion of technology is an 
empirical question. According to Fink & Maskus, the existing research suggests 
that countries having strengthened their IP regimes are unlikely to experience a 
sudden boost in inflows of FDI, and that the empirical evidence does not point 
to a positive role for IP in stimulating cross-border technology transfer.248 By 
contrast, in a study of Mansfield, which was based on interviews with IP 
executives of US corporations, large proportion of respondents from the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industries replied that their FDI decisions were 
affected by the levels of IP protection available.249 Another empirical research 
shows a positive relationship between IPR and transfer of technology; enhanced 
patent protections made for the 1994-2000 period have attracted significantly 
more imports of patent-sensitive technology from OECD countries to non-
colonial developing countries,250 and patent reforms after TRIPS accounted for 
as much as 20-percent increase in sectoral manufacturing exports from 
emerging countries to the US.251 By contrast, evidence from Turkey found that 
the banning of pharmaceutical patents appeared to have no significant effects on 
                                                      
Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology defines it as 
“the transfer of systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the 
application of a process or for the rendering of a service and does not extend to the 
mere sale or lease of goods” (UNCTAD, 2014, p, 1). 
247 Fink & Maskus, 2005, p. 3. 
248 Fink & Maskus, 2005, p. 8. 
249 UNCTAD-ICTSD Policy Discussion Paper, 2003, p. 87. 
250 Ivus, 2010. 
251 Maskus & Saggi, 2015, ¶ 83. 
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the level of FDI, technology transfer or domestic innovation, and an empirical 
study on Brazil, taking the manufacturing industry as a whole found no 
evidence that FDI levels were greatly affected by patent protection.252 While a 
well-managed patent system together with favouring licenses for technology 
transfer through outright restriction on FDI contributed in technological catch-
up in Japan after World War II,253 weak IPRs encouraged creative imitations 
and contributed technological and industrial capacities in Korea.254 
The picture painted by the empirical studies is, as Lemley observed, 
inconclusive, contradictory or complicated.255 Given that the technology 
transfer can take place through various channels, most of which are irrelevant to 
IP,256 and different conditions affect the transfer of technology,257 role of IPRs is 
limited and does not dictate the outcome. However, it would be fair to say that 
the TRIPS and TRIPS-plus regimes are not designed to promote the technology 
transfer. In the previous Section 2-2 “Historical Layer”, it is demonstrated that 
the early grant of patent privilege was, though its effectiveness is uncertain, to 
encourage technology transfer, and this policy objectives was pursued by 
incorporating certain rules in patent systems. They include the recognition of a 
technology importer as an inventor, locally confined concept of novelty, local 
working and linkage of patent protection term and a period of local learning of 
new technology. However, these rules designed for the encouragement of 
                                                      
252 UNCTAD-ICTSD Policy Discussion Paper, 2003, p. 87. 
253 Hoekman, Maskus & Saggi, 2004, pp. 17-18. 
254 UNCTAD, 2014, pp. 27-28. 
255 Lemley, 2015a, p. 1343. 
256 Maskus and Saggi (2015) identify six channels for international technology 
transfer: (a) trade in goods and services embodying new ideas; (b) foreign direct 
investment; (c) IP licensing including licensing of trade secret; (d) open innovation; 
(e) migration; and (f) global innovation networks (GINs, referring to an 
establishment within a global firm of one or more R&D facilities at different 
locations and the associated management decisions and exchange of information 
among them and the parent company, ¶ 75) (while former three are traditional 
channels, latter three are new forms of technology transfer (¶ 81) providing new 
opportunities for better access to technological information (¶ 124). 
257 Many factors such as geographical position of origin and destination markets, 
market size and competitiveness, commercial prospects, the level of development of 
human capacities and skills, governance, and infrastructure affect the transfer of 
technology (UNCTAD, 2014, p. 3). 
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technology transfer were entirely removed or substantially weakened by the 
TRIPS and TRIPS-plus provisions.  
Local working, the most important rule for the encouragement of technology 
transfer, is no longer a condition for the patent grant. A patentee, who imports a 
patented product, can meet the working requirement because the importation of 
patented product into a country where the patent is granted shall not entail 
forfeiture of the patent.258 Failure to work or insufficient working a patented 
invention is downgraded to one of the grounds for grating a compulsory license. 
Moreover, such a compulsory license cannot be issued before the expiration of 
a period of four years from the patent filing date or three years from the patent 
grant, whichever period expires later. Only when the compulsory license is 
insufficient to prevent the non-working abuse of patent right, forfeiture of the 
patent is allowed with an additional condition that two years from the grant of 
the first compulsory license has passed.259 The patented product260 refers to a 
product manufactured according to a patent and includes a product which is 
itself the subject of the patent and a product manufactured by means of a 
patented process.261 Therefore, a process technology may not be transferred by 
the mere importation of the patented product. Further, when the product patent 
is related to practical technology, it is hard to claim that the patent encourages 
the technology transfer.  
The term of patent protection is delinked from such policy measures of early 
patent that patent protection lasts for a period during which the local craftsmen 
learn the invention. Now the patent life is discussed in terms of reward to 
technology disclosure or a period during which patentees can recoup their 
investment. 
                                                      
258 Article 5(A)(1) of the Paris Convention and Article 2(1) of the TRIPS 
Agreement. The original text of the Paris Convention of 1883 contained a provision 
stating that in the case of importation of patented articles the patentee remained 
under the obligation to exploit his patent in accordance with the laws of the country 
into which he introduced the patented articles (Bodenhausen, 1968, p. 68). 
259 Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention. 
260 The Paris Convention uses the term “importation … of articles manufactured” in 
any of the countries of the Union. 
261 Bodenhausen, 1968, p. 68. 
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2-7.	Conclusion	
This chapter has delved into the trade dimension of IP from five correlated 
vantage points (i.e., history, diversity, IPE, substance and outcome). The 
historical analysis on the emergence of IP in Western Europe and the study on 
non-existence of IP in Eastern Asia show that there is no inevitable causal link 
between trade and IP. The concept of IP emerged as a trade policy in pre-
industrial Western Europe but its connection to trade was marginal and 
witnessed considerable fluctuation. In its history, IP was not always linked 
positively to trade and during the nineteenth century IP was considered to be in 
direct conflict with the notion of free trade.  
One of the decisive factors in the emergence of patent in Western Europe was 
the mercantilist trade policy, main purpose of which was to achieve trade 
surpluses by enhancing a cross border mobility of craftsmen and by 
encouraging local technological innovation. Yet the actual contribution of the 
early patent system to this policy objective was modest mainly because the 
structure and regulation of medieval and early modern guilds were restrictive in 
promoting the cross-border mobility of craftsmen, and because the learning cost 
of technology was relatively high due to the nature of tacit and practical 
technology. Therefore, the early patent statutes contained strict rules for 
achieving the policy objectives. Those rules include (1) allowance of 
importation patent, (2) recognition of an importer or introductory of foreign 
technology as an inventor, (3) strict condition of local working, (4) and linkage 
between the protection term of patent and the period of local learning of 
patented invention. These are the trade relatedness of the early patent history, 
which is entirely removed in TRIPS and TRIPS-plus provisions. 
This chapter also showed that the strategic use of patent system by 
manufacturing industries during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries brought about a conceptual change in the patent protection and the 
emergence of bilateral treaties on patent protection among several Western 
states. However, the internationalization of patent systems began not in the 
nineteenth century by the Paris Convention but in the mid-twentieth century 
when many developing countries joined the Convention in the hope of 
increased technology transfer and foreign direct investment from industrialized 
countries. But the patent was not considered as a primary concern of 
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international trade. It was not until 1980s that IP came to be strongly linked to 
trade issues and substantive provisions for the IP protection and enforcement 
became governed by trade regimes. This dramatic change occurred by a 
strategic behavior of private sectors with an aid of economically powerful states 
such as the US and the EU. The rational choice theory and explanations footing 
on either the macro level structure or the micro level agents are insufficient in 
accounting for the changes in 1980s which led to TRIPS and TRIPS-plus. This 
Chapter suggests that critical realistic perspective focusing on the mutually 
constructive interaction between agents and structure and institutions that 
mediate such an interaction provides better tools to analyse why and how the 
contemporary IP norms became trade-centric. Further, unlike the rational choice 
approach, the critical realistic perspective allows us to analyse the emergence of 
the post-TRIPS mobilization against stronger IP standards. 
Under the trade-centric IP regime, the differences in the standards of IP 
protection and enforcement among states are considered as trade barriers that 
must be removed as entirely as possible. TRIPS and TRIPS-plus are designed to 
remove the trade barriers by ratcheting up the IP standards, yielding changes in 
substantive rules in IP protection and enforcement. Two principles of GATT, 
the national treatment principle and most favoured nations principle, were 
incorporated into the global IP norms. The maximalist IP agendas such as 
expansion of protectable subject matter, extended term of protection, 
curtailment of national discretion on the limitations and exceptions of IP and the 
reinforced enforcement of IP became primary pillars of TRIPS and TRIPS-plus 
norms. TRIPS established a binding rule based on the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism, which means that any countries failing to comply with 
the obligations set forth in TRIPS may face trade retaliation authorized by the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body.  
The changed rules governing the global IP norms has failed to achieve intended 
purposes of IP protection (encouraging creative activities and wider 
dissemination of knowledge and creative expression). The purpose of IP can be 
accomplished by striking a fair balance between protection and diffusion of the 
products of IP. Although concerns on the balance between protection and 
diffusion are expressed in Article 7 of TRIPS and public policy objectives are 
declared in Article 8 of TRIPS as principles of the global IP accord, they are in 
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the form of exception and lack substantive operational clauses in contrast with 
detailed, mandatory provisions for the IP protection and enforcement. 
Technology transfer, one of the bargains between IP exporting and importing 
countries during the TRIPS negotiation, lack empirical evidences and, more 
importantly, certain rules that were initially designed to promote the technology 
transfer are entirely removed or substantially weakened by the TRIPS and 
TRIPS-plus provisions.  
The following chapter shifts to human rights dimension of IP to explore how 
the contemporary trade-centric IP norms intersect international human rights 
norms and proposes a new approach for the protection of intellectual creation 
from the human rights perspective. 





This chapter explores human rights dimensions of IP. As outlined in previous 
Chapter 2, IP norms have evolved with their relatedness to trade. Trade also 
played a vital role in provoking scholars and international human rights bodies 
to discuss IP in terms of human rights. When IP norms went into global with 
growing trade centrality, IP protection has been excessively expanded both 
globally and locally, creating conflicts with human rights and putting human 
rights under threat in certain areas. Hence trade is a common keyword in 
explaining both trade dimension and human right dimension of IP. However, 
the direction that trade invoked is different in both dimensions. Whereas trade 
works positively in expanding the reach of IP, in human right dimension, trade 
has been an essential catalyst to counterweight the expansion of IP. 
If the trade-centrality of global IP regime provokes ardent debate on the human 
right infringement, a straightforward way to explain the human right 
dimensions of IP would be to delineate areas where IP regimes bring about 
conflicts with various human rights. Many scholars, international legal expert 
bodies and human rights advocates have identified the conflicts of IP with the 
right to food, health, education, freedom of speech, privacy and share in 
information. However, this thesis tries to go further by approaching human 
rights intersection of IP in a holistic way. 
The holistic approach can be conceptualized by the term of “the right to science 
and culture”.262 Both Article 27 of UDHR and Article 15 of ICESCR provide 
conceptual, legal and normative sources for the right to science and culture. 
Those Articles ensure both protection and dissemination sides of intellectual 
                                                      
262 The term “right to science and culture” was first coined by Shaver and Sganga in 
2009 and employed by the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights in 
her consecutive reports of the UN Copyright Report of 2014 (A/HRC/28/57) and 
the UN Patent Report of 2015 (A/70/279). For the origin and process of the 
consecutive reports and discussions among state representative within OHCHR, see 
Bidault, 2016, pp. 25-28; Shaver, 2016, pp. 31-32. 
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creation, which is intended subject matter of traditional IP regime. Here, the 
‘protection side’ refers to, what is called in this thesis Author Clause - 
everyone’s right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.263 
The ‘dissemination side’ rises from two provisions of the international human 
rights instruments ensuring: (a) everyone’s right to take part in cultural life; and 
(b) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications.264 ICESCR 
expands the dissemination side by ensuring both the conservation, development 
and diffusion of science and culture,265 and the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research and creative activity.266 
The first part of this chapter traces historical evolution of discourses on the 
relationship between IP and the right to science and culture. It goes back, for the 
purpose of unearthing, rediscovering and contextualizing the original 
understanding, to the mid-1900s when the notion of the right to science and 
culture was first materialized in the formation of UDRP and ICESCR. Then, it 
travels chronologically through the long-forgotten period of the right to science 
and culture, and toward recent controversies on whether IP and human rights 
are in conflict or not and how to reconcile the human rights and IP regimes. 
Then, will be discussed two apparently competing sides of the right to science 
and culture (Section 3-3 for protection side and Section 3-4 for dissemination 
side) as well as norm-setting process of IP from the human rights perspective 
(Section 3-5). On the basis of the study on normative and practical meaning of 
the right to science and culture, Section 3-6 provides an alternative IP model. 
3-2.	Historical	Landscape	of	Intersection	between	Human	Rights	and	
Intellectual	Property	
IP has a short history for some attributes of which to be recognised as human 
                                                      
263 Article 27(2) of UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of ICESCR. 
264 Article 15(1)(a) and (b) of ICESCR and Article 27(1) of UHDR. For the 
expressional difference between these two Articles, and more comprehensive and 
broader scope of ICESCR in dissemination side than UDHR, see Section 3-4 
below. 
265 Article 15(2) of ICESCR. 
266 Article 15(3) of ICESCR. 
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rights. IP and human rights have different normative foundations and have 
developed in isolation. In the last few years, however, a great deal of literatures 
has discussed IP in terms of human rights.  
The examination of drafting history of UDHR and ICESCR aims at moving 
forward by looking back. By inspecting preparatory works of the international 
source of law for the right to science and culture, this section tries to re-
contextualise the right codified more than half a century ago and provide an 
insight on its contemporary implications. 
3-2-1.	Emergence	of	the	Right	to	Science	and	Culture	in	UDHR	and	
ICESR	
3-2-1-1. UDHR and its Drafting History of the Right to Science and 
Culture 
UDHR was built on the ashes of wars.267 Drafters of UDHR were trying “to 
repair damage of war, and to help construct the foundation of a just peace”.268 
This historical root has a connection with the right to science and culture, albeit 
weaker than civil and political rights have. 
Discussions on Author Clause 
UDHR was not authored by single person. As Morsink puts it, “numerous 
official representatives from dozens of countries made hundreds of amendments 
in hundreds of meetings and cast more than a thousand votes”.269 Drafting of 
UDHR includes seven formative drafting stages: (1) the first session of the 
Commission of Human Rights; (2) the first session of the Drafting Committee 
established by the Commission; (3) the second session of the Commission; (4) 
the second session of the Drafting Committee; (5) the third session of the 
Commission; (6) the Third (Social and Humanitarian) Committee of the 
General Assembly (held from September to December 1948); and (7) the 
                                                      
267 Brown, 2016, p. 29. 
268 Prost & Winter, 2013, p. 238. 
269 Morsink, 1999, p. 28. 
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Plenary Session of the same 1948 Assembly.270 
John Humphrey, a Canadian scholar and the representative of the UN 
Secretariat to the Commission on Human Rights, prepared a four-hundred-page 
blueprint for UDHR, which was consulted by the Drafting Committee271 during 
the UDHR’s formation.272 Humphrey did not include in his document anything 
comparable to today’s Author Clause. It was René Cassin, a French delegation, 
who suggested the inclusion of Author Clause.273 However, the first session of 
the Drafting Committee of 1947 decided not to include Author Clause in 
UDHR.274 
In the following year, again the French delegation proposed Author Clause, 
with minor stylistic changes, to the third session of the Commission on Human 
Rights which held from May 24 to June 18, 1948.275 The French proposal 
received support from delegations from Latin American delegations including 
those from Mexico, Cuba, Chile and Uruguay.276 However, opponents 
outnumbered. They reasoned that protection of author’s material interests was 
not properly speaking a basic human right and there was no special need to 
provide an additional protection to property right.277 Especially, the US 
delegation opposed the proposal on the grounds that copyright was a problem of 
international law.278 Finally, at the third session, the French proposal was 
                                                      
270 United Nations, 1950, pp. 524-527; Morsink, 1999, pp. 4, 11. 
271 Drafting Committee on an International Bill of Human Rights, first session, held 
on 9-25 June 1947. 
272 United Nations (n.d.). History of the Document. Retrieved on 9 November 2016 
from http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-
document/index.html.  
273 Shaver & Sganga, 2009, p. 29. René Cassin inappropriately took credit as the 
principal author of the UDHR (Shaver, 2010, p. 145). 
274 Morsink, 1999, p. 220. 
275 Ibid. 
276 The Mexican delegation successfully proposed the IP Clause in the American 
Declaration, which greatly influenced the discussions of UDHR, and among the 
Latin American countries, Ecuador took an opposing stance on the grounds that the 
protection of literary and scientific property should be dealt with under the general 
Article on property rights (Haugen, 2007a, pp. 174-175). 
277 Helfer & Austin, 2011, pp. 177-178. 
278 Morsink, 1999, p. 221. 
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rejected by 6 votes to 5, with 5 abstentions.  
This vote, however, was reversed at the Third Committee, more specifically at 
the 152nd session.279 Concerning Author Clause, initially proposed by the 
French delegation, positions were divided largely along the line between the 
common-law tradition and civil law countries.280 Most Latin American states, 
under the influence of the continent civil law traditions, supported the French 
proposal. By contrast, the US delegation from the common-law tradition 
objected on the grounds that protection of author, the main element of the 
proposed Author Clause, belonged to the domain of copyrights. Also, the UK 
delegation insisted that “copyright was not a basic human right and objected to 
the inclusion of rights targeted at specific classes of people, rather than 
principles that were valid for all men”.281 India under the common-law 
influence joined the US and the UK in opposition.282 In spite of such opposition, 
the proposed Author Clause passed the Third Committee. Morsink explains this 
was because the Third Committee had a much larger membership of 
representatives from Latin America, meaning that the proponents could count 
on a much larger Latin American vote.283 
Discussions on ‘Dissemination Side’ 
Unlike Author Clause, drafters were relatively easy in reaching an agreement on 
the inclusion of the right to take part in cultural life and the right of everyone to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific advances.  
Most debate on the right to take part in cultural life was about whether it should 
recognize rights of a certain group other than a nation, in particular the right of 
minority groups. For some governments, the group rights could threaten the 
nation state and territorial integrity.284 Therefore, the text of Article 27 of 
                                                      
279 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR/.152 (22 November 1948). The full name 
of the Third Committee is The Social and Humanitarian Committee of the General 
Assembly, held from September to December 1948. 
280 Haugen, 2007, p. 176; Shaver, 2010, p. 148. 
281 Morsink, 1999, p. 221. 
282 Shaver & Sganga, 2009, p. 32. 
283 Morsink, 1999, p. 221. 
284 Stamatopoulou, 2008, p. 8. 
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UDHR appears not to respect diversity and pluralism by assuming that cultural 
participation will take place in the “one” culture of the “nation-state”,285 which 
was improved later in ICESCR.286 The word “freely” after the phrase “to take 
part” was proposed by Peruvian delegation and supported by the UK 
representative because she thought “it useful to emphasize that participation in 
the cultural life of a community must be free”.287 
Regarding the right to share in scientific progress and its application, which was 
in part a reflection of drafters’ optimistic view that science had a potential to 
improve human life and living conditions,288 there was some disagreement on 
the ideological foundation. Socialist bloc led by Soviets and their allies wanted 
“science confined to politically defined objectives serving international peace 
and economic development”,289 or to place science “at the service of progress 
and democracy”.290 The Western groups strongly opposed this language for fear 
that it would put the science “at the service of politics”.291 Having met this 
opposition, Mr. Pavlov from the USSR denounced the Western countries as 
places where “science was subservient to militarism and … intellectual forces 
were concentrated on producing a terrible weapon of aggression for the 
destruction of millions of peaceful human beings”.292 This debate ended up with 
rejection of the  amendment of the Soviet bloc. 
3-2-1-2. ICESCR and Drafting History of the Right to Science and Culture 
                                                      
285 Ibid. 
286 Stamatopoulou explains that in the final text, Article 27 of UDHR includes the 
prescriptive word the in the phrase “the right freely to participate in the cultural life 
of the community”, while in ICESCR the word the is intentionally deleted: ‘the 
right of everyone to take part in cultural life’ (2008, p. 10). Therefore, it was 
improved from homogenous to multicultural right, meaning that the right includes 
cultural right of minority and to other communities and groups. 
287 Records of UNGA (1948): Item 77: Draft international declaration of human 
rights (E/800), p. 624. 
288 London, Cox & Coomans, 2016, p. 27. 
289 Claude, 2002, p. 12. 
290 Records of UNGA (1948): Item 77: Draft international declaration of human 
rights (E/800), p. 623. 
291 Ibid, p. 620. 
292 Ibid, p. 623. 
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ICESCR, adopted in 1966 together with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), was a product of approximately 20 years of 
negotiations of an effort to transform UDHR of 1948 into a legally binding 
obligation. In 1946, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(CHR),293 directed by the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), was established “to weave the international legal fabric that 
protects our fundamental rights and freedoms”.294 Upon the request of General 
Assembly to include articles specifically on economic, social and cultural rights 
in addition to civil and political rights for the initial draft Covenant prepared by 
the Commission in 1950, the Commission, assisted by the International Labour 
Union, the UNESCO and the World Health Organization (WHO) completed a 
new draft in 1951.295 After long period of discussions, the Third Committee 
(Social, Humanitarian and Cultural matters) could submit completed draft 
Covenant to the UN General Assembly in 1966.296 The provisions for cultural 
rights were substantively discussed at the seventh (April-May, 1951) and eighth 
(May 1952) sessions of CHR and at the twelfth session of the Third Committee 
of the General Assembly (October to November 1957).297 
In 1951 when ECOSCO first considered inclusion of economic, social and 
cultural rights in a human right covenant, UNESCO proposed articles for the 
right to science and culture. Most discussion of Article 15 focused on the right 
to take part in cultural life.298 The initial UNESCO draft, which became the 
basis for the Commission’s discussions in the seventh session,299 read: 
The Signatory States undertake to encourage by all appropriate means, 
                                                      
293 This body was replaced by the Human Right Council in 2006 by the UN General 
Assembly. 
294 Canada’s Human Right Commitments, 2015. 
295 Ibid. 
296 For official records on the drafting ICESCR, see Procedural History of 
Audiovisual Library of International Law provided by UN at 
http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/icescr/icescr.html and Dag Digital Repository of the UN at 
repository.un.org. 
297 Green, 2000, pp. 4-13. 
298 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, 2014, p. 1177. 
299 Green, 2000, ¶17. 
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the conservation, the development and the diffusion of science and 
culture. 
They recognize that it is one of their principal aims to ensure conditions 
which will permit every one: 
1. To take part in cultural life; 
2. To enjoy the benefits resulting from scientific progress and 
its applications; 
3. To obtain protection for his moral and material interests 
resulting from any literary, artistic or scientific work of which 
he is the author. 
Each signatory State pledges itself to undertake progressively, with due 
regard to its organization and resources, and in accordance with the 
principle of non-discrimination enunciated in paragraph 1, article 1 of 
the present Covenant, the measures necessary to attain these objectives 
in the territories within its jurisdiction.300 
Discussions on Author Clause 
Unlike the provisions for ensuring participation in cultural life and benefiting 
from scientific progress, the provision on author’s right was under debate from 
the outset. The representative of UNESCO supported the inclusion of author’s 
right on the grounds that “it had already been included in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights and represented a safeguard and an 
encouragement” for creators.301 However, the nay-sayers outnumbered, and the 
proposal for author’s right was rejected by 7 votes to 7, with 4 abstaining.302 
The same pattern of discussion reoccurred a year later in the eight session of the 
Commission. The French delegation resubmitted the original provision and 
maintained that a provision for the protection of author was necessary for 
rewarding “professional workers” and “it was not a matter only of material 
                                                      
300 UNESC Document E/CN.4/AC.14/2, p. 4. UNESCO presented the Commission 
with two versions (one long and one short) of a draft provision. For the long 
version, see Green, 2000, ¶15. 
301 ECOSOC Document E/CN.4/SR.228, ¶ 13. 
302 Green, 2000, ¶¶ 21, 25. 
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rights; the scientist and artist had a moral right to the protection of his work, for 
example against plagiarism, theft, mutilation and unwarranted use”.303 
Opposition was reiterated from delegations of the US, the UK and Yugoslavia, 
asserting that the issue was too complex to be included in the Covenant and 
should be addressed elsewhere, thereby the passage on author’s right was once 
again rejected.304 
For this reason, the draft Covenant submitted in 1957 by the Commission to the 
twelfth session of the Third Committee of the General Assembly did not include 
Author Clause.305 At this time, the French delegation abandoned to re-submit 
the proposal for author’s right.306 Instead, the representatives of Uruguay and 
Costa Rica307 co-sponsored an amendment introducing Author Clause.308 Their 
underpinning was the same as the UNESCO proposal of 1951 and the French 
proposal of 1952: the fact that UDRP contained such a clause.309 The French 
delegation and the representative of UNESCO supported the inclusion of 
Author Clause.  
The Uruguayan delegation strongly sought backing from other delegations by 
emphasising necessity for conforming with existing code of human rights, i.e., 
UDHR and for international cooperation to combat copyright piracy.310 Against 
                                                      
303 ECOSOC Document E/CN.4/SR.292, ¶¶ 8-9. 
304 Green, 2000, ¶¶ 28, 31. 
305 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 178. 
306 But later, the French representative to CHR proposed a provision for the author’s 
rights (UNGA, Third Committee, A/2929, chap. VIII, ¶ 54). 
307 Costa Rica became the co-sponsors by the invitation of Uruguayan 
representative (UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 31, also see UNGA, 
Third Committee, A/C.3/L.636/Add.1). 
308 UNGA Document A/C.3/L.636/Rev.1). 
309 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, 2014, p. 1225. 
310 UNGA Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.799, ¶ 30 (Mr. Tejera (Uruguay) replied to 
the USSR representative that “while he recognized that the moral and material 
interests of authors were in most countries protected by national legislation, the 
insertion of a provision on the subject in the draft Covenant was necessary in order 
to give an impetus to national legislation and to make sure that it was brought into 
conformity with existing international instruments”.); UNGA Third Committee, 
A/C.3/SR.797 ¶ 17 (“Mr. Tejera (Uruguay) … considered that a reference to 
author’s copyright was imperative. For lack of international protection, literary and 
scientific works, for example, were frequently pirated by foreign countries, which 
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this proposal, the USSR’s representative tried to revoke the grounds of 
proposal, noting that the fact of inclusion of Author Clause in UDHR “did not 
mean that it should be repeated automatically in the Covenant” and pointed out 
the non-universal nature of Author Clause – not rights concerned all mankind, 
instead concerned a particular group.311 He also criticized the changed position 
of UK and recalled that “after a long discussion the Commission on Human 
Rights had rejected by an overwhelming majority a proposal” for author’s 
right.312 To carry out his position, the delegation of USSR suggested alteration 
of the proposal for the author’s right to be protected by national legislation, 
which was supported by Romania.313 Facing objection from USSR and other 
representatives, the Uruguayan delegation expressed his firm decision to 
maintain his proposal by presenting another foundations: 
“It felt all the more justified in doing so since it had other excellent 
reasons: first, the addition of that paragraph would not lengthen the text 
of article 16 unduly; secondly, UNESCO had already achieved 
outstanding success in the matter and the adoption of that paragraph 
would give new impetus to the work of that organization and enhance its 
prestige; lastly, the right of the author and the right of the public were 
not opposed to but complemented each other. Respect for the right of 
the author would assure the public of the authenticity of the works 
presented to it”.314  
 
The amendment proposed by Uruguay was finally adopted by 39 votes to 9, 
with 24 abstentions.315 The existence of Author Clause in UHDR was the 
decisive factor in the triumph of proponents of author’s right. Due to UDHR, at 
least two delegations (from the UK and Chile) changed their position from 
‘nay’ in the seventh eighth sessions of the Commission of 1951 and 1952 to 
                                                      
paid no royalties to the authors”.). 
311 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 19. 
312 Ibid, ¶ 18. 
313 Ibid, ¶ 52. 
314 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 32. 
315 UNGA Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.799, p. 190. 
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‘yes’ in the Third Committee of 1957.316 The Author Clause of UDRP also 
contributed in making other delegations including Israel317 become more 
sympathetic to the author’s protection than before. Further, the proposer, the 
delegation of Uruguay, was able to come out very strongly: “he could not 
believe that any delegation could have valid reasons for opposing the insertion 
of a text which has already been adopted, since it appeared in article 27 of the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. There was no reason to vote against 
that text, other than a refusal to implement the Declaration on that point”.318  
For inventors, no delegation mentioned the word ‘inventor’ or ‘discovery’, only 
one delegation (Saudi Arabia) said “It should also be pointed out that the 
Committee had not adopted any article on the right to property, and in substance 
the Costa Rican and Uruguayan amendment dealt with literary and artistic 
property, as well as the rights of scientists and inventors”.319 
Discussions on ‘Dissemination Side’ 
The idea of the right to take part in cultural life, which was proposed by 
UNESCO,320 was generally supported by states in the Commission on Human 
Rights and General Assembly as an important human right.321 There were 
differing views on certain concept or notion contained in the UNESCO’s draft - 
whether to specify the cultural participation right to be “of the communities to 
                                                      
316 The UK delegation even stated that he did not know the position the delegation 
of the UK had taken in the previous meetings (UNGA, Third Committee, 
A/C.3/SR.799, ¶ 16 “He did not recall exactly why the Commission on Human 
Rights had rejected a similar recommendation, nor what stand his delegation had 
taken. But it certainly seemed to him now that it was essential to include a 
provision corresponding to that in article 27, paragraph 2, of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in the Covenant. He congratulated the representative 
of Uruguay on his action and would vote in favour of the amendment”). 
317 The Israeli representative explained her support of the Uruguayan amendment 
that the Covenant should not be weaker than UDHR (UNGA, Third Committee, 
A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 37). 
318 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 53. 
319 A/C.3/SR.798, ¶ 56, p. 185. 
320 ECOSOC Document, E/CN.4/541 (Agenda Item 3, suggestions submitted by the 
Director-General of UNESCO, 18 April 1951). 
321 Donders, 2008, p. 3. 
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which he belongs”.322 
For the science right, drafter of ICESCR debated on the goal or function of 
scientific progress as did during the UDHR drafting. Czechoslovakian 
delegation proposed to insert a phrase “in the interest of the maintenance of 
peace and co-operation among nations”.323 She felt this amendment facing no 
opposition as it was common knowledge that when technical and scientific 
progress was applied to the wrong ends, it could be harmful to humanity. In 
reality, however, objections prevailed and some delegation (for instance 
Greece) regarded the amendment “even dangerous”,324 or might provide a 
pretext for State control over scientific research and creative activity (U.K. 
delegation).325 Other representative opined that peace was best promoted by 
ensuring the greatest possible scientific and cultural freedoms.326 The 
representative of UNESCO did not view that the Czechoslovakian proposal was 
detrimental to creative freedom due to the UNESCO Constitution, suggesting to 
change the wording of the proposal in an exemplary manner (inserting “in 
particular”),327 which was accepted by the representative of Czechoslovakia.328 
Nonetheless, the Committee rejected the Czechoslovak amendment by 35 votes 
to 21, with 16 abstentions.329  
3-2-1-3. Lessons from the Drafting History of UDHR and ICESCR 
The first lesson learnt from the drafting history of UDHR and ICESCR is that 
their essential purpose was to “promote universal access to science and 
                                                      
322 UNGA, A/3764 (Report of the Third Committee, 5 December 1957), ¶ 75. 
323 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.795, ¶ 7. 
324 Ibid, ¶ 8. 
325 Ibid, ¶ 10. Supporter of the Czechoslovakian proposal came from Saudi Arabia 
and USSR (See, UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.797, ¶¶ 4 and 6). 
326 UNGA, A/3764 (Report of the Third Committee, 5 December 1957), ¶ 78. 
327 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.796 ¶¶ 5 -7. Article 1 of the UNESCO 
Constitution declared that education, science and culture were instruments of peace 
but he considered the idea of the right to benefit from scientific progress was new 
and in the process of evolution. 
328 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.797 ¶ 3. 
329 UNGA, A/3764 (Report of the Third Committee, 5 December 1957), p. 25. 
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culture”330. Most delegations having contributed the drafting process were less 
interested in the moral and material interests of the authors than everyone’s 
right to take part in culture. Maria Green, who prepared a background paper on 
the drafting history for the CESCR in 2000, observed that while there was not 
much disagreement on the notion of the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific advances, the discussion of authors’ rights was more fraught, and 
more complex.331 Many delegations sought to modify or completely exclude the 
proposed Author Clause. The strength of those oppositions appears to be unique 
in the history of the international bill of rights332. This indicates that the Author 
Clause is “far from self-evident”,333 and its drafting history supports “relatively 
weak claims of IP as a human right”.334 
Secondly, the protection side of the right to science and culture, i.e., the 
author’s right is inseparably interlinked with the dissemination side, and has no 
stand-alone footing for the human rights claim. Travaux of both UDRP and 
ICESCR shows that Author Clause was “supported primarily because of their 
instrumental character in realizing other rights”.335 This lesson requires the 
holistic approach for understanding the right to science and culture, as taken in 
this thesis. In the holistic approach, balance striking task of contemporary trade-
centric IP regime needs to be reoriented toward a direction that puts more 
emphasis on cultural participation and broader access to the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications. 
Third, in Author Clause, the protection of material interests of authors received 
less attention than moral interests. Some delegations conceived the protection of 
moral interests of authors as a means to protect intellectual workers “against 
improper action on the part of publishers”.336 For instance, the Mexican 
delegation, who was one of the strongest supporters of Author Clause and a 
                                                      
330 Shaver, 2010, p. 128. 
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designer of Author Clause for the American Declaration, defended the author’s 
rights as “the rights of the individual as an intellectual worker, scientist, or 
writer”,337 and Australian counterpart argued, in her opposition to Author 
Clause that “the indisputable rights of intellectual worker could not appear 
beside fundamental rights of a more general nature, such as freedom of thought, 
religious freedom or the right to work”.338 Further, the moral rights of authors 
were not claimed as a necessary legal or moral tool for the protection of an 
expression of human dignity. Caterina Sganga notes that although copyright law 
has evolved over time primarily to protect the economic interests of publishers, 
natural law conceptions of moral rights were originally conceived to protect 
authors from publishers.339 
Fourth, consensus on the protection of interest of inventors as opposed to 
authors is highly questionable. As discussed in the following Section 3-2-2-2, 
inventors were intentionally removed from Author Clause. Therefore, it is 
plausible to state that the existing patent laws cannot claim the backing of 
human rights,340 and “there is no human right to patent protection under Article 
15” of ICESCR.341 
3-2-2.	Long	Period	of	Ignorance	
The existence of the right to science and culture in the international human 
rights instruments have long been ignored. For more than half a century, the 
right to science and culture has been unobserved and its contents and scope 
have not been elaborated by academics, practitioners and international human 
rights organizations.342 Audrey Chapman points out that “this right is so obscure 
and its interpretation so neglected that the overwhelming majority of human 
rights advocates, governments, and international human rights bodies appear to 
                                                      
337 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.150, p. 617. 
338 Morsink, 1999, p. 221. 
339 Shaver, 2009, p. 34. 
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341 UN Patent Report of 2015, A/70/279, ¶ 90. 
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be oblivious to its existence”.343 
The reason for the long period of ignorance can be explained in two ways. First, 
the ambiguity and uncertainty in normative contents and scope of the right to 
science and culture have contributed to such an ignorance. Due to the 
vagueness, states believed that the rights in ICPPR were immediately 
guaranteed and enforced, while the rights in ICESCR were subject to state 
discretion and incapable of judicial enforcement,344 and fulfilment of the civil, 
political, social and economic rights been regarded as a precondition to 
participation in cultural life.345 Therefore, the International Commission of 
Jurists remarked that due to vagueness or lack of definition of normative 
content, critics of economic, social, and cultural rights often consider the right 
to take part in cultural life as a right that lacks necessary clarity.346  
Second, there has been no or little incentive and motivation for human right 
advocates, scholars and international human rights bodies to discuss IPRs in 
terms of human rights. Also, IP scholars, practitioners and policy makers had 
little motivation to approach IPRs from the perspective of human rights. The IP 
policy makers put priority on economic aspects of IP, national competitiveness 
and development of domestic industries. They believe that doing so serves to 
their interests. For instance, the national patent offices operate on “a fee-for-
service basis”,347 and consider patent applicants and patent holders their 
customers. Encouraging more stockpiling of patents is good not only for their 
income but also for strengthening their own organizational power. To the patent 
offices, there is no stimulus to approach the patent system in view of the human 
rights. The patent attorneys, a bigger IP experts group, have the same biased 
professional interests as their major income comes from big corporations filing 
a large number of patent applications.348 To them, the human right aspects of IP 
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are not sensitive and at best trivial with little overlapping with their practices 
and the operation of patent system. Copyright is not different. Copyright policy 
makers consider the copyright system as tools for economic growth and 
industrial development. Therefore, each legal regime was preoccupied with its 
own distinct concerns.349 
The long silence was broken by TRIPS. The dominance of trade rules in IPR 
regime, which was triggered by the launch of the WTO in 1995, prompted the 
discussion of IPRs in terms of human rights.350 As the human rights framework 
is based on international human rights treaties, the trade and human rights 
debate has been greatly influenced by the UN human rights institutions. In 
1999, the Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) initiated a 
broad work programme under the rubric of “Globalization and Its Impact on the 
Full Enjoyment of All Human Rights”.351 This programme assumed the primacy 
of human rights over trade agreements, and aimed at proposing “ways and 
means by which the primacy of human rights norms and standards could be 
better reflected in, and could better inform, international and regional trade, 
investment and financial policies, agreements and practices”.352  
Alongside the programme, there have been a series of reports with detailed 
analysis of trade and human rights. The first report, released in 2001, touched 
upon the relation of TRIPS and public health.353 Since then, the topics covered 
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353 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related 
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have included agricultural liberalization and the right to food, the liberalisation 
of trade in services, investment liberalisation, and the principles of non-
discrimination and participation as they apply in the context of trade policy.354  
The areas covered by the series of reports are the “new” issues that have been 
brought up by the WTO regime and their impacts on human rights.355 The 
works of UN human rights bodies did not arise in a vacuum: largely they were 
responses to civil society movements, and the relationship between human 




The approach to the intersection and relationship between IP and human rights 
can be divided into two: one theorizing a situation of incompatibility and 
conflict;357 the other denying the conflict and equating IP and human rights. As 
intuitively derived from the historical development outlined in the previous 
section, the initial debate was dominated by a perspective pointing to conflicts 
between IP and human rights, and most of the works from the UN human rights 
institutions were to identify conflicts and called for States to take fully into 
account the human rights implications of IPR regime. However, as the TRIPS 
and TRIPS-plus movements has produced a backlash, the current that 
emphasized conflicting aspects of IP created a crosscurrent, which emerged 
initially from IP industries and recently from states.  
Conflict Approach 
Conflict of IP with human rights has been asserted by scholars and the UN 
human rights bodies for longer than fifteen years. Chapman notes that IP, 
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especially post-TRIPS IP norms may be in conflict with human rights 
obligations.358 The Venice Statement on human rights also states that “the right 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications may create 
tensions with the intellectual property regime”.359 As early as 2001, the High 
Commissioner (Sub-Commission) confirmed that actual or potential conflicts 
existed between the implementation of TRIPS and the realization of economic, 
social and cultural rights.360 Also, in the statement of 2001, the ECOSOC 
Committee emphasized that any IP regime “that makes it more difficult for a 
State party to comply with its core obligations in relation to health, food, 
education or any other rights set out in the Covenant is inconsistent with the 
legally binding obligations of the State party”.361  
Underlying the conceptual framework of conflict approach lies the notion of 
primacy of human rights over economic policies and agreements.362 Scholars 
and civil societies also advocate the primacy of human rights over the freedom 
to participate in markets. For instance, Alston maintains that economic rights 
arising from WTO agreements are not, and should not be considered to be, 
analogous to human rights, pointing out the fundamental difference in 
objectives of two norms.363 Criticising the non-conflict approach which is based 
on ‘ultra-liberal’ view upholding the right to property and market freedom, 
Picciotto accuses it as simply having the effect of legitimising socioeconomic 
                                                      
358 Chapman, 2001, p. 19-20. 
359 Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and 
its Applications, Statement of Expert Group convened by UNESCO in Venice, 
Italy, 16–17 July 2009, ¶ 10, Retrieved from 
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inequalities.364 
Conflict between IP contained in the trade regime and human rights is 
fundamental due to their difference in nature. The General Comment No. 17 
explains: 
“[I]n contrast to human rights, IP rights are generally of a temporary 
nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else. While 
under most IP systems, IP rights, often with the exception of moral 
rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and 
even forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental 
entitlements of the human person”.365 
To a large degree, the conflict between IP and human rights is inevitable and 
inherent in that the TRIPS Agreement is an outcome of the strategic behaviour 
by firms in the chemical, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors,366 and a 
product of “structured agency”, i.e., the private business sectors.367 However, in 
order to make the human right norms operative, it is necessary to identify the 
nature of conflict and present concrete code of conducts that States follow in 
adopting IP policies, which is possible from the holistic approach to the right to 
science and culture as proposed in this thesis. 
Non-conflict Approach 
Those who support a positive role of trade in the protection of human rights 
view that IP is also a human right and hence there is no conflict. Strong version 
of this perspective comes from officers of WTO. Anderson and Wager, insist 
that “the trade liberalization creates wealth for all participants and thereby helps 
to generate the resources needed for the fuller realization of human rights”.368 
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To them, freedom to participate in markets is civil and political rights, and in 
this sense the WTO rules are “directly supportive of civil rights”, and stimulate 
economic growth, thereby “helping to generate the resources that are needed for 
the fulfilment of such rights”.369 Petersmann provides a theoretical, legal basis 
for this perspective by suggesting a “constitutionalism” approach in which the 
WTO rules are to be considered as a “constitutional framework” for the 
regulation of international markets, which is ultimately necessary for the 
fulfilment of human rights.370 Key to this perspective is the right to property 
required by human nature.371 IP norms globalised by the WTO rules, especially 
by the TRIPS Agreement are regarded as a complementary tool to the property 
right,372 and a means to ensure sound operation of market by curing the market 
failure.373 Due to the fear of expansion of IP by using human rights conception 
in this manner, some commentators avoid to discuss IP in human rights 
terms.374  
Another spectrum of the non-conflict school finds its foundation on common 
rationale between IP regime and human right. For instance, Minero maintains 
that human rights and IPRs share the same nature without hierarchical 
relationship, and both do not necessarily follow the same goals or values in any 
single case.375 The non-conflict approach goes on to equate Author Clause of 
the international code of human right with contemporary copyright.376 The 
equation is furthered by association of copyright holders.377 They criticise the 
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371 Cornides, 2004, pp. 141-143. 
372 Petersmann, 2005. 
373 Anderson & Wager 2006, p. 714. 
374 Helfer 2007, p. 1015. 
375 Minero, 2015, pp. 164-165. 
376 Torremans, 2004, p. 7; Minero, 2015, p. 169. In the words of Minero, the Author 
Clause “covers both economic and moral rights and therefore the whole of 
copyright”. 
377 For instance, the International Federation of Phonographic Industry (IFPI) 
elevates the status of copyright to “cornerstone” of the right to culture and an 
essential prerequisite for the enjoyment of the right to science and culture (IFPI, 
2014). 
89 / 335 
 
conflict approach as unduly focusing on practical effects of IPRs in specific 
situation and failing to address the broader picture,378 or as misguided narrow 
focus and fundamental failure of recognition on the long-term innovation 
dependent upon the existence of IP rights.379  
Recently, some member states of UN who pursued regional mega trade pacts 
took the same position. In June 2016, when replying to OHCHR, in a case 
concerning possible violation of human right obligations by TPP, the signatory 
countries of TPP except Australia and Canada argued that “[W]e reject the 
assertion that certain provisions in TPP could adversely affect the enjoyment of 
human rights”, and “[N]o participant in the TPP negotiations would have 
considered becoming party to a negotiated outcome that … unduly constrained 
access to affordable medicines”.380 For the public consultation in June 2014, 
organised by the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights on the impact 
of IP regimes on the enjoyment of the right to science and culture, the US 
representative to the United Nations maintained that rewarding authors and 
inventors through IPRs would “foster and promote culture, science and the arts 
for the benefits of the public”, and if there were any area where IPR regime 
impede access to culture, it was exceptional (“if implemented in particular way” 
or “certain systems for protecting geographical indications”).381 
3-2-4.	Co-existence	or	Reconciliation	Approach	
A holistic approach requires us to approach the right to science and culture from 
an all-inclusive perspective of its protection and dissemination sides. Like all 
other human rights, the right to science and culture is an embedded set of 
human rights. As regarded by drafters of ICESCR, the three components of the 
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right to science and culture are “intrinsically interrelated to one another”.382 The 
holistic view is supported by Article 15 of ICESCR itself. Paragraph 2 of 
Article 15 uses singular noun when it refers to the right set forth in Article 
15(1)(a) to (c), i.e., the right to science and culture.383 Therefore, from the 
holistic perspective, the right to science and culture is understood as a single 
right having three interrelated aspects of “(a) cultural participation, (b) access to 
the benefits of science and technology, and (c) protection of authorship”.384 “ 
Many commentators take the position somewhere between the conflicting and 
non-conflicting perspectives outlined above, which is loosely categorised here 
as “co-existence or reconciliation” approach. Even WTO opines the coexistence 
of the trade-centric IP agreements and human rights standards.385 Not all of 
them, however, makes the holistic approach. The spectrum of co-existence and 
reconciliation view is very wide, but one commonality is seeking ways to 
mitigate the tensions between IPR and human rights. 
Most of legal discourses discussed within the framework of international law 
are interpretative approaches: possible inclusion of human rights principles 
within the WTO framework.  
Having doubts about any rule-changing mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
between TRIPS and access to medicine, Hestermeyer suggests a solution 
through the WTO dispute settlement procedures, on the premise that WTO 
jurisprudence, i.e., the power of panels, may be most likely route for the 
importation of human rights law into WTO laws.386 Petersmann demonstrates 
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384 Information Society Project at Yale Law School (2008) Access to knowledge 
and the right to take part in cultural life, Submission to the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (41st Session, 3-21 November 2008), p. 1. 
385 Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Report of the Secretary-General, 
ESCOR, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 52nd 
Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/12 (2001) 
(submission by WTO), ¶ 8. 
386 According to Hestermeyer, amending the WTO Agreements to accommodate 
human rights is politically impossible because developing countries would fear that 
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the compatibility of market rights and human rights and the potential to bring 
them into harmony, and proposes counter balancing approach which takes into 
account the general consumer and citizen interests.387 But Picciotto criticises 
this approach as overlooking “the realities of inequalities of power”.388  
Abbott suggests a two-step approach for the balance striking within the existing 
international laws. For the first step, Abbott introduces a concept of “core” 
human right rules and res cojens. The Abbott’s “core” rights stems from the 
“core” obligation referred to in the General Comment No. 3 (1990).389 He points 
out that Article 52 of VCLT prohibits (or renders void) treaties that conflict 
with peremptory norms (res cojens), and if a provision of the TRIPS Agreement 
is in conflict with peremptory norms (such as state’s obligation to the core 
human rights), such a provision is void. The rule-modify would be the 
Ministerial Conference of the WTO, then a judicial or dispute settlement 
body.390 As to the appropriate body for the rule changing, Abbott, like 
Hestermeyer, admits that the WTO is not suitable because of structural 
imbalance (the negotiation at the WTO are conducted by trade delegations 
largely representing producer group interests) and of reluctance of governments 
to reform the WTO decision-making process shown so far (Ibid).  
Given the difficulty in identifying the “core” human rights391 and the lack of 
possibility of rule-changing, the second step is a judiciary solution, i.e., WTO 
Appellate Body (AB). As the mandatory of AB is to decide on the interpretation 
of the covered agreements, including TRIPS, it would be difficult from a 
                                                      
industrialised countries may use the human right provisions to justify trade 
sanctions. Further, less ambitious amendment such as the Doha Declaration is also 
politically infeasible due to the unequivocal opposition from some powerful 
industrialised countries. In addition, suggestion of establishing an institutional 
linkage between the WTO and human rights related bodies and organizations is 
viewed as providing little hope (Hestermeyer 2007, 287). 
387 Petersman, 2005, p. 87. 
388 Picciotto, 2007, p. 11. 
389 Abbott, 2006, p. 147. 
390 Ibid, p. 156. 
391 It seems that Abbott does not consider some aspects of right to protection of 
material interests of authors are recognized as “core” right by the CESCR in 
General Comment No. 17. He discusses the “core” rights in terms of right to life 
and right to health. 
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judiciary standpoint to conclude that a human rights treaty-based norm should 
be given priority within the framework of the WTO.392  
Simon Walker also supports the human rights consistent interpretation, but he 
raises the important issues of difficulties faced by developing countries of 
political and diplomatic pressures from the developed countries to implement 
TRIPS-plus policies.393 Referring to the 2001 Report, Walker rightly points out 
that the TRIPS Agreement does not take a human rights consistent approach. 
Among others, human rights considerations are provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement in the form of exceptions and the agreement fails to set out clearly 
to what extent the IPR holders have responsibilities of the public interest 
objectives.394 Dutfield and Suthersanen take a similar stand, arguing that “the 
proper interpretation of Article 15(1)(c) of UDHR implies a ‘right’ to IP is a 
human right, which is vested to individual creators”, and the problem lies in the 
implementation of IP norms not the norms per se.395 
Taking the holistic approach, Helfer and Austin suggest a human rights 
framework for IP, which is based on two distinguished dimensions of human 
rights in the context of IP: protective and restrictive dimensions.396 The 
protective dimension provides for IPR holders with both opportunities and 
risks. It is risky because the creator’s rights become “more circumscribed” and 
“modest”.397 First, the legal protection for economic exploitation of creation 
does not apply to legal entities. Second, the scope of right is varied depending 
on states: some may recognize the same exclusive rights as are found in IP 
treaties and statutes but with radically reduced terms of protection and 
expanded exceptions and limitations”, alternatively (or more threateningly) 
states may choose to abandon the exclusionary IP protection model, substituting 
it with “a system of liability rules, levies, or government subsidies”.398 The 
                                                      
392 Abbott, 2006, p. 159. 
393 Walker, 2006, pp. 175-178. 
394 Walker, 2006, pp. 173-174. 
395 Dutfield & Suthersanen, 2008, pp. 220-221. 
396 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 512. 
397 Ibid, p. 513. 
398 Ibid, p. 514. 
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opportunities are provided for indigenous groups and the “irreducible core of 
rights”, for the core component of rights, more stringent test for evaluating 
restriction being imposed.399 
In order to reconcile the existing IP and human rights, the UN Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights proposes the adoption of a public good 
approach to knowledge innovation and diffusion and suggests reconsidering the 
current maximalist IP approach.400 This proposal is based on Shaver’s idea that 
international IP laws are in tension with human rights norms fundamentally and 
systematically,401 proposing to treat science and culture as global public good. 
This proposal is appealing but needs to be refined by taking into account the 
tacit nature of knowledge as discussed in Section 3-4-2. 
3-3.	Protection	Side	of	the	Right	to	Science	and	Culture	
3-3-1.	Author	
3-3-1-1. Concept of Author 
The Author Clause defines the right conferred to author of scientific, literary or 
artistic production. The General Comment No. 17 equates the author to a 
creator and explains that writers and artists are beneficiary of the protection of 
Author Clause.402 
An author for the entitlement of the right to science and culture is not the same 
as defined in copyright law. While an author under copyright law refers to 
individuals who create something eligible for copyright protection, an author 
under the right to science and culture includes individuals, groups or 
communities who “have created a work, even where that work may not be 
protected by copyright”.403 However, the boundaries of the “non-copyrightable” 
                                                      
399 Ibid, pp. 514-515. 
400 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural 
Rights on the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications, 
A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012), ¶ 65. 
401 Shaver, 2010, p. 124. 
402 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 7. 
403 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 27. 
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creative works that are covered by the right to science and culture are not clear. 
The term “creation” may provide an interpretational guideline, which requires 
certain level of creativity and originality, “a distinction between 
uncopyrightable and copyrightable subject matter”.404 Therefore, the scope of 
author under the meaning of the human rights law does not unduly extend 
beyond the notion of author under the copyright law. 
In the international human rights instruments, the author’s right is recognised 
because of the personal linkage between authors and their creative works or 
productions. Therefore, the primary right bearer is a natural person, and the 
General Comment No. 17 makes clear that legal entity is not a recipient of the 
protection of Art. 15(1)(c) of ICESCR.405 The UN Copyright Report of 2014 
also confirms that the human right protection of authorship can only be claimed 
by human creator, excluding legal entity such as corporate publisher or 
distributer.406 Yet, the authors may license their rights, and therefore business 
enterprises may enjoy a derivative protection.407 Groups of individuals were not 
realised at the time of drafting UDHR and ICESCR, but later the UN human 
rights bodies have taken an expansive interpretation to encompass groups and 
communities for the right bearers.408 
3-3-1-2. Inventor and Author 
As Article 27(2) UDHR and Article15(1)(c) ICESCR refer only to ‘author,’ the 
                                                      
404 Drassinower, 2015, p. 218. For the difference of originality from copyright 
systems, see Section 3-6-3. 
405 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 7. By this human authorship requirement, a 
photograph taken by a monkey (as in case Natuto v. David John Slater et al., No. 
3:2015cv04324 (N.D. Cal. 2016)) and paintings ‘The Next Rembrandt’ drawn by 
Microsoft’s artificial intelligence have no room for claiming the protection of 
author’s right. 
406 UN Copyright Report 2014, ¶ 28. By contrast, the European Court has extended 
human rights protected under the ECHR to legal persons; e.g., under art. 10 
(freedom of expression), under art. 6 (fair trial) as well as art. 11 (freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association). The European Court decided that even the right 
to protection of one’s ‘private life’ and ‘the home’ can be extended to a legal 
person. accordingly, it is not surprising that the right to property has been conferred 
to legal persons in case law before the European Court (Banning, 2002, p. 172). 
407 Abbott, 2006, p. 149. 
408 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 1. 
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ensuing question is whether an inventor is covered by the international human 
right framework. The special rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, who 
declares that “there is no human right to patent protection” concluded in 2015 
that “the term “authors” within the right to science and culture can be 
interpreted to include inventors and scientific discoverers”.409 The CESCR also 
interprets the ‘scientific production’ as including innovation as well as scientific 
publication.410 According to the review of the CESCR on the drafting history of 
UDHR and ICESCR, it is explained that patent was not explicitly excluded 
albeit lesser attentions than copyright.411 Although majority of scholars agree on 
the negotiation history’s weak support for inventors, they do not deny the 
inclusion of inventor as a right bearer in the international human rights 
instruments.412 However, it is hard to maintain that inventors are covered in 
Articles 27(2) UDHR and 15(1)(c) ICESCR. It is not easy to draw a dependable 
conclusion that inventors are authors within the ordinary meaning of Author 
Clause as well as from the drafting history of the UDHR.  
The proposal to the Third Committee of 1948 for draft UDHR was initiated by 
the French delegation, which was joined and amended by the delegations of 
Cuba and Mexico. Original text suggested by the French delegation read 
(emphasis added):  
“The authors of all artistic, literary, scientific works and 
inventors shall retain, in addition to just remuneration for 
their labour, a moral right on their work and/or discovery 
which shall not disappear, even after such a work and/or 
discovery shall have become the common property of 
                                                      
409 UN Patent Report of 2015, ¶ 34. 
410 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 9 (“the protection of the moral and material 
interests of authors was given some attention, with the focus on copyright 
protection, and to a lesser extent patents”). 
411 Green 2000, ¶ 6; See also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Commission on the 
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, The Impact of the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on Human Rights: Report of 
the High Commissioner, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (2001), ¶21-22. 
412 Cullet, 2004, p. 4; Chapman, 2002, p. 314; and Walker, 2006. On the other hand, 
Dutfield and Suthersanen criticised the inclusion of inventor by the General 
Comment No. 17 as “confusing stance and language” (2008, p. 219). For more 
academic positions and their grounds, see Yu, 2016, pp. 45-53. 
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mankind”. [emphasis added] 
The joint amendment by the delegations of France, Cuba and Mexico included:  
“Everyone has, likewise, the right to the protection of his 
moral and material interests in any inventions or literary, 
scientific or artistic works of which he is the author”. 413 
Two days later Chang, delegation of China, proposed a compromised text 
which reads:  
“Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author”.414 
When comparing above three draft texts, it became clear that the compromised 
text of the Chinese delegation removed the phrases that are reasonably 
understood as referring to rights of inventors, as opposed to the rights of 
authors. The terms, ‘inventors’ and ‘discovery’ included in the original proposal 
and the phrases ‘in any inventions’ contained in the joint amendment were 
taken out by the Chinese compromised text. This compromised text passed the 
Third Committee as Article 25(2),415 and then the General Assembly as the 
current Article 27(2). In addition, the regional human rights instrument (the 
American Declaration416) adopted during the negotiation of the UDHR became 
the source of the Latin American delegations’ support of Author Clause that 
contained clear languages for inventors’ rights distinguished from authors’ 
rights. The American Declaration included an IP provision in its Article 13 
stating that every person has “the right to take part in the cultural life of the 
community”, and it then added “he likewise has the right to the protection of his 
                                                      
413 A/C.3/360, Draft International Declaration of Human Rights: Joint Amendment 
to Article 25 of the Draft Declaration (E/800) / Cuba, France, Mexico: 20/11/1948. 
414 A/C.3/361, Draft International Declaration of Human Rights: Compromise Text 
for Article 25 of the Draft Declaration (E/800). 
415 “A number of amendments had been proposed but after the USSR proposal had 
been rejected, a compromise text for the Articles, suggested by China, was first 
adopted in paragraphs and finally the whole Article, as amended, was adopted 
(United Nations Bulletin, January 15, 1949, Vol. VI, Number 2, p. 95). 
416 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man of 1948. 
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moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific, 
or artistic works of which he is the author”.  
Then, the negotiation history seems to suggest that the drafters intentionally 
removed the proposed rights to an invention or discovery from Author Clause. 
One may argue that when the drafters voted to the Chinese compromised text, 
they had in mind that the protection of authors was broad enough to cover the 
protection on invention. Or, it can be assumed that the drafters did not make a 
clear distinction between authors and inventors. None of these inferences is 
supported from the travaux preparatoires. During the negotiation of UDHR, 
eighty-one meetings took place and one hundred sixty-eight formal draft 
resolutions containing amendments to the various articles were submitted.417 
However, the detailed examination of each article was conducted in relatively 
short period, from 6 October to 7 December 1948. There were less than five 
official proposals on Author Clause, and most of the discussions were taking 
place at the 150th to 152nd sessions of the Third Committee, held from 20-22 
November 1948.418 
During these sessions, many delegates distinguished author’s right from 
inventor’s right and copyright from patent. Meeting records show that Mexican 
delegate used terms “the rights of authors and inventors’ patents”,419 Ecuador 
delegate also stated that “the Mexican, Cuban and French amendments 
introduced a new element concerning literary property and the rights of the 
inventor”.420 Peru delegate also expressed “the amendments submitted by the 
delegations of Mexico, Cuba and France designed to safeguard the rights of 
authors and inventors’ patents”.421 Mr. Cassin, the French delegate, mentioned 
when he claimed for the moral interest of inventors that “[I]t could also be 
argued that royalties and patents were sufficient to protect such persons [a 
                                                      
417 UN, 1950, p. 526. 
418 At the 178th meeting of the Third Committee on 6 December 1948 the Draft 
Declaration was adopted by a roll-call vote of 29 to none, with 7 abstentions. The 
Draft was considered at the 180th to 183rd plenary meeting of the General Assembly 
of 9-10 December 1948 (UN, 1950, pp. 529-530). 
419 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.150, p. 617. 
420 Ibid, pp. 618-619. 
421 Ibid, p. 619. 
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number of learned men and artists]. But he did not think so. His proposal not 
only took into account the material aspect of the question, but was also designed 
to protect the moral interests of artists and inventors “.422 Delegate of Brazil said 
“the protection of the moral and material interests of men of science, inventors 
and persons engaged in artistic pursuits”,423 and delegate of UK alleged “[T]he 
representative of France had spoken on the one hand of the recognition due to 
the author of an invention - a very legitimate claim - and on the other, of 
protecting the right of ownership attaching to an invention. Those were very 
different concept”.424 Also delegates from Chile and Canada distinguished 
“authors’ copyright and patents”.425 
However, the distinction was not made by all delegates. Curiously, one of them 
was the Chinese delegation. When he suggested the compromised text that 
deleted the phrase “in any inventions” from the joint amendment, he explained 
his proposal as minor changes of the joint amendment: “a few drafting changes 
in the second paragraph of the joint amendment of Cuba, France and 
Mexico”.426 Further, Cuban delegation welcomed and accepted the changes as 
“having clarified and improved the original text of the joint amendment”.427 
French delegation did not even mention anything on the Chinese proposal and 
merely expressed support to the Peru amendment.428 The Chinese delegation, 
just before the vote, clarified “the second paragraph was really a joint Cuban, 
French and Mexican proposal, and he asked that the second paragraph should 
be voted upon separately”.429 
With these records, it may be concluded that the removal of “interests in any 
inventions” was intentional but accepted as trivial changes among the drafters 
                                                      
422 Ibid, p. 620. 
423 Ibid, p. 621. 
424 Ibid, p. 624. 
425 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.151, p. 632. 
426 Ibid, p. 628. 
427 Ibid, p. 628. 
428 Ibid, p. 631. The Peru amendment was made on the first paragraph, not Author 
Clause (A/C.3/SR.150, p. 619). 
429 UNGA, Third Committee, A/C.3/SR.152, p. 633. 
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of the Third Committee.430 During the drafting negotiations, a majority of 
discussions was devoted to the first paragraph and the USSR proposal. The 
inclusion of Author Clause in the second paragraph was debated to lesser extent 
and the distinction between copyright and patent was not an issue, though many 
of drafters recognized such distinction. 
Meanwhile, revision of “scientific … works” in the joint amendment to 
“scientific … production” in the Chang’s compromised text does not provide 
textual and historical support for the conclusion that an author of the human 
rights law encompasses an inventor. For details, refer to Section 3-3-3 below.  
On the grounds outlined above, this thesis maintains that authors within the 
meaning of Author Clause do not include inventors under the meaning of the 
existing patent laws. This conclusion is also in line with the ordinary meaning 
of the text of Author Clause. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, the principle rule in interpreting a treaty is that a treaty be 
interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”.431 Then the question arises is the scope of author’s right to the 
material interests in scientific production, which is discussed in the following 
Section. 
3-3-2.	Any	Scientific,	Literary	or	Artistic	Production	
The protection of Author Clause is provided for “any scientific, literary or 
artistic production”. ECSCR divides this production into two: scientific 
production; and literary or artistic production. This division makes sense when 
we try to match subject matter of Author Clause with that of two major areas of 
IP - patent and copyright. The literary and artistic productions may correspond 
to subject matter of copyright laws, such as “poems, novels, paintings, 
sculptures, musical compositions, theatrical and cinematographic works, 
                                                      
430 The special rapporteur in the field of culture also pointed out that during the 
negotiation of Author Clause drafters dropped language mentioning inventors 
(A/70/279 ¶ 30), but she concluded that authors of Author Clause include inventors 
and scientific discoverers (A/70/279 ¶ 34). 
431 Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention. 
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performances and oral traditions”.432 By contrast, the scientific production is 
interpreted so broad as to encompass subject matters of both copyright and 
patent and even non-patentable subject matter, such as “scientific publications 
and innovations, including knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous 
and local communities”.433 In her UN Patent Report of 2015, the Special 
Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, does not refute such an expansive 
interpretation of scientific production, and merely alerted specific parameters 
and safeguards for the wide-ranging interpretation of the scientific production 
or patent.434  
The interpretative expansion of scientific production appears to be an effort to 
cover traditional knowledge and to encompass indigenous communities. 
However, the negotiation history of UDHR, again, disapproves such an 
expansive interpretation, and the protection of traditional knowledge and 
indigenous communities is possible without direct resorting to Author Clause.  
During the negotiation, the phrase “any scientific, literary or artistic production” 
was adopted through the following modifications:  
• Original text: “The authors of all artistic, literary, scientific works and 
inventors”; 
• Joint amendment: “in any inventions or literary, scientific or artistic 
works of which he is the author”; and 
• Compromised text: “any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author”. 
This shows that the drafters did not intend to attach any requirement of 
‘originality’ to inventors. Note that the originality is a requirement for 
copyrightable work, and the corresponding requirement for a patentable 
invention, i.e., novelty, has nothing to do with an origin of the invention. The 
                                                      
432 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 9. 
433 Ibid. 
434 A/70/279 ¶32. The safeguards are within what the UN human rights bodies have 
repeatedly stated: the equation of IP regimes with the human right to protection 
under Author Clause is false and misleading given the fundamental difference 
between the IPRs and human rights. 
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change of “works” in the joint amendment to “production” in the compromised 
text does not seem to attach originality to invention or discovery. Historically, 
the concept of “true and first inventor” in the early patent custom era had little 
to do with original invention as discussed in Section 2-2, and this had been 
remained in mid twentieth century when UDHR was drafted. What mattered 
was the introduction of new trade or innovation itself, not the entity who 
introduced it. Therefore, the personal link, which is a basic premise of the 
human rights protection of an author,435 lacks in invention or scientific 
production.436  
Further, in the words of Brinkhof, “scientific production cannot be understood 
as being a synonym for an ‘invention’”,437 and “scientific production is not 
synonymous with patents. … neither the UDHR nor the ICESCR provides 
sufficient legal basis for the view that the entitlement to a patent ought to 
belong to human rights”.438 
3-3-3.	Moral	and	Material	Interests	
UN human rights institutions have repeatedly acknowledged the difference 
between the human rights protection of ‘authors’ and the protection of existing 
IP regime. General Comment No. 17 begins with the basic and uncontroversial 
assertion that the “scope of protection” of authors’ rights in Article 15(1)(c) 
“does not necessarily coincide with what is termed IP rights under national 
legislation or international agreements”.439 Yet, it is not clearly defined what, 
precisely, these differences are in scope. 
                                                      
435 See General Comment No. 17, ¶ 23 (“the very nature of the rights protection in 
article 15, paragraph 1(c) … lies in the protection of the personal link between the 
author and his/her creation”), and A/70/279 ¶ 32 (“the human right to benefit from 
the protection of the moral and material interest resulting from one’s scientific, 
literary and artistic productions safeguards the personal link between authors and 
their creation”). 
436 Drefuss points out the personal link in invention does not exist because the value 
of invention or discovery resides in functionality and not in the identity of the 
inventor (2010, p. 80). 
437 Brinkhof, 2010, pp. 147-148. 
438 Ibid, p. 149. 
439 General Comment No. 17, ¶¶ 2 to 3. 
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The scope of author’s protection under the international human rights laws is 
examined by analysing its two components - moral and material interests of 
authors.  
The moral interest of authors was the primary concern of the drafters of the 
UDHR and ICECSR. They considered that intellectual creation was an 
expression of personality of an author, and the protection of moral interest of 
author was necessary tools to link the intellectual production and its author.440 
The drafters were also affected by then existing international agreement on 
copyright, the Berne Convention that protected the author’s moral right.441 
Therefore, the protection of moral interests may be interpreted as close to the 
‘moral rights’ provided in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention: the right to 
attribution442 and the right to integrity.443 444 
One unresolved question with regard to the moral interest is the scope of moral 
interests of an inventor. As discussed in the previous section, an inventor was 
intentionally excluded by the drafters of UDHR and ICESCR from the concept 
of an author in Author Clause. However, subsequent interpretations of UN 
human rights bodies have extended the concept of authors to include inventors 
or innovators by expansive interpretation of ‘scientific production’, which 
include scientific or technological innovations and discoveries. Then, how to 
ensure the moral interests of inventors and innovators? The General Comment 
No. 17 simply states that “[A]uthors … and inventors shall retain … a moral 
right on their work and/or discovery”, and reiterates the author’s moral right to 
attribution and to integrity defined in the Berne Convention.445 The UN Patent 
                                                      
440 Ibid, ¶ 12; A/70/279, ¶ 34 
441 The moral right was codified in Berne Convention during its Rome revision in 
1928. 
442 The right of authors to be recognized as the creators of their scientific, literary 
and artistic productions. 
443 The right to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, such productions, which would be prejudicial to 
their honour and reputation. 
444 By contrast, the TRIPS Agreement does not respect the moral rights of author. 
This indicates that under the TRIPS regime the rights of knowledge capitalists (and 
owners) are favoured over the rights of knowledge producers (May, 2000, p. 73). 
445 General Comment No. 17, ¶¶ 12-13. 
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Report of 2015 simply avoids this thorny issue without further elaboration on 
the moral right of inventor. 
If the author of the Author Clause is interpreted to include an inventor, the 
existing patent laws are lacking sufficient protection for inventor’s moral 
interests. Most of the international and national patent laws do not recognise a 
personal link between inventors and inventions. Take for example, the 
European Patent Convention (EPC) only recognise the initial entitlement of a 
European patent, which is belong to the inventor (Article 60(1)). Although 
some view this provision the direct product of Author Clause of UDHR,446 
Article 60 of EPC is insufficient to protect of moral interests of an inventor for 
two reasons. First, the initial entitlement ensured by EPC has nothing to do with 
the right to attribution and integrity. Second, the entitlement is given to the first 
applicant.447 Inventor’s right to attribution is mentioned in Article 62 EPC that 
an inventor shall have the right, vis-à-vis an applicant for or proprietor of a 
European patent, to be mentioned as such before the European Patent Office. 
This provision has its root on Article 4ter of Paris Convention providing that 
“[T]he inventor shall have the right to be mentioned as such in the patent”. But 
this right, commonly recognized as moral right of inventors, can be waived and 
its protection is a matter for national legislation.448 In addition, the right to be 
mentioned is not extended to the right to be named as an inventor on the 
scientific production or creation. Nor the right to claim integrity is ensured for 
inventors. Therefore, the existing rules for inventor’s moral rights are far from 
the human right protection of moral interests of inventors.  
                                                      
446 During the discussion of the failed Community Patent Convention of 1975, the 
International Federation of Inventors Associations (IFIA) maintained that EPC 
provision (specifically Article 60) permitting a true inventor asking a transfer of an 
European patent application when the applicant fails to prove successor “are a 
direct consequence of Article 27(2) of UDHR (General Secretary of the Council of 
the European Communities, 1981, p. 21) 
447 According to Article 60(2) of EPC, “if two or more personals have made an 
invention independently of each other, the right to the European patent shall belong 
to the person whose European patent application has the earliest date of filing”. 
448 Bodenhausen, 1968, p. 64 (“Since the inventor has only the right to be 
mentioned in the patent, he can waive this right, unless national legislation 
prescribes otherwise. The original proposals for the provision contained a clause 
according to which any contract contrary to the provision would be null and void, 
but this clause was not accepted”). 
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The scope of protection of material interests is less certain than moral 
counterpart. The first insight into the scope of the protection of material 
interests is its association to the right to own property set forth in Article 17 of 
UDHR, or to the enjoyment of right to an adequate standard of living ensured in 
Article 11(1) of UDHR. While some view that the right to property covers the 
IP rights,449 others question this view and emphasise inherent limitations to the 
protection of material interest.450 The UN human right bodies put emphasis on 
direct relations of the protection of material interests and right to an adequate 
standard living of authors.451 
The second insight is to look at the inherent limitations imposed on the 
protection of material interests. Other rights, recognized in Article 15 of 
ICESCR and Article 27 of UDHR, provide a guideline for the interpretation of 
the scope of the protection of material interest. One thing to note is that even 
with its association to the right to property, the protection of material interest is 
not to be equated with the protection under the contemporary IP laws. That is, 
the right to the protection of material interests does not cover all forms of 
economic interests. Unlike the traditional economic rights, the material interests 
are not tied to objectives of market efficiency and utilitarianism.452 Further, 
travaux of UDHR and CESCR indicates that the material interests cover a 
narrower type of economic interests: the right to remuneration for intellectual 
labour.453  
                                                      
449 E.g., Cornides, 2004, pp. 139-141 (on grounds that the right to property is not 
limited to tangible assets); the European Human Rights Court of Strasbourg on 
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
450 Wong, 2009, p. 44; Amani, 2009, pp. 196-8. 
451 General Comment No. 17, ¶15 and A/70/279, ¶ 10 (The purpose of the 
Committee in this interpretative approach is to avoid “the conflation of this term 
with property rights or rights of exclusion, especially when held by corporations 
rather than individual creators”). 
452 Wong, 2009, p. 46. 
453 Yu, 2004, pp. 1087-1088; Cullet, 2007, p. 409. Cullet suggests that “this 
provision should not guarantee a monopoly rent, but rather only basic material 
compensation for effective costs incurred in developing a new scientific, literary, or 
artistic production and to foster a decent standard of living”. 
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3-3-4.	Obligation	and	Implementation	
The UHDR and the ICESCR are clearly written in terms of state obligation.454 
Then are non-state actors such as private parties, e.g., corporations and 
international organizations including the World Trade Organization and the 
World Intellectual Property Organization not bound by the international human 
rights norms?  
Although the non-states actors are not directly bound by ICESCR and UDHR, 
they are not free to violate the international human right norms.455 The UN 
Human Rights bodies have recognized the violation of human rights by non-
state actors and suggested responsibilities of non-state actors and duties of 
states to prevent from committing such violations.456 Further, Article 5(1) of 
ICESCR makes clear that “[N]othing in the present Covenant may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or 
freedoms recognized herein”. Hestermeyer suggests interpreting the human 
rights norms to contain a duty of the state to protect individuals from violations 
of their rights by the state and by private parties.457 Other scholars take the same 
position on the grounds that state governments are required to regulate 
individual parties to satisfy states’ treaty obligations.458 
Since 1999, the UN human rights institutions interpret the “core” obligation in 
                                                      
454 General Comment No. 17 mentions only states. But this is because its function is 
to provide an interpretation standard for states and therefore it directs only to states. 
455 Hestermeyer, 2007, p. 97. 
456 See, Clapham, 2006, pp. 324-32. In connection to the right to food, see CESCR 
General Comment No. 12 at ¶ 19, with regard to the right to water, refer to CESCR 
General Comment No. 15 at ¶ 23 and ¶ 24, and for the right to health, see the 
CESCR General Comment No. 14 at ¶ 35 and ¶ 42 (“While only States are parties 
to the Covenant and thus ultimately accountable for compliance with it, all 
members of society - individuals, including health professionals, families, local 
communities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, civil society 
organizations, as well as the private business sector - have responsibilities regarding 
the realization of the right to health. States parties should therefore provide an 
environment which facilitates the discharge of these responsibilities.). 
457 He further argues that the WTO has no direct human rights obligations under its 
own treaties, but general international law may impose a certain obligation. 
458 Helfer, 2007, p. 12. 
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terms of rights to health, food, education or rights to take part in cultural life, 
and rights to enjoy benefits of scientific progress, all of which are reiterated in 
General Comment No. 17. In this approach, the key is that “any intellectual 
property regime that makes it more difficult for a State party to comply with its 
core obligations in relation to health, food, education, especially, or any other 
right set out in the Covenant, is inconsistent with the legally binding obligations 
of the State party”.459  
General Comment No. 17 firstly spelled out in great detail the “core” obligation 
in terms of the right to the protection of moral and material interests. It creates 
new “core” rights by enlisting at least five core obligations, which are of 
immediate effect: 
(a) To take legislative and other necessary steps to ensure the effective 
protection of the moral and material interests of authors;  
(b) To protect the rights of authors to be recognized as the creators of their 
scientific, literary and artistic productions and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, their productions that would be prejudicial to their 
honour or reputation; 
(c) To respect and protect the basic material interests of authors resulting 
from their scientific, literary or artistic productions, which are necessary 
to enable those authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living; 
(d) To ensure equal access, particularly for authors belonging to 
disadvantaged and marginalized groups, to administrative, judicial 
or other appropriate remedies enabling authors to seek and obtain 
redress in case their moral and material interests have been 
infringed; 
(e) To strike an adequate balance between the effective protection of the 
moral and material interests of authors and States parties’ obligations in 
relation to the rights to food, health and education, as well as the rights 
to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific 
progress and its applications, or any other right recognized in the 
Covenant. 
This approach is problematic for several reasons. 
First, it is doubtable that rights to the protection of material interests can be 
categorized as basic rights necessitating the “core” obligation, which is not the 
                                                      
459 Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc. 
E/C. 12/2001/15 (2001), ¶ 12. 
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subject of “progressive realization”.460 Rights that need to “ensure the 
satisfaction of minimum essential levels of rights” can be regarded basic, in a 
sense that the enjoyment of it is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights.461 
If the concept of core rights gain currency, the “right to life” would certainly be 
among them.462 For example, a right to free speech cannot be enjoyed by 
someone who is under physical threat, any more than a right to employment can 
be enjoyed by someone who is inadequately nourished.463 The rights to 
protection of material interests can be subject of “core” obligation when 
authors’ rights to enjoy an adequate standard of living can be ensured only by 
the remuneration for the intellectual production, which would be seldom in 
practice. 
Second, if the protection of material interests of authors is subject of “core” 
obligation, the ability of governments to regulate them ought to be exceedingly 
narrow. As Helfer suggests, according to this test, government restrictions on 
authors’ rights must be “(1) determined by law, (2) in a manner compatible with 
the nature of these rights, (3) must pursue a legitimate aim, (4) must be strictly 
necessary for the promotion of the general welfare in a democratic society, (5) 
such limitations must be proportionate, meaning that (6) the least restrictive 
measures must be adopted when several types of limitations may be 
imposed”.464 Therefore, this may lead to a system of protection stricter than 
those provided by the present copyright or patent system. 
                                                      
460 General Comment No. 3 defines the core obligations: A minimum core 
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels 
of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State 
party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of essential 
foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the 
most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations 
under the Covenant (General Comment No. 3, ¶ 10). By contrast, the progressive 
obligation relates to an obligation of which full realization of human rights depend 
on resources of the states. Therefore, “progressive” realization refers to that “States 
parties have a specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards the full realization of all the rights enshrined in the 
Covenant” (Statement by CESCR, UN Doc. E/C. 12/2001/15 (2001), ¶11). 
461 Vincent, 1986, p. 125. 
462 Abbott 2006, p. 148. 
463 Vincent, 1986, p. 125. 
464 Helfer, 2007, p. 994 
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Third, General Comment No. 17 fails to pay due attention to emerging and 
viable alternative systems which do not rely on the economic remuneration for 
free sharing of “scientific or artistic production” such as Free Software and 
Creative Commons. Some commentators have been disappointed with the 
inability of the CESCR to focus its General Comment No. 17 on the tension 




3-4-1-1. Culture and Cultural Life of Community 
The right to take part in cultural life is the broadest one of the five cultural 
human rights.466 It is broadest due to the “amorphous and complex nature”467 of 
culture and cultural life. In the broadest sense, culture includes everything 
related to human life, which distinguishes human from nature. In 
anthropological sense, culture has “a polysemantic value”,468 and encompasses 
“aspects of life such as language, norms, values, beliefs, and practices that are 
specific to a certain human group and distinguish that group from others”.469 
The drafters of UDHR and ICESCR mostly had in mind a narrow view of 
culture - the ‘high’ material aspects of culture,470 such as art, theatre, museums, 
and other tangible elements of culture. 
Later, the UN bodies took a broader concept of culture. For instance, in 1976 
UNESCO issued a recommendation characterising culture as encompassing “all 
                                                      
465 Cullet 2004 (arguing “Unlike the 2001 Statement, the [then-]proposed General 
Comment focuses mostly on the rights of individual contributors to knowledge and 
gives little space to questions concerning the impacts of intellectual property rights 
on human rights”.). 
466 Stamatopoulou, 2008, p. 3. Other four rights are: the right to education; the right 
to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application; the right under 
Author Clause; and the freedom for scientific research and creative activity. 
467 Thornberry, 2008, p. 4. 
468 Farah & Tremolada, 2015, p. 463. 
469 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 238. 
470 Donders, 2008, p. 4. 
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forms of creativity and expression of groups and individuals”,471 and 
participants in the Day of General Discussion held in 1992 and 2008 supported 
a wide understanding of the concept of ‘culture’, in line with the definition 
provided by the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity.472 The General 
Comment No. 21, following the anthropological approach,473 defines the 
‘culture’ as “encompassing all manifestations of human existence”, and 
characterised “cultural life” as “an explicit reference to culture as a living 
process, historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a 
future”.474  
In order to assess the existing global IP norms in terms of the human right to 
science and culture, and operationalize the right to science and culture to the 
level that this right becomes “sufficiently precise to give rise to identifiable and 
practicable rights and obligations”,475 it is necessary to narrow down our focus 
to cultural right in a specified and restricted sense. Here, ‘operationalization’ 
refers to an effort to make the right to science and culture operable in a real 
world and a decisive component of the normative force of a legal norm.476 
Without operationalization, how national courts, administrative bodies and 
legislators, as recommended by the UN Copyright Report 2014, interpret 
national copyright and patent rules “consistently with human rights standards, 
including the right to science and culture”?477 This operationalization process 
requires “a version of conceptual subsidiarity”,478 which brings a broad concept 
to closer to base and addresses a situation in terms of human rights. The notion 
of “access to knowledge” may provide a useful conceptual subsidiarity. ‘Access 
                                                      
471 UNESCO. (1976). Recommendation on participation by the people at large in 
cultural life. UNESCO Doc. 19 C/Resolutions. (¶ I.3(a)). 
472 In the fifth paragraph of the preamble of the Declaration, the ‘culture’ is 
regarded as “the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional 
features of society or a social group”, and encompassing “art and literature, 
lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. 
473 Romainville, 2015, p. 426. 
474 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 11. 
475 UN General Assembly Resolution 41/120, dated 4 December 1986. 
476 Romainville, 2015, p. 427. 
477 UN Copyright Report 2014, ¶ 97 
478 Thornberry, 2008, p. 6. 
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to knowledge’ is an umbrella term referring to various movements aiming at 
creating “more equitable public access to the products of human culture and 
learning”,479 and ultimately realising alternative model for knowledge and 
information production and sharing. It covers cross-sectoral issues such as 
“science, education, research, and many other public-policy areas”.480 The 
central themes of A2K are explained as “information commons and public 
domain”,481 “the public domain, the commons, sharing and openness” or “the 
idea of balance in IP and the protection of the public domain”.482  
By taking the notion of ‘access to knowledge’ as a conceptual subsidiarity, the 
culture within the meaning of the right to science and culture is redefined as 
something placed between the anthropological culture and the initial narrow 
concept of culture. The redefined culture may refer to “cultural expressions and 
heritage, and the processes of understanding, expression, learning, 
communication, and creation”.483 This redefined concept of culture is 
comparable with the first and second clusters of culture as defined by Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen who defines three clusters of culture: (1) ‘culture as capital’ 
(accumulated material heritage of humankind in its entirety or of particular 
human groups); (2) ‘culture as creativity’ (a process of artistic and scientific 
                                                      
479 Malcolm, 2010, p. 2. Benkler explains four long-term intellectual and material-
historical trends for an account of the emergence of the access to knowledge 
movement; (1) the rise of a globalized, liberal trading system, (2) the rise of 
information economy, (3) the subsequent genesis of a networked information 
society; (4) the rise of human rights in general as an ideal and the idea of 
development as freedom (Benkler, 2010, p. 222-223). Kapczynski locates the A2K 
movement as a reaction to structural trends in technologies of information 
processing and a conceptual critique of the narrative legitimating maximalist 
agenda of IP expansion (Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 18-30). 
480 Latif, 2010, p. 112. 
481 Kapczynski, 2008, p. 853. 
482 Boyle, 2008, p. 243. 
483 Romainville, 2015, p. 429. Inspired by Sunstein’s theory of ‘incomplete 
theorized and specified agreements’, Romainville opens a new way of definition for 
the right to take part in cultural life, which is in between a restrictive definition of 
“a right to access a set of definite artworks” and “anthropological definition given 
in General Comment No. 21” (Ibid, p. 428). According to her, this approach allows 
to identify six prerogatives that the right to take part in cultural life implies for 
individuals: creative freedom; the right to conservation, development and diffusion 
of the diversity of cultural heritages and expressions; access to cultural life and 
cultural informations; contribution to cultural life; freedom of choice; and 
participation in the decision-making in cultural matters (Ibid, pp. 430-435). 
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creation); and (3) ‘culture as a total way of life’.484 Joan posits that the second 
view of ‘culture as creativity’ is “the more traditional characterization of 
culture” in IP law, while the third description is more anthropological and the 
best for the protection of traditional knowledge of indigenous people.485 
Further operationalization of the right to science and culture is conducted by 
discussing other elements of the right in the ensuing sections. What should be 
noted at this section is the dynamic nature of the underlying concept of the 
right. Culture is not “a fixed artefact” but “a dynamic process of engagement 
among those who make up a culture”,486 and as ECSCR characterised, the 
cultural life is best understood by “reference to culture as a living process, 
historical, dynamic and evolving, with a past, a present and a future”.487 
3-4-1-2. “To Take Part” 
The main components of the right to participate or take part in cultural life 
include: (a) participation in; (b) access to; and (c) contribution to cultural life.488  
The participation component covers an active element: not merely including 
reference to ‘general participation’ in ‘cultural, religious, social, economic and 
public life’, but also to effective participation in decisions on the national and 
regional level.489 The access component is broadly interpreted to encompass the 
right “to know and understand his or her culture and that of others through 
education and information, and to receive quality education and training with 
due regard for cultural identity”.490 The third component, contribution to 
cultural life, refers to the right to be involved in creative activity such as 
creating “the spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional expressions of the 
                                                      
484 Stavenhagen, 2001, p. 87. 
485 Joan, 2016, p. 65. 
486 Benkler, 2006, p. 282. 
487 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 12. 
488 Ibid, ¶ 15. 
489 Thornberry, 2008, p. 7. 
490 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 15. 
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community.491 
Of these three components, the access component has been central to the 
historical proponents of the right to participate in cultural life,492 and is essential 
for the purpose of analysing the intersection of this right to IPRs. The notion of 
the right to culture, along with the right to science, can be best captured by the 
phrase ‘the right to access to knowledge’.493 By the right of everyone to culture, 
it is to be understood that everyone has the right to access to knowledge, to the 
arts and literature of all people,494 and IPRs of access-restricting nature creates 
an inherent, fundamental, and systematic tension with the right to culture.495 
According to Romainville, the access component has two different dimensions: 
material dimension, which implies more affordable performances, activities, 
cultural institutions, equally accessible cultural infrastructure; and intellectual 
dimension, which focuses on access to cultural information and to media and 
access to and enrichment of cultural capital and cultural references.496 When 
focusing on the intersection of IP and the right to science and culture, the 
second dimension has implications for distributive justice and freedom. The 
demand for access is a claim from those excluded, which anchored in the 
demands for distributive justice, as best demonstrated by the movement of 
access to AIDS medicines, which intimately bound up with claims about 
intellectual property.497 Freedom of action of ‘information commons’ can be 
guaranteed by condition of “a universe of existing information resources on 
                                                      
491 Ibid, ¶ 15. 
492 Romainville, 2015, p. 433. 
493 Submission by the Information Society Project at Yale Law School to CESCR 
(41th Sessions, 3-21 November 2008), p. 1. 
494 Boutros-Ghali, 1970, p. 73. 
495 In April 2007, the European Parliament called on the EC to initiate a thorough 
revision of IPRs in order to better ensure “free and fair access to cultural products 
and services, an access that, when denied, may constitute “root causes to 
counterfeiting and piracy” (European Parliament, European agenda for culture in a 
globalising world, Resolution P6_TA (2008) 0124 (April 2007), ¶ 52, cited in ISP 
of Yale, 2008, fn. 34). 
496 Romainville, 2015, pp. 433-434. 
497 Kapczynski, 2010, pp. 37-38. 
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which they have the authority to act”.498 However, IPRs, copyrights or patents, 
remove the authority to act on a given information and cultural resources and 
locates such authority in the hand of IPR holders.499 
3-4-1-3. Elements for the realisation of the Right to Take Part in Cultural 
Life 
For the full realisation of the right to take part in cultural life, mere protection 
and conservation of culture and cultural heritage are insufficient: enabling 
conditions and environment that guarantee for everyone to “access, participate 
in and contribute to cultural life in a continuously and developing manner” are 
needed.500 
ECSCR emphasised those necessary conditions to be met on the basis of 
equality and non-discrimination, which include: (a) availability of cultural 
goods and services; (b) accessibility for individuals and communities to enjoy 
culture fully; (c) acceptability of cultural policies and measures; (d) adaptability 
of cultural policies, strategies, programmes and measures adopted by the State; 
and (e) appropriateness (or cultural adequacy).501 
The importance of enabling condition and environment can be explained by 
‘combined capability’ of Nussbaum’s theory, which relates to ‘innate powers’ 
of people and ‘external opportunity’.502 It requires positive measures creating 
“possibilities and institutional infrastructure” allowing individuals to “actually 
enjoy that particular capabilities”.503 The measures to build infrastructure for 
ensuring real opportunities for everyone to access, participate in and contribute 
to cultural life, which has a connection with freedom as well as participatory 
role of individuals, are in tension with exclusive nature of IPRs in that the 
                                                      
498 Benkler, 2010, p. 227. 
499 Ibid, p. 228. 
500 Human Rights Council, Report of Special Rapporteur, A/HRC/31/59 (3 
February 2016), ¶ 8. 
501 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 16. 
502 The innate power, called ‘the basic capability’ by Nussabum, refers to the innate 
equipment of individuals necessary for developing more advanced capability 
(Nussbaum, 1997, p. 289).  
503 Romainville, 2015, p. 416. 
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freedom of individuals to take cultural product, and “cut it, paste it, mix it, and 
make it their own” is restricted by legal constraints, mostly by copyright 
laws.504 
3-4-1-4. Obligation of States 
Obligation imposed on the States party by the right to participate in cultural life, 
which is immediate, includes recognition of cultural practices and refraining 
from interfering in their enjoyment and development.505 From the holistic 
approach of human rights, active actions are also imposed. Hence, states must 
adopt steps necessary for the conservation, development and dissemination of 
science and culture as well as steps to ensure respect for the freedom 
indispensable to scientific research and creative activity.506 
Like other rights enshrined in ICESCR, the right to participate in cultural life 
imposes on State parties three types of legal obligations to: (a) respect; (b) 
protect; and (c) fulfil the right. The minimum core obligation in relation to the 
right to take part in culture includes, inter alia: an obligation “to respect and 
protect the right of everyone to engage in their own cultural practice, while 
respecting … freedom of thought, belief and religion”.507 
3-4-2.	The	Right	to	Enjoy	the	Benefits	of	Scientific	Progress	and	Its	
Applications	
3-4-2-1. Science, its Progress and Applications 
Among the human rights, the right to benefit from scientific progress is a 
“neglected” human right. Both UDHR and ICESCR ensure everyone’s right to 
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications. Although this right 
was inserted into the international human rights instruments long ago, it has 
long failed to attract attention from the human rights and scientific 
communities,508 and the only provision in Article 15(1) of ICESCR that the 
                                                      
504 Benkler, 2006, p. 276. 
505 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 44. 
506 Ibid, ¶ 47. 
507 General Comment No. 21, ¶ 55(c). 
508 Chapman & Wyndham, 2013, p. 1291; London, Cox & Coomans, 2016, p. 26. 
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Committee (CESCR) has not yet issued an authoritative interpretation.509 
The notion of ‘science’ in ‘scientific progress’ is far-reaching, not narrowly 
referring to technology but broadly encompassing “knowledge that is testable 
and rebuttable, in all fields of inquiries, including social sciences, and 
encompassing all research”.510 
In parallel with the ‘operationalization’ work on the right to participate in 
cultural life conducted in Section 3-3-1, the notion of ‘science’ needs to be 
narrowed down. In the narrowest conception, the science may be viewed as one 
applied to “industry and production whereby industry bases itself on specialized 
technical knowledge which relies on science … so that man can manipulate 
nature for the material welfare of man with far-reaching effects on his cultural 
orientation”.511 This concept of science needs to be expanded to cover major 
concerns of Venice Statement, that is increased human rights impacts arising 
from two factors: increasing disparities among states concerning the availability 
of resources, capabilities and infrastructure for research and development; 
private actors being the principal producers of scientific progress and 
technological advances, leading to inequality among people.512 
By taking into consideration of its intersection with the trade-centric IP norms, 
science is broadly defined to encompass creative production and relevant 
policies that are identified as “most directly challenged by international trade 
liberalization”,513 which definitely includes technologies and discoveries that 
may be covered by patents.514 Further, a broad set of technologies that are 
considered as “essential for realisation of the human rights to an adequate 
standard of living and cultural and scientific participation”,515 and that reveal a 
                                                      
509 Yu, 2016, p. 41. 
510 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26 (14 May 2012), ¶ 24. 
511 Otieno, 1970, p. 70. 
512 Venice Statement, ¶¶ 3-5. 
513 Morijn, 2008, p. 293. 
514 UN Patent Report 2015, ¶ 46. 
515 Shaver, 2016, p. 38. As the terms “progress” and “benefit” are linked to 
progressive realization of economic, social, and cultural human rights, some 
scholars view that the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
application is not an end itself but a vehicle for achieving other human rights, such 
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tension between patent exclusivity and the need for broad access to new 
technologies516 is to be included within the notion of science and its 
applications. 
3-4-2-2. To Share in or Enjoy Benefits 
The term ‘benefits’ of science, scientific progress and its application include 
both material and non-material benefits,517 and convey the idea of a positive 
impact on the well-being of people and the realization of their human rights.518 
The benefits should be enjoyed in a non-discriminatory manner. This principle 
of equality does not only apply to minority and vulnerable groups, but to those 
who did not take part in scientific progress. As Cassin declared, during the 
UDRP drafting, “[E]ven if all persons could not play an equal part in scientific 
progress, they should indisputably be able to participate in the benefits derived 
from it”.519  
In this vein, the right to enjoy benefits of scientific progress and its applications 
is linked to distributive justice and requires “affirmative actions”520 so that the 
right to science “cannot be reduced to the right to wait to benefit from any 
trickle-down effects … flowing from technological progress”.521 Thus, the right 
to participate in the benefits of science means, among other things, to be able to 
receive affordable medicine, which is a prerequisite to the full development of 
one’s personality”.522 Then, this right is in an inherent tension with IPRs, in 
particular with patent, which are, in the words of the Venice Statement, 
                                                      
as the right to health (London, Cox & Commans, 2016, p. 27). 
516 UN Patent Report 2015, ¶¶ 47-55. 
517 The non-material benefit may include “removal of certain prejudices, for 
example racial prejudices, which constituted a direct threat to the whole edifice of 
human rights (Commission on Human Rights, 1951, p. 11), and scientific 
methodologies and tools (Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26, ¶¶ 22, 24). 
518 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26, ¶ 24. 
519 Morsink, 1999, p. 219. 
520 Chapman, 2009, p. 14. 
521 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 237. 
522 Morsink, 1999, p. 219. 
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“temporary monopoly”.523 
Another important aspect of the “benefit sharing” is public participation in 
decision-making about science and its uses.524 This aspect can be justified by 
the principles of self-determination and participatory democracy model of 
governance of sciences. These principles require that major decisions about 
priorities and policies on science and its applications be made with input by 
diverse communities within a society.525 Public participation in decision-making 
process is also related to safety because certain scientific advancement is 
harmful and dangerous as exemplified in cases of agricultural biotechnology 
and artificial intelligence. 
Participation in a decision-making process is also vital in light of the nature of 
the right to enjoy benefit from scientific progress. This right does not directly 
confer to individuals or groups of people an enforceable entitlement to claim 
benefits of scientific progress. Rather, it entails a right for people to demand 
policy framework to be “adopted and implemented which aims at making the 
benefits of scientific progress available and accessible”.526 The availability and 
accessibility of the benefits are not only guaranteed by promoting scientific 
advancement and innovation, but by removing obstacles preventing people from 
accessing and using existing scientific knowledge and production. Here the 
norm-setting process of trade-centric IP norms gives rise to conflict with the 
right to science and culture, which will be discussed in Section 3-5 and the 
following case study chapters. 
3-4-2-3. Normative Content 
To delineate the normative contents of the right, the interlinked nature of this 
right needs to be taken into consideration. The right to benefit from scientific 
                                                      
523 Venice Statement, ¶ 10 (“The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications may create tensions with intellectual property regime, which is 
a temporary monopoly with a valuable social function that should be managed in 
accordance with a common responsibility to prevent the unacceptable prioritization 
of profit for some over benefit for all.) 
524 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, 2014, p. 1218. 
525 Chapman, 2009, p. 15. 
526 London, Cox & Coomans, 2016, p. 28. 
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progress and its application is inextricably linked to various other human rights 
including the freedom indispensable for scientific research and progress in 
Article 15(3) ICESCR, the right under Author Clause, the right to food (Article 
11 ICESCR), the right to health (Article 12 ICESCR) and other rights such as to 
a clean environment, education, information, labor rights, social security, 
sustainable development, and water.527 
The normative contents of the right to benefit from scientific progress and its 
application can be discussed in consideration of three aspects of the right: (a) 
freedom of scientific research and communication; (b) enjoyment of the 
benefits of scientific progress; and (c) protection from adverse effects of 
science.528 Based on this premise, the Special Rapporteur proposes four 
normative contents for the right to science: (a) access to the benefits of science 
by everyone, without discrimination; (b) opportunities for all to contribute to 
the scientific enterprise and freedom indispensable for scientific research; (c) 
participation of individuals and communities in decision-making; and (d) an 
enabling environment fostering the conservation, development and diffusion of 
science and technology.529 
Of these, the freedom of scientific research and communication can be ensured 
by creating an enabling and participatory environment for freedom of opinion 
and expression, seeking, receiving and imparting information, equal access and 
participation of all public and private actors, and capacity-building and 
education.530 
For the realization of the right to science, like for the right to participate in 
cultural life, access to scientific knowledge is pivotal.531 When the scientific 
knowledge is completely protected, it is difficult to see how one could still 
enjoy and exercise the right to science.532 Therefore, the Special Rapporteur 
                                                      
527 Venice Statement, ¶ 12(d). 
528 Saul, Kinley & Mowbray, 2014, p. 1215. 
529 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26, ¶ 25; Bidault, 2016, p. 21. 
530 Venice Statement, ¶ 13. 
531 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26, ¶ 27. 
532 Yu, 2016, p. 77. 
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stresses the need to guard against promoting the privatization of knowledge to 
the extent that it deprives individuals of opportunities to enjoy the fruits of 
scientific progress.533  In practical terms, the right to science implies the 
prioritization of universal access to essential technologies such as water 
purification, essential medicines, electricity, telephone and Internet services, as 
well as access to scientific education and the tools for learning.534  
The enabling environment for the promotion of diffusion of science and 
technology needs to be approached differently from that for the right to take 
part in cultural life by considering the tacit nature of scientific and technological 
knowledge. As discussed in previous Section 2-2-2, technological knowledge is 
tacit and practical knowledge, requiring information cost and learning cost. 
Therefore, a ‘pure’ pubic good theory does not apply to science and technology. 
Even when technological information is freely available by e.g., transferring, 
“the recipient needs to have basic knowledge to scan, understand, and use it”.535 
Thus, it would be wrong to equate scientific and technological knowledge to 
information as a public good. This observation has a significant implication in 
transfer of technology between North and South, which is a broken promise of 
TRIPS (see Sections 2-5 and 2-6) and TRIPS-plus bilaterals (for an analysis 
with the EU-Korea FTA, see Section 5-3-2). 
3-4-2-4. Obligation of States 
The duty of states on the science right includes obligations: (a) to respect the 
freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity, such as 
freedom of thought, to hold opinions without interferences, and to seek, receive, 
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, and to take appropriate measures 
to prevent the use of science and technology in a manner that could limit or 
interfere with the enjoyment of the human rights and fundamental freedom, (b) 
to protect the right by taking measures to prevent and preclude the utilization by 
third parties of science and technologies to the detriment of human rights, and 
                                                      
533 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/20/26, ¶ 65. 
534 UNGA, Report of the OHCHR on the seminar on the right to enjoy the benefits 
of scientific progress and its applications, A/HRC/26/19 (1 April 2014), ¶ 11 
(summarizing the presentation of Ms. Shaver). 
535 Archibugi & Filippetti, 2015, p. 486. 
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to ensure in particular the right to information and free and informed consent; 
(c) to fulfill by adopting a legal and policy framework and establishing 
institutions to promote the development and diffusion of science and 
technology, and by promoting access to the benefits of science and its 
applications on a nondiscriminatory basis.536 
3-5.	Norm	Setting	Process	
Both the UN Copyright Report of 2014 and Patent Report of 2015 express 
considerable concerns on transparency and democratic process in international 
IP norm setting. Particularly, bilateral, regional or plurilateral trade negotiations 
such as ACTA and TPP, carried out amid great secrecy, allowing substantial 
corporate participation but excluding equivalent public interest voices, are 
concerned to advance private interests at the expense of public welfare or 
human rights.537 This democratic deficit may bring a conflict with the human 
right to take part in public affairs enshrined in Article 25 of ICCPR,538 and the 
right to science and culture.539  
Transparency and public participation in norm setting are much less guaranteed 
in bilateral trade negotiations than multilateral discussions of such as WIPO and 
WTO. Rather secrecy has long been a standard in bilateral forums. The shift to 
less transparent negotiation forums is “part of effort by powerful actors to 
institutionalize new unequal norms in other forums, not yet challenged by social 
movements”,540 and to avoid “an open debate over the standards being proposed 
                                                      
536 Venice Statement ¶¶ 14-16. 
537 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 19. In case of TPP, while law makers were not 
allowed to access to draft texts, so-called “trade advisers” were frequently given 
access to major parts of TPP draft texts, and these “trade advisers” were “simply 
lobbyists representing the interests of U.S. corporations” (Rubinson, 2017, p. 454). 
538 The conduct of public affairs is a broad concept which covers all aspects of 
public administration, and the formulation and implementation of policy at 
international, national, regional and local levels (General Comment No. 21 on the 
right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of equal access to 
public service, ¶ 5). 
539 The right to participate in cultural life covers the right to contribute to cultural 
life which is supported by the right to take part in the definition, elaboration and 
implementation of policies and decisions that have an impact on the exercise of a 
person’s cultural rights (General Comment No. 21, ¶ 15(c)). 
540 Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, pp. 110-111 (citing Morin, J-F. (2006). 
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in the agreement”.541 Government officials taking part in bilateral trade 
negotiations have a discretion to opt for a closed-door negotiation strategy, and 
from the perspective of diplomats and negotiators, maintaining secrecy seems 
valuable by permitting smooth and efficient negotiation process and creating an 
environment of confidence for negotiators.542 However, given that IP-related 
negotiations in bilateral trade forums are directly linked to domestic legislations 
in which openness is a well-established norm, and increasingly cover diverse 
range of issues affecting various groups of people, such a discretion needs to be 
balanced with public interests that can be ensured by transparency and public 
participation of trade negotiations.  
Therefore, as the Washington Declaration declares, “intellectual property policy 
making should be conducted through mechanisms of transparency and openness 
that encourage broad public participation . . . [and] [n]ew rules should be made 
within the existing forums . . . where the texts of and forums for considering 
proposals are open”, and “[a]ll new intellectual property standards must be 
subject to democratic checks and balances”.543 
From the positive nature of the right to science and culture, which requires 
positive measures creating possibilities and institutional infrastructure allowing 
individuals to actually enjoy their particular possibilities and public 
participation in decision-making process of cultural and scientific policies as 
discussed earlier in Sections 3-4-1 and 3-4-2, transparency is not sufficient. 
Transparency, referring to openness of or better access to information, primarily 
focus on information equity.544 Transparency may change the power structure 
between the government and the public by removing asymmetry of information, 
serving a more democratic and human rights friendly norm setting.545 Yet, 
                                                      
Tripping up TRIPS debates IP and health in bilateral agreements, International 
Journal of Intellectual Property Management, 1, 37) 
541 Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, p. 110. 
542 Limenta, 2012, pp. 78-79, 86. 
543 The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, 
adopted by the Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest held 
on August 25-27, 2011 with over 180 experts from 32 countries. 
544 Limenta, 2012, p. 92. 
545 This will be demonstrated later in case studies on FTAs, in particular see, 
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transparency does not necessarily allow active participation. For active 
participation, individuals and groups of people who are affected are guaranteed 
to have an ability to influence decision-making and to involve in agenda-setting 
and actual discussion, while recognising governments’ discretion as policy 
makers. 
Transparency and public participation in IP norm setting process is an 
obligation imposed upon states by the human rights instruments. Yet, in order 
for IP policies to be made in a democratic way, it is necessary to convince the 
policy makers of the benefit to them of transparency and public participation.546 
Lack of democratic process may raise a question on the efficiency of the norm 
and its legitimacy.547 As Limenta puts it “transparency and public participation 
are significant to enhance the credibility of trade negotiation process. Greater 
credibility generates a greater degree of compliance”.548 Further, transparent 
and democratic process in norm-setting is vital in striking a fair balance 
between protection and dissemination, without which IP systems would lose 
credibility.549 
Further, the international IP norms formulated in this way foreclose the 
possibility of alternative model such as access-oriented legislation. This has 
created a form of path dependency – the proliferation of proprietary models, 
alongside stringent restrictions on access-oriented model – that the A2K 
movement aims to address.550 Therefore, it is recommended that international IP 
instruments, including trade agreements, be negotiated in a transparent way, 
permitting public engagement and commentary, and that national patent laws 
and policies be adopted and reviewed in forums that promote broad 
                                                      
Section 5-6-3 on EC’s efforts to harmonize criminal enforcement rules. 
546 Limenta, 2012, p. 93. 
547 Drahos, 2002, p. 180. 
548 Limenta, 2012, p. 77. 
549 One example of good practices for the transparent and democratic process is the 
UK’s copyright law revision process in 2014. The new legislation was adopted 
through an extensive consultation process, resulting in legislation that expanded 
copyright exceptions and limitations and ensured that several crucial limitations 
could no longer be overridden by private contract (UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 
86). 
550 Bannerman, 2016, p. 18. 
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engagement, with input from innovators and the public at large.551 
3-6.	Human	Rights	Model	of	IP	
3-6-1.	New	Balance	and	L&E	
Balance is a foundational element in IP system. It is not foundational only in IP; 
it is the central question of law in general. The role of law keeping peaceful 
coexistence of the human groups can only be achieved through a balance 
between opposing interests.552 But in the trade-centric IP regime the balance is 
biased in favor of right holders. TRIPS Agreement, unlike Berne and Paris 
Conventions, employs in Article 7 the terminology of “balance” between rights 
and obligations. However, the balance provision is outweighed by a large 
number of substantive provisions for stronger protection and enforcement of 
IPRs. Further, the balance provision has little or no independent weight in 
applying TRIPS.553 The balance provision is far from addressing the concerns of 
imbalance of TRIPS.  
Furthermore, the TRIPS-plus bilateral and regional trade agreements do not 
have the balance provision. Study of Wechsler reveals that out of the 17 FTAs 
driven by the US, only one FTA, the US-Chile FTA, explicitly recognize “the 
need to achieve a balance between the right holders and the legitimate interest 
of users and the community with regard to protected works”.554 Some EU FTAs 
are worse. For instance, the EU-Korea FTA, contains an outspoken provision 
explicitly ignoring the balance, stating in Article 10:1 that the goals of IP 
Chapter are to: “(a) facilitate the production and commercialisation of 
innovative and creative products in the Parties; and (b) achieve an adequate and 
effective level of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights”.555 
                                                      
551 The UN Patent Policy of 2015, ¶¶ 92-93. 
552 Geiger, 2015, access right, p. 6. 
553 Wechsler, 2009, p. 4. (In 25 TRIPS dispute settlement cases by 2009, “there 
were only one appellate body report and three panel reports that explicitly referred 
to the term “balance” in an IP law context”). 
554 Wechsler, 2009, p. 3. 
555 Compare Article 195 of the EU-Colombia and Peru FTA signed on 29 June 
2012 (“The objectives of this Title are to: (a) promote innovation and creativity and 
facilitate the production and commercialisation of innovative and creative products 
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The human rights approach of IP may work to recover the broken balance of the 
trade-centric IP norms. For striking a fair balance, the first step is delineating 
two opposing poles to be balanced. In human rights model, the dissemination 
side of the right to science and culture should be balanced with private interests 
of IPR holders. And in striking the balance, the private interests should not be 
unduly favoured and the public interest in enjoying broad access to creative 
productions should be given due consideration.556 
The second step is to take a larger perspective. As Breakey suggested, copyright 
exceptions are not “a small, tentative island in the large sea that is the 
fundamental prohibition on copying from others’ work”.557 Rather, “intellectual 
property is just a small lake in the larger continent; it is a set of limited and 
tentative exceptions to much larger and more fundamental rights like the right 
to free speech”.558 This approach is in line with the holistic approach of the right 
to science and culture. From this, more positive user’s right may be constructed. 
As discussed in previous Sections, the protection of author’s moral and material 
interest is justifiable only when it promotes a full enjoyment of other human 
rights, especially the right to culture. Given the right to culture is a positive 
right, the balancing exercise does not refer to one against a mere limitation or 
exception to the protection of moral and material interest. Therefore, the 
principle of restrictive interpretation of limitation and exceptions is no longer 
applied to the balance striking work. The right to take part in cultural life and 
the right to benefit from scientific progress can be fully justified without 
resorting to “limitations and exceptions” to IP protection or to flexibilities of 
TRIPS. 
                                                      
between the Parties; and  (b) achieve an adequate and effective level of protection 
and enforcement of intellectual property rights that contributes to transfer and 
dissemination of technology and favour social and economic welfare and the 
balance between the rights of the holders and the public interest”). One of the 
reasons of the change in the language of the objective provision of the EU FTAs 
recognizing the primacy of economic development goals for agreement partners 
may be that the EU negotiators were aware of considerable criticism on the TRIPS-
plus agenda in the previous EU FTAs (Maskus, 2014, pp. 171-172). 
556 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 35. 
557 Breakey, 2016, p. 2. 
558 Ibid. 
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Also vital in this balance striking work is to understand the nature of trade-
centric IP norms. They do not aim to incentivize creative activities of 
individuals. Rather, they aim to commercialize products in technological and 
cultural industries and to boost rent-seeking by investors in trade partner 
country as revealed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
3-6-2.	Liability	Rule	for	the	Protection	of	Material	Interests	of	Authors	
Property and liability rules are two distinct forms of legal protection of 
entitlement. Calabresi and Melamed distinguishes them: while under the 
property rule, a person is granted an absolute title to conduct a certain act or to 
never being subjected to a certain infringement, under the liability rule, a person 
is required to accept an infringement by another person as long as there is a 
compensation for damages.559  
In an economic cost-benefit analysis of law, the choice between the property 
and liability rules depends on two factors: externalities; and transaction costs. In 
his seminal article, Coase claims that even in the presence of externalities, 
private bargaining through a market system can lead to an optimum outcome.560 
Further, if transaction costs are zero, initial allocation of entitlement does not 
matter.561 In other words, who is entitled by either property or liability rule does 
not affect the outcome. However, as Coase himself admits, no transaction cost 
is “a very unrealistic assumption”.562 Then, two questions arise in the presence 
of transaction cost: how to allocate an entitlement; and which rule is to be 
applied. Conventional wisdom is that the entitlement is allocated in a way that 
an obligation is placed on those who have the least costly solution, and when 
transaction cost is low, the property rule is better, whereas with high the 
transaction cost, the liability rule produces more efficient outcome and 
externalities are internalized.563 A property rule is also chosen when the amount 
                                                      
559 Calabresi & Melamed, 1972, p. 1091. 
560 Coase, 1960. 
561 Merges, 1994, p. 2565 (f.n. 6). 
562 Coase, 1960, p. 15. 
563 Krauss, 1999, p. 788; Merges, 1994, p. 2655. One of the striking examples of the 
low transaction cost is the bargaining between beekeepers and farmers. As honey 
bees do not fly very far, one beekeeper can contract for its pollination service with 
one farmer. There are no bystanders and the property rights here are clear; 
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of damages is hard to be calculated by courts or public policy makers. 
In the context of IP, most of the creative works and innovations exhibit positive 
externalities, and a free market would involve underproduction of creative 
goods.564 This can be explained by the currently dominant justification of IPRs 
– a utilitarian justification.565 Creators cannot fully capture or “internalize” 
benefits that free-riders enjoy from creative goods because the creative goods 
are non-rival and non-excludable. Due to this ‘public goods’ problem or 
‘tragedy of commons’ problem, the creators are dissuaded from incurring costs 
necessary in creation, leading to underproduction. Therefore, property rights for 
the protection of creators emerge as a tool for internalizing positive 
externalities.566 IPR, a “classic instance of a property rule”567 is justified in both 
Coasean and Demsetzian models on various accounts.  
For instance, Merges supports property rules of the Coasean model as they 
work effectively in situations involving IPRs because: (1) there are only two 
parties in IP transaction; (2) the transaction costs are low; and (3) courts have 
difficulties in setting the terms of exchange given the abstract nature of creative 
ideas and the varied and complex business environments in which IP assets are 
deployed.568 Kieff, advancing the Demsetzian model, maintains that strong 
                                                      
beekeepers own bees and farmers own crops. Hence the externalities generated by 
honey bees pollinating crops in the nearby farms are all internalized (Cheung, 
1973). Cases for high transaction cost are many such as driving while using a cell 
phone (having negative externalities on the safety of others but people cannot 
contract with all drivers), flu shot (exhibiting positive externalities but hard to know 
the beneficiaries e.g., by not sneezing in a subway), and ‘thank you for not 
smoking’ (producing positive externalities and difficult to make efficient deals with 
potential victims of second smoking). 
564 Langus, Neven & Shier, 2013, p. 40. By contrast, Merges observes that even the 
existence of externalities in IP is debatable due to abstract nature of creative ideas 
(1996, p. 2658) 
565 Fromer, 2010, p. 1458. 
566 Kieff, 2006, p. 338; Demsetz, 1976, p. 354 (arguing that “property rights arise 
when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits 
and costs”). 
567 Merges, 1994, p. 2655. 
568 Ibid, p. 2664. 
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property protection of IP is efficient for commercialization of IP asset.569 
Critics point out that the biggest risk of applying property rules in IP case is 
holdup, enabling IP holders to demand the full value of others’ use as a 
condition of approving it and preventing society from benefiting from 
improvement by subsequent creators.570 More importantly, the transaction costs 
in IP bargaining are not low, contrary to the fundamental assumption for the 
choice of property rule. In IP bargaining, the transaction costs are high because 
of costs in delimitating boundaries between protected and unprotected areas. 
The scopes of patent and copyright are determined by uncertain interpretative 
rules such as ‘doctrine of equivalent’ for patent and ‘substantial similarity’ for 
copyright. These rules are also varying. Further, validity of right is uncertain in 
case of patent because most of patents turn out to be invalid in litigations. 
Therefore, economists, particularly information economists, offer no or lesser 
clear endorsement of property rule of IP.571 
One point at which the human rights discourse can enter into the choice 
between property and liability rules is the basic premise of legal economics. 
The “optimal outcome” of the Coasean model is determined in terms of 
economic efficiency, i.e., efficient allocation of resources, not of income 
distribution.572 The problem is that the economic model does not take seriously 
into account justice and distributive consequences of policies, albeit not entirely 
rejecting justice as a criterion for assessing the economic efficiency.573 Given 
that the human rights protection of moral and material interest of creator has no 
stand-alone footing and inseparably interlinked with dissemination side as 
demonstrated in Section 3-2-1, the consideration of equal allocation of 
resources and distributive justice is a built-in condition of the human rights 
model of IP. The goal of utilitarian economic efficiency, i.e., the aggregate 
welfare maximization is not a substitute for justice and the values reflected in 
certain legal rules including IP ought not to be reduced to mere factors in a 
                                                      
569 Kieff, 2006, p, 332. 
570 Lemley, 2012, p. 468. 
571 Kapczynski, 2012, p. 988. 
572 Coase, 1960. 
573 Posner, 1998, p. 30. 
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utilitarian calculus.574  
Another problem of the (neo-)classical economic model is its premise that 
rational agents are self-interested maximizers of utility, which varies only in 
quantity and is therefore measurable.575 However the self-interest is not the 
main motivation of creators and agents do not act rationally. Behavioral 
economists suggest that various factors affect agents’ action such as an 
endowment effect, regret aversion, and optimism/ownership bias. In the context 
of copyright works, due to a ‘creativity effect’, rational creators value more 
their creations than buyers do, and hence liability rule is better than property 
rule for optimal transaction of creative production.576 
The human rights approach of IP supports a liability rule rather than a property 
rule. The liability rule is supported from all of three components of the right to 
science and culture discussed in this Chapter. In the first component, i.e., 
Author Clause, the protection of moral and material interests of author does not 
necessarily require a property-based protection. Rather, the human rights 
approach of IP disapproves the property rule.577 Maximalist IP concept is based 
on the premise that the subject matter of IP is public goods having features of 
nonrival and nonexcludible, and that the problem of under-production or free-
riding should be addressed by exclusionary property right of IP similar to the 
protection of property right. This argument, however, lacks empirical 
support.578 Nonetheless, the contemporary IP standards have incessantly moved 
to higher and higher protection level or what is called by James Boyle to an 
                                                      
574 Lee, 2000, p. 26. 
575 Nussbaum, 1997, p. 1197. 
576 Bucaffusco & Sprigman, 2011, p. 32. 
577 Concerning the right to property, it should be noted that the languages of UDHR 
and ICESCR for the right to science and culture are quite different from the human 
rights protection of property in Article 17 of UDHR (Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 
186).  
578 Lemley, 2015a, pp. 1336, 1338 (arguing that scholars failing to provide 
empirical evidence turn to a religion-like “belief system that does not require 
evidence at all” and “believe in IP as an end in itself”); Merges, 2011, p. 3 
(confessing that “I simply cannot justify our current IP system on the basis of 
verifiable data showing that people are better off with IP law than they would be 
without it”). 
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“evidence-free zone”.579 
The human right model of IP suggests to reconstruct the IP rights by restricting 
the level of protection to the material interests of creators, which is tied to “the 
ability of individual creators to enjoy an adequate standard of living”.580 The 
right to enjoy an adequate standard of living can be achieved through one-time 
payment,581 and the liability rule based on this would prevent transaction costs, 
which are higher than royalties, and be less restrictive of the fundamental rights 
and more effective in securing creators an appropriate income.582 The liability 
rule may be progressively implemented, as Helfer and Austin suggest, by 
combining alternative models such as “liability rule, levies, or government 
subsidies”, and  by “abandoning the exclusive rights altogether except for 
minimal attribution and integrity guarantees”.583 
3-6-3.	Right	to	Invention	
3-6-3-1. Invention as an Expression 
The human right model calls for a somewhat radical change in the notion of the 
right to invention or patent right. As demonstrated in Section 3-3, the 
negotiation history of Author Clause shows that the drafters expressly removed 
the patent-like protection from the human right approach of IP. Also, the 
interpretation of Author Clause according to the principle of treaty 
interpretation suggests that the protection of author’s material interest does not 
encompass a patent right to exclude others from using an invention. Saying that 
a patent right is excluded from the scope of Author Clause, however, is not to 
argue that any entitlement to invention is in conflict with human right approach 
to the protection of invention. The invention in the human right perspective is 
defined in a quite different way than the existing national and international 
                                                      
579 Boyle, 2008, p. 205. 
580 A/70/279 ¶ 10 and A/HRC/28/57 ¶ 12. The Special Rapporteur pointed out that 
the right to material interests should not be conflated with property rights or rights 
of exclusion. 
581 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 16. 
582 Mylly, 2015, p. 109. 
583 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 514. 
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patent laws. Insofar as an invention represents an “intrinsically personal 
character” 584 of inventor’s human mind, an inventor may claim a human right 
protection as an author under the meaning of Author Clause. 
In order to reconceptualise an inventor as an author or to recast an invention 
into an expression, it is required to investigate the nature of invention and 
copyright work and the processes in which an invention is produced (‘inventing 
process’) and a copyright work is authored (‘authoring process’).  
Although invention and copyright work are the sine qua non of patent and 
copyright laws, there is no coherent theory of the invention and copyright work 
applicable across jurisdictions, and studies on the ‘inventing process’ and 
‘authoring process’ are underdeveloped. Concerning the nature of invention, 
some national laws positively define what invention is,585 and others simply list 
categories that are excluded from patentable invention.586 When there is no 
positive definitional provision, it is difficult to delineate the boundary of 
categories that fall within or outside the concept of invention, particularly in the 
area of new technology.587 These incoherence and difficulty are also found in 
copyright. Most of national and international copyright laws do not define what 
literary and artistic works are. Despite of the “absence of any coherent theory” 
of copyright work,588 large consensus is that copyright work is “an original form 
                                                      
584 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 12. 
585 Notable examples are found in patent laws of Northeast Asian countries (Art. 2 
of Chinese Patent Law - “Inventions mean new technical solutions processed for a 
product, a process or the improvement thereof”, and Art. 2 of Japanese and Korean 
Patent Laws - “Invention means the highly-advanced creation of technical idea 
utilizing the laws of nature”). The US domestic law contains very loose and 
recursive definition in Art. 100(a) saying that “the term “invention” means 
invention or discovery”, and the US courts have long held that “law of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are excluded from patentable subject matter 
(Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern., 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014)). 
586 See Art. 52 of EPC excluding discoveries, scientific theories, mathematical 
methods, aesthetic creations, schemes, rules and methods for performing mental 
acts, playing games or doing business and programs for computers. The origin of 
the EPC’s exclusionary categories lies in a proposal of Germany and the Netherland 
in 1960s for then discussed Community patent law (Pila & Torremans, 2016, p. 
172). These exclusions lack clear underlying principles and are subject of 
qualifying condition, i.e., “as such” condition (Colston & Galloway, 2010, p. 111). 
587 Pila & Torremans, 2016, p. 155. 
588 Plia, 2010, p. 241. 
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that an author has adopted to express an idea” 589 or “particular form of 
expression in which an author conveyed ideas or information to the world”.590  
However, the manner in which the requirement of ‘originality’ is codified and 
interpreted varies by legal traditions, and its meaning is not quite as self-evident 
as is commonly assumed.591 In common law copyright system, originality 
means that “the work derives from the copyright owner, as opposed to that 
individual having copied it from a previous source”,592 and, therefore, under the 
UK copyright system, there is “no need to have any cultural or artistic merits or 
to reflect the maker’s or author’s personality in any way”.593 By contrast, in 
civil law author’s right system, to be original a work has to bear certain degree 
of creativity. Therefore, the degree of creativity for a work to be eligible for a 
copyright protection remains relatively higher in jurisdictions of civil law 
tradition,594 although the degree of such a difference has been gradually reduced 
among jurisdictions.595  
While the basic concepts of patent and copyright lack coherent theories and 
reveal differences among jurisdictions, a widely accepted divide line between 
patent and copyright is that while patent protects functionality, copyright 
protects non-functional aspect.596 In other words, functional aspect of creation 
belongs exclusively to a patent arena.597 Beldiman defines functionality as 
                                                      
589 Latreille, 2009. P. 134. 
590 Hollinrake v Truswell [1894] 3 Ch 420, 424 (Lord Herschell LC). 
591 Fisher, 2016, p. 438. 
592 Nimmer, 2001, pp. 14-15. 
593 Ohly, 2009, p. 288. 
594 In common law system, “at least some minimal degree of creativity” is required 
(Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345). The degree of 
creativity is also different in civil law jurisdictions. While French law does not 
explicitly mention the creativity prong (ICPI 1992, Art. L. 112-4), the German law 
expressly speaks of ‘personal intellectual creation’ (Art. 2(2) UrhG 1965) and 
Austrian law requires ‘distinct intellectual creation’ (Art. 1(1) UrhG 1936) 
(Rahmatian, 2009, p. 293). 
595 Fisher, 2016, p. 447; Rahmatian, 2009, p. 294 (arguing no contradictions 
between civil law and common law traditions in reality). 
596 Karjala, 2003, p. 451; Beldiman, 2008 p. 123. 
597 Protection of functionality solely by patent is justified on the grounds that 
threshold for patent protection is higher than other IPRs and term of protection is 
132 / 335 
 
something to “accomplish a given specific, concrete, practical and useful 
task”,598 and Buccafusco depicts functional aspect of invention as “making 
things stronger, lighter, faster, more efficient, and easier to use”.599 So the 
functional aspect of creation is distinguished from an expression that belongs to 
copyright arena. Expression is a ‘mark’ or ‘stamp’ of author’s personality on 
work,600 unique to author, and something to appeal to people’s “emotions, 
judgement, aesthetics, etc”.601 As observed by Drassinower, who frames a 
copyright work as a “communicative act” whereby a person addresses other 
through speech, while copyright concerns a relation between persons and patent 
concerns a relation between persons and objects.602 
This distinction is generally valid for the policy objectives of patent and 
copyright systems. But it is a purely legal dichotomy, valid in specific context 
of IP laws. Study on creativity tells a different story.603 In a psychological study 
on creativity, “there is no difference between scientific creativity and artistic 
creativity; the mechanisms are the same”.604 There are two definitions on 
creativity: individualist and sociocultural definition. By the individualist 
definition, creativity means a new mental combination that is expressed in the 
                                                      
shorter (Buccafusco & Lemely, 2016, p. 2). 
598 Beldiman, 2008, p. 121. 
599 Buccafusco, 2016, p. 1266. Also, Buccafusco & Lemely, 2016, p. 9 (“patent 
protection of functionality means protection of things that make a product work at 
all, or work better, or with fewer defects, or more cheaply”). 
600 Rahmantian, 2009, p. 293. 
601 Beldiman, 2008, p. 125. 
602 Drassinower, 2015, pp. 8, 65. 
603 The creativity study refers to a broad set of studies on education, institution and 
public policies to enhance creativity, the process by which individuals, communities 
and firms produce creation, relationship between creativity and national economic 
growth and so on. When focusing on the creative process, the creativity study has 
evolved through three waves: (1) a first wave began in the 1950s and 1960s, 
focusing on personal traits of exceptional creators; (2) a second wave in the 1970s 
and 1980s based on cognitive psychology and focusing on the internal mental 
processes that occur while people are engaged in creative behavior; and (3) a third 
wave from the 1980s and 1990s, called a socio-cultural approach, focusing on 
creative social systems and sociocultural contexts (Sawyer, 2012, p. 4). Combining 
latter two waves, Nersessian proposes an environmental approach (Nersessian, 
2005). 
604 Fishman, 2015, p. 1341. 
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world, excluding ideas that are not expressed, and under the sociocultural 
definition, creativity is the generation of a product that is judged to be novel and 
also to be appropriate, useful, or valuable.605 Under either definition, two stages 
of creative process – ‘finding a problem’ and ‘problem solving’ stages606 are 
common in ‘inventing process’ and ‘authoring process’.  
The problem finding in the ‘inventing process’ is constructed in social and 
cultural contexts surrounding an inventor. The solution to the problem 
presented by the inventor is a communicative act. In this sense, invention can be 
regarded as an expression, something that is expressed toward society by 
inventor. From their studies on telephone inventions of Bell and Edison, 
Gorman and Carlson show that the ‘inventing process’ may be viewed “as 
dynamic process combining abstract ideas with tangible object”, and that “like 
creative people in other fields, inventors succeed by manifesting mental models 
in terms of mechanical representation”.607 The ‘mental models’, referring to a 
process in which inventor combine ideas with objects,608 are “shaped by 
inventors in response to social and economic pressures as well as personal 
preferences.”609 The mental models developed by one inventor “differ 
completely or in detail from everyone else’s with regard to the same object to 
be understood”.610 Then, invention may be regarded as a manifestation uniquely 
expressed by an inventor. 
When an invention is conceived as an expression, at least four modifications in 
patent laws are entailed. First, discoveries devoid of either of the ‘problem 
finding’ or ‘problem solving’ stage are not eligible for patent protection. For 
                                                      
605 Sawyer, 2012, p. 7. 
606 Fromer explains that there are four stages in creative process: preparation 
(finding a problem and gathering necessary information), incubation (unconscious 
processing of information to solve the problem, plodding toward a solution), 
illumination (the “a-ha” moment of insight, which may occur suddenly and 
consciously), and verification (testing ideas and fully developing them), key aspects 
of which are problem finding (associated with preparation) and problem solving 
(associated with the next three stages) (Fromer, 2010, pp. 1463-1466). 
607 Gorman & Carlson, 1990, p. 156. 
608 Ibid, p 134. 
609 Ibid, p. 156. 
610 Seel, 2013, p. 1244. 
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instance, new molecule or new use of known material discovered in an 
unconscious manner is excluded from protection. Second, the role of patent 
claims is replaced with embodiments that are described in a patent application 
because what is expressed by the ‘mental models’ are embodiments. Third, the 
notion of ‘romantic authorship’ and ‘the lone inventorship’ needs to be 
modified. Fourth, those who are original in the ‘problem finding’ and ‘problem 
solving’, i.e., independent inventors are entitled of protection, which will be 
discussed in detail in the following Section. 
3-6-3-2. Independent Inventor Protected as an Author 
The conceptual shift of invention may lead to a new approach to the scope of 
patent protection. The patent protection is not extended to cover the same or 
equivalent function of patented invention: it only encompasses the same or 
equivalent embodiments described in patent application. Described embodiment 
is the main vehicle that an inventor expresses her invention. 
In addition, the conceptual change of the protection of invention involves a 
substantial modification to the absolutistic nature of current patent right. A 
patent right is called absolute because it can exclude not only those who copy or 
free-ride a patented invention but also independent inventors who are not 
responsible for the free-riding problems. A person who independently (and 
simultaneously) invents the same or equivalent invention may be included as an 
author under the meaning of the right to science and culture.611 As the current 
patent laws do not fit with concept of creator within the meaning of Author 
Clause of the international human rights instruments, the winner-takes-all rule 
may make sense in utilitarian or economic terms, not the human rights 
perspective.612 
In the human right model suggested here, independent inventors are entitled to 
the protection of material interests. Yet, this entitlement is non-exclusive and 
defensive in nature, based on the ‘liability rule’, not on the ‘property rule’. The 
                                                      
611 The protection of an independent inventor is deemed to be required in Author 
Clause. See, Gordon, 2010, p. 162 (arguing that the ICESCR speaking of scientific 
author implies to include “anyone who independently makes or creates … were 
second in time”). 
612 Gordon, 2010, pp. 166-167. 
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entitlement of independent inventor not only ensures fairness. It is also effective 
in reducing the monopoly deadweight loss, while maintaining the incentive to 
invent. Further, it can fix the problem of abuse of patent system, such as patent 
trolls or ‘non-practicing entities’.613 
3-7.	Conclusion	
This Chapter explored the human rights dimension of IP through the lens of the 
right to science and culture. Another lens of human rights such as the right to 
health, food, education, information, and freedom of expression may provide 
different outlooks on the human right dimension of IP. Virtue of the lens of the 
right to science and culture is its allowance for all-inclusive approach to IP and 
human rights. They allow us to embrace IP as an internal variable and treat the 
inherent tension of IP, a tension between protection and dissemination, within 
the framework of human rights. Protection side of the right to science and 
culture – everyone’s right to benefit from the protection of moral and material 
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author, which is termed ‘Author Clause’ here – provides a fresh insight 
for the concept of author and inventor and scope of protection for them, which 
are distinguished, conceptually and normatively, from those found in the 
existing IP norms. The dissemination side of the right to science and culture – 
human rights to participate in cultural life and to benefit from scientific progress 
and its applications – provides an alternative perception on the models for 
production system of creative knowledge in a way to enable people to freely 
and in a more democratic way participate in creative activity, share creative 
information and knowledge, and remove barriers created by trade-centric IP 
norms. 
Regarding the protection side of the right to science and culture, this Chapter 
found that, contrasting to arguments of IP industries and FTA participating 
states, Author Clause provides shaky grounds for the human rights protection of 
                                                      
613 NPEs are abusive and harmful because they “hold patents for the primary 
purpose of enforcing them against alleged infringers” and harm the patent system 
by “exacting outsized licensing fees on threat of litigation” (Halo Elecs., Inc. v. 
Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016)). Their abusive actions can 
significantly reduce incremental innovation (Executive Office of the US President 
(2013) Patent assertion and U.S. innovation).  
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IP, and the scope of IP pursuant to Author Clause is much narrower than that 
found in the existing trade-centric IP norms. Author Clause only covers the 
right to the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 
artistic production of which he is the author. This implies that trademark, 
undisclosed information and, arguably, patent are not encompassed by the 
International Bill of Human Rights. Further, the material interests protected by 
Author Clause do not cover all forms of economic interests. The author’s right 
to the material interests is more directly related to the right to an adequate 
standard of living than the right to property. Moreover, the boundary of author’s 
right is intrinsically limited by the broader right to science and culture. 
Next, concerning the dissemination side of the right to science and culture, this 
Chapter suggested conceptual and practical models for understanding the 
intersection of IP and human rights and reconciling the tension inherent in IP 
itself as well as the tension between IP and human rights. 
First, by taking the notion of ‘access to knowledge’ and ‘capabilities approach’ 
as conceptual subsidiarity, this Chapter tried to reconceptualise and 
operationalise the concept of two components of the right to science and culture 
– the right to take part in cultural life and the right to enjoy benefits from 
scientific progress. According to the operationalisation, culture is redefined as 
having its place somewhere between the anthropological culture and the initial 
narrow concept of culture, referring to “cultural expressions and heritage, and 
the processes of understanding, expression, learning, communication, and 
creation”.614 However, this concept of culture is not static; it can be best 
understood as a living process, evolving by engagement of those who make up a 
culture and dynamically redefined by the way to conceptualise the normative 
contents of the right. The science is, for the purpose of studying the intersection 
of the right to enjoy benefits from scientific progress and existing IP norms, 
redefined to encompass creative production, innovations and technological 
knowledge that may be covered by patent and broad set of scientific 
knowledges which are essential for realisation of the human rights to an 
adequate standard of living and reveal a tension between patent exclusivity and 
                                                      
614 Romainville, 2015, p. 429. 
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the need for broad access to new technologies.615  
Second, distributive justice, which is ignored in the utilitarian justification of IP, 
finds its footing in the positive nature of the dissemination side of the right to 
science and culture. The right to take part in cultural life includes as its central 
normative content an active element of the right to access to cultural 
information. The demand for access is a claim from those excluded, which 
anchored in the demands for distributive justice. The right to share in or enjoy 
benefits of scientific progress also conveys a positive impact on the realisation 
of human rights. This right covers those who do not or could not play an equal 
part in scientific progress, and is not reduced to the right of people to wait 
spillover of scientific progress and its applications spreading to them. 
Third, enabling condition and environment are crucial for the realisation of the 
right to science and culture from the perspectives of capabilities approach and 
access to knowledge movement. It is hard to interpret both the right to take part 
in cultural life and the right to benefit from scientific progress, albeit their 
positive nature, to confer individuals or groups an enforceable entitlement to 
claim access to or benefits of creative production against creators. Rather, they 
entail a right for people to demand cultural and scientific policies to be framed 
in a way to make cultural and scientific creations available and accessible. The 
real opportunities for the availability and accessibility of cultural and scientific 
creations are guaranteed by removing barriers preventing people from accessing 
and using those creations. The barriers imposed by patent and copyright have 
implications with the freedom for participants in cultural life and scientific 
researcher.  
Finally, the reconciliation model proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur in the 
field of cultural rights, i.e., the public good approach is a good starting point. 
However, the public good model needs to be streamlined in consideration of 
tacit nature of knowledge and its social dimensions.  The immanent form of 
knowledge, tacit knowledge, is communicated and exists in interpersonal 
relation for its production and dissemination.616 
                                                      
615 UN Patent Report of 2015, ¶¶ 47-55. 
616 Ramello, 2008, p. 80. 
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The findings of this Chapter allow alternative models for production and 
dissemination of creative production based on human rights perspective. The 
proposed models include (a) shift from existing property rules to liability rules, 
(b) recognition of rights of independent inventors, (c) conceptual and practical 
change of invention as an industrial or technological expression, and (d) 
modification of traditional balance striking between protection and diffusion of 
IP by taking into account of positive nature of the right to science and culture. 
  




This Chapter, for the empirical study of the intersection of IP and human rights, 
examines the Korea-US FTA (“KORUS”). Case study on KORUS is 
meaningful as KORUS is one of the strongest trade-centric approaches of IP. 
When KORUS was concluded in 2007, the USTR’s highest advisory committee 
applauded, in its report to the US president, the final text of KORUS as “the 
strongest ever bilateral protections for intellectual property”, and a possible 
model for future FTA negotiations.617 American business sectors also evaluated 
IP Chapter of KORUS as strongest ever.618 Actually, the US proposals for 
TPPA IP Chapter were based upon KORUS. However, many of them were 
watered down in the end. Therefore, the US business interests, especially the 
pharmaceutical sectors complained the agreed TPPA text as “less robust 
compared to KORUS”.619  
Main focus of KORUS case study is to see how are the two dimensions of IP, 
trade dimension discussed in Chapter 2 and human rights dimension discussed 
in Chapter 3, reflected or neglected in KORUS. Regarding the trade dimension 
of IP, this Chapter will examine the early trade concerns and TRIPS-plus rules 
through the lens of KORUS. The early trade concerns include: (1) cross-border 
                                                      
617 USTR, 2007, p. 5 (“The members of the ACTPN commend the U.S. negotiators 
for obtaining what appears to be the strongest ever bilateral protections for 
intellectual property … We view this as an extremely important outcome and a very 
strong part of the agreement. It should serve as the model from here on out”.) 
618 The U.S.-Korea Business Council and the Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States, 2007, p. 17 (“The U.S.-Korea FTA features some of the strongest IPR 
protections and enforcement rules ever included in a U.S. trade agreement. … The 
FTA … sets a powerful precedent for IPR protection and enforcement for other 
major Asian markets”.) 
619 CRS Report 2016 on TPP at p. 47. On the other hand, the USTR’s advisory 
committee for IP issues “Some business groups, especially in the pharmaceutical 
sector, while broadly supportive of the IPR chapter, express concern that certain 
aspects of it may be less robust compared to KORUS, while others say that vigilant 
enforcement of TPP will not lead to any substantive differences from the level in 
KORUS.[FN131: “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement: Report of the 
Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC-15)”, 
December 3, 2015] …” The IP chapter also contains some new provisions that go 
beyond existing U.S. FTAs, such as KORUS” (Ibid) 
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mobility of artisans; (2) local working of technological knowledge and 
information; and (3) actual practice of new trade as discussed in Section 2-2. 
The TRIPS-plus rules to be examined here, as discussed in Section 2-5, refer to: 
(1) two pillars of GATT, the national treatment principle and most favoured 
nations principle; and (2) typical ingredients of maximalist IP agenda such as 
the expansion of protectable subject matter, extended term of protection, 
curtailment of national discretion on the limitations and exceptions of IPRs, and 
the reinforced enforcement measures. Further, this Chapter investigates the 
elements of diversity layer of trade dimension of IP, including, as discussed in 
Section 2-3, political, social and cultural contexts that may enable or disable 
certain IP-related institutions and ideologies, and the elements of outcome layer 
including, as discussed in Section 2-6, intended purposes and balance of IP and 
transfer of technology.  
Regarding the human rights dimension of IP, this Chapter will investigate the 
extent to which has KORUS an intersection with the human right to science and 
culture discussed in Chapter 3. The right to science and culture will be tested in 
terms of both the protection side of the right to science and culture, i.e., 
protection of moral and material interest of author under the Author Clause 
discussed in Sections 3-2 and 3-3, and the dissemination side, i.e., the right to 
take part in cultural life and to benefit from scientific progress discussed in 
Section 3-4. Empirical study of KORUS in terms of the human right to science 
and culture inevitably requires a human rights impact assessment (HRIA).  
Methodologies for the HRIA are borrowed from the EC’s Guideline of 2015,620 
which builds on recent academic literature on HRIA for trade agreements. The 
Guideline requires that the HRIA be based on the normative framework of 
human rights, and the depth and scope of the assessment be calibrated to the 
type of trade measures and the magnitude of the expected human rights 
impacts.621 Modeled on the Guideline, this Chapter tries to assess human rights 
impact assessment through three steps of: screening (narrowing down the list of 
                                                      
620 European Commission, 2015a. The EC’s Guideline of 2015 aims at identifying 
and preventing the impacts that trade policies may have on human rights in the EU 
and member states, to avoid the negative ones and to enhance the positive ones. 
621 European Commission, 2015a, pp. 5-6. 
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issues to be assessed and identifying key human rights issues); scoping 
(clarifying the scope of content of the listed issues, describing the likely impact 
on human rights and indicating whether the impact is beneficial (promotion of 
human rights) or negative (limitation of human rights)); and detailed 
assessment.622  
For the purpose of screening, i.e., narrowing down and identifying key human 
rights issues in KORUS, this Chapter begins with negotiation history to 
examine the process by which the strongest trade-centric pact came into 
existence. Then, this Chapter delves into specific provisions that have 
implications on the right to science and culture. For the purpose of the empirical 
study on KORUS, a range of core issues that have actual or possible significant 
human rights impact are chosen and their implications in IP policies and 
subsequent developments are analyzed. Impact assessment is conducted to 
KORUS obligations on general provision, patent, copyright and enforcement, 
excluding trademark and trade secret, and mainly directed to South Korea 
because KORUS has brought about little changes in the US. For instance, while 
all of the Korean IP laws have been amended due to KORUS, none of the US 
laws were affected by KORUS.623 Ex post impact assessment carried out in this 
Chapter differs from section from section because of uneven availability of 
evidence-based information and insufficient time lapse for gathering a robust 




There would be few FTAs that have experienced more twists and turns than 
                                                      
622 The core methodological steps for carrying out the human right impact 
assessment are by and large common in various research institutions. For instance, 
refer to The World Bank & the Nordic Trust Fund (2013), Study on human rights 
impact assessment: A Review of the Literature, Differences with other forms of 
Assessments and Relevance for Development’ p.22 (preparation, screening, 
scoping, evidence gathering, consultation, analysis, recommendation & 
conclusions). 
623 KORUS urged Korea to amend at least twenty domestic laws in which IP-related 
laws were more than half. 
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KORUS. The negotiation for KORUS was commenced in February 2006 by a 
sudden offer of Korean government. Despite of strong resistance and 
controversies, the talks on KORUS were concluded in nine months. Then the 
concluded texts were re-opened twice in 2007 and 2010, and motions for 
approving KORUS were submitted to the Korea National Assembly three times. 
It took five years for KORUS to be a legally binding treaty in both countries. 
After another five years, KORUS now faces a risk of termination or 
renegotiation.624 Chronological records of KORUS show such twists and turns:  
• 2 February 2006: Public hearing in Seoul; 
• 3 February 2006: Official launch of KORUS negotiation; 
• 5 June 2006 to 12 March 2007: Eight official rounds of negotiation; 
• 19 to 22 March 2007: Higher-level discussion; 
• 26 March to 2 April 2007: Ministerial talk; 
• 2 April 2007: Conclusion of negotiation; 
• 25 May 2007: Concluded KORUS text made open; 
• 21 to 22 June 2007: Re-negotiation (1st);625 
• 30 June 2007: Signing FTA texts; 
• 7 September 2007: Korean motion for KORUS approval (1st); 
                                                      
624 Rucker, 2017 (reporting that the US President threatened, in an interview on 28 
April, 2017, to terminate KORUS as it was “a horrible deal” and “should’ve never 
been made”). 
625 The first re-negotiation was to reflect the deal of US politicians. The Democratic 
Party, having gained majority seats in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate in the mid-term election of January 2007, changed the Bush 
Administration’s trade policy, and announced a bipartisan deal with the 
Administration, called “A New Trade Policy for America” on May 10, 2007. This 
May 10th deal required reopening and amending then pending FTAs with Korea and 
Colombia, not only with Peru and Panama, to reflect, in enforceable languages, the 
Democratic priorities (Kim, 2007). These include new standards on labor, 
environment and global warming, patent and access to medicines, and investment. 
Long before the announcement of the May 10th deal, the Korean government had 
vowed several times that there would be no renegotiation as it inevitably broke the 
highly-calibrated compromises between two countries. However, the Korean 
government had no alternative but to accede the US demand. For the development 
and political implication of the May 10th deal, see Destler, 2007. 
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• 8 October 2008: Korean motion for KORUS approval (2nd); 
• 30 November to 3 December 2010: Re-negotiation (2nd);626 
• 4 May 2011: Withdrawal of the 2nd motion;627 
• 3 June 2011: Korean motion for KORUS approval (3rd); 
• 3 October 2011: US motion for KORUS approval; 
• 12 October 2011: US motion approved; 
• 22 November 2011: Korean motion approved; 
• 27 January to 20 February 2012: Consultation on implementation of 
KORUS; and 
• 15 March 2012: KORUS entering into effect. 
4-2-2.	Deals	on	IP	
IPR was one of the most controversial issues in KORUS negotiation. When the 
final round of talk was finished on March 12, 2007, a small number of issues on 
agriculture, auto, trade remedy, broadcasting and IPRs were remained unsettled 
and had to be moved to a higher-level discussion. Even after the Korean Trade 
                                                      
626 The second re-negotiation was again initiated by the US. Unlike the Korean 
government, the US government, despite signing the KORUS FTA in 2007, did not 
seek a congressional approval until 2010. It was because the Democratic leadership 
had complained the commitments on autos and beef. The modifications made in the 
second re-negotiation are incorporated in KORUS in the form of an “exchange of 
letters” and two “agreed minutes”. 
627 Withdrawal of the second motion reveals unpreparedness of Korean negotiators 
and has a special implication in connection with the effect of IP-related treaties in 
Korea. The second motion was recanted due to an inaccurate Korean translation of 
English text of KORUS. Unlike other FTAs to which South Korea is a party, 
KORUS recognizes two texts, the English and Korean texts, “equally authentic” 
(Art. 24.6). While the Korean Constitution admits that any treaties ratified and 
proclaimed in accordance with the Constitution has the same effect as the domestic 
laws, some Korean IP laws such as the Patent Act (Art. 26) and the Trademark Act 
(Art. 5) prescribe that international agreements prevail domestic laws. The treaty 
prevailing rule of the Korean industrial rights laws has been maintained for several 
decades since 1961, the purpose of which is explained by the Korea Patent Office to 
respect the international harmonization of industrial property laws. This rule was 
entirely repealed when KORUS was approved by the National Assembly in 2011 
due to the concerns of law makers on unequal application of KORUS between the 
US and Korea (Note that in the US, KORUS is not a treaty under the meaning of 
the US Constitution; it's a congressional-executive agreement having no direct 
applicable effect, inferior to conflicting federal laws). 
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Minister reported to the Korean president of the outcome of the higher-level 
discussion, IPRs were still under debate because the US sustained its position to 
include the controversial non-violation dispute for IPRs.628 The outstanding 
issues were all cleared in the ministerial meeting where negotiators of the 
competent departments on patent and copyright policies were excluded and had 
no final say. 
Concerning the copyright negotiation, the Korean negotiators strongly opposed 
the US push for TRIPS-plus and WCT/WPPT-plus provisions. According to an 
interim memo prepared by negotiators of the Ministry of Culture after the third 
round of talk and the official reports of the Trade Minister to the National 
Assembly after the first and second rounds of talk, the Korean negotiators took 
a firm stand against the US proposals on the following grounds: 
• Copyright Term Extension: The term of protection is the most 
important element for a balanced copyright protection. The US demand 
to extend the term from life plus 50 years to 70 years is unacceptable 
because of huge potential adverse social and cultural impact; 
• Temporary Copying: Expanding author’s reproduction right to cover 
temporary copying is unacceptable because harmful effects such as 
undermining use of copyrighted works and restricting users’ access to 
information; 
• Technological Protection Measures: TPMs for access control are 
unacceptable because of unduly over-protection of copyright holder 
against users in digital network environment; 
• ISP Liability: Proposal of the US to bind ISPs to provide user’s 
personal information to copyright holders needs a careful consideration 
as it may jeopardize the business of ISPs; and categorizing ISPs into 
four types as under the DMCA is not necessary in consideration of 
possible emerging new type of services; and 
• Statutory Damages: Introduction of pre-established damages is 
undesirable as it conflicts with the actual damages principles under the 
Korean legal system of civil law tradition. 
                                                      
628 For details on the non-violation dispute in WTO/TRIPS Council, see Section 2-
5. 
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Regarding the negotiations on patent, in which the Patent Office took part, and 
TRIPS-plus protection of pharmaceutical products, for which the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare led the Korean negotiation team, the Korean negotiators 
were also firm in opposing the US proposals for the following reasons: 
• Patent Term Extension for Delay in Patent Grant: Unacceptable as 
this may cause an increase of royalty payments by domestic industries, 
leading to a price increase of patented products and a decrease of 
consumer benefits; 
• Patent Term Extension for Delay in Drug Approving Process: The 
US demand to include any delay made by foreign authorities in drug 
approving process is not acceptable;  
• Data Exclusivity: Expanding the data exclusivity to cover disclosed 
information and “similar products” is unacceptable, because the 
meaning and scope of the “similar” products are unclear, and the 
expansive protection may spark strong oppositions from domestic 
pharmaceutical industries; 
• Patent-Approval Linkage: Linkage between a drug approval process 
and a patent status is not acceptable because a patent holder can, 
without the linkage system, seek remedies against infringers through 
litigation and under the Korean judicial system infringement disputes 
can be easily and cheaply decided by a trial; and 
• Restriction of the Grounds for Granting Compulsory Licenses: The 
US demand to limit the grounds on which compulsory licenses of 
patented inventions are granted to exceptional circumstances such as 
national emergency is not acceptable because they are narrower than 
those permitted under the existing Korean laws. 
However, the opposition of the Korean negotiators was not kept long. When the 
third round of talk was finished in September 2006, the Trade Minister urged 
the negotiators of the Ministry of Culture, the Patent Office and the Ministry of 
Justice,629 to accept the US demands. According to several local news reports, 
                                                      
629 The Ministry of Justice participated in the negotiation for discussions on IPR 
enforcement section. 
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the Trade Ministry asked negotiators of the relevant departments to provide a 
“full cooperation” to the US negotiators in the fourth round of talks where the 
IPR division was the only division that was supposed to have a five-days long 
full discussion.630 At that time, the US adopted a strategy of “defeating one by 
one” to appease the Korean negotiators’ opposition in individual issues. For 
instance, the US negotiators sought to have a talk on copyright issues with only 
negotiators from the Ministry of Culture, and patent issues with only negotiators 
from the Patent Office. Stringing along with the US negotiators, the Trade 
Ministry of Korea urged relevant departments to do as the US wanted. 
For the most of the IPR-related issues, the US is the main demandeurs and 
Korea was on the defensive. However, not all of the US demands were the 
attainment targets. They demanded some TRIPS-plus agenda for a bargaining 
chip. These include: (1) a prohibition of parallel importation of copyrighted 
works;631 (2) expanding patentable subject matters to cover diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and surgical methods for the treatment of humans and animals; (3) 
triple damages for willful patent infringements; (4) patent term extensions due 
to any delay including one occurring in the third countries; and (5) broadening 
trademark right to reach “related goods or services”. 
Also, the Korean negotiators proposed certain provisions that were new to the 
US for the purposes of showing off that they were not merely defensive and to 
get a bargaining chip. These include: (1) obligation of protection of author’s 
moral rights;632 (2) removal of a fixation requirement in copyright rule, 
                                                      
630 Noh, 2006 (citing an internal document of government departments obtained by 
the Korean Times and interviews with an anonymous official of the Ministry of 
Justice). 
631 Concerning the parallel importation of patented products, the US Congress 
prohibited, in 2005, USTR from imposing any restriction to trade partners. See, 
Section 631 of the Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies 
Appropriation Act of 2005 (Public Law No. 109-108). The congressional action 
was to reflect the concerns that patent might prevent US citizens from enjoying 
competitive advantages of cheap medicines sold in foreign countries such as 
Canada. In May 2017, the US Supreme Court generally endorsed the international 
exhaustion of patent right, allowing parallel importation of patented toner cartridge 
(Impression Products v. Lexmark International, No. 15-1189.) as the Court did for 
copyrighted works in 2013 (Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2351 
(2013)). 
632 Against this proposal, the US negotiators requested Korean counterpart to 
present any empirical evidences showing that Korean authors had been suffering 
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especially in reproduction right;633 (3) a mandatory publication of all of the 
patent applications; (4) an introduction of patent examination request system; 
(4) mandating an internationalism in the concept of prior arts in determining 
patentability;634 and (5) repealing a Hilmer doctrine.635 
These bargaining chips were exchanged each other and abused by each in 
domestically claiming that they obtained some concession from the counterpart. 
There is no document showing the whole picture of the exchange and trade-off 
between the negotiators. However, according to records of the Korean National 
Assembly and interim memo of negotiators, following deals were made: 
• Korean demand for protection of moral rights was traded with the US 
demand of prohibition on parallel importation of copyright works at the 
5th round of December 2006;  
• US demand to insert into KORUS a binding sentencing guideline for 
courts in criminal procedure was watered down to a non-binding 
recommendation at the 5th round;636 
                                                      
from lack of moral rights in the US. The US Copyright Act does no fully protect the 
moral right of authors but the US businesses, politicians and some scholars have 
maintained that the US laws protect author’s moral right in combination of various 
state and federal statutes such as tort and contract laws. Even the WIPO Director 
General (Dr. Bogsch) witnessed before the US Congress that the US did not need to 
“enact statutory provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 6bis of 
the Berne Convention” (US Copyright Office, 2017, p. 7871). Now the US 
government is conducting a formal study on this issue. See, US Copyright Office, 
2017. 
633 Unlike the US counterpart, the Korean Copyright Act does not require for a 
work to be “fixed” in a tangible object. One of the concerns of the Korean 
negotiators was that the fixation requirement might preclude the protection of live 
performance. 
634 Under Section 102 of the US Patent Act, if the invention were publicly known or 
used in countries other than in the US, it does not constitute prior arts in 
determining a novelty or a non-obviousness. The Korean negotiator demanded the 
US to make prior arts publicly known anywhere in the world the statutory bar. 
635 The Hilmer doctrine refers to a rule established by the US court (In re Hilmer, 
424 F.2d 1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970)), under which a foreign patent application could not 
count as prior art of its foreign filing date, abolished by the American Invention Act 
on 16 March 2013 (Randall, 2013, pp. 20-21). 
636 Relevant KORUS text is the second sentence of Article 18.10:27(a), saying that 
“[E]ach party shall further encourage judicial authorities to impose those penalties 
at levels sufficient to provide a deterrent to further infringements …” 
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• US proposal on written requirements of patent claims was agreed upon 
as Korean negotiators suggested,637 and the Korean demand for 
removing a fixation requirement from copyright rule was withdrawn at 
the 5th round;638 
• Korean commitment on auto was traded-off with the US’ commitment 
on the extension of transition period of patent-approval linkage for three 
years at the 2nd renegotiation of November 2010; 
• As a part of the package deal made at the higher level talk of March 
2007, Korea conceded on the copyright term extension and the US 
relaxed its position on statutory damages and data exclusivity; and 
• At the final, 8th round of March 2007, a package settlement on unsolved 
patent-related issues was reached by Korean accepting the US demands 
and the US conceding on the patent term extension for longer period of 
delay in patent prosecution (three years from the date when a request 
for examination is filed, not two years as demanded by the US). 
4-2-3.	Discussion	and	Analysis	
Negotiation history of KORUS shows lack of transparency and public 
participation, which are the main elements for human rights approach of IP as 
discussed in Section 3-5. The first two lines of ‘A Brief Chronology’ of Section 
4-2-1 reveal that the public hearing for KORUS took place just one day before 
both governments announced official launch of KORUS negotiation, indicating 
a purposeful ignorance of the human rights concerns on transparency and public 
participation of trade negotiation. A process of public hearing was mandatory 
for Korean government. According to a Presidential Decree on free trade 
agreements,639 no FTAs that were deemed by the Trade Minister640 apt for FTA 
                                                      
637 This was what the Korean Trade Minister reported to the National Assembly, but 
it is unclear what the Korean negotiators suggested because the written requirement 
of Article 18.8:10 is modeled on the US case laws. 
638 Footnote 7 of Article 18.4:1 KORUS “The Parties reaffirm that it is a matter for 
each Party’s law to prescribe that works and phonograms shall not be protected by 
copyright unless they have been fixed in some material form”. 
639 Decree No. 121, enacted on 8 June 2004. 
640 At that time, the former title of Trade Ministry was the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade. After KORUS went into effect, trade function was transferred to 
the Ministry of Industry and Energy. Across this thesis, the term “Trade Ministry” 
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negotiation could be launched without prior public hearing. Further, any 
decision of government to float or not the FTA ship had to depend on the 
outcome of the prior public hearing. The hearing for KORUS was held with 
only inviting researchers of governmental think tank, and over in the middle 
due to farmers’ demonstration. However, this did not affect the floating of FTA 
ship. To Korean governments, the public hearing was nothing more than a ritual 
to avoid debate on breach of the procedural requirement.  
The Presidential Decree also required two additional procedures for public 
participation: during the FTA negotiation; and after the negotiation, none of 
which was adhered to by government. Stakeholders including business sectors, 
experts and even law makers were not allowed to access to draft text and 
detailed negotiation information. They were kept secret and only small numbers 
of friendly scholars were shared with limited information on KORUS 
negotiation. Therefore, KORUS, lacking democratic checks and balances, could 
not reflect voices of those who would be affected. 
The negotiation history of KORUS also shows that the public choice theory or 
rational choice theory in its internationalised version discussed in Section 2-4 
does not hold true for KORUS. Korea did not expect transfer of technology 
from the US or increased domestic innovation in exchange of upward IPR 
standards. IP deals were a scapegoat for concluding a bilateral trade deal with 
the US. Therefore, the deals on IP incorporate almost all of the core elements of 
maximalist IP agenda, while ignoring intended purpose of IP and the early trade 
concerns such as cross-border mobility of artisans, local working of new 
technologies and trade.  
Political context and governance structure in trade policy within the Korean 
government, which in turn widened the unequal bargaining power, may be the 
main account for the explanation of Korea’s acceptance of TRIPS-plus agenda 
of the US.  
For the KORUS IP negotiation, the US had clear objectives – improving further 
“the protection that Korea afforded to IP, including strengthened measures in 
                                                      
or “Minister of Trade” is used to refer to administrative branches of both 
departments. 
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Korea against the illegal online distribution and transmission of copyrighted 
works”,641 and exporting the standard of IPR protection “similar to that found in 
United States law”.642 By contrast, Korea had no concrete objectives that were 
specific to IP negotiation. Let alone the negotiation objectives, the Korean 
negotiators were busy in catching the meaning of US proposals and had to 
follow the intensive schedule of talks set by the US domestic law without 
having a sufficient time for preparation.643 When reporting to the National 
Assembly of the 3rd round of talk, the Minister of Health and Welfare, which 
was in charge of pharmaceutical related IP talks, confessed that the primary role 
of his department was, as in football games, a defense to prevent the opposition 
team from scoring goals. The Patent Office even admitted, in its written 
response to a lawmaker in October 2006, that the best way to cope with the 
trade pressure from the US would be to “streamline or modernize the Korean IP 
laws through the trade negotiation with the US”. The only department that tried 
to hold fast in rejecting the TRIPS-plus and WCT/WPPT-plus proposals of the 
US was the Ministry of Culture. When the Ministry of Trade urged the 
copyright negotiators to provide a full cooperation to the US for the 4th round of 
talk, they asked their Minister to meet in person the Trade Minister to alleviate 
the pressure from the trade department. They also called for a joint action with 
the Patent Office and the Ministry of Justice.  
All of these efforts were ended without success. Main reason was that the 
KORUS negotiation was under control of the Trade Ministry having a 
presidential support on its back. To the trade officials, contracting FTA with the 
US itself was the primary goal. Their performance was evaluated by a binary 
                                                      
641 USTR letter to the U.S. House of Representatives (February 2, 2006). 
642 19 U.S. Code § 3802(b)(4)(iii). Later, the US added new objectives for TPP to 
address cybertheft and protect trade secrets and proprietary information”. (The U.S. 
Congressional Research Service Report No. R44489, ‘The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress, May 4, 2016, at page 
45). 
643 Official rounds of KORUS negotiation were over in nine months due to tight 
schedule set by the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Act of 2002, under which the US 
President has to notify the U.S. Congress its intent to enter into the FTA with South 
Korea under the Trade Promotion Authority, also called a fast-track trade authority, 
which statutorily expired on April 1, 2007. The fast-track trade authority has not 
been renewed about for eight years since 2007 until the Obama Administration was 
given such an authority for TPPA in 2015.  
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choice between concluding or failing bilateral deal with trading partners, no 
matter what commitments were made in there. Furthermore, the Korean 
president was pursuing KORUS for highly political purposes which include, 
something vague, a doctrine of strategic flexibility, the role of a balancer among 
the major powers in Northeast Asia, and reforming Korean economic structure, 
especially of service sector, triggered by an external shock. In this process, the 
public policy aspects of IPRs and fair balance between rights and dissemination, 
let alone the human rights dimensions, found no or little way to engage.  
4-3.		General	Provision	of	KORUS	
4-3-1.	Obligations	under	KORUS	
The IP Chapter of KORUS starts with the general provision (Article 18.10:1) 
consisting of twelve paragraphs. They deal with affirmation of the rights and 
obligations under TRIPS, international IPR treaties both Parties shall or make 
all reasonable effort to ratify, a ratchet provision,644 and provisions for national 
treatment, application to existing subject matter and prior acts, and transparency 
(identical to an “internal transparency” required in WTO).645  
4-3-2.	Discussion	and	Analysis	
The general provision shows the nature of KORUS. First, KORUS reflects the 
changes of substantive rules produced by trade-centric IP norms, which were 
discussed in Section 2-5. The principles of GATT such as NTP and MFN are 
incorporated into KORUS. Although KORUS does not explicitly mandate MFN 
obligation, under Article 18.1:2, which confirms the rights and obligations 
under TRIPS, both Parties cannot derogate from the MFN obligation of Article 
4 of TRIPS. Yet, the scope of MFN obligations under TRIPS is uncertain on for 
                                                      
644 The ratchet provision in KORUS IP Chapter is different from the ratchet clause 
in Service Chapter. Under the Service Chapter, a Party is locked in every time it 
takes a measure for further liberalization of service market. By contrast, the ratchet 
provision of IP Chapter merely permits more extensive protection and enforcement 
of IPRs, and a Party is free to move back from higher standards to the minimum 
standards mandated by KORUS. 
645 Article X of GATT imposing obligations on contracting parties to publish their 
laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings affecting trade is 
called an internal transparency (Limenta, 2012, pp. 79-80). 
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instance, whether it covers only the IPR protection mandated by TRIPS or 
extended to more extensive protection and enforcement of IPRs provided by 
only KORUS or other bilateral or regional agreements.  
Second, and more importantly, unlike other multilateral IP treaties and previous 
US FTAs (such as the US-Chile FTA), KORUS does not have any provision 
referring to public interests and balance between private and public interests in 
protection, dissemination and access to intellectual productions.646 This skewed 
provision may cause a lopsided interpretation and application of the other 
provisions, most of which are related to the substantive protection and 
enforcement of IPRs. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, “objectives and purpose” of a treaty are vital factors in interpretation 
of a treaty (Article 31), and WTO panels regarded the objectives text as a 
guiding principle that can help ensure that the rest of the chapter is interpreted 
in line with negotiators’ intentions – “it can add colour, texture and shading to 
our interpretation”.647 
The general provision of KORUS lacking the balance provision shows the very 
nature of the pact, and reveals how are the US and Korean negotiators on IP 
policies indifferent of human rights dimension of IP. 
4-4.	Copyright	
4-4-1.	Reproduction	Right	and	Temporary	Storage	
4-4-1-1. Obligations under KORUS 
Article 18.4:1 of KORUS makes clear that temporary storage be under control 
of copyright, i.e., the reproduction right. Unlike TPPA, KORUS employs the 
term “temporary storage in electronic form” and confirms such a right bestowed 
                                                      
646 Compare Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, and Article 18.4 of TPP (embracing “the 
underlying public policy objectives of national systems” and recognizing the need 
to “promote innovation and creativity” and “facilitate the diffusion of information, 
knowledge, technology, culture and the arts”) and the latest FTA to which Korea is 
a party (Article 15.5 of the Korea-Colombia FTA recognizing “the need to maintain 
a balance between the rights of the right holders and the public interest” and 
technology transfer, and allowing measures to “prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders”). 
647 Weatherall 2015a, 5. 
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to performers and producers of phonograms as well as to authors and their 
“successors in title”.648 Further, contrasting the EU InfoSoc Directive, KORUS 
does not provide a mandatory exception to this right.649 Inversely, KORUS 
confirms that any limitation or exception to the reproduction right to temporary 
storage should be restricted to the controversial three-step test and even when 
either Party introduces an open-ended fair use limitation, the three-step test 
prevails. 
4-4-1-2. Controversies on Temporary Storage 
Obligations on the temporary storage was highly controversial during the 
negotiation. The Korean negotiators strongly opposed the US proposal for the 
temporary storage and the disagreement was not solved until the final round of 
talk (8th round). The Ministry of Culture, which co-chaired, along with the 
Trade Ministry, the Korean IP negotiation division, was very stubborn in the 
opposition. When the 1st round of talk ended, the Ministry of Culture decided 
not to accept the US proposal as they viewed that it would “weaken the 
promotion of (fair) use of copyrighted works and undermine access to 
information”.650 Further, the Trade Ministry reported to the National Assembly 
of the outcome of the 2nd round negotiation that the Korean negotiators opposed 
the introduction of temporary storage because the problem of temporary storage 
could be indirectly addressed by in combination of the permanent reproduction 
right, the right to communication to the public and the protection of 
technological protection measures. However, the Trade Minister, having 
controlled the whole process of Korean negotiation, changed its position later 
and urged the copyright officials to accept the US proposal on the temporary 
                                                      
648 Footnote 8 of the Article. By contrast, Article 18.58 of TPP does not use the 
term “temporary storage”. Instead, it says “the exclusive right to authorize or 
prohibit all reproduction of their works, performances or phonograms in any 
manner or form, including in electronic form”. 
649 Under the InfoSoc Directive, Member states must exempt temporary copying 
from the reproduction right subject to several conditions that: (1) the temporary acts 
of reproduction are transient or incidental and an integral and essential part of a 
technological process; (2) whose sole purpose is to enable: (a) a transmission in a 
network between third parties by an intermediary; or (b) a lawful use of a copyright 
work or other subject-matter to be made; and (3) they have no independent 
economic significance (Article 5(1) of the Directive 2001/29/EC). 
650 Anonymous, 2006. 
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storage. A negotiators’ interim document revealed that the copyright officials 
asked their Minister to meet in person with and persuade the Trade Minister to 
stop pushing them on the issue. For the purpose of preparing defensive 
strategies, the Minister of Culture and the National Copyright Commission held 
a consultation meeting with copyright experts, industries and activists, ended up 
with failure. 
The issue of temporary storage re-emerged during the congressional approval 
process in Korea. This time the issue was not whether the copyright policy 
change putting the temporary storage under the control of copyright holder was 
acceptable, but whether the US implemented the temporary storage obligation 
of KORUS.  
The US Copyright Act defines “copies” by referring to the concept of fixation. 
In Cartoon Network case,651 which was decided after the KORUS pact was 
signed, the US Federal Court ruled that for the work is “fixed” two conditions 
have to be met: the embodiment requirement (the work is in a medium that 
enables it to be “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated”); and the 
duration requirement (the work’s embodiment must last for a “period of more 
than transitory duration”). The Cartoon Network court held that the buffer 
memory copy of a router for 0.1 second and holding up a TV programming for 
up to 1.2 seconds, are not “copies” under the meaning of the US Copyright Act 
because they do not meet the “duration requirement”.  
This decision is distinguishable from the MAI System decision,652 which was the 
cornerstone for the US negotiators’ push for the temporary storage proposal and 
the Korean negotiators’ understanding that the US legally recognizes the 
temporary storage. The Cartoon Network decision sparked the debate on the 
question of US’ implementation of KORUS. In November 2011, seventy 
lawmakers of five opposition parities in Korea brought this issue to a criminal 
proceeding against the Trade Minister. Under this pressure, the Trade Ministry 
began to consult several US and Korean law firms about the compatibility of 
US Copyright Act with the KORUS obligation. Further, during the 
                                                      
651 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
652 MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 
155 / 335 
 
implementation review process of December 2011 to February 2012, the Trade 
Ministry raised the issue of temporary storage obligation against USTR. 
However, USTR simply replied that the US law were in compliance, and there 
was no further counter-reaction from the Korean government. 
4-4-1-3. Discussion and Analysis 
Granting an exclusive right to temporary storage alters the fundamental nature 
of copyright system in digital environment.653 Every online activity, either by 
users or telecommunication service providers, entails temporary storage of 
information in electronic form. A web browser cannot display information on a 
screen without receiving from a remote host and temporarily storing data 
packets for such information.654 Therefore, granting a reproduction right on 
temporary storage in electronic form is akin to giving copyright holders a power 
to control the Internet, a full control of access to information online.655 Such a 
right is analogous to a power to control reading books, listening music, and 
watching movie. Then, the obligation of temporary storage goes too far beyond 
the human rights protection of material interests of author discussed in Section 
3-3-4. 
Temporary storage is not a mere theoretical question. It has a practical 
implication. Further, the process in which the temporary storage was proposed 
and implemented shows the USTR’s strategy to push ‘US law-plus’ agenda to 
trading partners and how the balance in copyright policy is broken in trading 
                                                      
653 One of the broadest judicial interpretation of temporary storage is the US 
decision of Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 
2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999) (holding that “[W]hen a person browses a website, 
and by so doing displays the Handbook, a copy of the Handbook is made in the 
computer’s random access memory (RAM), to permit viewing of the material. And 
in making a copy, even a temporary one, the person who browsed infringes the 
copyright”.) 
654 Lord Sumption explained “where a web-page is viewed by an end user on his 
computer, … temporary copies to be made on screen … without which the web-
page cannot be viewed by the user”. (Public Relations Consultants Association Ltd. 
v. The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. [2103] UKSC 18 (17 April 2013). 
655 Weatherall, 2015b, p. 7: “Including temporary copies within the reproduction 
right therefore has the tendency to transform copyright into an ‘access right’ that 
enables copyright owners to take action against every user and every possible 
intermediary that facilitates or provides technology to users that interacts with any 
kind of copyright material (which means any text, any image, any sound)”. 
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partners when they import only one side of the rule. The US law strictly 
requires “fixation” to be defined with reference to “duration requirement”. 
However, in Korea, the fixation is not statutory requirement and hence the court 
of Korea does not consider the duration requirement as shown in various cases 
involving: background music streaming; loading a screen capture computer 
program into RAM; and TV program streaming device.   
In a music stream case, the court held that digital sound, which was originally 
recorded on a phonogram possessed by a copyright licensee, is temporarily 
fixed to a tangible media when it is transmitted to a defendant’s computer and 
streamed to be played by defendant, thereby leading to an infringement of 
reproduction right.656 In this decision, the court does not consider how long does 
the streamed sound last. 
In a RAM copy case, the court again ignores the transient nature of temporary 
storage.657 It held that a computer program (called “Open Capture”), which is 
for a screen capture, entails loading the program onto memory (logical memory) 
of Windows OS, resulting in a (temporary in electronic form) fixation of the 
program onto the physical and tangible media (RAM), and thus loading 
program itself constitutes a temporary reproduction under the meaning of the 
Copyright Act. The Court even rejects the alleged infringers’ argument that the 
RAM copy is transient as its duration is too short, finding that the RAM copy 
exists long enough while the program is running. 
The “RAM copy doctrine” of the Open Capture court is much broader than that 
of the MAI System court of the US and the standard of temporary reproduction 
of EU’s InfoSoc Directive because the Open Capture court viewed that:  
1) the “necessity for smooth and efficient information processing”, the 
statutory prong for an exception of the temporary reproduction, 
meant a temporary storage such as buffering or caching occurred 
during Internet browsing, use of transmitted digital works, or use of 
copyrighted works stored in computer storage medium;  
                                                      
656 The Seoul High Court, 2013Na2007547, November 28, 2013. 
657 The Seoul Central District Court, 2013GaHap63771, February 21, 2014.  
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2) a RAM copy of a computer program was not for efficient data 
processing;  
3) performing a function of computer program with the RAM copy was 
an essential part of sale of the program, having a separate economic 
value on its own; and  
4) the newly added exceptional provision for temporary reproduction 
(Article 35bis of the Copyright Act of 2012) only allowed for repair 
and maintenance purpose of a computer, indicating a legislative 
intension to exclude the RAM copy created during the normal 
operation of a computer program.658 
In a TV program streaming device case, the Seoul District court ruled that a 
retailer of a stream enabling device, neither a manufacturer of the device nor a 
streaming service provider, is liable for a direct infringement of temporary 
reproduction right.659 Even users were found liable as a direct infringer violating 
the right to communication to the public because they were involved in 
activities retransmitting other users the received TV signal via P4P technology, 
a variant of P2P. 
The temporary storage obligation reveals more harmful effect of FTAs, a lock-
in effect; FTAs acting against domestic reform. Concerned about the expansive 
application of the temporary storage obligation of KORUS, law makers 
introduced, in January 2013, a bill to amend the Copyright Act by inserting the 
“duration requirement”. The bill replaces “temporarily or permanently fixing” 
in the definition of “reproduction” with a phrase “fixing (referring to the case 
where fixation lasts permanently or for sufficiently stable period of time so as to 
allow reproduction of works).” Against this legislative reform, the Trade 
Ministry submitted a dissenting opinion to the National Assembly, indirectly 
indicating a possible breach of KORUS. Further, the International Federation of 
the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) argued, in its written opinion submitted to the 
National Assembly, that the amendment specifically excluded “special forms of 
                                                      
658 This finding was repealed by appeal court (the Seoul High Court, 2014Na19631, 
November 20, 2014) and the case is pending before the Supreme Court. 
659 The Seoul Central District Court, 2014GaHap534942, September 4, 2015. 
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reproduction, i.e. temporary reproductions” and made Korea to breach 
international treaty obligations under the Berne Convention as well as under the 
WCT and WPPT.660 Also, the Ministry of Culture viewed the temporary storage 
as broad as to cover all forms of streaming services of copyrighted works. In 
determining that whether mobile service of filelocker service provider is within 
the special type online service provider of Article 104 of the Korea Copyright 
Act, the Ministry of Culture (the Copyright Protection Division) considers that 
RAM copies created in user’s mobile device when the user enjoys contents 
provided by the filelocker’s streaming service are reproduction because Article 
2(22) defines the reproduction includes a temporary storage. 
4-4-2.	Term	of	Protection	
4-4-2-1. Obligations under KORUS 
KORUS requires the term of copyright protection to be at least author’s lifetime 
plus 70 years, or 70 years from publication or creation of works, performance or 
phonograms.661 This compels Korea to amend its Copyright Act for the 
additional 20 years protection.662  
4-4-2-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The obligation of extended protection term of copyright has provoked resistance 
and opposition from scholars, civil societies, and even the copyright industry. 
Especially, the publishing industry maintained that the term of protection 
should remain within the realm of national policy and could not be conditions 
for foreign trade, contending that the push of the US was nothing but extending 
the term during which US copyright industries could receive copyright royalties 
from Korea.663 
                                                      
660 IFPI, 2013, pp. 2-3. 
661 Article 18.4:4(a) and (b). 
662 The Korean Copyright Act was amended for additional 20 years for authors 
according to the EU-Korea FTA, which was concluded later than KORUS but 
entered into effect (provisionally) earlier than KORUS. However, an amendment 
for additional 20-years protection for neighboring rights was made effective by 
KORUS. 
663 Korean Publishers Association, 2006; Korean Publishers Association, 2007. 
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The term of copyright protection is one of the key elements in striking a fair 
balance between private interests of copyright holders and public interests. 
From the human rights perspective, whilst the moral interests of authors can last 
forever, the material interests of authors need to be limited in time to ensure “a 
vibrant public domain of shared cultural heritage, from which all creators are 
free to draw”.664  As the General Comment No. 17 points out, the human right 
aspect of the protection of author’s material interest is to enable authors to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living, which can be achieved by an one-time 
payment, and therefore the duration of protection of author’s material interests 
need not extend over the entire lifespan of author.665 
Formally, the Korean negotiators stood with these opposition groups. From the 
1st round of talk, the Korean negotiators were firm in rejecting the US demand 
as they viewed it unacceptable due to huge social and economic impacts, and 
reported to the National Assembly that their stance was to keep the author’s life 
plus 50 years under the international standards such as TRIPS and the Berne 
Convention. The copyright term extension was one of the standout issues held 
out to the last. At the final round of talks of March 8 to 12, 2007, most of the 
outstanding issues of the IP Chapter were resolved. However, the copyright 
term extension was not on the list. Only at the ministerial high level talk of 
March 19 to 22, 2007, the Korean negotiators suggested a package deal under 
which Korea accepted the US demand of additional 20 years for copyright 
protection, and in exchange the US conceded on provisions for statutory 
damages and data exclusivity.666  
However, from the outset the Korean negotiators admitted that they would not 
be successful in defeating the US demand of the copyright term extension. 
According to an interim report drafted prior to the official round of talks, the 
negotiators viewed that it would be difficult to sustain positions contrary to the 
US counterpart in key provisions such as the copyright term extension. They 
knew that the maximum commitment obtainable from US was transitional 
                                                      
664 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 50 
665 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 16. 
666 The package deal was revealed by a printed autobiography of then Ministry of 
Trade (Hyun-Jong Kim). Yet, it is still unknown what the US commitments were on 
the statutory damages and data exclusivity.  
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period.667 
As the extension of copyright protection term was come into force by the EU-
Korea FTA, its impact will be discussed in the following Chapter 5 (Section 5-
4-2). 
4-4-3.	Restoration	of	Expired	Rights	of	Neighbouring	Rights	
4-4-3-1. Obligation under KORUS 
Restoring copyright protection is not an obligation of the FTAs. Contrariwise, 
Article 18.10:1(10) of KORUS provides that “a Party shall not be required to 
restore protection to subject matter that on the date of this Agreement enters 
into force has fallen into the public domain in the territory of the Party where 
the protection is claimed”. The only exception to this applies when the IP 
Chapter provides otherwise. Examples of this include Article 18 of the Berne 
Convention (“Works Existing on Convention’s Entry Into Force”) and Article 
14.6 of the TRIPS Agreement.668 Therefore, subject matters of neighboring 
rights put into the public domain before March 15, 2012, the effective date of 
KORUS, by the term expiration under the Korean Copyright Act needs not to 
be restored for an extended protection. 
4-4-3-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The copyright term extension mandated by the EU-Korea FTA and KORUS 
produced extraordinary and unprecedented consequences: a restoration of 
expired neighboring rights. During the implementation review period, the US 
demanded that the existing Korean Copyright Act be revised, restoring the 
expired neighboring rights to fulfill Korea’s obligations under TRIPS, which 
                                                      
667 Anonymous, 2005. This report was drafted by a senior researcher of the Korea 
Copyright Commission and a law professor after their visit to Australia (from 
August 3 to 10, 2005) and having meetings with a copyright law consultant and a 
principle legal officer of the Attorney General’s Department of Australia, an officer 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, three scholars of the 
Australian National University and University of Technology, and experts of the 
Australian Copyright Council and related institutions. The report has been kept 
classified and undisclosed by Korean government, but downloadable at the website 
of the Professors for Democracy (PD) 
<http://www.professornet.org/_new/idx.html?Qy=pds4&nid=161&page=64>. 
668 Article 18.4:5 of KORUS. 
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was binding under KORUS. 
Under this pressure, the KORUS implementation act (amendment of the 
Copyright Act) restored rights on phonograms that were fixed during July 1, 
1987 and June 30, 1994 and expired, on or before March 15, 2012, by 20 years 
lapse from the fixation date, and the resurrected rights remained effective for 
fifty years from the fixation date. This restoration also applies to performance. 
For more than twenty years, the 20-years protection of neighboring rights under 
the Korean Copyright Act, which is shorter than fifty years required by TRIPS, 
has never come into question by any other TRIPS member countries. The 
retrospective protection has a huge impact. The phonograms published during 
July 1, 1987 and June 30, 1994 are estimated more than five thousand for 
56,000 songs. When the amendment was brought to the Constitutional Court, 
the Court ruled that the retrospective protection is not unconstitutional.669 The 
complainant who was engaged in a business to remake several hundred of 
expired phonograms argued that the revised act to implement KORUS was an 
unconstitutional retroactive legislation and that conflicted with the 
constitutional right to freedom of business. However, the Constitutional Court 
held that the restoration of related rights was not retroactive legislation because 
it only regulated activities on phonogram after the amendment went into effect. 
Further the Court ruled that the interests of the complainant were not a specific 
right, but merely interests or opportunities for acquiring money, or the legal or 
actual circumstances of business activity that resulted in no deprivation of 
property. Concerning the freedom of business, the Court held that the 
amendment was proportional in that whereas the protection term of copyright 
for authors had been continuously extended, the non-extended protection term 
of 20-years for neighbouring rights was insufficient and unreasonable, and even 
under the amendment the complainant could still use the phonogram by paying 
royalties. Further, as the amendment provided a grace period for two years, 
during which the complainant could sell the already produced phonograms in 
the market, the restoration of related rights is, according to the Court, had 
nothing in conflict with the constitution. 
                                                      
669 The Korean Constitutional Court, 2012HunMa770, November 28, 2013. 
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4-4-4.	Protection	of	Technological	Measures	
4-4-4-1. Obligations under KORUS 
KORUS protects technological protection measures (TPMs) much broadly than 
the international standards such as WCT and WPPT.670 First, KORUS makes 
clear that TPMs encompass “access control”, which is not mandated by WCT 
and WPPT, as well as for “copy control”.671 Second, it prohibits both activities 
of circumvention and trafficking circumvention device. Third, knowing act of 
circumvention of TPM has to be subject to both civil and criminal penalties.672  
KORUS also restricts limitation and exception of TPM. Modeled on the US law 
(17 USC §1201), it allows only eight permanent exceptions to the prohibition 
on circumvention: reverse engineering a computer program for the sole purpose 
of achieving interoperability (Art. 18.4:7(d)(i)); encryption research by an 
appropriately qualified researcher (Art. 18.4:7(d)(ii)), prevention of minors 
from accessing to inappropriate online content (Art. 18.4:7(d)(iii)); security 
testing (Art. 18.47(d)(iv)); protection of personally identifying information (Art. 
18.4:7(d)(v)); government acts for law enforcement  (Art. 18.4:7(d)(vi)); access 
by nonprofit library, archive, or educational institution for the sole purpose of 
making acquisition decision  (Art. 18.4:7(d)(vii)); and certain uses exempted by 
either Party subject to a mandatory triennial review (Art. 18.4:7(d)(viii)).673 
                                                      
670 In KORUS, TPM is defined to mean “any technology, device, or component 
that, in normal course of its operation, controls access to a protected work, 
performance, phonogram, or other protected subject matter, or protects any 
copyright or any rights related to copyright (Article 18.4:7(f)).  
671 The WCT and WPPT do not obligate the protection for an “access control” 
TPM. Article 11 of WCT and Article 18 of WPPT only require “adequate legal 
protection and effective legal remedies” against the circumvention of effective 
technological measures that are used “in connection with the exercise of their 
[authors’] rights” and restrict acts which are “not authorized” by the authors”. 
While the “access control” refers to TPM for controlling access to copyright works, 
the “copy control” means TPM for protecting “exclusive rights granted to copyright 
owners” under the copyright laws. See Notices of Library of Congress, U.S. 
Copyright Office on Section 1201 Study, December 29, 2015 (80 FR 81369-01, 
2015 WL 9460398), at p. 2. 
672 The “knowing” prong is broader in KORUS and the US-Singapore FTA (Article 
16.4.7(a)) than the US-Chile FTA (Article 17.7.5(a)) as they add a “reasonable 
grounds to know” clause (Handler & Mercurio, 2016, p. 330). 
673 TPP also requires civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for circumventing 
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4-4-4-2. Discussion and Analysis 
A broader protection of TPM extended to an access control has been widely 
criticized as being used by copyright holders in anti-competitive business, 
stifling free expression and scientific research, preventing non-infringing uses, 
such as fair use, an overly narrow exception,674 and failing to keep up with 
changing technologies with inadequate conditions for nonprofit entities.675  
Having recognized these problems, the Korean government has long denied 
stronger protection of TPMs than the international standards. Therefore, it was 
natural that the Korean negotiators strongly objected the US’ demand for an 
expansive protection of TPM. In preparing the 2nd round of talk, the Korean 
negotiators posited that penalties against circumvention of access control TPM 
would undermine the user’s right to access to information and provide an overly 
extensive protection for copyright holders. They viewed that the protection of 
TPM should remain as supplemental tools for ensuring an effective exploitation 
of copyright holders in digital environment. This position was sustained at least 
until the 6th round of talk. At the hearing of the National Assembly, the Trade 
Minister also confirmed that the strategy of Korean negotiators for the 3rd round 
of talk was to negotiate TPM within the boundary of domestic copyright laws 
that did not prohibit circumvention of the access control TPM. However, the 
stronger protection of TPM was one of the non-negotiable trade policies of the 
US, and KORUS incorporated what the US demanded. 
To implement KORUS, the Korean Copyright Act was revised to embrace 
protection of access control TPMs. Still its impact is limited. Prior to KORUS 
entering into effect, the Korean courts interpreted TPMs for “copy control” so 
                                                      
TPMs or selling devices and services for breaking TPMs, subject to certain 
exceptions for noninfringing uses. While KORUS appears to confine exceptions 
and limitations to specified measures, TPP appears to set out broader parameters for 
providing exceptions and limitations regarding circumventing TPMs. According to 
USTR, “TPP’s anti-circumvention of [TPMs] provisions do not preclude new 
exceptions, like cellphone unlocking, while still protecting new online services that 
engage in legitimate digital trade (USTR, n.d.). 
674 Handler & Bryan Mercurio, 2016, p. 331. 
675 United States Copyright Office, 2015, p. 81373. According to this notice, the 
Register of the U.S. Copyright Office concluded that the statutory exemptions for 
reverse engineering, encryption research, and security testing, and activities for 
non-profit entities have been proven compelling.  
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broadly as to encompass an access code for a computer game. For instance, in 
“PlayStation 2 mod chip” case,676 the Korean Supreme Court held that an access 
code for “PlayStation” was a technical protection measure within the meaning 
of the Computer Program Protection Act (“CPPA”).677 Users could not run the 
PlayStation 2 game program by copying it and reproduction of the access code 
was impossible with normal device and software. Further, the access code or 
boot ROM itself was unable to block physical copy of the program. Then, the 
mod chip, a circumventing device called “Blue Messiah Chip” that the 
defendant manufactured and sold, according to the court, was equivalent to 
means for preventing physical copying, a TPM within the meaning of the 
CPPA. In other words, the court viewed that the mod chip replaced the function 
of the access code. Later, the Supreme Court granted protection on 
technological measures against: (1) a patch program that could decode, without 
authorization, encrypted control words transmitted by satellite broadcasting 
service providers, and enabled users to freely watch the broadcasted 
programs;678 (2) a circumventing tool that made DS game devices of Nintendo 
to treat the pirated game software as if it was licensed;679 and (3) a 
circumventing tool enabling karaoke businesses to perform for their customers 
newly released songs without paying music copyright holders.680  
                                                      
676 The Supreme Court, 2004Do2743, February 24, 2006. 
677 The CCPA is a special law to Copyright Act and was enacted in 1986 as a 
consequence of bilateral agreement between the US and Korea, aiming at 5-years 
retroactive protection of computer programs created by US citizens. On the other 
hand, the Supreme Court rejected a technological measure banning access to a 
computer program used in chauffeur service (The Supreme Court, 2010Do1422, 
February 23, 2012). 
678 The Supreme Court, 2007Do10735, October 29, 2009. 
679 The Supreme Court, 2010Do1441, July 14, 2011. 
680 The Supreme Court, 2015Do3352, July 9, 2015. In this case, the Court admitted 
that around four thousand songs were illegally distributed by the circumvention 
device, causing serious harms to copyright holder as much as KRW 1.3 billion, and 
sentenced 2.5 years in jail to the accused who manufactured key elements of the 
circumventing device. 
165 / 335 
 
4-4-5.	Three-Step	Test	and	Fair	Use	
4-4-5-1. Obligation under KORUS 
KORUS does not mandate limitations and exceptions of copyright. Instead it 
confirms that the controversial three-step tests be applied to the reproduction 
right, which is extended to cover temporary copying,681 and to all of the 
exclusive rights ensured by copyright and related rights clauses.682 With regard 
to television signal, whether terrestrial, cable, or satellite, any limitations or 
exceptions for retransmission on the Internet are absolutely prohibited.683  
KORUS, in its footnote 11 of Article 18.4:1, allows a room for more flexible 
fair use with two limitations: in connection with the reproduction right; and 
qualifying it by referring to the three-step test.  
4-4-5-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The fair use footnote is not to fully guarantee the open-ended more flexible 
limitations and exceptions: it simply reflects the concerns on possible side 
effects caused by the expansive protection of the reproduction right to 
temporary storage in electronic form. Further, KORUS restricts the application 
of fair use within the boundary of three-step test. Under this restriction, Korea 
had to legislate fair use clause (Article 35ter of the Korean Copyright Act) by 
mixing the four requirements of Section 107 of the US Copyright Act684 and the 
second and third elements of the three-step test.685  
Before the enactment of the fair use clause, the most commonly relied-upon 
defense to a claim of copyright infringement were the specific limitations for 
                                                      
681 Footnote 11 of Article 18.4:1. 
682 Article 18.4:10(a). 
683 Article 18.4:10(b). 
684 The four requirements include: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
685 The first element of three-step test, “certain special cases”, was not codified in 
the Korean Copyright Act because legislators viewed that it did not fit with concept 
of open ended fair use. For a contrary interpretation that the three-step test does not 
limit an open-ended exception, see, Geiger, Gervais & Senftleben, 2014. 
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quotation and private use.686 However, both were codified in restrictive terms 
and courts interpreted them narrowly. First, to be a permitted quotation, a so-
called “master-servant relationship” has to be met. The condition of master-
servant relationship was developed by the Korean Supreme Court from 1990s 
modeled on Japanese case laws. It requires that “the quoting work is superior, 
while the quoted work is subordinate”.687 Therefore, reproducing the whole or a 
substantial amount of a work is excluded from the permitted quotation. The 
Supreme Court of Korea later relaxed the master-servant relationship by 
legitimating reproduction of thumbnail images by search engines.688  
The open-ended fair use clause induced, albeit slowly, changes the judicial 
practices. For instance, in 2015, the Seoul Western District Court upheld the 
fair use defence in a copyrighted photo case, supported by the appeal court.689 
In this case, the copyright holder was Image Making, one of the notorious 
copyright trolls in Korea. The defendant was a peace movement NGO called 
Without War. For using a photo of sliced flatfish in a blog posting, Image 
Making demanded, in a civil litigation, damages of as much as KRW 2 
million.690 
In upholding all of the lower court’s reasoning, the appeal court found that the 
use was fair under Article 35ter. Concluding non-infringement, the court 
considered such factors as: (1) the purpose of the use was not-for-profit, to 
encourage a vegetarian diet; (2) the photo used in the blog was not substantial; 
(3) the potential impact on the market or business of the copyrighted work 
would be small because the main customers of the photo at issue would be 
advertising companies and restaurant businesses; (4) there was no copyright 
notice on the photo, making difficult for Without War to recognize the 
existence of copyright; (5) the degree of creativity of the photo was low; and (6) 
                                                      
686 Jong, 2013, pp. 176-194. 
687 Ueno, 2009, p.170. 
688 2005Do7793, February 9, 2006. 
689 Seoul Western District Court, 2015Na33407, November 26, 2015. 
690 According to price schedule of copyright holder, the retail price was KRW 
300,000. 
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the used photo was of lower quality than the original.691 
In other cases, the Korean courts did not admit a fair use defense. For instance, 
when a liquor wholesaler posted news articles for an exclusive use of its 
employees, the court held that it conflicted with the normal exploitation of 
works and unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of copyright 
holders.692 Furthermore, when a company produced audiovisual materials for an 
online lecture in which textbooks sold by the plaintiff were used, the court did 
not view it fair because the textbooks were used for-profit and their potential 
market value would be substantially undermined.693 
The UN human rights bodies recommends that “national courts and 
administrative bodies should interpret national copyright rules consistently with 
human rights standards, including the right to science and culture,” and noted 
the importance of copyright limitations and exceptions to empower new 
creativity, promote educational opportunity, expand space for noncommercial 
culture.694 The open-ended fair use clause recently introduced in the Korea 
Copyright Act has shown how it serves to achieve the recommended states 
obligation and strike a fair balance in flexible way between the copyright 
holders and users in various cases described below. 
4-5.	Patent	
4-5-1.	Patentable	Invention	
4-5-1-1. Obligations under KORUS 
Article 18.8:1 of KORUS sets forth inventions that can or cannot be entitled for 
the protection of patent and requirement for patent registration. The first 
sentence mandates both Parties to make patents available for any invention 
                                                      
691  The lower court first ordered a reconciliation of money settlement that the 
defendant pays half of the retail price (KRW 150,000). However, the defendant 
raised an objection to this order and asked the court to render a formal decision. 
692 Seoul Central District Court, 2013Na36100, February 11, 2014. 
693 Seoul Central District Court, 2012GaHap541175, February 12, 2015. 
694 Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights, Copyright policy and the right 
to science and culture, U.N. General Assembly, Doc. A/HRC/28/57 (Dec. 24, 
2014). 
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directed to either a product or a process, regardless of technical field, which is 
new, involves an inventive step and is industrially applicable.  
Article 18.8.2(b) of KORUS permits both Parties to exclude “diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and surgical procedures for the treatment of humans or animals” 
from the patentable inventions. The same Article also allows exceptions for the 
purpose of protecting ordre public or morality including protecting human, 
animal, or plant life or health or avoiding serious prejudice to the environment.  
4-5-1-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The scope of patentable inventions directly affects both the right to protection 
of material interests resulting from scientific production to which he is the 
author and the right to benefit from scientific progress. Patentable inventions 
under the domestic patent laws and international IP treaties are not identical to 
the “scientific production”, or “scientific progress and its applications” of the 
international human rights instruments. Both are different in fundamental 
purposes, not only in terms of scope. In human right perspective, the moral and 
material interests of scientific production are protected insofar as a personal link 
between the scientific productions and creators exists. Further, Author Clause of 
the international human right laws require authorship for the protection of moral 
and material interests. By contrast, patentable inventions are determined by 
quite different requirements, such as industrial applicability, novelty and 
inventive step. Here, any personal link is not required.695 
The first sentence of Article 18.8:1 of KORUS for patentable invention is the 
same as Article 27(1) of TRIPS. However, the second sentence of Article 
18.8(1) of KORUS is TRIPS-plus because it embraces “any new uses or 
methods of using a known product”. The language used in KORUS is slightly 
different from TPP. While KORUS says that “each Party confirms that patents 
shall be available for any new uses or methods of using a known product”, TPP 
prescribes that “each Party confirms that patents are available for inventions 
claimed as at least one of the following: new uses of a known product, new 
                                                      
695 Gordon observes that the current IP law has two primary conceptions of who 
counts as a creator: subjective originality versus being objectively ‘first’, but patent 
legal systems do not consistently follow either conception (2010, p. 163). 
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methods of using a known product, or new processes of using a known 
product”.696 Further, TPP watered down the obligation; “A Party may limit 
those new processes to those that do not claim the use of the product as such”. 
This “new use” clause may foreclose the TRIPS flexibilities that allow a 
national discretion in determining patentability of inventions. Further, it may 
systematically ensure the “evergreening” strategy of pharmaceutical companies 
- an endless extension of patent protection of one pharmaceutical product.697 For 
the purpose of striking a proper balance between private and public interests, 
and at the same time for ensuring respect for a wide range of human rights, 
flexible patentability requirements, and exclusion from patentable subject 
matter are recommended for national government to use.698 
The exception for “diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical procedures” is 
modelled on Article 27.3(a) of TRIPS with minor change (replacing “methods” 
of TRIPS with “procedures” in KORUS). No provisions in Korean and US 
patent laws preclude such procedures from invention. Instead, under the Korean 
practice, the diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical method is deemed lacking 
industrial applicability.699 KORUS contains no exceptional provision to plant 
and animals, which are excludable in TRIPS (Article 27(3)(b)) and TPP (Article 
18.37:3(b) and 4). Therefore, the USTR’s advisory committee satisfied with this 
broader protection of patent, especially for bio-industries.700  
                                                      
696 Article 18.37:2 of TPP. 
697 The term “evergreening” is used to describe patenting or marketing strategies of 
pharmaceutical industries to extend the period of patent protection or effective 
period of market exclusivity, which are considered to be unjustifiable and therefore 
abusive (UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines (2016) 
Final report: Promoting innovation and access to health technologies, p. 5). 
698 UN Patent Report of 2015, ¶¶ 64-65. 
699 Section 5.1 of the Korea Patent Office’s Patent Examination Guideline 
(Amended on 11 February, 2016, Patent Office Bylaw No. 89). 
700 [ITAC-15 Report 2007, 14-15] “The obligation, which includes patents on plants 
and animals, reinforces the standards that exist today in Korea and validates the 
importance of extending, without exclusion, broad patent eligibility for 
biotechnology products”. 
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4-5-2.	Revocation	of	and	Opposition	to	Patent	
4-5-2-1. Obligations under KORUS 
Article 18.8:4 of KORUS mandates the grounds to revoke a patent to be the 
same as those for refusal of a patent registration. The grounds for the refusal are 
not specified as an obligation. Rather, it simply enumerates certain grounds 
such as fraud, misrepresentation, or inequitable conduct, all of which are 
codified in the US Patent Act, but not in the Korean Act.701 
The third sentence of Article 18.8:4 prohibits a pre-grant opposition system. 
4-5-2-2. Discussion and Analysis 
Restricting the ground to revoke a patent to those for refusing patent grant 
limits state’s discretion to use TRIPS flexibilities on revocation or forfeiture of 
patent right.702 It also prevents states from taking ex post measures against 
patentee’s misuse of right such as non-working. Historically, local working has 
been viewed as a device for the transfer of technology and a tool to balance the 
exclusive rights of patentees with their obligations towards contributing to 
public interests703 as discussed in Section 2-2. 
The US’ proposal for the ban of pre-grant opposition became a catalyst for 
Korea to entirely abolish an opposition system itself in 2006.704 The traditional 
arguments against the pre-grant opposition system are abuse by competitors and 
delay in patent granting, leading to an inadequate protection of inventors. 
However, the empirical data do not support such arguments. 
<Table 4-1> Pre-Grant Opposition System from 1971 to 1998 
                                                      
701 The second sentence of Article 18.8:4 KORUS allowing that either Party may 
revoke a patent or hold a patent unenforceable on the grounds of fraud, 
misrepresentation, or inequitable conduct is one of the balancing provisions for 
public interest. However, Korean government was reluctant to reflect this provision 
into the domestic laws simply because the provision is not mandatory. 
702 UN Patent Report of 2015, ¶ 69. 
703 Ganguli, 2014, p. 68. 
704 At that time, the Korean Patent Act allowed only a post-grant opposition, which 
was enacted on March 1, 1998.  
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Year 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Opposed 228 218 211 248 323 361 221 327 443 350 
Patent  
Rejected 
38 144 124 50 68 85 35 60 66 122 
Grant 1,370 1,363 1,118 2,173 1,488 1,594 851 1,426 3,200 3,385 
Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Opposed 310 364 302 472 530 620 450 384 314 359 
Patent  
Rejected 
113 125 63 97 140 121 101 111 52 96 
Grant 3,499 5,123 4,512 4,725 4,569 4,652 5,749 5,282 9,283 16,608 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Opposed 199 236 221 223 344 426 421 389 9,494 
Patent  
Rejected 
58 57 55 78 73 66 73 24 2,295 
Grant 17,060 18,372 19,038 19,500 20,661 25,707 38,292 39,430 318,646 
 
As shown in <Table 4-1>, during the pre-grant opposition period of 1971 to 
1998, total grants of patents and utility models were 280,030, and oppositions 
raised against 9,494 patent publications in Korea. Therefore, the opposition rate 
is 3.39% and 24.17% of the opposed patent publications were unregistered.705 
When concentrating the time frame to the period when the yearly patent grants 
exceeded 10,000, and discussions for abolishing the pre-grant opposition 
system were emerging, i.e., from 1992 to 1998, total number of patent grants 
and utility models were 181,000, and 2,260 oppositions were filed with 426 
patent publications unregistered. Thus, the opposition rate was only 1.25% 
(among these 18.85% of the opposed patent publications were unregistered). 
These figures were not substantially changed during the post-grant period from 
1999 to 2007 as shown in <Table 4-2> below (the opposition rate of 0.32% and 
                                                      
705 The opposition rate should be counted on the number of patent publications that 
deemed by patent examiners as registable. However, data on such publications is 
not available from database provided by the Korea Patent Office. Given the small 
portion of oppositions per grant, the opposition rate counted on the number of grant 
is a valid approximation. 
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patent revocation rate of 22.97%).706 
<Table 4-2> Post-Grant Opposition System from 1999 to 2007 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Opposed 453 377 265 301 274 244 329 378 213 2,834 
Patent Revoked 18 56 58 69 84 94 80 83 109 651 
Grant 95,503 76,701 78,517 85,273 81,437 83,250 106,228 150,526 126,500 883,935 
 
The pre-grant opposition systems have played a role of a recipe for remedying 
social cost of low-quality patent and patent trolls.707 According to Drahos who 
conducted extensive interviews with various patent offices, the pre-grant 
opposition system was successful for keeping patent quality.708 As illustrated by 
Indian experiences, the pre-grant opposition system is particularly important in 
patients’ right to access to essential medicines.709 The empirical data of <Table 
4-1> and <Table 4-2> demonstrate the remedying function of the pre-grant 
opposition system without causing abusive delay of patent grant. However, the 
US has exercised bilateral pressures upon trade partners to drop the pre-grant 
opposition.710 Not only Korea, Japan also dropped the pre-grant opposition 
through bilateral discussion with the US in late 1980s when the US complained 
that pre-grant opposition was filed by Japanese firms to purposely delay the 
                                                      
706 Compare with figures of European Patent Office in 2015 – opposition rate of 
4.4%, and 31% of patents were revoked (European Patent Office, 2015, p. 2). 
707 Worrel explains the pre-grant opposition is to “increase the efficiency of the 
examination process, decrease the number of patent erroneously issued, and to 
avoid giving undeserved protection to patent applicant like NTP” (2011, p. 834).  
708 Drahos, 2010, p. 148 (“The German and British models of patent administration, 
which proved to be so influential in the twentieth century, both had pre-grant 
opposition and some countries such as Australia and India retain it as part of their 
system. At the interview in the German PO, pre-grant opposition was said to be a 
very important tool of patent quality”). 
709 Ho, 2009, p. 699 (explaining that the denial of an India Glivec patent seems to 
have been promoted by a pre-grant opposition filed by the Cancer Patient Aid 
Association of India). 
710 Drahos, 2010, p. 172. 
173 / 335 
 
patent grants on the US inventions.711 
Cost of low-patent quality is obvious. Patents that should have not been granted 
raise prices without adequate compensation to society. They “might damage 
competition and eventually harm innovation incentives, with detrimental effects 
for consumers”.712 This holds true regardless of the definition of patent quality; 
it can be defined either by “techno-economic quality created by the patent’s 
underlying invention” or “legal quality created by the patent’s reliability as an 
enforceable property right”.713 
The role of pre-grant opposition becomes more apparent as the patent quality 
deteriorates. Harhoff et al. demonstrate that patent quality has long been 
decreasing partly because of low examination standard, which in turn fueled the 
increase in patent applications.714 Patent applications also increase when patent 
protection is stronger, thereby patent becomes more profitable for inventors. 
Thus, “owners of obvious inventions also have a private incentive to seek a 
patent”.715  
Screening quality of patent offices is poor not because patent examiners are 
under-skilled. It’s because of weak incentive and high work load of patent 
offices. According to the US GAO’s survey of USPTO examiners, 70% of 
examiners admit that “they do not have enough time to complete a through 
examination given a typical workload”.716 When the examiners are allotted less 
time to conduct a patent examination, they were less likely to make time-
intensive prior art rejections and more likely to grant a patent.717 The examiners 
also have less incentive because there is neither the carrot nor the stick; they are 
not rewarded for rejecting more patent applications, and they are not 
                                                      
711 Japan Patent Office, 2016, p. 2, footnote 1. 
712 Scellato et al., 2011, p. 19. 
713 Burke & Reitzing, 2007. 
714 Harhoff et al., 2007, p. 93. 
715 Scellato et al., 2011, p. 3. 
716 USGAO, 2016, p. 2. 
717 USGAO, 2016, p. 10 (USPTO examiners spend about 22 hours total on average 
on each application from start to final determination). 
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responsible for incorrectly-granted patents. 
Pre-grant opposition system needs to be reintroduced especially where patent 
quality tends to be low such as in Korea where all of the factors contributing to 
the low patent quality exist; large number of patent applications, low 
examination standards, weak incentive of patent examiners and higher 
workload. In Korea, invalidation rate of patent for five years from 2011 to 2015 
turns out to be on average 50.5% in terms of the first instance trial decisions, 
and workload of Korean patent examiners is five times higher than EPO 
counterpart. In 2014, the Korean patent examiners had to examine on average 
230 patent applications, which is incomparably higher than workload of other 
patent offices-160 of JPO, 47 of EPO (in 2013), and 77 of USPTO.718 Restoring 
the pre-grant opposition system requires a bilateral negotiation with the US. 
Yet, the bilateral deal would be feasible as the US during the negotiation of TPP 
changed her position to support the pre-grant opposition procedures.719 
4-5-3.	Patent	Term	Extension	
4-5-3-1. Obligations under KORUS 
Under KORUS, a patent term extension is possible for compensating two kinds 
of delays: delay in drug approval process; and delay in patent examination 
process, the latter of which is new to Korea.  
Article 18.8:6(a) of KORUS requires both Parties to allow the patent term 
extension for the compensation of unreasonable delay in granting the patent. 
The unreasonable delay should include a delay in the issuance of the patent of 
more than four years from the filing date, or three years after a request for 
examination, whichever is later.720 This provision has a retroactive effect 
                                                      
718 Korea Patent Office, 2016, p. 3.  
719 New, 2013. 
720 There are two models for this extension. While the US-Chile FTA (Article 
17.9(6)) and the CAFTA (Article 15.9(6)(a)) allow for extension in cases of delay 
in granting a patent of less than five years from filing date or three years from the 
request of examination whichever is later, majority of FTAs (US-Singapore FTA, 
US-Morocco FTA, US-Australia FTA, US-Bahrain FTA and US-Korea FTA) allow 
for extension in cases of delay less than four years from filing date or two years 
from the request of examination. 
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regardless of the effective date of the KORUS - the patent term extension 
should be available for all patent applications filed on or after January 1, 2008. 
4-5-3-2. Discussion and Analysis 
When KORUS was negotiated, the Korean government estimated that among 
the registered patents only 0.2% would be subject to the patent term extension 
for the examination delay, and the patent applications filed on or after January 
2008 that were likely to benefit from the term extension would be less than 10 
cases per month. Therefore, it concluded that the economic impact was trivial 
and insignificant. Furthermore, the Korea Patent Office reported to the National 
Assembly that the KPO would keep the average examination duration for 9.8 
months and control it less than 16 months.721 Since KORUS entering into effect, 
an application for the term extension for the examination delay was filed only 
once, but rejected by the KPO as failing to meet the statutory requirement. 
Although no direct impact has been observed, the KORUS obligation on patent 
term extension may cause indirect, more harmful effects. The obligation may 
press KPO to speed up examination process, eventually leading to low patent 
quality. As illustrated in previous Section 4-5-2-2, KPO has already met the 
conditions of the low patent quality, and the term extension will add to this 
condition. 
The term extension for compensating delay in drug approval process has been 
applied in 487 cases for ten years from 2007 to August 2016. In addition to this 
actual impact, the TRIPS-plus provision is theoretically defective given that the 
patent right is an exclusive right, not a positive right. When a patent is granted, 
patent owner can prohibit anyone who, without consent, produces, sells, 
distributes or uses a product or uses a method covered by the patent claim 
regardless of whether the patent owners can or cannot work their own product 
or method. Therefore, the term extension to compensate the period during 
which patent owners cannot market their pharmaceutical products lacks 
theoretical justification. 
                                                      
721 The Review Report of the National Assembly (2011) p.783. 
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4-5-4.	Grace	Period	
4-5-4-1. Obligations under KORUS 
KORUS mandates a 12-months grace period.722 This extends the existing grace 
period for additional 6 months in Korea for which a publicly disclosed 
information may not be considered to be part of prior art.  
4-5-4-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The additional grace period means that, for others working in the same area of 
medicines or medical technology, there would be additional uncertainty as to 
whether they can work on or produce a particular medicine or medical 
technology disclosed by any person for fear that a patent application may be 
filed 12 months later.723 
Although a comprehensive qualitative assessment of the extension of grace 
period needs a further study,724 the following data is sufficient to show a 
potential adverse impact. Since KORUS entering into effect, more than ten 
thousand applications for the extended grace period has been filed with the 
Korean Patent Office, and most of them (99.6%) were granted. 
<Table 4-3> Applications and Grant of Extended Grace Period 




On or after six 
months 
Application for exception 15,002 11,396 
Exception granted 14,912 11,355 
                                                      
722 Article 18.8:7(b). 
723 UNITAID, 2014, p. 25. 
724 For potential adverse impact of the grace period to the third party’s rights to 
information, majority of academic views in disfavor of the grace period, see UK 
Patent Office, 2012. According to the analysis of the UK office, the main views 
from the respondents are that a grace period is not required partly because the grace 
period would allow “someone to restrict the use of publicly available information 
by patent applications even though people would not realize that the information is 
the subject of a patent application until later when the application is actually 
published” (Ibid, p. 15). 





Data exclusivity is one of the strongest TRIPS-plus provisions that provide an 
over-protection on pharmaceutical products, delaying generic entry and 
restricting patients’ right to access to medicine. It is also criticized as unethical 
by compelling generic producers to conduct duplicate clinical trials on 
patients.725  
KORUS does not use the term “data exclusivity”. Instead, it prohibits the 
approving authority from authorizing generic companies to market the generic 
product on the basis of data concerning safety or efficacy submitted by 
originator company.726 As the data exclusivity was introduced in Korea by the 
trade pressure from the EC and the existing rules are almost the same as agreed 
upon between Korea and the EC in early 1990s, this topic will be discussed in 
detail in the next Chapter (See Section 5-5-4). 
4-6-2.	Patent-Approval	Linkage	
4-6-2-1. Obligations under KORUS: A ‘Harder’ Model of Linkage 
Drug approval process is “distinct and separate”727 from the status of patent that 
may cover drug under an approval examination. The linkage between patent 
status and drug approval process was invented by the US in 1984,728 and the US 
has spread out the linkage system through bilateral and regional trade 
                                                      
725 USFTC, 2003, p. 9 (“The FDA considered retesting of generic drugs to be 
wasteful if the underlying drug is safe and effective. Moreover, such retesting is 
unethical because it requires that some risk patients take placebos and be denied 
treatment known to be effective.”). For debates on the data exclusivity, refer to 
Section 5-5-4. 
726 Article 18.9:1 and 2. 
727 Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, LPA 443/2009 (Delhi H.C.) (India) at ¶ 28 (cited 
in Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 440). 
728 The US enacted the linkage regulation by the Hatch-Waxman Act (Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C § 355). 
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agreements.729 In the US, its aim was “to balance the competing goals of 
stimulating pioneering innovation and facilitating generic entry”,730 and to 
achieve a balance between “cheaper drugs today and better drugs tomorrow”.731 
However, in a country having a different structure of pharmaceutical industries 
and drug regulation system, the linkage regime may not work as intended. It 
could yield a decline in innovative products, substantial delays in generic entry, 
increased monopoly price, wasteful litigation and increased public health 
costs.732 Due to the potential harmful impact on public health, even the May 10th 
deal of the US politicians recommended to remove the linkage clause from 
FTAs.733 
Reflecting these concerns, the linkage regime was one of the most controversial 
issues in KORUS negotiation. It has long faced strong opposition from public 
health advocates, patients’ groups and Korean pharmaceutical industries. From 
the beginning of KORUS negotiation, Korean negotiators were firm in 
opposing the US’ demand on linkage regime. However, it was a non-negotiable 
trade policy of the US. The USTR and US Congress decided not to apply the 
May 10th deal to Korea “in view of Korea’s relatively higher level of economic 
                                                      
729 In 1993, Canada introduced the linkage system under NAFTA, followed by 
Mexico in 2003. Most other countries have entered into bilateral or regional trade 
pacts with the US incorporating the linkage regime, which include Australia, 
Bahrain, Chile, Singapore and South Korea. Two exceptions are Japan and China 
but they are not entirely free from the pressure of the US. For the Chinese story, see 
Liu, 2012. In May 2017, the Chinese Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) 
proposed new linkage regime, under which every applicant for a drug approval has 
to notify relevant patent holders and the CFDA, upon informed of initiation of 
patent infringement suit by the patent holders, may delay the drug approval for up 
to 24 months. For unofficial English translation of official notice of Chinese 
government, see https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/file_repository/alert_circular_55.pdf. 
730 Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 439. 
731 Epstein & Kuhlik, 2004, p.11. 
732 Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 435. 
733 The May 10th deal refers to “A New Trade Policy for America” adopted by the 
US Congress and the Administration on May 10th 2007 (see Section 4-2-1), 
requiring USTR to “amend FTA so that there is no “linkage” requirement between 
drug regulatory agencies and patent issues: in particular, no requirement that the 
drug regulatory agency withhold approval of a generic until it can certify that no 
patent would be violated if the generic were marketed.” 
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development”.734 The maximum commitment Korea obtained, at the end of two 
renegotiations, from the US was a three-year transition period for a full 
implementation of the linkage obligation. 
The patent-approval linkage may take two forms. In a ‘soft’ model, a patentee 
may be notified of any generic application that may be in conflict with a patent 
granted by the Patent Office and listed by the drug approval authority. Under a 
‘hard’ model, the drug approval authority is obliged not to approve marketing 
of generic drugs if there exists any relevant listed patent. In the ‘hard’ model, 
the patentee needs “not seek private enforcement of rights to bar the generic 
approval”.735 Therefore, by simply listing patent, the patent holder obtains 
“what is tantamount to an interlocutory injunction … without having satisfied 
any of the criteria a court would require before enjoining issuance of” generic 
approval.736 The linkage regulations, as Flynn et al put it, “reverse the onus, 
forcing generic company, blocked from access to market, to affirmatively sue 
the patent holder in order to gain market access”.737 KORUS adopts the hard 
model. It is harder than the previous US FTAs and the US domestic regime in 
two aspects. 
First, the KORUS text defines a patent to be linked to the drug approval process 
as a patent “notified to the approving authority as covering that product or its 
approved method of use (emphasis added)”.738 Here, “that product” refers to the 
previously approved pharmaceutical product, i.e., the original product. 
However, it is unclear whether the patent is confined to a product patent and a 
method of use patent, or it broadly covers a process patent. This blurring comes 
from the word “covering”. In contrast to the Australia-US FTA requiring 
“where that product is claimed in a patent”, and TPP requiring “an applicable 
patent claiming an approved pharmaceutical product or its approved method of 
                                                      
734 USGAO, 2007, p. 42. 
735 Rubinson, 2017, p. 460. The ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ models stem from two options that 
TPP signatory countries may take (Article 18.51 of TPP). 
736 Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 436. 
737 Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, p. 178. 
738 Article 18.9:5(a). 
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use” (emphasis added),739 a patent covering a pharmaceutical product under 
KORUS may include a process claim due to TRIPS. According to Article 
28(1)(b) of TRIPS, a patentee on a process has an exclusive right on the product 
“directly obtained by that process.” Therefore, under KORUS, a process claim 
(e.g., a claim directed to a method for producing a pharmaceutical product) can 
be notified as covering the original product, and the KORUS linkage is more 
vulnerable to an ‘evergreening abuse’. 
Second, in KORUS, there is no explicit language allowing an automatic stay. 
The automatic stay refers to a time period during which a generic approval is 
prohibited. Under the US law, if a patent holder takes a legal action against 
generic applicant, the generic approval process automatically stops for up to 30 
months.740 In Canada, the automatic stay lasts for up to 24-months.741 When 
there is no predetermined period of stay, the drug approval authority has to wait 
before approving generic until a court renders the final decision finding that 
either the listed patent is invalid or generic does not infringe the listed patent.742 
Then, a patent holder, who is likely to lose the case, has a strong incentive to 
delay court proceedings as long as possible. Given that most of the listed 
patents are found invalid as shown in previous Section 4-5-2-2, or not covering 
generics as shown in following Section 4-6-2-3, the incentive to delay is real 
and big enough to push patentees over the edge into the delay action. Therefore, 
the automatic stay is considered as a mechanism to balance the patent linkage 
system by facilitating elimination of weak patents and encouraging timely 
resolution of patent dispute.743 However, KORUS fails to alleviate these 
concerns. Rather, it mandates that if there is no “consent or acquiescence of the 
patent owner”, the generic approval is prohibited “during the term of a patent”. 
                                                      
739 Article 17.10:4(a)(i) of the Australia-US FTA and Article 18.53:1(c) of TPP. 
740  21 U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The 30-months period may be prolonged or 
shortened by court. 
741  Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations, SOR/98-166, March 12, 1998, s. 6(1)(2)(3), amending s. 7(1)(e) and 
7(5). In 1988, Canada shortened the automatic stay to 24-month from 30-month for 
the purpose of reducing unnecessary litigation and streamlining the litigation 
process (Government of Canada, 1998, p. 1055). 
742 Listing of patent is made on ‘Orange Book’ in the US and on ‘Green List’ in 
Korea. 
743 GPhA’s letter to USTR on March 2, 2006. 
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More seriously, at the negotiation table, Korean negotiators denied to accept the 
US proposal to insert texts for explicitly supporting the automatic stay. This 
was because the Korean negotiators did not fully understand the function and 
underlying policy objectives of automatic stay. When this arouse controversy, 
the Korean negotiators made excuses by asserting that both sides agreed to 
implement the linkage obligation in an appropriate way each regarded as 
appropriate, which was, however, not confirmed in a written format.  
These two ‘harder’ elements of the linkage regulation are not actually 
implemented in Korea. However, they are sufficient to show that the negotiators 
were far away from balancing approach to mitigate harmful impact of the 
linkage regime. The agreed harder model also reveals that the extent to which 
can the trade-centric IP norms move beyond the obligation of TRIPS and the 
US domestic law. Moving beyond the US domestic law occurred in early 2015 
when Korea had to fully implement the linkage obligation in connection with 
biologics. Linkage of biologics goes beyond even KORUS.  
4-6-2-2. KORUS-plus Implementation - Biologics 
The linkage clause of KORUS does not define the scope of a pharmaceutical 
product eligible for the linkage privilege. Such a scope can be inferred from 
other provisions in the KORUS IPR Chapter. Article 18.8:6(b) for a patent term 
extension for compensating delay in drug approval process defines “new 
pharmaceutical product” as a product containing a new chemical entity without 
mentioning biologics. By contrast, Article 5.8 of Chapter Five (Pharmaceutical 
Products and Medical Devices) makes clear that pharmaceutical product 
includes biological products.744 This broader definition is only valid for the 
purpose of KORUS Chapter Five, and thus it is fair to conclude that the 
negotiators did not intend to extend the linkage regulation to cover biological 
products. This conclusion is also supported by the US domestic law itself, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, which was the model for the KORUS linkage provision. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act does not apply to biologics. Instead, the US enacted, 
after the signing of KORUS, a new regulation for additional protection of 
biologics through data exclusivity, not the linkage regime – the Biologics Price 
                                                      
744 “For purposes of this Chapter: … pharmaceutical product or medical device 
means a pharmaceutical, biologic, medical device, or diagnostic product”. 
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Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA).745 Among others, the BPCIA does 
not contain the ‘soft’ model for patent-approval linkage (notification 
process).746  
Nonetheless, the US government pushed Korea to enact a patent-approval 
linkage system that applies to biologics. In a letter dated on February 17, 2015 
to the Korean Minister of Food and Drug Safety, the US Ambassador 
maintained that “[T]he United States meets this obligation through the Hatch 
Waxman Act and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act 
(BPCIA), and the U.S. system therefore is KORUS-consistent”.747 He 
reaffirmed that “it is critical that Korea adopts a patent linkage system that 
covers all pharmaceutical products, in line with KORUS”.748 The US 
Ambassador wrote this letter to block a bill jointly prepared by Korean 
lawmakers and civil society groups on public health, which aims to exclude 
biological products from the linkage regime and to ban the generic exclusivity. 
The pressure of the US did work in preventing the bill from getting majority 
supports of members of the National Assembly. Korean government also took a 
position that biological products should be subject to linkage regulation. 
4-6-2-3. Impacts of the Linkage Regulation 
In 2007, Korean government estimated that potential impact of linkage would 
be the worst in IPR sectors. The potential impacts of patent-approval linkage 
                                                      
745 Pub. L. 111-148, §§ 7001-7003 (42 U.S.C. § 262). BPCIA provides for an 
abbreviated approval pathway for follow-on biologics, or bio-similar products, and 
at the same time seeks to incentivize innovation by providing originators (reference 
product sponsors) a longer period of data exclusivity (12-years) (Rubinson, 2017, p. 
464). 
746 The notification process of Hatch-Waxman Act is distinguished from a schedule 
for a series of information exchange between the originator (reference product 
sponsor) and biosimilar applicant (called as “patent dance”) under BPCIA, which is 
optional as confirmed by the US Court (Amgen Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 794 F.3d 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2015)). Kim (2012, pp. 234-236) maintains that the patent linkage of 
KORUS does not cover biologics because: (1) the US BPCIA does not target 
patents notified to the approving authority (Instead, patent list is exchanged 
between original and generic pharmaceutical companies); and (2) the legislative 
intention of BPCIA was to protect the original biologics by data exclusivity, not by 
the patent-linkage system. 
747 For scanned copy of the letter, see Nam, 2015. 
748 Nam, 2015. 
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estimated in an official report of Korean government on 27 April 2007 
published just after the conclusion of FTA talks, can be summarized in <Table 
4-4> below:749  
<Table 4-4> Ex Ante Estimation of Patent-Approval Linkage 
Category Result (Yearly average for 
10 years) 
Domestic Drug Production Loss (billion KRW) 67.3 to 145.8 
Job Loss (person) 275 to 595 
Increase in Drug Costs of Public Health Insurance 
(billion KRW) 
51.7 to 175.4 
 
The ex ante estimation of 2007 was based on the assumptions that: (1) due to 
patent-approval linkage, market entry of generics would be delayed for 9 
months; (2) patent infringement litigations between generic and original drug 
makers would increase by 40%; (3) winning rate of domestic pharmaceutical 
companies in patent disputes vis-à-vis foreign companies would be maintained 
at 66.7%.750 
The estimated adverse impacts of patent-approval linkage on drug production, 
job and public health cost, albeit poor methodologies and too rough 
assumptions, have gained widespread support. The reality, however, turned out 
to be somewhat different. In a comprehensive ex post assessment of 2016, the 
actual impact of linkage was evaluated to be insignificant. This assessment is 
mandated by the linkage implementation act,751 and conducted on the following 
                                                      
749 Government of Republic of Korea, 2007, pp. 66-71. The estimation maintained 
substantially the same in a governmental reassessment report of August 2011, 
which was conducted to reflect renegotiated deals of KORUS of December 2010. 
750 Ibid. The winning rate of 66.7% was obtained from empirical data on 81 
pharmaceutical patent litigations since 1988 where domestic firms won the lawsuit 
in 54 cases. The winning rate was significant in the government’s assessment as 
defeated domestic firms could not market generic products, leading to no impact on 
delay of generic entry (Government of Republic of Korea, 2007, p. 67). 
751 Art. 50undecies of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act (amended on March 13, 2015) 
provides that the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety shall conduct an impact 
assessment of patent-approval linkage regime, including impacts on domestic 
pharmaceutical industry, health policies, and jobs, as well as analysis on foreign 
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conditions:752 
• Number of patents listed on the Green List from 2012 to 31 May 2016: 
908; 
• Number of original products covered by listed patents (same period): 
1,186; 
• Generic applications: 2,146 generic products have been applied for 
marketing approvals against 151 listed original products from 12 
December 2012 to 31 May 2016; and 672 generic products have been 
applied for marketing approvals against 108 listed original products from 
15 March 2015 to 31 May 2016; 
• Patent dispute: 1,869 patent trial cases from 15 March 2015 to 31 May 
2016; 
• Prohibited generic approval: 17 requests have been filed by originators to 
bar generic approval, with 3 granted, 2 rejected, 3 withdrawal and 9 
pending; and 
• Generic exclusivity: 204 generics were applied for generic exclusivity 
against 52 listed original products from 15 March 2015 to 31 May 2016 
(among these, generic exclusivity has been granted to 152 generic 
products). 
The assessed impacts of the 266-pages-long report can be summarized by 
<Table 4-4> below. 
<Table 4-5> Ex Post Impact Assessment of Patent-Approval Linkage 
Category Result 
Domestic Drug Production Loss (billion KRW) 0.016 to 0.037 or 0.010 to 
0.024 
Job Loss (person) Original Firms 2.75 to 4.66 
Generic Firms 3.41 to 5.98 
Increase in Drug Costs of Public Health 
Insurance (billion KRW) 
0.18 to 0.34 
                                                      
cases. 
752 Lee, 2016, pp. 51-70. 
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As shown in <Table 4-5>, the impact of linkage is insignificant, ignorable in 
terms of production loss, job loss and public health costs. This unexpected 
result may be explained in two ways. First, it is premature to evaluate the actual 
impacts given the short time lapse from full implementation (only fifteen 
months).753 Second, as a result, there have been only three cases that actually 
banned generic approval, and the period during which generic entry was barred 
was only 1.4 months on average.754 However, tiny portion of originators’ 
request to bar generic approval (only 17 requests against 2,146 generic 
applications),755 and a steep rise of patent disputes (1,869 cases for the 
assessment period and about 40 times surge in 2015 from 2013 as explained 
below) require different interpretations. 
Bouchard et al., based on the ‘general systems theory’, suggest to investigate 
both structural and functional aspects of different systems of linkage regime to 
assess the performance of the system relative to its goals and objectives.756 In 
their structure-function analysis, the ‘structural aspects’ refer to “broad 
administrative, legal, and policy attributes of the linkage regime in differing 
jurisdictions”, and the ‘functional aspects’ refer to “the output of the regulations 
in each jurisdiction”.757 They show that the structure and function have a 
mutually influential relationship through an array of positive and negative 
feedback loops, and demonstrate that discrete statutory mechanisms and the 
way these mechanisms interact with relevant provisions of patent and food and 
drug laws have the potential to substantially alter outcomes and outputs.758  
One of the discrete statutory mechanisms that primarily affects the ex post 
                                                      
753 The report also explains that the linkage system has been under-used by 
pharmaceutical industries (mainly by originators) because it is in an early stage of 
operation (Lee, 2016, p. 78). 
754 Lee, 2016, p. 88. 
755 Note that under the Korean linkage system originator has to file a separate 
request to the approval authority by showing its legal action against the generic 
applicant and asking ban of generic approval. 
756 Bouchard et al., 2011, pp. 402-403. 
757 Ibid, pp. 403-405. 
758 Ibid, p. 455. 
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impact of 2016 is generic exclusivity. Secondary effect comes from a statutory 
mechanism that overly curtails the period of automatic stay. These two factors 
are not requirements of KORUS as demonstrated in previous Section 4-6-2-1. 
Therefore, in the strict sense, the ex post impact of 2016 is not an impact of 
KORUS. It’s a functional aspect or output of ‘administrative, legal and policy 
attributes’ of a distinct Korean linkage system. In a nutshell, (1) the generic 
exclusivity of 9-month functions to signal an over-reward to generic applicants 
who successfully challenge the listed patents, triggering, in combination with a 
window of 14-day to be the ‘first’ generic,759 an excessive competition between 
generic companies, and (2) short period of automatic stay, 9-month, which is 
the same period of time for the generic exclusivity, discourages originators to 
rely on the linkage privilege. This conclusion can be confirmed from empirical 
data on patent disputes. 
<Table 4-5> below shows how many patent disputes, in term of trial cases,760 
have been arisen from 2013 (when the ‘soft’ model of linkage was 
implemented) and a steep rise of patent disputes in 2015 (when the ‘hard’ 
model of linkage was implemented).  
<Table 4-5> Patent Trials Concerning Patents Listed on the Green List 
(Source: Korean Patent Office, Soft-landing of trials on patents related 
to drug approval (Press release of 4 April 2017) 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
(March) 
Total 
Filed 49 216 1,957 311 154 2,687 
Decided 37 207 606 63 0 913 
Withdrawn 12 9 703 13 2 739 
                                                      
759 Unlike the Hatch-Waxman model of the US, the Korean linkage model permits 
14 days for the eligibility of the ‘first’ generic. In other words, if a generic applicant 
challenges the listed patent within 14 days from the date when the ‘true’ first 
challenge was initiated by another generic applicant. Due to this 14-day window, 
multiple generic applicants are involved in a single patent challenge, resulting in a 
large number in both patent litigations and owners of generic exclusivity. 
760 Patent trial refers to a proceeding before the Intellectual Property Trial and 
Appeal Board (IPTAB) established within the Korean Patent Office, which consists 
of three instance procedures followed by the Patent Court and the Supreme Court. 
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Procedural Dismiss 0 0 288 0 0 288 
Pending 0 0 360 235 152 747 
 
<Figure 4-1> shows that overwhelming majority of patent disputes was initiated 
by generic applicants who sought the generic exclusivity. Compare the huge 
number of trials that can only be brought by generic applicants (‘Invalidation 
(G.)’, ‘Invalidation (Ext.)’, ‘Scope (Neg.)’) with the tiny number of trials 
initiated by originators (‘Scope (Pos.)’. Whereas generic applicants opened 
2,670 cases, originators initiated actions only in 17 cases against generic 
applicants, with none in 2015 and 2017). 
<Figure 4-1> Patent Trials by Type 
(Source: Korean Patent Office, Soft-landing of trials on patents related 
to drug approval (Press release of 4 April 2017) 
 
• Invalidation (G.): Invalidation trial of a patent grant. 
• Invalidation (Ext.): Invalidation trial of a patent term extension. 
• Scope (Neg.): Trial to confirm the scope of a patent right, filed by a 
potential infringer against a patentee, negatively seeking a non-
infringement decision. 
• Scope (Pos.): Trial to confirm the scope of a patent right, filed by a patentee 




















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Invalidation (G.) Invalidation (Ext.) Scope (Neg) Socpe (Pos.)
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As revealed from the empirical data on patent disputes above, the operation of 
linkage regime is governed by one statutory mechanism – the ‘generic 
exclusivity’. Again, the generic exclusivity is not provided in KORUS. It is 
codified in the US law and allows the first generic company who successfully 
challenges the linked patent to exclude other generics for 180 days.761 The 
purpose of the generic exclusivity is to provide incentives for generic company 
to take a risk of challenging the validity of patent.  
During legislating the implementation act of patent linkage in Korea, generic 
exclusivity was controversial. Supporting groups reiterated the incentive 
argument.762 In the US, the incentive to challenge could be necessary due to 
high litigation cost.763 By contrast, costs in patent dispute in Korea is much less, 
on average around 1% of the US cost. Benefits of generic exclusivity, such as 
early resolution of patent disputes outweighed by social costs, which may 
include: (1) subsequent generic entry being delayed even when there is no risk 
of patent infringement; (2) potential encouragement of pay-for-delay settlement 
between a patentee and the first challenger; (3) unfair benefit to patentee as the 
patentee can duopoly market even when its patent is found invalid or 
unenforceable;764 and (4) unequal and disproportionate reward to the first 
challenger given that there is no such a reward in disputes involving patents for 
                                                      
761 No other countries having patent-approval linkage systems permit the US model 
of generic exclusivity, mainly because they do not feel any need to provide 
incentives to challenge pharmaceutical patents. One exception is Taiwan. In August 
2016, Taiwan, in an effort to join TPP, amended domestic laws to introduce patent-
approval linkage regime (patent listing and automatic stay of 15-month), and to 
confer the first generic who successfully challenges the listed patent, a marketing 
exclusivity for 12-month (Chen, 2016). 
762 Shin, 2014, p. 1109. Supporters include large scale generic companies, 
originators, patent lawyers and the Korean government. 
763 Ohly, 2010, p. 16. According to the American Intellectual Property Law 
Association, the average cost in patent litigation of the US was estimated as much 
as USD 6 million in 2011 (Liu, 2012, p. 646). 
764 The marketing exclusivity vested to the first generic is unable to exclude 
marketing of patentee because it can only bar marketing approval subsequent to the 
first generic. Therefore, for 9-month of generic exclusivity period, the patentee, 
along with the first generic, can control the market. In other words, the generic 
exclusivity is tantamount to a duopoly entitlement to originator maker whose patent 
is found invalid or unenforceable. 
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other technological fields. Despite of the social costs, the Korea legislation 
provides the generic exclusivity for “9 + 2” months.765 
These two discrete statutory mechanisms (the generic exclusivity and curtailed 
period of automatic stay) have produced unintended, somewhat paradoxical, 
consequences: under-use by originator, and over-use by generic makers. The 
under-use of originator indicates that one of the policy goals of the linkage 
regime, i.e., “stimulating pioneering innovation”766 fails to be achieved.767 The 
ex post impact assessment of 2016 also reveals that 86% of respondents in 
pharmaceutical industries replied that there was no impact of the linkage regime 
on their R&D investments for new drugs, and estimates that R&D investment of 
original maker would be rather reduced by KRW 34 to 58 million.768 The over-
use by generic maker and a steep rise of patent disputes imply that the first 
generic exclusivity does not work as intended. This can be explained by the 
phenomenon of ‘trial concentration’ as illustrated by <Table 4-6> below. 
 <Table 4-6> Top 10 Patent owners and Trials (as of 15 June 2017) 
(Source: Green List of the Korean Ministry of Food and Drug 
Safety, https://medipatent.mfds.go.kr) 
No. Top 10 Patent Owners Top 10 Makers Involved in Disputes 






Patents) (Trials per 
Patent)1) 
1 Novartis 44 AstraZeneca 447 (16) (27.9) 
2 MSD 36 Astellas 280 (11) (25.5) 
3 Jansen 34 Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
252 (13) (19.4) 
                                                      
765 The additional 2-month exclusivity is optional, only granted when the generic 
product is put under the reimbursement scheme of the National Health Insurance 
System. 
766 Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 439. 
767 The under-use by originator also shows little ‘evergreen abuse’ in Korea, which 
is prevented by unintended measures. Comparing with Australia which legislated 
“anti-evergreening measures that allowed Australia’s Attorney-General to join 
injunctive applications by brand name patent holders against generic manufacturers 
and claim damages if a price rise occurred” (Tully, 2016, pp. 409-410). 
768 Lee, 2016, pp. 152, 245. 
190 / 335 
 
4 GSK 32 Pfizer 212 (10) (21.2) 
5 Roche 28 Bayer 101 (8) (12.6) 
6 Pfizer 27 Jansen 97 (11) (8.82) 
7 Bayer 26 Takeda Pharma. 76 (4) (19) 
8 AstraZeneca 26 BMS 76 (7) (10.9) 
9 Takeda Pharma 24 Mitsubishi 
Tanabe Pharma 
75 (3) (25) 
10 Boehringer 
Ingelheim 
23 Santem Pharma. 72 (3) (24) 
Total  300  1,688 (86) (19.6) 
1) ‘Trials’: The number of patent trials filed before IPTAB including four 
types of trials of <Figure 4-1>. 
‘Involved Patents’: The number of all patents involved in the trials. 
‘Trials per Patent’: The average number of trials per patent. 
* The number of all patents listed on the Green List: 1,504 
 
<Table 4-6> shows that most of trials are intense on a few patents owned by a 
small number of original makers. Trials on 86 patents out of 1,504 listed patens 
occupy 62.8% of whole trial cases. The trial concentration occurs because 
multiple generic applicants have taken actions against the same patent within 
the ‘14-day window’. At first glance, the primary motivation appears to be the 
generic exclusivity. A trial case that involves the largest number of generic 
applicants is on a patent for ‘Amozaltan’ (a hypertension treatment). Twenty 
generic makers jointly challenged the patent (Registration No. 10-1232296) and 
got exclusivity on their forty-five generic products. Not only was an expected 
private gain from the market exclusivity a pivotal motivation; market size does 
matter. In most cases, expected profitability from the large scale of market is 
the primary motivation of patent challenge. ‘Amozaltan’ was one of the super-
blockbuster drugs in Korea. As demonstrated in joint challenges against patents 
covering Pfizer’s ‘Viagra’ and GSK’s ‘Rosiglitazone’ in China, the size of 
market encourages generic makers “to band together and challenge the patents 
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covering particularly profitable drugs”.769 Behavior of generic makers in patent 
challenges may depend on various factors such as capabilities to develop certain 
generic products, “weakness” of patents, likelihood of a successful challenge, 
and judicial interpretation of the threshold of patentability.770 But the 
profitability expected from market size is the decisive factor in generic maker’s 
patent challenge as supported by several academic studies. For instance, in the 
US almost of all blockbuster drugs over the 1995-2000 period have been subject 
to patent challenges,771 and for patents listed on the Orange Book from the 2000 
to 2010 period, challenges were “much more common for higher sales drug”.772 
This holds true even when the challenge was not successful. Grabowski shows 
that even when patentees win a majority active ingredient (AI) patent litigation 
(60%), patent challenges for new molecule increasingly extend to stronger AI 
and core patents.773  
4-6-2-4. Discussion and Analysis 
As evidenced above, the competing goals of linkage regime are found 
frustrated. They are not likely to be achieved in Korea because the overall 
pharmaceutical market size is incomparably small to the US counterpart.774 The 
linkage regime configured by KORUS failed to stimulate pioneering 
                                                      
769 Liu, 2012, p. 647. 
770 Another factor specific to Korean linkage experience is ‘jumping on the 
bandwagon’. Abrupt increase of trials in 2015 (see <Table 4-5> and <Figure 4-1>) 
was the result of flock in filings of March and April, when the ‘hard’ model of 
linkage was implemented (698 in March and 861 of April occupying 79.7% of the 
whole filings in 2015). Uncertainty of the impacts of the ‘hard’ model became a 
cognitive bias, pushing multiple generic makers to race to enter the ‘14-day 
window’. Sudden decrease of trials in 2016 both in terms of the number of filings 
and the invalidation trials as shown in <Figure 4-1> also supports the bandwagon 
effect. 
771 Grabowski & Kyle, 2007, p. 497. 
772 Hemphill & Sampat, 2012, p. 328. 
773 Grabowski, 2014, pp. 26-27. 
774 According to an IMS report, in 2016, the market size of Korea is as small as 3% 
of the US one (USD Bn 13.0 vs. 461.7, measured by medicine spending) (Aitken, 
Kleinrock & Nass, 2016, pp. 8-9). Medicine spending per capita is also 
incomparable (USD 1,955 in the US and USD 295 in South Korea, Ibid, p. 45). 
Consensual view of generic industries is that the patent-approval linkage system 
works when market size is big enough to ensure a significant payoff from a single 
molecule (Storton, 2012, pp. 5, 10). 
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innovation. Policy goal to facilitate early entry of generic was achieved only 
moderately. The ex post assessment of 2016 measures that the generic entry was 
shortened by 8.2 months in the case of ‘Amozaltan’ (‘Amozaltan’ is the only 
case that the assessment conducted for the shortened generic entry), but there 
was no further generic entrance after the 9-month generic exclusivity ended.775 
Then, both from the patent and industry policy perspectives, there is little 
reason to maintain the linkage regime. However, it is not certain if the 
outcomes, i.e., the functional aspects of Korean linkage system may mutually 
influence the structural aspects as the ‘general systems theory’ expects. One is 
the regime’s early stage in its operation. The other, more significant one, is a 
limited policy discretion. The linkage regulation is a treaty obligation, requiring 
bilateral, highly political, negotiation with the US to be reformed.   
 The human rights discourse may provide policy margins for reforming the 
linkage obligation. Protection of pharmaceutical patent under the linkage 
regime deviates too far from the protection of material interests of 
pharmaceutical inventors. First, the 9-month automatic stay of generic entry, 
albeit its shorter term vis-à-vis 30-month of the US model, has nothing to do 
with adequate standard of living of inventors, which has a more direct link with 
the protection of material interest of author as discussed in Sections 3-3-4 and 
3-3-5. Rather, it transforms drug approving authorities into private guards for 
pharmaceutical companies and converts private costs of patentees in enforcing 
their rights into a social burden. Second, the generic exclusivity runs counter to 
the principle of protection of material interest of creator. Generic applicants 
who successfully challenge patent are not entitled for the protection because 
what they do has no dealing with creation.  
Positive nature of the dissemination side of the right to science and culture 
requires cultural and scientific policies to be framed in a way to make cultural 
and scientific creation available and accessible and to remove barriers 
preventing people from accessing to and using those creations (Section 3-4-2). 
The linkage regime is found to have little function to enhance availability of 
innovative drugs, even when it is in the extreme version of IPR protection of the 
                                                      
775 Lee, 2016, p. 129. 
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maximalist IP agenda. The barriers to access are found moderate.  
There is another stronger reason not to maintain the linkage regulation. In a 
separate assessment, it was revealed that in 88.4% cases the listed patents were 
found invalid, and 91.5% of the listed patents are found unenforceable.776 These 
figures were obtained from an analysis on 235 trial cases initiated from 2013 to 
July 2015. They signify that social cost in maintaining the linkage regime is 
disproportionately higher than social benefit in providing stronger protection for 
innovative pharmaceutical companies. It is highly disproportionate because 
whereas when a patent is incorrectly granted and linked to drug approval 
process, its cost is borne by a society, when a generic is incorrectly approved, 
leading to a patent infringement, a patentee can recover every cost incurred by 
the infringement. The high ratio of patent invalidation also suggests that the 
problem of ‘bad’ patents be resolved in a way other than the generic exclusivity. 
The generic exclusivity is a market-based incentive, designed to reward private 
entities who take the risk of patent challenge. As discussed above, a private gain 
expected from a loom-large market of relevant medicine may provide a 
sufficient incentive for patent challenge.777 Given the social nature of 
incorrectly issued patent, this problem has to be resolved by public policy. One 
possible way is an independent review body to correct mistake of patent issuing 
authorities. 
Finally, the evidence presented in this Section also shows that the linkage 
regulation departs far away from the early trade concerns of IP such as actual 
practice of new trade and local working of new techniques (Section 2-2-4). And 
public choice theory discussed in Section 2-4 supporting the choice of TRIPS-
plus rules by developing countries as rationale because of benefits from 
                                                      
776 Chon, 2015. She also found that the invalidation rate in 2014 was 100%, 
meaning that all of the twenty patents were invalidated by the IPTAB in 2014. 
777 This is one of the reasons that TPP does not contain the generic exclusivity. TPP 
draft of 2013 incorporated a provision for the generic exclusivity (Article 
QQ.E.17:1(d) – “when a Party delays the grant of marketing approval consistent 
with subparagraph 5(b)(i), provide an effective reward, consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement, for the successful challenge of the validity or 
applicability of the patent. …FN 116: A Party may comply with paragraph 5(d) by 
providing a period of marketing exclusivity in appropriate circumstances to the first 
such other person or persons to challenge a patent), which was removed from the 
2014 draft. 
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technological transfer and foreign direct investment does not hold true in 
linkage case of KORUS. It only holds true that maximalist IP concept discussed 
in Section 2-5 are incorporated in its extreme format. The beneficiary of 
KORUS linkage system is not pharmaceutical companies, either original or 




One of the main purposes of the US in bilateral negotiation is to level up the 
enforcement of IPRs, especially enhanced enforcement provisions that the US 
sought but failed in achieving at the TRIPS negotiation. During the KORUS 
talks, the Korean negotiators were more or less sympathetic to the US’ TRIPS-
plus proposals on IPR enforcement. The bottom line of the Korean negotiators 
was to keep any ensued domestic legislative changes to a minimum. This was to 
avoid possible political debates at the approval process within the National 
Assembly and to prevent potential complaints or trade sanctions from the US. 
The outcomes of such negotiation are problematical in three aspects. First, the 
enforcement section of KORUS unduly narrows state’s discretion than TRIPS. 
As the WTO panel observes in China – Intellectual Property Rights case,778 
TRIPS allows more discretion in enforcement (Part III of TRIPS) than 
protection of IPRs (Part II of TRIPS).779 However, KORUS removes these 
discretional flexibilities. Second, it conflicts with the fundamental principles of 
due process and procedural justice, undermining national obligation to protect 
human rights, especially everyone’s right to fair trial, which is enshrined in the 
international human rights institutions.780 Everyone’s right to fair trial is a key 
element of human rights to safeguard the rule of law. Finally, KORUS 
institutionalizes unfair and inequitable procedures between IP holders and 
                                                      
778 China – Measures affecting the protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (China – Intellectual Property), Panel Report (adopted 20 March 
2009) WT/DS362/R. 
779 Yamane, 2011, p. 419. 
780 Article 10 of UDHR. 
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alleged infringers, which can be called an ‘IP exceptionalism’ instead of rule of 
law. It provides too much privileges in judicial proceedings for the benefits of 
IP holders, and produces inequality between parties, unequal opportunities of 
either party to contest, and an unfair distribution of the burden of proof. Typical 
example is a presumption obligation.  
Article 18.10:3 of KORUS mandates statutory presumption on authorship and 
subsistence of copyright, and validity of registered patent and trademark rights. 
This strong presumption in favour of right holders shifts the burden of proof to 
alleged infringers, which should be applied to criminal proceedings not only 
civil and administrative proceedings.781 Presumption in criminal proceeding 
may bring a conflict with the presumption of innocence, the fundamental 
principle under which the prosecutors have to show every element of crime and 
establish that the allegedly infringing activity does not fall into the 
“circumstance precluding wrongfulness”. By shifting this burden, the alleged 
infringer has to prove his innocence. 
In the words of Flynn et al, the IP-exceptionalism enforcement rules implicate 
“due process and procedural protections against unwarranted deprivation of 
liberty and property and may deter lawful competition and expression”.782 
On the implementation level, it is noteworthy to point out that both the US and 
Korean domestic laws do not fully implement the presumption obligation. In the 
US, there exists neither presumption of authorship for “the person whose name 
is indicated as the author, producer, performer, or publisher of the work, 
performance, or phonogram in the usual manner”, nor presumption of the 
subsistence of copyright in the work. In Korea, only the authorship is presumed 
and validity of registered patent and trademark is not presumed. Instead, the 
Korean Patent Act presumes the negligence of alleged infringer,783 which is not 
obligated under KORUS. 
                                                      
781 By contrast, the Korea-Canada FTA mandates the presumption of authorship and 
subsistence of right only in civil proceeding involving copyright and related rights 
(Article 16.13:5). 
782 Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, p. 184 
783 Article 130 of the Korean Patent Act. 
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4-7-2.	Civil	Enforcement	
The provisions for civil enforcement are to ensure to the maximum extent the 
economic interests of IP holders. For the full compensation for them, KORUS 
intervenes the way to calculate the amount of damages. KORUS not only 
guarantees the compensation of “the injury the right holder has suffered as a 
result of infringement”, but also presumes the profit of alleged infringer to be 
the amount of damages, and forces the court to consider, in determining the 
amount of damages, the value of infringed goods, “measured by the market 
price,784 the suggested retail price, or other legitimate measures of value 
submitted by the right holder”.785  
4-7-2-1. Pre-established or Statutory Damages 
KORUS exempts the burden of IP holders to prove their actual harm that has a 
causal link to the infringement by introducing a pre-established or statutory 
damage rule.786 Further, KORUS defines the nature of statutory damages rule 
differently from that defined by the US courts.  
First, it is replaceable of, rather than supplemental to the actual damages rule 
because right holders of copyright and trademark can choose pre-established 
damages “in lieu” of the primary remedies such as actual damages and 
presumed infringer’s profit. When choosing the statutory damages track, the 
right holders do not need to show the difficulty to prove the actual harm or 
profits.  
Second, it is punitive, not compensatory given that KORUS mandates the “pre-
established damages shall be in an amount sufficient to constitute a deterrent to 
future infringements”, and that KORUS omits exceptions for innocent or 
ordinary infringers. 
In contrast to the punitive nature, the US Supreme Court observed that “a civil 
                                                      
784 Concerning the market value in calculating the ‘reasonable royalty’, some US 
courts require that damages be limited to the proven number of instances of actual 
infringement (Yamene, 2011, p. 495). 
785 Article 18.10:5(a) and (b). 
786 Article 18.10:6. 
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sanction that cannot be fairly to said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but 
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent 
purpose, is punishment”.787 Concerning the qualifying condition for innocent 
infringer, the US court can, pursuant Section 504(c)(2) of the US Copyright 
Act, reduce the statutory damages lower than the minima when “infringer was 
not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an 
infringement of copyright”. 
The concept of statutory damages is alien in civil law jurisdiction. The 
underlying principle of the damages relief is to ensure a full compensation of 
actual injury caused by an unlawful act. Therefore, a causal link between the 
unlawful act and the injury should be established, in principle, by a plaintiff, or 
the injured. If there is no actual and causal injury, the person who committed 
the unlawful act is NOT liable even when an unlawful act takes place. For this 
reason, at the early stage of the KORUS negotiation, the Korean negotiators 
were reluctant to accept the US proposal on the statutory damages rule.788 
However, in the end, they accepted the alien rule. The KPO explained the 
reason was that they felt it necessary for the enhanced protection of trademark 
holders, and the Korean government departments jointly explained that they 
considered the concerns (probably of the US negotiators) that in civil litigations 
on copyright and trademark, right holders were difficult to prove the amount of 
actual injury and the amount of damages actually admitted by Korean courts 
were insufficiently low. 
So far, the statutory damages rule had a limiting effect in Korea and there have 
been no awards of statutory damages which are “arbitrary, inconsistent, 
unprincipled, and sometimes grossly excessive”, which have been observed in 
the US.789 It is because Korea implemented it in a restrictive way by enacting 
only the upper limit of pre-established damages for both copyright and 
                                                      
787 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (quoted in Samuleson & 
Wheatland, 2009, p. 461). 
788 The statutory damages rule was modeled on the US law. For the US 
governmental recommendations for reforming the statutory damages scheme in 
copyright, refer to White Paper on Remixes, First Sale, and Statutory Damages (the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration (NTIA)), published on January 28, 2016. 
789 Samuelson & Wheatland, 2009, p. 441. 
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trademark,790 and it is applied only when trademark holders actually use their 
validly registered mark and when allegedly infringing mark and goods/services 
are identical to the registered mark and goods/services.791 
4-7-2-2. Destruction of Infringing Goods, Materials and Implements 
Under KORUS, when IP holder alleges an infringement, goods, materials, 
implement, and, in case of trademark counterfeiting, even documents are to be 
seized,792 and when found pirated or counterfeit, the infringing goods should be 
destroyed, and the materials and implements used in manufacturing the 
infringing goods have to be destroyed or disposed of outside the channels of 
commerce.793  
This obligation reduces TRIPS flexibilities. Unlike TRIPS Article 46, the 
requirement of “predominant use” of materials and implements in the creation 
of the infringing goods is not required under KORUS, and the need for 
proportionality between the seriousness of infringement and remedies orders as 
well as the interests of third parties of TRIPS is omitted in KORUS. Further, the 
inclusion of all materials and implements used in the creation of the infringing 
goods is broader than the US domestic law. Section 503(b) of the US Copyright 
Act permits a court to “order the destruction or other reasonable disposition of 
… all plates, molds, matrices, masters, tapes, film negatives, or other articles by 
means of which such copies or phonorecords may be reproduced”.794 
                                                      
790 For copyright infringement, the upper limit is KRW ten million per copyright 
work, which is quintuple for willful and for-profit infringement, and for trademark 
infringement, the upper limit is KRW 50 million. Unlike up to USD two million for 
willful counterfeit, there is no increased maxima in trademark counterfeit in Korea. 
791 The term “equivalent” is to reflect the definition of “counterfeit trademark 
goods” of KORUS: “any goods … bearing … a trademark that cannot be 
distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark” (Footnote 30 of Article 
18.10:19, which aims at the border measures). 
792 Article 18.10:8. For the seizure under this Article, it is sufficient that the 
allegedly infringing goods, material, and implements have a relevance to the act of 
infringement. 
793 Article 18.10:9(a) and (b). 
794 Griffin, 2011, p. 7. 
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4-7-2-3. Provisional Relief 
KORUS compels in an unbalanced way a provisional relief for IP holders. 
Article 18.10:27 provides that “[E]ach party shall act on requests for provisional 
measures inaudita altera parte795 expeditiously”.  
This intentionally removes “the safeguards and limitations that TRIPS institutes 
around such order”796 such as “where any delay is likely to cause irreparable 
harm to the right holder” or “where there is a demonstrable risk of evidence 
being destroyed” in Article 50(2) of TRIPS. Further, there is no “check and 
balances” provided by TRIPS Articles 50.3 and 50.4 that require the right 
holder to provide “any reasonably available evidence … with a sufficient degree 
of certainty that the applicant is the right holder and that the applicant’s right is 
being infringed or that such infringement is imminent” and the alleged 
infringer, in the inaudita intera parte measures, shall be notified of the 
execution of the measures and a review shall take place upon request of the 
defendant to deciding whether the measures shall be modified, revoked or 
confirmed”.  
Both the US and Korea, either at the time of negotiation or during the 
implementation phase, had no legislations or case laws permitting, in principle, 
the provisional measures excluding the other party from being heard. Instead, 
the US courts have long granted a preliminary relief only when the plaintiff 
shows that (1) she is likely to succeed on the merits, (2) she will suffer 
irreparable harm from the defendant’s conduct, (3) less harm will result to the 
defendant if the preliminary injunction issues than to the plaintiff if the 
preliminary injunction does not issue, and (4) the public interest weighs in favor 
of the plaintiff.797 
In addition, Korean civil laws make it a rule to hold hearing joinable by the 
other party and permit court to render an interim injunction without hearing the 
other party only when such hearing makes unattainable the purpose of the 
                                                      
795 Latin for “Without hearing the other Party” (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 2005, p. 604). 
796 Weatherall, 2015c, p. 32. 
797 Griffin, 2011, p. 8. 
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injunctive relief.798 Concerning the need of domestic legislative change for 
implementing the inaudita altera parte obligation, the Korean government 
explains that as KORUS simply requires the Party to act expeditiously upon 
requests for provisional measures and does not make mandatory all provisional 
measures be proceeded without hearing of the alleged infringer, any legislative 
change is not necessary. 
4-7-3.	Administrative	Enforcement	
4-7-3-1. Border Measures 
KORUS grants a power to the customs authorities to suspend release of 
suspected counterfeit or pirated goods into free circulation when a right holder 
requests to do so with “adequate evidence”.799 The suspension should be applied 
to “all points of entry to its territory” and remain applicable for at least one 
year.800 While the border measures initiated upon the request of right holder 
control only importation, ex officio measures regulate three types of the flow of 
goods: importation; exportation; and in-transit shipment.801  
Although from the language of Article 18.10:22 of KORUS it is unclear if the 
actions against the exportation or in-transit shipments are to be taken under the 
laws of the country of importation, its intention is to block international trade of 
suspected counterfeit or pirated goods by applying the law of countries taking 
the border measures. This would expand the economic interests of IP holders 
extraterritorially because they can exercise their rights even when goods are not 
                                                      
798 Article 304 of the Korean Civil Execution Act. 
799 The requirement of “adequate evidence” is less strict than “prima facie 
evidence” of Article 51 of TRIPS. 
800 Article 18.10:19. 
801 Article 18.10:22. The ex officio measures refer to an action that “does not require 
a formal complaint from a private party or right holder” (footnote 31 of the Article), 
and for the purpose of the ex officio actions the in-transit merchandise means 
“goods under “Customs transit” and goods “transhipped” as defined in the 
International Convention on the Simplification and Harmonization of Customs 
Procedures (Kyoto Convention)” (footnote 31 of the Article). Note that not all the 
US FTAs mandate the ex officio measures against in-transit shipments: the US-
Australia FTA §17.11:22 (ex officio with respect to imported merchandise); the US-
Singapore FTA §16.9:19 (“goods imported into or exported out of a party’s 
territory”). 
201 / 335 
 
infringing IPRs in the country of origin and destination. The seizure of Indian 
generic drugs by Dutch authorities in 2008 sparked this controversy.802 IP rights 
are territorial and applicable law in private international laws is to be 
determined on the basis of strongest territorial link or connection to the legal 
issue to be decided.803 This principle is ignored in KORUS. 
The border measures of KORUS also force unequal treatment between the 
owners of IPRs and suspected goods. While IPR holders can request seizure of 
suspected goods by providing “a reasonable security or equivalent assurance”, 
Article 18.10:20 prohibits an importer from obtaining possession of suspected 
counterfeit or pirated goods in any case including when the importer posts a 
bond or other security.804 While the KORUS pact was negotiated, the Korean 
laws applied the border measures only to goods that were suspected as 
infringing trademark and copyright, and permitted release of seized goods when 
the importer of goods requested with posting a bond or other security. 
4-7-3-2. Unilateral Commitment for Combatting Book Piracy 
KORUS contains an unprecedented administrative enforcement commitment 
targeting book piracy on university campus. In the second side letter of KORUS 
IPR Chapter,805 the Korean government vows to police “book piracy on 
university campus”, and increases its efforts to combat illegal book printing 
                                                      
802 The Dutch authorities seized the generic medicines produced in India destined to 
Brazil and other countries pursuant to the European Communities Council 
Regulation No. 1383/2003 (EC Regulation No 1383/2003) and applying the law of 
EC transit country. The Dutch court also found the in-transit product as infringing 
patents of Netherland on the grounds that the legal status of goods in transit is to be 
assessed as if they had been manufactured in the Netherlands (European Union and 
a Member State – Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit, Request for Consultations 
by Brazil, WT/DS409/1, 19 May 2010, p. 3) 
803 Ruse-Khan, 2011a, p. 682. 
804 Comparing with ACTA Article 18 (A Party may, only in exceptional 
circumstances or pursuant to a judicial order, permit the defendant to obtain 
possession of suspect goods by posting a bond or other security). And, Article 53(2) 
of TRIPS permits for certain forms of alleged IP infringements, the owner/importer 
of the goods must have the option of posting a security in order to have the goods 
released (Ruse-Khan, 2011a, p. 676). 
805 Entitled by USTR “Promoting Protection and Effective Enforcement of 
Copyrighted Works”. 
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activities pursuant to the Master Plan for IPRs of 2004.806  
Under this unilateral commitments, Korea has to take specific actions no later 
than six months from the effective date of KOURS to: (1) implement policies 
promoting use of the legitimate materials by students, lecturers, bookstores, and 
photocopy shops on university campus; (2) enhance training activities on book 
piracy enforcement and raise the awareness among enforcement personnel; (3) 
reinforce enforcement activities with respect to underground book piracy 
operations; and (4) develop and pursue targeted public education campaign. 
Combatting book piracy was one of the long wish lists of the US publishing 
industries. The American book publishers estimated loss of USD 39 million in 
2000 due to the book piracy in Korea, a 56% increase from 1995,807 and USTR 
elevated Korea to the Special 301 Priority Watch List from the Watch List in 
2004.808 Since then, IIPA has continuously complained that “massive illegal 
photocopying in and around university campuses and more complicated pirate 
offset print operations” were the chief problems facing book publishers in 
Korea. IIPA further requested, in March 2005, the Korean Minister of 
Education to encourage every university to devise action plans for reducing 
book piracy on campus.809 However, the Ministry simply sent letters to 
                                                      
806 The Master Plan for IPRs 2004 (original Korean title contained the term “IPRs 
Protection”) was prepared to deal with trade pressures from foreign countries on the 
arguable domestic IPRs infringements. The Plan was administered by the Prime 
Minister’s Office for pan-governmental actions for IPR enforcement, protection and 
public awareness. 
807 Choi, 2003, p. 665. However, it is still unknown how are reliable and objective 
the methodologies that the US copyright industries relied upon for the estimated 
loss. Later in 2013, the IIPA published methodologies to assess the impact of 
copyright piracy, but they included only three categories of copyright works: 
software (including business computer program and entertainment software); 
motion pictures; and records and music. See, IIPA, 2013.  
808 Korea was removed from the Watch List in 2009. It is interesting to note that 
when Korea was elevated to the Priority Watch List in 2004, Korean government’s 
efforts to combat piracy on university campuses was assessed as one of the positive 
steps and the USTR’s 2010 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers mentioned for Korea that “concerns remain with elevated levels of online 
piracy, corporate end-user software piracy, book piracy in universities, 
counterfeiting of consumer products, and a lack of coordination between Korean 
health and IPR authorities to prevent the issuance of marketing approvals for patent 
infringing products”. 
809 IIPA, 2006, p. 387. 
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universities and showed, according to IIPA, little interest since 2006, revealing 
no evidence of concrete implementation of the action plans or meaningful 
follow-up by the Ministry.810 Therefore, IIPA views that the side letter of 
KORUS builds on the initiative in 2005 with the cooperation of the Ministry of 
Education.811 However, given that the commitment in the side letter is purely 
unilateral, and book piracy was not the Korea-specific issues,812 it would 
reasonable to see it as the outcome of package deal between the US and Korean 
negotiators. 
4-7-3-3. Impact of Combatting Measures against Book Piracy 
After the official signing of the KORUS pact in June 2007, Korean government 
dramatically reinforced its enforcement actions against book piracy. According 
to the leaked wire of the US Embassy to Korea, the Korean government 
“confiscated 17,811 pirated books in 2008, up from 10,068 in 2007” and 
deleted 12.16 million printed publications on-line, up from 3.23 million in 
2007”.813 Further, the Copyright Protection Center (at that time, one of the 
governmental organizations), the police and prosecutors engaged in a special 
enforcement period for 100 days between April and June 2008, confiscating 
172,081 items, four times as many illegal DVDs, tapes, CDs, books and pieces 
of reproduction equipment as were confiscated during the same period in 
2007.814 From then on, official raid on photocopying and printing becomes 
annual events in and around university campuses, especially when new school 
semesters begin in March and September. 
There are at least two problems with the side letter against book piracy: shifting 
public resources for the benefits of private sectors; and foreclosing the space for 
students’ fair use.  
                                                      
810 IIPA, 2009, p. 293. 
811 Ibid. 
812 In the written submission of IIPA to USTR for the 2014 Special 301 Report, 
print piracy has been prevalent in many developing countries for several years, 
calling for aggressive actions by law enforcement authorities. 
813 Wikileaks Cablegate - US Embassy Seoul, 2009 Special 301 - Post 
Recommendation (16 March 2009). 
814 Ibid. 
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The problem of resource allocation affects the recognition and in turn behaviors 
of students who have legitimate rights to copy educational materials for either 
private studying or educational purposes. According to Article 25(3) of the 
Korean Copyright Act, which was effective during the KORUS negotiation,815 
those who receive an education at an educational institution may reproduce or 
make copyright works available to the public provided that it is recognized as 
necessary for the purpose of education.816 The purpose of education is 
interpreted as broadly as to encompass after-school courses such as volunteer 
activities and club activities that are administered by school, supplemental 
curriculum and preparing exam, not only the official class curriculum. Further, 
the law permits students to reproduce whole work when it is inevitable in view 
of the character of work, the purpose and form of the use.817 Contrasting the use 
of copyright works by educational institutions themselves, the student’s use is 
NOT subject to a remuneration scheme. In addition, Article 30 of the Act 
exempts a private copying from copyright infringement when the use of work is 
for personal non-for-profit purpose and takes place in a limited space like the 
home. Therefore, the reprographic copying for private study or for the purpose 
of receiving education made by students themselves or by someone else on their 
behalf was, and still is, legitimate. The strong enforcement on book piracy not 
only forces students feel guilty even when their copying is legitimate, but also 
actually restricts the fair use of students for educational purposes.  
4-7-4.	Criminal	Enforcement	
4-7-4-1. Commercial Scale and “Anything of Value” 
KORUS expands the scope that the criminal procedure has to be applied. 
KORUS uses the same term “commercial scale” as TRIPS does, but it defines 
willful copyright infringements to include those having “no direct or indirect 
motivation of financial gain” and “for purpose of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain”, which includes “the receipt or expectation of anything 
                                                      
815 Act No. 8101, amended on 28 December 2006, and effective on 29 June 2007. 
816 The making available exception is to ensure the legitimate use of students 
attending in online education.  
817 The student copying is also permitted in Japan (Article 35(1) of the Japanese 
Copyright Act as amended in 2003) and Australia in a limited range. 
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of value”.818  
In China-IPRs case,819 the TRIPS panellist interpreted the “commercial scale” 
in both qualitative and quantitative terms in dissenting the US interpretation that 
commercial scale refers to “basically everything that is ‘commercial’ with the 
exception of some trivial or de minimis activities” (¶ 7.576). However, the 
“commercial scale” under KORUS is “reduced to the quantitative element of 
demanding significant amount infringements or, alternatively, to a qualitative 
element requiring a purpose of commercial advantage or financial gain”.820 
Further, the phrase “anything of value” of KORUS is “an incredibly broad 
definition that would appear to criminalize every “willful” infringing act of 
copying, which, by definition, gives something of value to its receiver”.821 The 
threshold of commercial scale is somewhat higher than DR-CAFTA which 
requires in Article 15.11:26 criminal liability when there is more than de 
minimis financial harm and the US-Chile FTA defining, in footnote 34 of 
Article 17.11:22, the commercial advantage or financial gain to exclude de 
minimis infringements. Nonetheless, the definition of “financial gain” of 
KORUS is low enough to encompass every file sharing on the Internet.822  
The “financial gain” is modeled on the US No Electronic Theft Act,823 which 
specifically aims at addressing bartering (trading infringing copies of a work for 
other items),824 and some US courts interpret it broadly finding “financial gain” 
or “commercial advantage” when: the infringing material is offered for free;825 a 
hotel performs music even if customers do not pay for the performance;826 
                                                      
818 Article 18.10:26(a) and (b) and footnote 33. This is based on Sections 101 
(definition for “financial gain”) and Section 506 of the US Copyright Act. 
819 WT/DS362/R (January 26, 2009). 
820 Geiger, 2012, p. 187. 
821 Flynn et al., 2012, p. 195. 
822 The USTR’s advisory committee emphasizes keeping the threshold low (ITAC-
15 Report, 2007, p.379). 
823 Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997). 
824 USDoJ, 2013, p.57. 
825 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001). 
826 Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 595 (1917). 
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individuals receive cable broadcasts using illegal device to watch programs for 
which payment should have been paid;827 and an engineering firm uses pirated 
drafting software to keep overhead low.828  
4-7-4-2. Criminal Enforcement as a New Business Model 
Although the lower standard of “financial gain” is not legislated into Korean 
laws, KORUS plays a role to block copyright reform initiatives to address the 
abusive use of the criminal enforcement.  
Soon after the signing of KORUS, Korea experienced a dramatic increase of 
complaints of copyright crime from 2007. Around one hundred thousands of 
persons were accused of copyright infringement in a year, and juvenile’s 
victims occupied 24% in 2008.829 But the actual indictments by the prosecutors 
were very small: from 2005 to 2013 on average only 7.38% of the complaints 
were brought to the court. Most of them were for summary proceedings and 
public trial occupied only 0.22%.830 Notably in 2008, among the complaints as 
many as 90,979, only 8 complaints led to the public trial (0.00879%).  Among 
the complaints that were not indicted by the public prosecutors in 2008, around 
60% cases were withdrawn by the complainants.  
These unimaginable figures, i.e., the skyrocketed increase of criminal 
complaints on the one hand and the tiny portion of actual trial on the other hand 
are for two reasons.  
First, the threshold for entering the criminal procedure is too low – almost 
nothing. The only threshold is knowingness. Any infringing act is subject to 
criminal penalty regardless of the nature or seriousness of offense.  
                                                      
827 Charter Commc’ns Entm’t I, LLC v. Burdulis, 367 F. Supp. 2d 16, 32 (D. Mass. 
2005). 
828 USDoJ, 2013, p.58. 
829 The number of complained reduced to a half since 2010 when the Ministry of 
Culture and the Prosecutors’ Office took an interim measure not to prosecute those 
who were first involved in the copyright infringement crime or minors. 
830 The summary proceedings, also called summary indictment, refer to a court 
proceeding by which judge orders, without attendance of the accused, a fine or 
penalty. See, Korean Minister of Justice, Criminal case procedures available at 
http://fgn.kics.go.kr/en/jsp/cjp/criminalCaseProcedures09.jsp. 
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Second, the criminal enforcement has been strategically abused by copyright 
holders and lawyers. The threat of criminal sanction became a new business 
model since 2007 when KORUS officially signed. Most of the complaints, 63% 
in 2008, were raised by law firms. They hired special agents to regularly 
monitor the Internet and sent warning letters to individuals who conducted 
technically copyright infringing activity, threatening criminal actions. In 
exchange of stopping the criminal action, they asked a cash settlement. The 
criminal enforcement procedure provides copyright holders with a leverage 
using the threat of criminal action as the initiation of criminal procedure is 
subject to a complaint by the right holder.  
The phenomenon so-called a “business of copyright settlement money” has 
been widespread and become a serious social problem in Korea for nearly a 
decade. To fix this problem, several bills to raise the threshold of the copyright 
criminality has been introduced in the National Assembly. The latest effort 
makes the statutory requirements for criminal sanction: a for-profit purpose; or 
harm or injury to copyright holder of more than KRW one million.831 The 
copyright industries and like-minded scholars and practitioners presented a 
united front to the bill when it passed the competent committee in April 2014 
and had a legal formality examination ahead. Their opposition was based, 
among others, on possible disputes with foreign countries, predicted complaints 
from foreign authors, degradation of general public’s recognition on copyright 
protection, and breach of KORUS, which requires criminalizing copyright 
violation for purpose of private financial gain. Due to their strong resistance, the 
reform bill was finally foundered in May 2016. 
4-7-4-3. Counterfeiting Labels 
For enhanced criminal enforcements, KORUS introduces again alien rules that 
are targeting counterfeit labels and unauthorized camcording, both of which are 
based solely on the US laws, and the policy objectives of which are 
questionable. 
                                                      
831 The threshold of KRW one million was modeled on the US laws of “during any 
180-day period … a total retail value of more than $1,000 (17 U.S.C. § 
506(1)(1)(B)). 
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Article 18.10:28(a) KORUS prohibits knowing trafficking of counterfeit or 
illicit labels affixed to copyright works even absent willful trademark 
counterfeiting or copyright piracy.832 It also prohibits trafficking of counterfeit 
documentation or packaging for the pirated copies. The mandatory criminal 
sanction against this ancillary offense is not found in TRIPS and narrowed 
down in TPPA.833  
The KORUS obligation is problematic in itself as it is US law-plus. First, the 
prohibition of counterfeit or illicit labels of KORUS lacks qualifications of the 
US domestic law requiring a documentation and packaging to be in physical 
form (§2318(b)(5). Second, restrictive scope of the documentation and 
packaging that should be “copyrighted” in itself (§ 2318(c)(4))834 is missing in 
KORUS. 
4-7-4-4. Anti-Camcording Provision 
The anti-camcording provision set forth in Article 18.10:29 KORUS is 
problematical in both terms of protection of copyright holders and human rights 
to participate in cultural life. It mandates criminal procedures against so-called 
“camcorded version” of film. It applies to any person who “knowingly uses … 
an audiovisual recording device to transmit or make a copy of the motion 
picture … from a performance of the motion picture … in a public motion 
picture exhibition facility”. Not only a person who actually uses an audiovisual 
recording device, but the person who “attempts to use” the device is also subject 
to the criminal punishment. Using an audiovisual recording device does not fall 
within the bundle of rights exclusively enjoyable by copyright holder. Nor does 
attempting to use the recording device. In this sense, KORUS creates criminal 
offense against a sort of preparatory act. In principle, criminal sanction is 
                                                      
832 KORUS does not define the illicit labels but according to its mother provision, 
18 USC §2318(b)(4), the term refers to labels that are genuine certificates, licensing 
documents, registration cards or similar labeling components that the copyright 
owner would normally use to verify that a work is noninfringing, but which are 
distributed or intended for distributing without the owner’s permission. 
833 Article 18.77:3 of TPPA requires only “willful importation and domestic use, in 
the course of trade and on a commercial scale” and applies when a mark identical to 
a registered trademark is applied and intended to be used to the same goods or 
services. 
834 USDoJ, 2013, pp.288-289. 
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applied to act that actually resulted in any crime, and punishing the preparatory 
act is only allowed in exceptional serious crimes cases such as a murder or an 
offense against the safety of a state.835 
Another problem arises from its immunity from fair use defense. A violation of 
anti-camcording provision constitutes a separate cause of action independently 
from infringement of reproduction, distribution or communication to the public 
rights. Therefore, limitation or exception to the copyright, such as fair use and 
private end-user copying is not applied. Further the mens rea requirement of 
“knowingly” is lower than the “willfulness” requirement for criminal copyright 
offenses, and it is not necessary to show copyright infringement.836 Therefore, 
the US film industries picked up the anti-camcording provision of KORUS as 
one of the four “gold standard” provisions bringing significant benefits to U.S. 
content producers.837 
The mother law of the anti-camcording provision is the US Family 
Entertainment and Copyright Act (18 USC §2319B), enacted by overstated and 
misleading figures coined by the US entertainment industries. At the US 
Congress, the US movie industries presented an estimated annual loss of $3.5 
billion the movie industry suffered because of hard-goods piracy to which the 
“camcorded version” occupied a significant portion.838 They further complained 
that “camcorded versions of movies in theatrical release account for more than 
90 percent of the first copies of motion pictures illegally distributed on the 
Internet.839 Responsive to this claim, the US Congress admitted the significance 
and urgency of protecting movie industries from the misuse of camcorders. Not 
surprisingly, such estimation has not been subject to an independent review, and 
according to Geist and AT&T Labs, most of movie piracy originates from 
insiders of movie industries; 77% of pirated movies actually come from 
                                                      
835 TPPA does not contain a mandatory provision targeting the camcording (Article 
18.77), and ACTA prohibits, which is optional, only actual “copying of 
cinematographic works” (Article 23.3). 
836 USDoJ, 2013, p. 84. 
837 Time Warner Inc., Written submission to the USITC, June 21, 2007. 
838 The U.S. House Report 109-33 – Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 
2005, p. 2. 
839 Ibid. 
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industry insiders and advance screener copies provided to movie reviewers.840 
For about five years since the anti-camcording provision was implemented in 
2012, no actual cases involving those who misused the camcorder in theaters 
have been reported in Korea. The Copyright Protection Center has not even 
mentioned camcorded piracy in its annual reports. This appears to imply that 
the deterrent effect of anti-camcording legislation is working as intended. But, 
in reality, low-quality in both terms of image and sound of camcorded version 
has deterred distribution of camcorded films. Those who are familiar with 
DVD- or Blueray-quality clips do not tend to download and watch the 
camcorded version.  
Actual impacts of the anti-camcording provision occurred in unexpected areas. 
In 2017, when famous movie stars shared, via their ‘Instragram’ pages, a few 
photos taken in theaters while they were watching movies, they were soon 
accused as violating the Copyright Act. Having faced public criticisms, they 
deleted the photos and their agencies apologized officially. This anecdote 
highlights that the “fiction”841 created by the US copyright industries and their 
consistent lobbying affects cultural activities and freedom of expression of 
individuals. Taking still photos in public theater and sharing them with friends 
are not subject of the anti-camcording legislation. As the US Congress put it, 
the legislation “would not, and is not intended to, reach the conduct of a person 
who uses a camera, picture phone, or other photographic device to capture a 
still photo from an exhibition of a motion picture”.842 Unlike the intended scope, 
the legislation reached a non-violating conduct, a conduct of individuals who 
participate in their cultural life. 
4-7-5.	Online	Enforcement:	Shutting	Down	Internet	Sites	
4-7-5-1. Obligations under KORUS 
KORUS contains an unprecedented and extraordinary side letter, entitled 
“Online Piracy Prevention”. It aims at shutting down Internet sites that permit 
                                                      
840 Geist, 2007; Simon, 2003. 
841 Geist, 2007. 
842 The U.S. House Report 109-33, p. 2. 
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an unauthorized reproduction, distribution, or transmission of copyrighted 
works. This heinous side agreement was hailed by the USTR’s advisory 
committee as “a very welcome supplement to the FTA principles”, 843 but has 
never appeared again in subsequent bilateral, regional, or plurilateral trade 
agreements involving the US or other TRIPS-plus demanding members. The 
lone precedent is the side letter between Russian Federation and USTR when 
Russia was trying to join the WTO club in 2006.844 
It is still unknown how this side letter became a part of the KORUS pact. Yet, 
from the similarities in terms of intended policy objectives, contents and timing 
with the Russian letter, it is likely that the KORUS side letter was drafted by 
Korean government to appease the US counterpart and to conclude the 
negotiation in a short period of time. The side letter consists of commitments of 
nine sentences. Excepting the first sentence that declares open-ended policy 
objectives of shutting down Internet sites by both Parties, the remaining eight 
sentences are “the very specific unilateral obligations given by Korea to the 
U.S. government”.845 There, Korea concedes to “providing more effective 
enforcement” against webhard services and peer-to-peer services, and to 
“strengthen enforcement of IPRs in Korea” by co-working with “private sector 
and with the United States and other foreign authorities”. Further, Korea vows 
to issue a specific policy directive, no later than six months after KORUS enters 
into effect, establishing a joint investigation team for an effective enforcement 
against online piracy. Also, Korea agrees to take actions in a transparent way to 
right holders, and prosecute “individuals and companies that profit from 
developing and maintaining services that effectively induce infringement”. 
4-7-5-2. Discussion and Analysis 
The policy objectives of this side letter cannot be something that is agreed upon 
by the US and Korea because they conflict with the framework of ISPs safe 
harbor. The shutting down side letter targets Internet sites that permit an 
“unauthorized” reproduction, distribution, or transmission of copyright 
                                                      
843 ITAC-15 Report, 2007, p. 381. 
844 The Russian letter, a work of US copyright industries and USTR (Mendenhall, 
2005), is available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96620.pdf. 
845 Gwen, 2007. 
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works.846 However, permitting unauthorized circulation of digital materials, 
copyrighted or not, is the basic, underlying function of ISPs. Under the US and 
Korean laws, none of the ISPs are required to provide their services with 
“authorized” materials. ISPs defined in the safe harbor provisions of KORUS 
can enjoy exemption from liability even when they permit unauthorized 
reproduction, distribution, and transmission of copyright works between 
users.847  
Despite the high praise of USTR’s advisory committee, the US government and 
copyright industries has been indifferent in Korean implementation of the 
shutting down obligation.848 It is because Korea has taken rigorous copyright 
enforcement measures since KORUS was negotiated, not directly from the 
shutting down obligation. A graduated response system, or a three strikes law 
was enacted in April 2009 and the Korean government suspended 487 users’ 
accounts from 2009 to 2012, and sent, from 2009 to 2012, warnings to as many 
as 240,938 users.849 Further, under the Korean three strikes rule, the Ministry of 
Culture may order suspension of online bulletin board services such as webhard 
or cyberlocker. Even hyper-linking became the target of the three strikes 
regulation. In September 2013, the Korea government ordered ISPs to delete 
two hundred posting that provided link information of unauthorized movies. 
These administrative actions are conflicting with court decision. The Supreme 
Court made clear several times that providing link information does not 
constitute a copyright infringement, directly or indirectly. More rigorous 
measures taken by Korea include a filtering obligation of certain types of ISPs 
including cyberlocker and P2P service providers, and so-called a webhard 
                                                      
846 Comparing the Russian side letter that uses the term “pirated material”, “shutting 
down pirate websites”, and “illegal distribution of content protected by copyright 
and related rights”. 
847 Article 18.10:30 of KORUS. 
848 In March 2013, the Ministry of Culture replied to a law maker that the US side 
has never asked Korea of any information on the policies for blocking Internet sites, 
and there have been no discussions between two Parties including, in the Joint 
Committee, established pursuant to Article 22.2 of KORUS and co-chaired by 
USTR and the Korean Minister of Trade for supervising the implementation of 
KORUS, or in sub-committees and working groups. 
849 In March 2013, the Korean National Human Rights Commission recommended 
to consider abolishing the three strikes law (Giblin, 2013, p. 165; Nam, 2013). 
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registration system.850 These rigorous measures, voluntarily taken by Korean 
government might make satisfaction the US copyright industries without need 
of strict enforcement of the shutting-down provisions. 
4-8.	Conclusion	
Regarding the trade dimension of IP discussed in Chapter 2, this Chapter shows 
that KORUS is distinct from the early trade concerns while fully reflecting the 
maximalist IP agenda of TRIPS-plus era. Further, this Chapter reveals that the 
trade-centric IP rules were framed without democratic process of transparency 
and public participation, and contain a plenty of provisions having a potential of 
negatively affecting the right to science and culture. Beneficial impact in 
promoting human rights is rarely observed – only in fair use clause, which is 
not directly mandated by KORUS, a sort of by-product produced in a way that 
Korean government blinds dark sides of the overly expansive protection of 
copyright in temporary storage (Sections 4-4-1 and 4-4-5). 
On the normative level, this Chapter reveals that the gap lying between human 
rights approaches of IP and trade-centric IP norms in KORUS is irreconcilably 
and irreducibly large. The negotiation history of KORUS shows that human 
right protection of author was mere bargaining chips, and almost all of the core 
provisions for TRIPS/WCT/WPPT-plus agenda became a legally binding treaty. 
Trade-off between negotiators were not made in a way to boost creativity of 
individuals of both countries or to allow individuals to “actually enjoy 
particular capabilities”.851 As evidenced in this Chapter, the level of IPRs 
protection and enforcement under KORUS even goes beyond the US statutes or 
case laws in temporary storage (Section 4-4-1), patent-approval linkage on 
biological products (Section 4-6-2-2), provisional relief (Section 4-7-2-3), 
statutory damages (Section 4-7-2-1), and counterfeiting labels (Section 4-7-4-
3). 
An in-depth review of negotiation history of KORUS reveals that the pact was 
                                                      
850 The filtering obligation and a webhard registration system are closely related to 
the EU-Korea FTA that prohibits a general monitoring obligation. Thus, this will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (see Section 5-6-4). 
851 Romainville, 2015, p. 416. 
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created no to best serve policy goals of Korea and how successful was the US 
strategy of forum shift “vertically” into bilateral trade agreement talks.852 The 
negotiation history, in terms of failed resistance of grass roots, politicians, and 
objections of some governmental branches (such copyright and public health), 
confirms the FTA as a “very efficient tool in the process of promoting 
neoliberal policies”.853  
On the human rights impact level, KORUS, however, exhibits somewhat 
complex outcomes. In some areas, apparent adverse impacts were identified, 
and in other areas there have been no or little impacts. Two explanatory 
accounts may be offered.  
First, the way of implementation matters. Not all of KORUS obligations were 
implemented as the treaty requires. Some are entirely ignored in domestic 
legislations or implemented in a restrictive way, which include: (1) presumption 
of authorship, subsistence of copyright, and validity of trademark and patent 
rights (no presumption of authorship and subsistence of copyright in the US and 
no presumption of subsistence of copyright and validity of trademark or patent 
in Korea, see Section 4-7-1); (2) statutory damages of copyright or trademark 
infringement (limited implementation in Korea, Section 4-7-2-1); (3) inaudita 
intera parte provisional relief (no actual application in both countries, Section 
4-7-2-3); and (5) online enforcement aiming at shutting down internet sites (no 
implementation in Korea but having equivalent effects through other 
enforcement measures, Section 4-7-5).  
Second account is “context-sensitive” nature of IP protection, strongly 
depending on the specific industry and varying significantly across sectors.854 
As demonstrated in case studies on the patent-approval linkage, different 
structure of Korean pharmaceutical industries having incomparably small 
market size, less litigation costs and distinctive way of implementation (e.g., 
shorter period for automatic stay of generic approval) produced ignorable 
impact in terms of production loss of domestic pharmaceutical industries and 
                                                      
852 Sell, 2003. 
853 Krikorian, 2010, p. 305. 
854 Machnicka, 2016, p. 440. 
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public health cost. The linkage case study also reveals that even with its 
extreme version of TRIPS-plus, the linkage protection failed to achieve 
intended purpose of “stimulating pioneering innovation”.855 In addition, where 
harmful impacts on human rights were observed, including: extension of 
copyright protection term (Section 4-4-3); ban on pre-grant opposition of patent 
(Section 4-5-2); extension of grace period (Section 4-5-4-2); patent term 
extension for compensating delay in patent grant (Section 4-5-3); measures for 
combatting book piracy (Section 4-7-3-2); and anti-camcording provision 
(Section 4-7-4-4), the impacts are not direct from the KORUS texts, and 
unintended consequences are detected. 
KORUS becomes a vehicle for the US to push Korea to take further liberalized 
measures for the interests of the US business. When Korea expressed its 
interests in TPP, the US attached conditions of further concessions of Korea and 
a full implementation of KORUS, which may have adverse impact on human 
rights. These conditions include environmental regulation on high emission 
vehicle, cross-border transfer of financial private information, and public health 
mechanism for pharmaceuticals and medical devices. 
The impact of KORUS does not remain within the border of Korea. It crosses 
the border and affects foreign trading partners. Soon after signing KORUS in 
2007, the Korean government in various branches started to regard KORUS as a 
minimum standard and a model for IPR protection and enforcement to follow in 
subsequent trade negotiations. Morin explains this with a concept of domino 
effect of a chain reaction.856 According to Morin, the broadest goal of the US 
bilateralism is to create a measurable effect beyond the targeted country and one 
way to achieve this goal is to create a chain reaction.857 As the former USTR 
Robert Zoellick explained, the “idea is to start out with the leading reformers 
[…] and then try to connect others to it over time”, with a hope for the new 
partners to actively negotiate similar provisions in their treaties with third 
countries.858 This is what Korea is doing in RCEP negotiation. For RCEP, 
                                                      
855 Bouchard et al., 2011, p. 439. 
856 Tso, 2014. 
857 Morin, 2009, p. 178. 
858 Ibid, p. 177. 
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Korea proposed TRIPS-plus provisions having an adverse impact on the right to 
access to medicines. Besides, Korean proposals contain the notorious three-
strikes-out rule for copyright protection against repeat infringers.859 
More profound impact of KORUS, which is not apparent from either the FTA 
texts or negotiation history, is on an ideational level. The IP protectionism, 
maximalist IP agenda, and IP exceptionalism have produced ideational changes 
by affecting the values and perceptions of policy makers and the general public. 
IPRs infringement does not remain within private affairs of individual IP 
owners, it is considered as social problems to be addressed by deploying public 
resources. Therefore, escalating and reallocating public resource toward 
enhanced IP protection gain acceptance. The prevalent perception on IP is 
elevated to the status of, what Lemley calls, ‘faith-based, religious belief’ - they 
believe in IP as an end in itself, and IP is considered as some kind of pre-
political right to which inventors and creators are entitled, needing no empirical 
evidence.860 This, in turn, sparks changes in structure and function of IP policy 
institutions, and reinforces insider governance of IP offices, making them more 
vulnerable for regulatory capture.861 Then, it becomes more difficult for policy 
makers to consider human rights aspects of IP. In this sense, the locked-in effect 
and limiting policy space for TRIPS flexibilities stem from both KORUS and 
inside.  
To fix the problem, identifying root is vital. The root of the ideational shift was 
exogenous but now is endogenous. Driving force of KORUS is explained as a 
“deal between Korean and U.S. economic elites”,862 i.e., the transnational 
corporations, or as “Korean capitalist rivalry with China and Japan”.863 
According Park, concerns on lagging behind in FTA competitions with other 
Asian nations, Korean capital including Samsung pushed signing of FTAs.864 
                                                      
859 Article [X.G.7]: Measures against Repetitive Copyright Infringers on the 
Internet of leaked RCEP negotiation document. 
860 Lemley, 2015, pp. 1337-1338. 
861 Deere, 2009a, p. 116. 
862 Martin, 2011, p. 327. 
863 Park, 2009, p. 454. 
864 Ibid. 
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This holds true in general but is insufficient to explain the changes of IP 
policies. Competitive advantages of Korean capitalists lie in manufacturing 
mainly of electronics, automobiles, ships, semiconductors and steel. In these 
fields, market barriers of the US were sufficiently low and their preferences in 
trade deal were limited in certain areas such as services, electronic commerce, 
government procurement and protection of investors. This observation requires 
modification of ‘three-stage’ model of Morin and Bannerman for the 
explanation of IP policy changes in Korea. According to the ‘three-stage’ 
model, (1) coercive pressure of the US triggered strengthening of domestic IP 
standard in Korea (stage one),865 (2) institutional changes fuelled transformation 
of domestic industries from duplicative imitation to creative imitation or 
genuine innovation, making them stronger in enthusiastic advocators and 
effective preachers for appropriate IPR protection and diffusing ideas 
sympathetic to strong IP protection (stage two),866 and (3) the prevalent 
paradigm and the perception of the national interest in Korea has shifted in 
favour of strong IP protection (stage three).867 As discussed in Sections 1-1 and 
2-4, the primary agent gaining power in ‘stage two’ of Morin and Bannerman’s 
model is not private sector; it’s IP offices. They have an administrative power in 
domestic patent or copyright policies, and is distinct from the private business 
sectors because they govern the policy-making process and hold control of 
institutions that are crucial in the interaction of structure and agency. 
 	
                                                      
865 Morin & Bannerman, 2015, pp. 226-229. 
866 Ibid, pp. 229-230. 
867 Ibid, pp. 221, 230. 




For the case study on the intersection of the trade-centric IP norms and human 
rights, this Chapter examines the EU-Korea. The main purpose of this case 
study is to test the hypothesis of this thesis–the contemporary trade-centric IP 
norms fail to achieve their intended purposes and cause human rights conflicts. 
The reason for conducting a case study on the EU-Korea FTA is that among the 
numerous EU FTAs, the EU-Korea FTA is one of the most far-reaching and 
comprehensive trade deals, containing TRIPS/WCT/WPPT-plus provisions, and 
the most ambitious FTA implemented by the EU.868  
The same methodologies taken in the previous Chapter 4 for testing KORUS 
are applied here. However, the scope and breadth discussed in this Chapter is 
narrower than the discussion of KORUS because the EU-Korea FTA contains 
fewer provisions that have implications on human rights and IP policies. In 
addition, some of the overlapping contents in both FTAs were previously 
covered in Chapter 4. The EU-Korea FTA was less controversial than KORUS. 
In the EU, it was relatively uncontentious because the EU could benefit from 
the TRIPS/WCT/WPPT-plus commitments previously made between Korea 
and the US. In Korea, it was less debated because KORUS made the general 
public, policy makers, civil society members, and the negotiators to regard the 
deal with EU as less serious. 
For analysing the EU-Korea FTA, this Chapter begins with the negotiation 
history and strategies of the EU and Korea. Then, this Chapter explores in 
detail, specific provisions that have implications on human rights, primarily the 
right to science and culture. The human rights impact assessment carried out 
here covers those resulted from obligations under the general provision, 
protection of patent and pharmaceutical products, protection of copyright and 
related rights, and enforcement of IPRs. 
                                                      
868 European Commission, 2016 (Report on the FTA), p. 2. 




Negotiations of the EU-Korea FTA officially launched on 7 May 2007, just one 
month prior to the signing of KORUS. After almost two years, with eight 
formal rounds of working level discussions (from May 2007 to March 2009), 
the trade pact was initialled on 15 October 2009. It was signed during the EU-
Korea Summit in Brussels on 6 October 2010,869 and the European Parliament 
gave its consent to the FTA on 17 February 2011, making it provisionally 
applicable as of 1 July 2011, and fully enforceable on December 13, 2015.870 
Long before the EU-Korea FTA was negotiated, many European countries and 
Korea have maintained close trade relationships. The Framework Agreement on 
Trade and Co-operation between the EU and Korea was signed in 1996,871 and 
an FTA with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was signed on 15 
December 2005. However, these relationships have not made trade to be central 
in the IP policies of each signing party. The Framework Agreement of 1996 
contains only one provision (Article 9) for IPRs. Despite inclusion of this 
provision, it does not impose legally binding obligation for the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs, merely confirming the implementation of TRIPS.872 Also, 
the FTA between member states of EFTA and Korea is free from TRIPS-plus 
provisions.873 The EU-Korea FTA entirely changed this relationship. It imposed 
the TRIPS/WCT/WPPT-plus obligations, even adding EU-plus duties (such as a 
strict ban on retransmission of television signal over the Internet and criminal 
enforcement provisions). This change was driven concurrently by both parties. 
From mid-2000s, the EC altered its trade policy concerning IPRs in bilateral 
agreements, as disclosed in the EC’s strategy paper, Global Europe of 2006,874 
                                                      
869 Lakatos & Nilsson, 2016, p. 4. 
870 The agreement was amended in 2014 to allow the Republic of Croatia to join. 
871 Its upgraded version was signed in May 2010 and entered into force on 1 June 
2014. 
872 The IPR provision was deleted and replaced with an IPR-irrelevant provision for 
trade and investment in the upgraded text of 2010. 
873 see Chapter 7 and Annex XIII of the FTA. 
874 European Commission, External Trade (2006) Global Europe: Competing in the 
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and IPR Enforcement Strategy of 2005.875 Traditionally, the EU had not 
demanded its trade partners to accept IPR standards higher than those required 
by multilateral agreements such as TRIPS, respecting national discretion. The 
new trade policy, which is more likely to converge with the practice of the US 
in its FTAs,876 requires far-reaching IPR standards that go beyond TRIPS and 
are found in the EU laws.877 Korea also changed its trade policy during mid-
2000s to seek comprehensive, high-standard FTAs with world’s largest 
economies including the US, the EU and China. Despite this movement, Korea, 
however, has not adopted a concrete policy framework in connection with IPRs. 
When KORUS was signed in 2007, the commitments made by Korea in 
KORUS IPR sector became the minimum standards for subsequent bilateral 
negotiations. This means that Korea was ready to accept the EU’s proposals of 
TRIPS/WCT/WPPT-plus provisions insofar as they do neither exceed KORUS 
nor cause substantial legislative change in Korea.878 
Consequently, IPR was less controversial in the formation of the EU-Korea 
FTA. Certain disputed issues between negotiators were resolved at the early 
stage, which include: joining the Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks 
(Article 10.16);879 protection of unregistered design (Article 10.29);880 
                                                      
World (November 13, 2006). 
875 Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual property rights in third countries. OJ 
C 29/3 (26 May 2005). 
876 CIEL, 2007, p. 4. 
877 Watal observed that the only obvious difference between the EU and US FTAs 
is that the EU FTAs contain GIs and enforcement more extensive than TRIPS 
(2014, p. 48). 
878 Generally, the EU-Korea FTA mirrors the scope of KORUS with some 
exceptions including no specific chapter on foreign direct investment, disallowance 
of trade sanction against violations of labor and environment provisions, and a 
positive-list mechanism for service market opening (Cooper, Jureans, Platzer & 
Mark, 2011, pp. 1, 16). 
879 The EU negotiators demanded mandatory compliance with the Singapore 
Treaty, while the Korean counterparts tried to lower the obligation because the 
treaty was not effective at that time. They reached to an agreement to water down 
the obligation that both parties “make all reasonable efforts to comply with” the 
treaty. 
880 The EU demanded an exclusive right for unregistered appearance of a product, 
even when it was known to the public, while Korea pointed out no practical benefit 
of such a protection. In the end, Korea agreed, for an unknown reason, to keep 
protecting the unregistered design by the Unfair Competition Prevention and Trade 
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protection term of registered design (Article 10.30);881 compliance with the 
Patent Law Treaty (Article 10.33);882 judicial order for the submission of 
evidence such as banking, financial or commercial documents of the alleged 
IPR infringers (Article 10.43);883 corrective measures for court order to destroy 
IPR infringing goods or remove those goods from the channels of commerce 
(Article 10.47:1); artists’ resale right (Article 10.10); and data exclusivity 
(Articles 10.36 and 10.37). Provisions on trademark and design were easily 
agreed upon, while the protection of geographical indications (GIs) was the 
most controversial issue.884   
All of the outstanding IPR issues were cleared during the sixth round of talks 
(28 January 2008), excepting GIs and the remuneration right of performers and 
phonogram producers for public performance of music.885 A package deal, 
resolving these issues, was struck at the final stage. The EU withdrew its 
demands on remuneration rights of phonogram producers and performers for 
public performance and ten-years period of data exclusivity. In exchange, Korea 
agreed to expand the border measures to cover patent and GIs in addition to 
copyright and trademark. The artists’ resale right was agreed to be revisited in 
two years after the FTA entered into effect.886 On the criminal enforcement rule, 
both sides commenced negotiation when the working level discussion was 
officially over at the eighth round of talks (24 March 2009), which will be 
                                                      
Secret Protection Act (footnote 12(a) of Article 10.29). 
881 For the protection term of registered design right, the EU proposed up to 25 
years, but Korea successfully countered to lower it to at least 15 years in 
accordance with TRIPS. 
882 At that time, among the member states of the EU, only the UK joined the Patent 
Law Treaty, and thus the final text does not make mandatory both parties to comply 
with the treaty. 
883 Until the second round, Korea had no position on this proposal but in the end 
accepted the EU’s proposal. 
884 Having a few items entitled for the GIs protection, Korea tried to reduce down 
the the number  of protectable GIs. Initially, the EU demanded more than 2,900 
agricultural products and foodstuff for GIs, but, in the end, curtailed them to more 
than 160 products with a preservation of further discussion for adding new GIs. 
885 The remuneration rights are not included in the final text, but they are related to 
Article 10.9 as discussed in Section 5-4-3. 
886 However, until 2016, they have not discussed the resale right (see, Section 5-4-
5). 
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discussed in detail in Section 5-6-3. 
5-2-2.	Implementation	of	the	EU-Korea	FTA	
Implementation of the EU-Korea FTA is controlled exclusively by the trade 
bodies of both sides. The FTA establishes a Trade Committee co-chaired by the 
Trade Ministry of Korea and the Member of the EC responsible for trade. The 
mandate of the Trade Committee is to ensure a proper operation of, supervise 
and facilitate the implementation and application of the FTA.887 Under the 
Trade Committee, several specialised sub-committees and working groups are 
established, and IP Dialogue to address topics relevant to the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs is founded according to an agreement under the IP 
Chapter.888 
Discussions of the various implementation bodies have been carried out behind 
closed doors without permitting public engagement and commentary, with 
details of the discussions kept in secret. However, the EC’s annual reports on 
the implementation of the EU-Korea FTA to the European Parliament show that 
the implementation discussion serves as a window for the European industries 
to solve their private complaints. Further, the trade officials in both parties 
approach public policies such as health-related policy as trade barriers to be 
removed.  
The EC found that the EU-Korea FTA “has worked very well” in favour of the 
EU mainly because of an unexpected high increase of EU export of goods (55% 
in the fourth year of FTA implementation) and services (11% in 2014 compared 
to 2013) to Korea.889 In order to maintain this trade advantage, the EC has not 
abandoned the attitude of approaching the public policy of trade partner as a 
trade barrier. For instance, the EC has tabled, whenever they met at the 
Working Group on Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices, issues such as the 
drug pricing system and practices under the Korean public health system and 
appropriate recognition of the value of innovated, patented drugs in Korean 
                                                      
887 Article 15.1:3 of the EU-Korea FTA. One exception is the Protocol on Cultural 
Cooperation. 
888 Article 10.69:2. 
889 European Commission, 2016 - FTA Implementation Report, p. 12. 
223 / 335 
 
determination of the reimbursement prices of medicines and medical device.890 
Implementation discussions on IPRs have taken place in two tracks: the IP 
Dialogue; and the Working Group on Geographical Indications (GI Working 
Group). On these tracks, complaints from the European companies have been 
the main topic and matters that may affect the interest of IPR industries have 
been put on the tables. These matters include those not specifically dealt with in 
the FTA such as trademark squatting, invalidation rates in the Korean patent 
system, implementation of copyright provision with regard to public 
performance, and relationship between standard essential patent and 
competition policy of Korea.891 The principal aim of the GI working group is to 
add lists of new GIs.892 
5-2-3.	Strategies	of	EU	for	IPRs	in	the	Bilateral	Trade	Agreement	with	
Korea	
When the EU and Korea considered a possible trade deal at the preliminary 
discussions in 2005 and 2006,893 the enforcement of IPRs was the top priority of 
the EU for a bilateral trade deal with Korea. Luc Devigne, head of the IPR unit 
at the DG Trade of the EC, confirmed that “IP will be [an] extremely high 
priority, especially effective enforcement … [And] in a number of trade deals, 
the EU is planning to go even beyond minimum standards of TRIPS”.894 DG 
                                                      
890 European Commission, 2015 – FTA Implementation Report, p. 6 (The Working 
Group had its first meeting on 26-27 April 2012 and has met every year from 
2014); European Commission, 2016 – FTA Implementation Report, p. 8. 
891 European Commission, 2013 - Annual Report, p. 7; European Commission, 
2014 - Annual Report p. 7; European Commission, 2016 Annual Report pp.9-10. 
The public performance right does not form a part of the FTA obligation as 
discussed infra Section 5-4-3. Nonetheless, insufficient implementation of the 
performance right of Korea has been an issue raised every year by the EC. 
892 European Commission, 2014 - Annual Report, p. 7; European Commission, 
2015 - Annual Report, p. 8; European Commission, 2016 - Annual Report p. 9. 
893 Before official launch of talks for the EU-Korea FTA in May 2007, the EU and 
Korea first discussed the possibility of a trade deal at the EU-Korea trade 
ministerial conference in May 2005 and held two consecutive preliminary 
discussions in July and September 2006 (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
of Korea (2006, September 25) Je-2-cha han-EU FTA ye-bi-hyeob-ui gae-choe 
[The second preliminary consultation meeting for the Korea-EU FTA] [Press 
release]. Retrieved from http://www.fta.go.kr/eu/. 
894 Gerhardsen, 2007. 
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Trade of EC regarded an insufficient enforcement of IPRs a serious harm to EU 
business, and solving it became the central objectives of the EC’s new 
ambitious trade policy. In Global Europe of 2006, 895 which aims at stimulating 
growth and creating jobs in Europe by reinforcing the competitive position of 
EU industry globally,896 the EC pledged to seek strengthening “IPR provisions 
in future bilateral agreements and the enforcement of existing commitments in 
order to reduce IPR violations and the production and export of fake goods”, in 
particular against “China, Russia, ASEAN, Korea, Mercosur, Chile and 
Ukraine”.897  
However, IPR enforcement was not the single goal of the EC, a more detailed 
IP chapter, which would be closer to the US-style and cover “the protection of 
design rights, enforcement as well as geographical indications” were also 
pursued by the EU as high importance to be included in FTAs.898 The process in 
which the EC picked up the “priority countries” and their agenda for FTA talks 
shows the lack of “the condition of representation” required for democratic 
process of international bargaining,899 and broad public participation in 
international IPR norm-setting process.900 
The “priority countries” were selected by the EC surveying 63 countries based 
on 290 replies mostly from copyright and trademark industries in the EU.901 The 
survey formed a part of the EC’s action plans disclosed in the IPR Enforcement 
Strategy of 2005,902 which led to a one-sided, unified strategy. This was despite 
                                                      
895 European Commission, External Trade (2006) Global Europe: Competing in the 
World (November 13, 2006). 
896 EC, 2006 – Global Europe, pp. 2 and 6. Later, in 2010 the EC complemented the 
Global Europe, main message of which is very similar, but adds a new element for 
strategic trade dimension for the EU by highlighting cooperation with Brazil, 
China, India, Japan, Russia, and the US (Pitschas, 2014, p. 214; European 
Commission (2010) Communication: Trade, growth and world affairs. Trade policy 
as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy, COM(2010) 612 final).  
897 EC, 2006 - Global Europe, p. 13. 
898 Gerhardsen, 2007. 
899 Drahos, 2002, p. 161. 
900 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 93. 
901 EC (2006, October) Enforcement Survey 2006. Retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/february/tradoc_145795.pdf 
902 European Commission (2005) Strategy for the enforcement of intellectual 
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its proclaimed intentions not to impose “unilateral solution” upon third 
countries and to refrain from proposing a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 
promoting IPR enforcement.903 Against Korea, the EC indicated that main areas 
of concerns in term of IPR violation were: counterfeiting (departing from the 
traditional interpretation of counterfeiting by including infringements of design 
right, not only trademark infringements); lack of copyright protection prior to 
1957 (meaning a shorter term of copyright protection); unauthorised use of 
geographical indications; and certain restriction on patent licenses for 
pharmaceuticals.904 
Inserting their voices into the formal discussion of the EU-Korea FTA, 
European business sectors presented extensive and far-reaching wish lists. For 
instance, in 2007, the European Chamber of Commerce in Korea provided the 
EC with information that they deemed needing to be solved through the trade 
agreement. The information came from various committees within the Chamber 
of Commerce, including: Beer-Wine-Spirits; Intellectual Property Rights; and 
Healthcare Committees. They complained regarding various issues such as 
insufficient court rulings against IPR infringers and insufficient protection of 
data submitted for approval of pharmaceutical products, and demanded 
improved enforcement actions, in particular criminal enforcement.905  
5-2-4.	Strategies	of	Korea	for	IPRS	in	the	Bilateral	Trade	Agreement	
with	EU	
Until 2004, a free trade agreement with the EU was a part of mid- or long-term 
project for South Korea. It was changed around 2005 when KORUS was 
discussed, and pursuing FTAs with the world largest economies, under the 
slogan of “making Korea a hub for international FTA networks”, became the 
main strategy of Korean trade policy. However, the policy change was not the 
                                                      
property rights in third countries, 2005/C 129/03. 
903 Ibid, p. 1. 
904 European Commission (2004) Summary of Survey (Country: South Korea), 
Retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/august/tradoc_113217.pdf. 
905 The European Chamber of Commerce in Korea, (2007),. Trade Issues and 
Recommendations 2007, Retrieved from http://trade.eucck.org/site/2007/. 
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product of a process in which the voices of the stakeholders in relevant sectors, 
let alone a wide range of public participation, were heard in a transparent way.  
In this context, for the talk of the EU-Korea FTA, the Korean negotiators had 
no specific strategies in regarding IPRs. As explained previously, Korea was 
ready to accept the TRIPS-plus agenda, which would not go beyond KORUS. 
Therefore, the Korean government evaluated the outcomes of the EU-Korea 
FTA as optimistic, which include: 
• Reinforcing the enforcement of IPRs beyond that required by TRIPS; 
• Strengthening the level of copyright protection in accordance with the 
change of technological environment (the same level as KORUS); 
• Clarifying obligations related to trademark registration procedures; 
• Clarifying the level of protection of registered and unregistered design 
or appearance; 
• Regulating extension of term of protection for pharmaceutical patents 
and data exclusivity within the scope of KORUS; 
• Ensuring protection of Korean geographical indications within the 
European territory by agreeing mutually protecting GIs registered on 
Annex 10 (64 items for Korean GIs and 162 items for EU GIs); 
• Safeguarding predictability and legal stability of IPR protection by 
clearly providing the procedurals for civil and criminal remedies against 
IPR infringements; and 
• Suppressing cross border trade of IPR infringing goods by expanding 
the scope of border measures.906 
5-2-5.	Discussion	and	Analysis	
When the trade-centric IP norms had gone global from mid-1980s to 2000s, 
some IP exporting countries such as the US and the EU adopted a “carrot-and-
stick approach”, a tactic hinged on threatening countries with commercial 
retaliation or using economic benefits as an incentive to impose stronger IP 
protections.907 The negotiation history examined here shows that the EU was 
                                                      
906 Government of Republic of Korea, 2010, p. 367. 
907 Krikorian, 2010, p. 296. 
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able to save the cost of the carrot-and-stick approach because of the voluntary 
liberalization of Korea.  
It is challenging to explain the Korea’s choice to voluntarily open its market 
and deregulate IPRs, especially when Korea has been estimated to be the 
biggest victim of the globalization of IPRs through WTO/TRIPS.908 One 
possible explanation is the expectation of the Korean government that cost of 
deregulating IPRs would be outweighed by an increased access to foreign 
markets. In this account, TRIPS-plus rules are regarded as a necessary evil in 
pursuing the liberalized trade environment and it is inevitable for Korean 
domestic industries to accept the TRIPS-plus norms in the course of competing 
with companies of the world economies. Another explanation is, as shown in 
the previous Chapter, “reform-minded liberal economist and policy makers” 
were successful in expanding their influence within the Korean government 
since the 1980s.909 In carrying out their agenda, IPR became a scapegoat. 
Further, external trade pressures from the US and the EU to elevate the level of 
domestic IPR protection have forced the policy makers to internalize the IP 
maximalist agenda. 
The case study on the phase of negotiation and implementation of the EU-Korea 
FTA shows that one particular interest of society, or the business sector, and 
trade policy makers have dominated the whole process and gained the authority 
to set agendas. In Korea, there was little procedure permitting public 
participation in agenda setting for IPR negotiation. In the EU, the consultations 
took place predominantly with IPR-related industries, such as accessories and 
apparel luxury goods, entertainment software companies, and copyright 
associations representing more than 140 European member companies.910 They 
                                                      
908 A study of the World Bank estimated that the largest impact in terms of change 
in payment of royalties and licensing fees by an elevated patent protection by 
TRIPS would be found in the Republic of Korea (The International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (2002) Global economic prospects and the 
developing countries, p. 133 (estimating Korean loss of patent rent of 15,333 in 
millions of 2000 dollars, almost triple than China, the second largest victim of -
5,121 in the same unit)). 
909 Ministry of Strategy and Finance & KDI School of Public Policy and 
Management (2015) South Korea’s voluntary unilateral import liberalization 
during the 1st half of 1980s, p. 29 
910 European Commission (2006) A summary of the replies to the 2006 
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reported, without sufficient supporting data and reliable methodologies, 
widespread copyright piracy and a large number of counterfeit goods in South 
Korea and complained a discriminatory protection by Korean authorities for 
local entertainment software industry and refusing assistance in protection for 
foreign industries.911  
Further, the negotiation and discussions of implementation were undertaken 
amid great secrecy, with “substantial [European] corporate participation but 
without an equivalent participation of public interests voices”.912 None of the 
negotiation documents was made public during the negotiation. Even after the 
pact was transformed into a binding norm having the same effect as domestic 
laws, no detailed explanation was provided and the talk for implementing the 
FTA remained secret.913  
This lack of democratic process results in a failure of consideration of human 
right aspects of IPRs and raises questions on the efficiency of the norms and its 
legitimacy.914 In larger part, the FTA was a tool that business sectors advanced 
their private interests at the expense of the public welfare and human rights. The 
biggest problem in the trade-centric IPR norm setting process examined in this 
Section lies in that the inherent policy objectives of IPRs themselves are 
inevitably subordinate to wider, more general trade liberalization policies and 
the vague policy aims of top level politicians. The fundamental policy 
objectives of IPRs, i.e., striking a fair balance either between “the effective 
protection of the moral and material interests of authors and … the right to take 
part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its 
                                                      
enforcement survey relating to South Korea, Retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/october/tradoc_130429.pdf. 
911 Ibid. 
912 UN Copyright Report of 2014, ¶ 19. 
913 When an information disclosure was requested in June 2016 by this author for 
the full list of documents that have been exchanged between the EU and Korean 
negotiators for the IPR Chapter, the Korean government, on 4 July 2016, only 
disclosed a list of five documents for the full list. The disclosed list includes: 
Presumption of Authorship or Ownership (28 January 2008); GI Protection Level (9 
December 2008); EU food GIs transcription into the Korean alphabet (12 December 
2008); EU spirit GIs transcription into the Korean alphabet (12 December 2008); 
and EU wines GIs transcription into the Korean alphabet (12 December 2008). 
914 Drahos, 2002, p. 180. 
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applications”,915 or between “rules of appropriation and rules of diffusion”,916 
have lost their grounds in this process as elaborated in subsequent Sections. 
5-3.	Principles	and	Objectives	of	the	IPR	Chapter	of	the	EU-Korea	FTA	
5-3-1.	Lack	of	Balancing	Consideration	and	Legitimacy	
While the law is a product of the power dynamics within society, it pretends to 
serve the interests of general public for two reasons. First, by not expressing the 
winner’s interests in a naked manner, the law can force obedience of people. 
Therefore, examining only the legal texts that appear to promote common 
interests may fail to reveal the interests that the law actually seeks to pursue. 
Second, when rulers cannot completely suppress the weak, they must make 
concessions. In this case, the law has an appearance that reflects the interests of 
all the members rather than reflecting the interests of the strong.917  
However, the EU-Korea FTA is outspoken in expressing the power relationship 
in IPRs. It declares that the objectives of IPR Chapter are to facilitate 
“commercialisation” of IPR products and to achieve an adequate and effective 
level of protection and enforcement of IPRs.918 With this explicit revelation of 
the commercial interests of IPR holders, the FTA loses its legitimacy. The 
balance between private and public interests in the TRIPS Agreement or 
between the protection and dissemination sides of the right to science and 
culture has been collapsed in the EU-Korea FTA.919 Due to this destruction of 
legitimacy, it is difficult to expect the voluntary compliance of the members of 
society. Maintaining these norms should be supported by powerful and coercive 
means such as civil and criminal enforcement measures and retaliatory trade 
actions. 
                                                      
915 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 39(e). 
916 Drahos, 2002, p. 162. 
917 Lee, 1999. 
918 Article 10.1(a) and (b). 
919 The approach of the EU-Korea FTA is quite different from TPP, which 
recognizes broader range of interests not merely the right holders and users but also 
service providers and the public (Article 18.4), and recognises the importance of 
public domain (Article 18.15). 
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5-3-2.	Transfer	of	Technology	and	Its	Effectiveness	
One of the most striking differences between the EU-Korea FTA and KORUS 
lies in the commitment for technology transfer. Unlike KORUS, the EU-Korea 
FTA contains a provision for technology transfer. From the human rights 
perspective, the transfer of technology is an essential element in any system for 
the protection of the material and moral interests of intellectual productions.920 
It also forms a fundamental element of patent systems.921 Further, as discussed 
in previous Sections 2-5 and 2-6, the transfer of technology, together with an 
expectation of increased foreign direct investment, was the decisive incentive 
that allowed developing countries to join the global trade-centric IP norms. If 
TRIPs is considered to pursue creation of a safe environment for global trade, 
IPRs are predominantly deemed an instrument to facilitate technology 
transfer.922 Despite this positive aspect, the effectiveness of technology transfer 
commitment in the EU-Korea FTA is doubtable due to considerable limitations. 
First, the obligation of technology transfer of the EU-Korea FTA is a soft 
commitment, lacking a firm obligation.923 Article 10.3:1 of the FTA only 
encourages exchanging views and information on their practices and policies 
affecting transfer of technology. Also, it simply calls for a particular attention to 
the conditions necessary to create an adequate enabling environment for the 
transfer of technology. In the case of TRIPS, the firm obligation for transfer of 
technology was an unmet demand of developing countries.924 The lack of a firm 
obligation turned out to have produced little meaningful results.925 When 
considering the tacit nature of technological knowledge, which requires 
information cost and learning cost as discussed in Sections 2-2-2 and 3-4-2-3, a 
                                                      
920 General Comment No. 17, ¶ 38. 
921 UN Patent Report of 2015, ¶ 4. 
922 Westkamp, 2005, p 98. 
923 Abbott, 2014, p. 168. 
924 Watal, 2014, p. 51. Article 7 of TRIPS provides that the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs should contribute to the transfer of technology, and Article 
66.2 of TRIPS imposes a soft commitment only upon the developed countries to 
“provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose 
of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members”. 
925 Abbott, 2014, p. 168. 
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firm program for the enabling environment is crucial.926 
Second, a more meaningful provision for the technology transfer, which aims to 
prevent anti-competitive licensing practices, is also restrictive in scope.927 
Under the EU-Korea FTA, each Party has to take measures to prevent or control 
two kinds of IPRs-related practices and conditions:: (1) the practices adversely 
affecting the international transfer of technology, which are different from 
Article 40(2) of TRIPS requiring adverse effects on competition in the relevant 
markets; and (2) the practices constituting an abuse of IPRs by the right holder, 
not the abuse of dominant position of IPR holders.928 Further, the EU-Korea 
FTA does not take into consideration the unequal bargaining power between 
licensor and licensee.929 
5-3-3.	NT,	MFN	and	Unequal	Coalition	Effect	
As discussed earlier in Section 2-5, the national treatment (NT)930 and most-
favoured nation (MFN) principles are major pillars of the global trade-centric 
IP. These major elements are missing in the EU-Korea FTA.931  
Behind this absence of NT and MFN is TRIPS. By anchoring to TRIPS,932 the 
EU and Korea can benefit from any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
                                                      
926 Many economic studies have shown that North-South technology transfer was 
unsuccessful due to the lack of enabling conditions (Archibugi & Filippetti, 2015, 
p. 486). 
927 For the discussion on the interpretation and possible application of EU’s 
competition law according to technology transfer commitments of the EU FTAs, 
see Drexl, 2014, pp. 280-283. 
928 Article 10.3:2. 
929 By contrast, under the EU-CARIFORUM FTA, an abuse of obvious information 
asymmetries constitutes a separate cause of action to take measures independently 
from the abuse of IPRs. 
930 More accurately, the NT is a “no less favourable” standard rather than a strict 
equivalent treatment standard. 
931 Not all of the EU FTAs follow this model. See, for instance, the EU-Peru-
Colombia FTA (Article 6.1:3 and 4). In case of US and Asian FTAs, only a 
minority of them includes NT and MFN provisions, while just over two-thirds of 
the EU FTAs include such provisions (Valdés & McCann, 2014, p. 16). 
932 Article 10.2:1 of the EU-Korea FTA mandates effective implementation of 
TRIPS and confirms that the FTA complements obligations under TRIPS. 
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granted by their partner in other FTAs with regard to the protection IPRs.933 
Undoubtedly, the EU may gain more than Korea in this regard, due to the 
heightened IPR standards set by the US in earlier FTAs including KORUS.934 
Even without an MFN provision, the EU can benefit from the commitments of 
KORUS because most of the IP provisions take the form of domestic 
legislations applicable generally rather than measures specifically applied at the 
border.935 In this way, the EU can free ride on KORUS as it did on the US’ 
Section 301 against Korea in 1980s,936 and as demonstrated in the following 
Sections 5-5-3 and 5-5-4.  
The “multilateralization effect” of NT and MFN standards,937 which allows IP 
right holders from across the globe to enjoy the higher IPR standard that an 
FTA member has offered in various trade deals differs between the EU and 
Korea. Whereas the EU denies the direct applicability of FTAs including the 
EU-Korea FTA,938 Korea admits that any treaties ratified and proclaimed 
pursuant to the Constitution have the same effect as the domestic laws.  
The multilateralization effect is reinforced by treaty accession or compliance 
provisions that create a “coalition effect”.939 Those provisions are not contained 
in the General Provision but are scattered throughout the IP Chapter of the EU-
Korea FTA.940 
                                                      
933 Aleman, 2014, pp. 68-69; Drexl, 2016, p. 63. 
934 Watal, 2014, p. 48. 
935 Valdés & McCann, 2014, p. 39. 
936 Drahos & Braithwaite 2002, p. 127. 
937 Ruse-Khan, 2016, p. 170. 
938 Article 8 of the Council Decision 8525/10 confirms that the EU-Korea FTA 
“shall not be construed as conferring rights or imposing obligations which can be 
directly invoked before Union or Member States courts and tribunals”. An FTA 
provision explicitly denying the self-executing effect is found only in Article 6 of 
Annex 7-A-1 EU Party, List of Commitments in Conformity with Article 7-7 
(Cross-Border Supply or Service), saying that “the rights and obligations arising 
from the list below shall have no self-executing effect and thus confer no rights 
directly to natural or juridical persons”.) 
939 Morin explains the coalition effect as creating strategic alliance of like-minded 
countries in multilateral settings (2009, pp. 182-184). 
940 For instance, Article 10.5 for the Rome Convention, Berne Convention, WCT 
and WPPT; Article 10.16 for the Singapore Treaty; Article 10.33 for the Patent Law 




The EU-Korea FTA does not incorporate provisions for rules that were 
mentioned as good practices by the UN Copyright Report of 2014. Instead, it 
mandates compliance with specific protective rules for copyright and related 
rights under the international treaties, including the Rome Convention, Berne 
Convention, WCT and WPPT.941 For the most part, the EU-Korea FTA imports 
the relevant EU laws and specifically regulates the term of copyright protection, 
collective management, right to communication to the public, technological 
protection measures, right management information, and limitations and 
exceptions. One of the features of the copyright clauses of the EU-Korea FTA is 
an emphasis on right of performers, phonogram producers and broadcasting 
organisations.942  
5-4.2.	Term	of	Protection	
5-4-2-1. Life plus 70 Years for Authors 
Article 10.6 of the EU-Korea FTA extends the copyright protection term to at 
least the author’s life plus 70 years.943 This Article touches upon only the 
author’s right and controls the case where the protection term is calculated on 
the basis of a natural person. 944 This restrictive scope was for two reasons.  
First, when the FTA was negotiated, the EU was discussing a possible extension 
of the protection term of rights of performers and phonogram producers. 
Therefore, the EU was not able to propose a term extension for related rights.945  
                                                      
Treaty; and Article 10.39 for UPOV. 
941 Article 10.5. 
942 The EU-Korea FTA does not have any provision for reproduction right, which is 
in contrast with the draft EU-India FTA (Article 11.4bis) and the EU-Thailand 
FTA, which incorporates Article 2 of the InfoSoc Directive. 
943 This obligation is waived for two years for Korea (Article 10.14). 
944 One exception applies for broadcasting organisations. Article 10.7 ensures the 
protection term for no less than 50 years from the first transmission of a broadcast 
either by wire or over the air, including by cable or satellite. 
945 In 2011, the EU extended the protection term to 70 years, not 95 years as in the 
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Second, the negotiators of the EU and Korea realized that they could not 
harmonise and bridge the gap between their respective domestic laws. For 
instance, under the European law,946 the protection term of authors runs for 70 
years from the creation date, in the case of works for which the term of 
protection is not calculated from the death of an author.947 By contrast, the 
Korean Copyright Act counts the protection term of works made for hire from 
the publication date.948 Further, whereas the EU law provides that the term of 
protection of cinematographic or audiovisual work expires 70 years after the 
death of the last of those who have contributed to the creation of the work,949 
the Korean law stipulates that the term of protection runs from the time when 
the work is published without listing those who are entitled to be authors950. 
5-4-2-2. Impact of the Term Extension 
A comprehensive impact assessment of the copyright term extension in terms of 
overall social welfare or human rights to science and culture would be 
premature given that only three years have passed since it was implemented. 
However, the dissemination effect of the term expiration is obvious from 
following example.  
An explosive publication of Hemingway’s works hit the bookstore shelve in the 
first half of 2012. Ernest Hemingway, an American novelist, died in 1961 and 
copyright on his works expired at the end of 2011 because the term extension of 
the amended Copyright Act did not go into force until March 15, 2013. Around 
twenty works, including ‘A Farewell to Arms’, ‘The Old Man and the Sea’, and 
‘The Sun also Rises’,951 were translated into Korean, and approximately 
                                                      
EC’s original proposal. See, Directive 2011/77/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 27 September 2011 amending Directive 2006/116/EC on the term 
of protection of copyright and certain related rights. 
946 Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights. 
947 Article 1(6) of the Directive 2006/116/EC. 
948 Article 41 of the Korean Copyright Act. 
949 Article 2(2) of the Directive 2006/116/EC. 
950 Article 42 of the Korean Copyright Act. 
951 In the US, the Hemingway’s works are still under copyright protection. For 
instance, ‘The Sun Also Rises’ is protected until 2022 because it was first published 
in 1926 with a copyright notice and was renewed within 28 years  
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400,000 copies were published in the early of 2012. This is as many as the 
number of copies published for the previous ten years. Many of the previous 
publications were “pirate” copies, having been printed without copyright 
license. The Ernest Hemingway Foundation, founded in 1965 by his widow, 
Mary Hemingway, and holding copyright on Hemingway’s works was not 
interested in publication of Korean editions. Domestic publishers tried to 
contact the Foundation to get a permission but communication itself was 
arduous. Even when they obtained a contact with the Foundation, the 
permission was simply refused or the royalty rate the Foundation requested was 
too high.952 Reportedly, a major publisher in Korea said that as Hemingway was 
one of the most famous writers worldwide and domestically, they tried, for 
fifteen years, to contact and get a permission from the Foundation to publish his 
works, but were only refused.953 
Expiration of copyright removed all these hurdles and provoked an explosion of 
publication. However, it did not provoke price competition. New publications 
were sold at the same price or higher than previously sold. Instead, it provoked 
competition in the quality of translation. Publishers employed experts and 
professors in American literature and raced each other, providing opportunities 
for readers to enjoy unique and diverse beauty in Hemingway’s works. In 
addition, they published relatively less famous works of Hemingway, which had 
been unavailable in the local language. The same phenomenon occurred in 
2013, when another term expiration arrived for authors such as Hermann Karl 
Hesse, a German-born Swiss poet, novelist and painter, and William Faulkner, 
an American writer and Nobel Prize laureate.  
The Hemingway case shows the problem of copyright barriers for those who are 
willingness to pay and the significance of real opportunities for the availability 
of cultural products, which were discussed in Section 3-4. It also suggests that 
the property based copyright may raise the transaction cost to the extent that 
actual bargaining is unattainable, and the liability rule may produce more 
                                                      
(http://librarycopyright.net/resources/genie/example.pdf). 
952 Kim, 2012a (reporting that the minimum royalty rate requested by the 
Foundation was USD 100,000 per work, which was two or three times higher than 
the typical rate of classic works for Korean publishers).  
953 Ibid. 
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efficient outcomes as discussed in Section 3-6-2. Due to the term extension for 
additional twenty years, users in Korea need to wait until 2034 to see the same 
effect as Hemingway for works of authors who died in 1963. 
5-4-3.	Right	to	Communication	to	the	Public	and	Remuneration	Right	
of	Performers	and	Phonogram	Producers	
5-4-3-1. Controversies and Compromise on Remuneration Right for Public 
Performance 
One of the controversial issues between the negotiators was a remuneration 
right of performers and phonogram producers for pubic performance. This issue 
was raised by the EU at the second round of talks (16 to 20 July 2007). 
According to the Korean government, the EU proposed to mandate both parties 
to legislate a remuneration right for performers and phonogram producers when 
a phonogram was used for performance in public places such as a pub, café, or 
restaurant.954  
To this proposal, the Korean negotiators responded that they were unfamiliar 
with the idea and asked time for internal discussions. Later, they took a stand 
against this proposal on three grounds. First, the remuneration paid to 
performers and phonogram producers would be a significant burden on the 
small-scale businesses and in the worst-case scenario, consumers visiting pubs 
or cafés could not listen to music or the cost would be shifted to the consumers. 
Second, the protection term for neighbouring rights was agreed upon to be 
extended to 70 years with KORUS and such expansive protection, equally 
applied to Europeans, was sufficient to reward performers and phonogram 
producers.955 Third, despite the EU’s law, the Member States of EU had not 
fully implemented the remuneration rights in their domestic laws.956 
At the later stage of talks, the EU withdrew its demand. However, it was not a 
concession without cost. In return, the EU was able to obtain a concession from 
                                                      
954 Press release of the Korean Minister of Culture and Tourism (31 August 2007). 
955 Nam, 2008, p. 12. 
956 Personal communication, on the condition of anonymity, with an officer of the 
Korean government on 16 November 2016, who led the copyright team for the 
negotiation of the EU-Korea FTA. 
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Korea of expansive border measures for patent, design, new plant varieties, and 
geographical indications, not only for copyright and trademark. This give-and-
take compromise is flawed because the EU proposal cannot extend to cover the 
public performance of phonograms. The findings of this case study also reveal 
the lack of expertise of the Korean negotiation team and at the same time 
exposing the EU’s strategy to obtain what they want by pushing overly broader 
interpretations of its proposal. 
5-4-3-2. Interpretation of Communication Right and its Encompassing 
Public Performance 
Among the negotiators, there was no doubt that the EU proposal was modelled 
on Article 8(2) of the Rental Directive.957 The Article 8(2) was inspired by 
Article 12 of the Rome Convention.958 In order to interpret the EU proposal, it is 
necessary to determine, first, whether the “communication to the public” under 
Article 8(2) of the Rental Directive covers a public performance, and, second, if 
the “communication to the public” under the EU proposal also covers a public 
performance. 
It is clear that the “communication to the public” of Article 8(2) of the Rental 
Directive covers the public performance. While the communication to the 
public under the Info. Soc. Directive is limited to the case where the public is 
not present at the place where the communication originates, the right to 
communication to the public granted by Article 8(2) of the Rental Directive 
covers any communication to the public, including the ones where the public is 
present at the place of the communication.959  
Regarding the second issue, the proposed text by the EU for the second round 
                                                      
957 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related 
to copyright in the field of intellectual property, which repealed Directive 
92/100/EEC. 
958 Vanheusden, 2007, p. 17 (In implementing the Rome Convention, the Rental 
Directive removed the limitation to “direct use”, and extended the remuneration 
right to be additionally payable for the indirect use of phonograms published for 
commercial purposes). 
959 Ramalho, 2016, p. 165. As the two Directives employ the same terminology, 
“communication to the public” and have different concept and scope, it is 
particularly confusing (Eechoud, 2009, p. 82).  
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of talks is considered to exclude the public performance or “on the spot” 
communication,960 as shown from the draft text below.961 
EC Draft of 6 July 2007 (prepared for the 2nd round of 16 to 20 
July 2007) 
Article 5.5 – Broadcasting and communication to the public 
1. For the purpose of this provision, the right of communication to 
the public is understood as covering all communication to the 
public not present at the place where the communication 
originates. This right covers any such transmission or 
retransmission of a work to the public by wire or wireless means, 
including broadcasting. This right does not cover any other acts. 
… 
3. The Republic of Korea and the EC shall provide a right in order 
to ensure that a single equitable remuneration is paid by the user, if 
a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a 
reproduction of such phonogram, is used for broadcasting by 
wireless means or for any communication to the public, and to 
ensure that this remuneration is shared between the relevant 
performers and phonogram producers. The Republic of Korea and 
the EC may, in the absence of agreement between the performers 
and phonogram producers, lay down the conditions as to the 
sharing of this remuneration between them. 
 
The proposed Article 5.5(3) aims at a remuneration right for performers and 
phonogram producers (“a single equitable remuneration paid by the user”). This 
right is confined to the case of the secondary use of phonogram, i.e., “if a 
phonogram … is used … for any communication to the public”. The meaning of 
communication to the public is defined in Article 5.5(1) as excluding the “on 
the spot” communication. It provides that the communication refers to “all 
communication to the public not present at the place where the communication 
originates”. In addition, the Article begins with a clarifying phrase “[F]or the 
purpose of this provision”. Therefore, it is clear that when the EU proposed the 
remuneration right, they intended to exclude the public performance. This 
structure was maintained until fifth round of talks.962 
                                                      
960 Eechoud, 2009, p. 82. 
961 Unpublished text, on file with author. 
962 The clarifying phrase and the limitation of “not present at the place where the 
communication originates”, which stems from the Recital 23 of the Info. Soc. 
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One notable change occurred after the seventh round where the EC allegedly 
withdrew its demand. The expression in the previous proposal to exclude “on 
the spot” communication was removed. Instead, the EC proposal introduced a 
new definition of the communication to the public, “transmission to the public 
by any means”, and broadcasting was isolated from the concept of 
communication to the public. Moreover, the EC split the remuneration right into 
two sub-paragraphs, as shown below.963 
EC Draft of October 2008 (between the 7th round (May 2008) and 
8th round (March 2009)) 
Article 9.5.5 – Broadcasting and communication to the public 
1. For the purpose of this provision: 
… 
b) communication to the public means the transmission to the 
public by any medium, otherwise than by broadcasting, of sounds 
of a performance or the sounds or the representations of sounds 
fixed in a phonogram; however for the purpose of Paragraph 5, 
communication to the public includes making the sounds or 
representations of sounds fixed in a phonogram audible to the 
public. 
… 
3. Each Party shall provide a right in order to ensure that a single 
equitable remuneration is paid by the user, if a phonogram 
published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction of such 
phonogram, is used for broadcasting by wireless means or for any 
communication to the public. 
4. Each Party shall establish in its legislation that the single 
equitable remuneration shall be claimed from the user by 
performers or producers of phonograms, or by both. Both Parties 
may enact legislation that, in the absence of an agreement between 
performers and phonogram producers, sets the terms according to 
which performers and producers of phonograms shall share the 
single equitable remuneration. 
 
This proposal became the final text, Article 10.9 of the EU-Korea FTA, having 
                                                      
Directive, are also found in the texts of EC proposals of 12 December 2007 
(prepared for the 6th round of 28 January to 1 February 2008). 
963 Unpublished text, on file with author. 
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the same title with the same structure of sub-paragraphs. The final proposal was 
modelled on Art. 15 of WPPT. Despite the final text deleting the limiting 
expression to exclude “on the spot” communication, it is clear that the Article 
does not include public performance of phonogram because it uses the term 
“transmission” when it defines the communication right. The term 
“transmission” is not used in the Rental Directive. It is used in the Info. Soc. 
Directive, Recital 23 of which says “[T]his right [the communication right] 
should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by 
wire or wireless means, including broadcasting”. Transmission, by definition, 
excludes any distribution of works in the form of tangible object. It also 
excludes non-copy communication carried out without wire or wireless means. 
5-4-3-3. Discussion and Analysis 
The case study conducted here reveals a flawed compromise between the EU 
and Korea. The finding also shows the importance of transparency in IPR norm 
setting. If the negotiation texts were not kept confidential to for a  small circle 
of negotiators but open to a limited extent for review by legal experts, the deal 
would have been struck in a quite different way and Korea would not have 
revised its law to extend the border measures to cover all categories of IPRs.  
Further, the debate over the remuneration right for performers and phonogram 
producers triggered an independent legislative change in Korea. Inspired by the 
EU’s proposal, the performers and phonogram producers were successful in 
lobbying the Korean National Assembly to enact the remuneration right for 
public performance in March 2009.964 This happened despite the Korean 
government’s promoting the deal with the EU as their successful negotiation for 
the benefit of consumers and small business such as café owners. 
5-4-4.	Ban	on	Retransmission	of	Television	Signal	over	the	Internet	
The EU-Korea FTA, in Article 10.9:5, grants broadcasting organisations an 
exclusive right to both control re-broadcasting and fixation of their broadcast. 
New to Korea is the right to control communication to the public of television 
                                                      
964 The Copyright Act as amended on 25 March 2009 and effective on 26 
September 2009. 
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broadcast where such communication is made in places accessible to the public 
against payment of an entrance fee. In addition, the EU-Korea FTA prohibits, in 
Article 10.7:2, any retransmission of television signal over the Internet.  
It is uncertain if this ban is a strict prohibition or subject to the limitations and 
exceptions (L&E) set forth in Article 10.11. Although the L&E provision refers 
to Articles 10.5 through 10.10, it is questionable if negotiators intended to 
permit retransmission of television signals on the Internet when the cumulative 
conditions of the three-step test are met. The L&E provision limits its scope to 
“in their legislation” and is applicable to “the rights granted to the right holders 
referred to in Articles 10.5 through 10.10”. By contrast, the ban on 
retransmission of television signal over the Internet applies to each “Party”. In 
the EU-FTA, the “Party” includes any legislative, administrative and judicial 
bodies, central or local, of Korea, the EU and its Member States. Therefore, if a 
court exempts a certain internet retransmission from copyright infringement, the 
decision may give rise to a conflict with Article 10.7 and the Party cannot resort 
to the L&E provision because it is not within an applicable scope, i.e., a 
legislative measure. Moreover, the banning provision is hardly considered as 
“the right granted” mentioned in the L&E provision of Article 10.11. 
In addition to the discord regarding the right granted and the banning provision, 
the referring Articles in the L&E provision are inaccurate. The reference to the 
L&E provision in Article 10.6 governs the protection term for natural authors. 
However, it would not be possible for the EU or Korea to enact a legislation to 
curtail the term of protection in certain special cases, e.g., where works of 
highly educational value are out of print and the potential commercial gain of 
reprint is low. Then, the L&E provision of the EU-Korea FTA can be regarded 
as a general statement of negotiators’ intention to incorporate the three-step test 
into the trade pact between the EU and Korea.965  
If the ban of retransmission of television signals on the Internet is of an absolute 
nature, excluding the application of L&E provision and even the “right clearing 
                                                      
965 Personal communication, on the condition of anonymity, on 16 November 2016 
with an official of Korean government, who lead the team for copyright negotiation 
of the EU-Korea FTA. 
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scheme”,966 it may cause serious problems to public policy objectives of 
stimulating free circulation of audiovisual media services,967 and protecting the 
human right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application.968 
5-4-5.	Artists’	Resale	Right	
For the human rights measures to protect the material interests of authors, the 
UN Copyright Report of 2014 recommends the artist’s resale right (droit de 
suite).969 This right is regarded as necessary to fix the problem of the inequality 
of legal expertise and bargaining power of individual authors vis-à-vis 
publishers and distributors. For a nuanced and balanced approach between 
supporting and constraining creators’ right by copyright law, the Report 
advocates the creators’ right to share in the proceeds from future sales of their 
works.970 
Unlike the UN Copyright Report, the negotiators of the EU-Korea FTA did not 
approach the resale right from the human rights perspective. The EU tried to 
transplant its own level of protection.971 In the course of negotiations, the 
Korean negotiators emphasized that the resale right was an alien concept in 
Korea and they would need to carry out consultations with artists and relevant 
industries and stakeholders, which would take a significant amount of time. The 
EU accepted this and an agreement was reached to revisit the matter again, not 
                                                      
966 The scheme includes a cable retransmission under Article 9.6 of the Satellite 
Broadcasting Directive 93/83/EC. 
967 This is set out in the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 2010/13/EU, which 
is technology-neutral and covers all services provided by TV, the Internet and 
mobile phone (European Commission. (2015) Questions and answers on the public 
consultation on the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMSD). Retrieved 
from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/questions-and-answers-
public-consultation-avmsd). 
968 The single exception of this ban provided in the FTA text is a retransmission 
over a closed and defined subscriber network that is not accessible from outside of 
the Party’s territory (Footnote 1 of Article 10.7:2). This exception, stemming from 
the US FTAs, intends to exempt retransmission by Internet Protocol TV (IPTV). 
969 A/HRC/28/57, ¶ 101. 
970 Ibid, ¶ 45. 
971 Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work 
of art. 
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making it obligatory in the FTA. Therefore, Article 10.10 mandates both parties 
to enter into consultation to review the desirability and feasibility of introducing 
the resale right within two years from the FTA’s entry into force. However, as 
of June 2017, they have yet to revisit the resale right and the EC’s annual 
reports on the implementation of the EU-Korea FTA have not mentioned any 
movements for discussing the resale right. 
5-5.	Patent,	Public	Health	and	Protection	of	Pharmaceutical	Products	
5-5-1.	General	Remarks	
The EU-Korea FTA contains only three provisions for patent: an obligation to 
comply with the Patent Law Treaty (Article 10.33);972 the recognition of the 
Doha Declaration (Article 10.34); and the patent term extension (Article 
10.34).973 Remaining two provisions in the Sub-Section E for Patents are 
irrelevant to patent – data exclusivity submitted for marketing approval of 
pharmaceutical products (Article 10.36) and agro-chemical products (Article 
10.37).974  
The presence of so few patent-related provisions can be explained on three 
accounts. First, the EU has no harmonised rule on patent. Patent eligibility and 
process of patent examination and grant is governed by the European Patent 
Convention (EPC), which is not a treaty administered by EU institutions. 
Further, the unitary patent, the EU regulations for which entered into force on 
20 January 2013,975 only has a pan-European effect granted by the European 
Patent Office, which again is not an official body of the EU, and is under the 
                                                      
972 The obligation to endeavour for the compliance with the Patent Law Treaty is a 
mechanism for “smooth transition” to stronger IP protections, which becomes part 
of the obligation under TRIPS due to its MFN clause (Aleman, 2014, p. 78). 
973 In the meantime, the provision for genetic resources, traditional knowledge and 
folklore (Article 10.40) mandates both Parties to encourage the equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising from the utilisation of knowledge, innovations and practices of 
indigenous and local communities. However, it does not specifically require a 
patent applicant to identify sources of biological material used in a patent 
application and described as part of an invention (Contrasting Article 164 of the 
EU-CARIFORUM FTA). 
974 In the language of the FTA text, the agro-chemical products are expressed by 
plant protection products. 
975 EPO, 2016. 
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rules and procedures of the EPC. Second, there has been few complainants from 
European business sectors regarding substantive rules or practices of patent 
scope and grant in Korea. Most of their concerns can be resolved by IPRs 
enforcement provisions. Third, even without any substantive TRIPS-plus 
provisions for patent protection, the EU can benefit from TRIPS-plus 
commitments made through KORUS.976 
5-5-2.	Public	Health	and	Doha	Declaration	
The most widely cited debate on the trade-centric IPR norms concerns the 
access to medicines, which may be impeded by strong protection of patent, 
exclusivity of pharmaceutical products and intensified enforcement measures.977 
Despite relatively weak in the TRIPS-plus protection of pharmaceuticals than 
KORUS, the EU-Korea FTA is questionable to sufficiently resolve the public 
health concerns. Article 10.34 of the EU-Korea FTA recognises the importance 
of the Doha Declaration and requires both Parties to contribute to the 
implementation of the subsequent paragraph-six solution. 
Some scholars rate highly the reference of the Doha Declaration in the TRIPS-
plus FTAs. For instance, Acconci et al. explain:978 
It is beyond any doubt that references to the Doha principles have a 
stronger impact on the interpretation of TRIPS flexibilities than mere 
reference to TRIPS, in that they suggest that fundamental public needs 
must be given due weight when balanced against the investor’s IPRs. … 
TRIPS/Doha can be considered as relevant as a ‘subsequent agreements 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provision’ in the sense of Art. 31.3(a) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, therefore, ‘shall be taken into 
account, together with the context’ in the process of interpreting the 
TRIPS Agreement. This can represent a turning point also in WTO/TRIPs 
case-law, which is sometimes elusive as regards public concerns. 
 
However, interpreting the Doha Declaration reference clause in accordance with 
the principles of treaty interpretation, i.e., the standard of ordinary meaning of 
the terms, the EU-Korea FTA is insufficient to resolve the numerous public 
                                                      
976 For details of the KORUS commitments, see Section 4-5. 
977 Yu, 2014, p. 118. 
978 Acconci, Valenti & De Luca. 2014, pp. 205-206. 
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health concerns. For example, in accord with the reference clause, can Korea 
and the EU, as declared in Paragraph 4 of the Doha Declaration, interpret and 
implement the TRIPS-plus provisions of the EU-Korea FTA in a manner 
supportive of their own rights to protect public health and promote access to 
medicines for all? Or is Korea, as recommended by Argentina and Brazil for the 
establishment of a development agenda for WIPO,979 allowed to operate the 
EU-Korea FTA in a manner that does not run counter to the public health 
objectives under the international human rights instruments? At least three 
explanations block that possibility. 
First, in TRIPS-plus FTAs, there are four different models of reference to the 
Doha Declaration. Each model differs in terms of the extent to which it ensures 
the TRIPS flexibilities and national discretion and sovereignty.980 Among these, 
the EU-Korea adopts the weakest model, simply recognising the importance of 
Doha Declaration, and there are no specific further workable provisions. 
Second, a simple reference clause would help interpreting, in favour of public 
health, other provisions when they are ambiguous. But, in the EU-Korea FTA, 
most of the substantive rules on the protection and enforcement of IPRs are 
clearly defined. 
Third and more importantly, the Doha Declaration clause in the EU-Korea FTA 
restricts its application to only the Sub-Section E of the agreement, regarding 
Patents.981 This condition is an excessive restriction when compared to other EU 
FTAs. In the case of the EU-Vietnam FTA, the reliance upon the Doha 
                                                      
979 Helfer & Austin, 2011, p. 125. 
980 Ruse-Khan, 2011, pp. 353-357 (The first weakest model is of a general nature 
(using the terms “recognise the principles”, “affirm their commitment to” or 
“recognise the importance of:”). The second one ensures  with a legally binding 
language the consistency of Doha Declaration. A more promising third model 
incorporates such terms as “a Party may take measures to protect public health in 
accordance with the Doha Declaration”. The last model employs the actual 
languages of the Doha Declaration languages or contains further assuring phrase 
that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as to impair the capacity of the 
Parties to promote access to medicines”. 
981 The second paragraph of Article 10.34:1 saying “In interpreting and 
implementing the rights and obligations under this Sub-section, the Parties are 
entitled to rely upon the Doha Declaration”. 
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Declaration applies to the entire IPR chapter.982 This holds true with the EU-
Colombia-Peru FTA and the EU-Central America FTA as well.983 In addition, 
the Korea-Canada FTA also assures the application of the Doha Declaration to 
the entire IPR chapter.984 Moreover, the more promising sentence to guarantee 
the national capacity to promote access to medicines and protect public health is 
omitted in the EU-Korea FTA.985 
5-5-3.	Patent	Term	Extension	to	Compensate	Delay	in	Drug	Approval	
Process	
The EU-Korea FTA obligates a patent term extension to compensate the delay 
in the marketing approval process of pharmaceutical product and plant 
protection products.986 The pharmaceutical product refers to any substance or 
combination of substances which may be administered to human beings with 
the object of making a medical diagnosis, treating or preventing disease, or 
restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions or structures.987 
Unlike KORUS, the EU-Korea FTA makes clear that the pharmaceutical 
product includes biologics such as vaccines, gene therapy and cell therapy 
products988 The maximum duration of extension is limited to five years and 
further extension is possible for paediatric use.989 
Although the term extension is not limited to “new” pharmaceutical products, 
                                                      
982 Article 8.2:1. 
983 Article 197.2 of the EU-Colombia-Peru FTA and Article 229:2(a) of the EU-
Central America FTA. 
984 Article 16.5. 
985 Such a sentence is found in Article 13.2 of the draft EU-India FTA of April 2010 
(negotiation of FTA between the two was commenced in June 2007 and is still 
ongoing as of December 2016) - “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as 
to impair the capacity of the Parties to promote access to medicines and protect 
public health”. Later the EC confirmed that any future investment provisions be 
fully consistent with this clear commitment and nothing in FTA should “prevent 
India from using compulsory licensing including for the manufacture and export of 
medicines to other developing countries in need” (EC, 2011a). 
986 Article 10.35:1 and 2. 
987 Article 6 of Annex 2-D and footnote 15 of Article 10.35(1). 
988 The second paragraph of Article 6 of Annex-2D. 
989 Footnote 17 of Article 10.35:1. 
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until recently the Korea Patent Office only allowed the term extension for new 
drugs. The term extension was introduced by the Patent Act Amendment in 
1986 due to a bilateral trade deal with the US. From 1999 to 2007, the extension 
was granted for both new and generic drugs, but from 2012 all of the 
applications for generic drugs have been rejected by the Patent Office. This 
practice, however, is to be reversed due to a recent ruling of the Patent Court.990 
The purpose of the patent term extension is to “compensate the patent owner for 
the reduction of effective patent life” resulting from a delay in “the first 
authorisation to place the product on their respective markets”.991 However, as 
discussed in previous Section 4-5-3, the patent term extension is theoretically 
flawed given the exclusive nature of patent right. Behind the patent term 
extension lies the fact that patent life starts too early. The winner-take-all game 
of patent system triggers an excessive patent race, urging an early start of patent 
life. The more the winner gets, the higher the patent race will be, which is the 
case in pharmaceuticals. 
5-5-4.	Data	Exclusivity	
5-5-4-1. Negotiating Process and Arrangement 
The UN High Level Panel considers data exclusivity as one of the notable 
TRIPS-plus provisions that significantly affects the public health and patients’ 
right to access to medicines.992 Nonetheless, data exclusivity is the one area that 
shows a large degree of convergence in all TRIPS-plus FTAs.993 The most 
aggressive demandeurs for higher protection of test data than in present in 
TRIPS is the US. By contrast, the EU was not such demandeurs during its first 
                                                      
990 2015Hu1256 (January 29, 2016) (holding that the patent term extension is not 
confined to new pharmaceutical products). 
991 Article 1035:2. 
992 Secretary-General, U.N., 2016, p. 25. Drexl observes that test data exclusivity 
will certainly make drugs more expensive and create budgetary constraint for the 
social security systems in developed countries, and in developing countries where 
health care system is poor, it can even exclude patients from access to drugs (2016, 
p. 75). MSF (2015) maintains that data exclusivity is a means of impeding generic 
competition, and maintaining artificially high prices, thereby restricting access to 
medicines. 
993 Watal, 2014, p. 50. 
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generation FTAs such as those with Chile, South Africa, and CARIFORUM, 
but this stance was changed in the second generation FTAs including those with 
Peru-Colombia and Korea.994 
In the course of negotiations with Korea, the EU requested 10-years for the 
period of data exclusivity during which no subsequent marketing approval 
would be granted without an explicit consent of the marketing approval holder 
of the original product. Further, the EU demanded a possible extension of the 
period up to 11 years when the original holder obtained, during the first 6 years, 
an authorisation for one or more new therapeutic indications for the same 
product. These demands were largely patterned on the EU’s Directive.995 
Against this demand, Korea tried to level down the protection of test data to the 
level set forth in Article 39(3) of TRIPS. The data protection under TRIPS is 
distinguished from the data exclusivity and provides the general protection 
affordable to undisclosed information or trade secrets.996 Alternatively, Korea 
proposed protecting test data within the scope of its domestic law. The 
disagreement between the two lasted until the final round of talks.997 
The final text, in large part, reflects the EU position, but having exclusivity of a 
shorter term (at least 5 years) and removing possible extension period of up 
to11 years. Article 10.36 of the EU-Korea FTA mandates legislative measure to 
ensure confidentiality, non-disclosure of and non-reliance998 on the test data and 
                                                      
994 Roffe, 2014, p. 24; Drexl, 2016, pp. 65-66. 
995 Directive 2004/27/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 
March 2004 amending Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community code relating to 
medicinal products for human use. 
996 Valdés & McCann, 2014, p. 26; Flynn, Baker, Kaminski & Koo, 2013, pp. 167-
168; and Shugurov, 2015, p. 54. For the negotiation history of TRIPS and 
explanation why TRIPS does not support a reading to the effect that Article 39(3) 
requires data exclusivity, see Fellmeth, 2004, pp. 454-460; Correa, 2002, pp. 72-84. 
997 Official story is different. The Korean government announced that the EU 
withdrew its demand for 10-years data exclusivity at the 6th round. However, the 
actual draft reveals that they did not reach an agreement on the protection term. The 
actual draft refers to the unpublished (on file with author) draft text of the EU-
Korea FTA reflecting each party’s position as of September 2008 (consider that the 
final 8th round of working level talk was held on 23 to 24 March 2009, and the 7th 
round of talk took place on 12 to 15 May 2008.). 
998 While the meaning of “confidentiality and non-disclosure” is straightforward, 
the concept of non-reliance is less obvious. The EU and the US aims, with the term 
of non-reliance, to prohibit any forms of reliance (direct, indirect, active and 
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preventing drug authorities from granting subsequent marketing approval of 
generic products for at least five years.999 Unlike KORUS, the EU-Korea FTA 
does not contain such an ambiguous term as the “similar product”,1000 and 
implicitly requires “considerable efforts” and “undisclosed” test data by 
defining “data” with reference to Article 39 of TRIPS.1001 Contrasting the “new 
chemical entities” of TRIPS, the FTA provides data exclusivity for new 
pharmaceutical product that may be produced with known chemical entities. 
5-5-4-2. Difference between FTA and National Practices 
Historically, in the EU, data exclusivity was introduced in 1986 to afford sui 
generis protection for originator pharmaceutical companies in some Member 
States that did not confer patents to pharmaceuticals, such as Spain and 
Portugal.1002 However, data exclusivity has provided an additional and separate 
legal protection for originator companies as well. 
Impact assessment of the data exclusivity protection is hard mainly because 
both Parties operate data exclusivity systems quite differently from what the 
FTA requires. 
The European model is called the “(8+2)+1” formula.1003 During an 8-year 
period, called the “data exclusivity” period in a limited sense, an application for 
generic product (including hybrid and biosimilar products) cannot refer to the 
                                                      
passive reliance) by drug authorities, including reliance upon originators’ test data 
in bio-equivalence test (comparing reference product with generics in terms of 
chemical and toxic levels) (Pugatch, 2004, p. 7). 
999 Article 10.36. For agrochemical products, the period of exclusivity is at least ten 
years. 
1000 By contrast, the EU-Singapore FTA prevents subsequent marketing approval of 
the same or a “similar product” (Article 11.33). 
1001 However, in practice, the “considerable efforts” in originating the test data are 
not explicitly required in the EU and Korea. 
1002 Junod, 2004, pp. 502-503. In the EU, the data exclusivity was introduced in 
1986 through the Directive 87/21/EEC, which amended Directive 65/65/EEC. 
1003 This formula, introduced by the revised Directive (2004/27/EC), is applied to a 
pharmaceutical product that has been authorised of marketing through EU’s 
centralized procedure for which the initial submission was made before 20 
November 2005 (European Medicines Agency, 2016a, p. 21), and the mutual 
recognition procedure, which is mandatory for marketing in several Member States 
(EC, 2004, p. 14 (Vol. 2A, Ch. 1)). 
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test data of reference product, meaning that the submission of the application 
itself is not accepted by drug authorities such as the European Medicines 
Agency.1004 The following 2-year period forms a total 10-year marketing 
exclusivity period along with the preceding 8-year, and during the 2-year 
period, submission of generics authorisation is permitted but generics cannot be 
placed on the market. An additional non-cumulative 1-year period is granted 
where an application is made for a new indication for a well-established 
substance provided that significant pre-clinical or clinical studies were carried 
out in relation to the new indication.1005 
When the reference medicinal product is nationally authorised, a 6-year period 
may apply depending on the Member States.1006 Those countries may choose 
what Cook called the “not-beyond patent expiry” option.1007 That is, they can 
cap the data exclusivity period at the instance that the patent protects the 
reference medicinal product expires.1008 
Korea also runs its own system, called “post-marketing surveillance” (PMS). 
Drug authorities, specifically, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety (MFDS) 
may designate newly approved pharmaceutical product as subject to re-
examination.1009 The purpose of PMS is to explore newly appeared adaptation 
symptoms and collect additional data of actual medical dose after marketing 
approval. The PMS re-examination is carried out within 3 months when the 6-
                                                      
1004 The reference product refers to a medicinal product which has been granted a 
marketing authorisation by a Member State or by the Commission on the basis of a 
complete dossier, i.e., with the submission of qualify, pre-clinical and clinical data 
in accordance with Articles 8(3), 10a, 10b or 10c of Directive 2001/83/EC and 
(European Medicines Agency, 2016, p. 8). 
1005 Article 10(5) of the Directive 2001/83/EC); European Medicines Agency, 2016, 
p. 22. 
1006 European Medicines Agency, 2016a, p. 15. The EFTA countries also apply six-
year period. 
1007 Cook, 2000, p. 43. 
1008 Junod, 2004, p. 504. If a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) extends the 
patent life, then the cap sets in when the SPC expires. Three countries, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal have opted for this solution. 
1009 Article 25 of the MFDS’ Regulation Regarding the Licensing, Report and 
Examination of Drug Products. 
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year (for new drug)1010 or 4-year (for new indication)1011 period expires from the 
initial approval date. During the 6-year or 4-year period, generics have to 
submit data equivalent to or exceeding the original data unless use of the data is 
consented by the originator or they apply for an approval after expiration of the 
PMS period.1012 The 4-year period is cumulative because it is applicable 
whenever MFDS designate drugs having new indication as PMS drugs. Nor is 
the “not-beyond patent expiry” option available. 
The 6-year formula used in Korea originates from the bilateral deal with the EU 
in 1980s and early 1990s. When the US brought Korea to heel at the bilateral 
IPR talks in 1986 (see, Section 1-1), the EU approached Korea, demanding the 
same level of protection by threatening suspension of Korea’s GSP 
privilege.1013 In the end, Korea accepted what the EU requested, including the 6-
year data protection by the PMS system.1014 
5-5-4-3. Impact Assessment 
For the impact assessment of data exclusivity, both the potential benefit and 
cost must be assessed. 
Originator pharmaceutical companies support data exclusivity for necessary 
incentive for innovation.1015 Some commentators predict that data exclusivity 
may soon surpass patents as the primary driver of innovation in the 
                                                      
1010 The new drug refers to new pharmaceutical products, prescription drug with 
different active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) type or composition, prescription 
drugs having the same ingredient but different administration form from the 
approved drug. 
1011 PMS for new indication include prescription drugs with the same API and 
administration form but having a clearly different effect or efficacy, and other drugs 
as designated by MFDS. 
1012 IFPMA, 2011, p. 76. 
1013 Drahos, 2002, p. 178. 
1014 Article 2.2.c of the Korea-EC Record of Understanding (April 1993) provides 
that “during the 6 years following the initial approval of marketing a new 
pharmaceutical product in Korea, any application for approval by a second or 
subsequent person to manufacture and/or market the same product which seeks to 
rely on test data supplied by the original applicant, shall only be accepted if 
accompanied by a full set of phase I, II and III clinical test data which have been 
originated by the subsequent applicant himself” (Kang, 2007, p. 9). 
1015 IFPMA, 2000, p. 1. 
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pharmaceutical industry.1016 Junod rejects this line of argument as 
pharmaceutical companies have no choice but to submit test data if they want to 
sell their drugs.1017 Fellmeth observes that the incentive claim is empirically 
unproven and the “first-mover advantage” for registering a drug would 
outweigh the cost of obtaining marketing approval.1018 The US FTC does not 
recognise the incentive claim for longer exclusivity period (12- to 14-year for 
biologics) because “it does not spur the creation” of a new drug.1019 In countries 
with little capacity to develop innovative new drugs and having a small 
domestic market, like Korea, data exclusivity would provide a little incentive 
for innovation within their territories. 
The cost of data exclusivity may include its potential adverse impact on drug 
price, generic competition and its market entry, the availability of TRIPS 
flexibilities such as compulsory licenses,1020 and therefore the accessibility of 
medicine.1021 Due to lack of reliable raw data, evaluating the cost of Korea in a 
comprehensive, empirical and quantitative way is not achievable. For instance, 
as shown in tables below, the relationship between the number of new drug 
approval and the number of PMS drugs is unclear. One of the key parameters in 
estimating the delay of generic entry and its possible impact on the drug price, 
i.e., the generic penetration rate is not currently available as well.1022  
                                                      
1016 Morgan, 2010; Thomas, 2015, p. 42. 
1017 Juno, 2004, p, 485. 
1018 Fellmeth, 2004, pp. 469-470. Instead of data exclusivity, Fellmeth suggests an 
alternative cost sharing model that generics compensate the first registrant of the 
drug through a re-adjustable royalty system (2004, pp. 482-499). 
1019 US FTC, 2009, p. 44. 
1020 Concerning the compulsory license and the negotiation of the EU-India FTA, 
the EU indicated that data exclusivity would not hamper the effective use of a 
compulsory license because of the Doha Declaration reference clause and 
confirmed that in the case of conflict between data exclusivity rules and compulsory 
licensing, the latter would override the former (European Commission (2010) EU-
India FTA negotiation and access to medicines: Questions and Answers. at ¶ 4.). 
This assertion is less likely applicable in actual dispute involving the EU-Korea 
FTA from the objectives embodied in Article 10.1 that emphasises 
commercialisation of IPR product and adequate and effective protection and 
enforcement of IPR, and from the weakest referencing model to the Doha 
Declaration as discussed supra Section 5-2-2. 
1021 Forman & MacNaughton, 2016, p. 55. 
1022 The generic penetration rate refers to the degree of replacement of the 
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When the Korean government published its 105-pages long report on possible 
impacts of KORUS in 2011, they estimated that KRW 133.8 billion1023 would 
be the cost of data exclusivity for the first 10 years from the entry into force of 
KORUS (<Table 5-1>). Further, it was estimated that 443 persons would lose 
their jobs due to data exclusivity for the same 10 years. However, the 
methodologies they used for this estimation were not disclosed and are still kept 
confidential. Moreover, the impact of data exclusivity was only conducted in 
cases where data exclusivity was extended to protect “disclosed” test data. For 
this limited impact assessment, it was assumed that 9.6% of generics would rely 
on disclosed data.1024 The figure, 9.6%, is of low credibility as it was obtained 
from a questionnaire survey, conducted in July 2006, involving participants 
from 24 pharmaceutical companies having patent-related divisions.1025 Further, 
the survey response rate is still unknown.1026 
<Table 5-1> Estimated Impact of KORUS on Pharmaceutical Industries 
(Source: Government of Republic of Korea. (2011, August 5). Re-evaluation 









                                                      
originators’ products with generics, which varies depending on pharmaceutical 
product, market size, relevant industries and public policies such as subsidy and 
drug reimbursement policy. 
1023 The KRW 133.8 billion is the sum of 726 (Production Loss), 484 (Income 
Loss), and 128 (Consumer Welfare) of the Table. 
1024 The 9.6% is a product of 12% (“incrementally modified drugs” occupying 12% 
of total generic drugs) and 80% (assumption made from responses replying that 
disclosed data would be used in 80% of the “incrementally modified drugs”) 
(Government of Republic of Korea (5 August 2011) Re-evaluation of economic 
impact of the Korea-US FTA, p. 97). The “incrementally modified drug” refers to a 
medicine that has ingredients and efficacy similar to those of an original new drug 
but its property or formulation is changed to improve convenience in use (Kang, 
2016). 
1025 Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare (2007) Press Release (press explanation 
material, 13 April 2007). 
1026 For questionnaire on the patent linkage, of 24 persons only 14 persons replied. 
Their estimations on possible increase of patent dispute due to the introduction of 
patent linkage system varied too much from 30% to 3,000 %. Nonetheless, the 
Korean government simply presumed that the increase would be 50%, and 
concluded her impact assessment. 
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Production 
(Sale) Loss [1] 
Linkage 274 to 592 604 to 1,308 4,390 to 9,500 
Data 
Exclusivity 
64 81 726 
Income Loss 
[1] 
Linkage 182 to 394 402 to 871 2,924 to 6,327 
Data 
Exclusivity 
43 54 484 
Job Loss [2] Linkage 167 to 361 368 to 798 2,678 to 5,795 
Data 
Exclusivity 
39 49 443 
Consumer 
Welfare* [1] 




-11 -14 -128 
* Impact on Consumer Welfare includes increase of governmental expenditure in 
reimbursing drug cost under the National Health Insurance System and out-of-pocket 
burden of patients resulting from delay of generic entry into the market. 
[1]: KRW 0.1 billion 
[2]: Person 
 
Thus, the empirical evidence is still insufficient. Yet, from the empirical data on 
“sensitivity of drugs to data exclusivity protection”,1027 it can be drawn a 
conclusion that the data exclusivity has a substantial exclusionary impact on 
generics. Nam et al. reported that among new drugs of which patents were 
expired, data exclusivity under the PMS system has lived longer than patent for 
26 products (new drugs) and 81 products (new indication).1028 Similar empirical 
studies have been reported in the US.1029 Further, as shown in <Table 5-2> 
below, there are more products protected under PMS than approved new drugs. 
This seems to be due to the cumulative 4-year PMS for new diagnostic 
indications. Then, the trend of more PMS protection than new drugs will 
                                                      
1027 Pugatch, 2004, p. 21. 
1028 Nam, Lee, Kim, & Oh, 2007, p. 489. 
1029 According to Junod, among 137 drugs approved by the US FDA between 1998 
and February 2004, 23 drugs were protected by data exclusivity for a period past 
the expiry of the last patent, and 22 drugs (among those 23 drugs) had no patent 
listed in the Orange Book (2004, p. 487). 
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continue. 
<Table 5-2> New Drugs and Products under PMS 
Source: Government of Republic of Korea, Ministry of Food and Drug 
Safety (2016) 2016 Food & Drug Statistical Yearbook (Vol. 18), pp. 332, 337, 
442. 










2004 52 59 9 68 
2005 48 42 12 54 
2006 60 32 23 55 
2007 65 69 33 102 
2008 39 68 20 88 
2009 21 75 36 91 
2010 48 56 16 82 
2011 28 63 17 80 
2012 17 63 13 76 
2013 23 72 10 82 
2014 49 95 22 117 
2015 38 151 11 162 
Total 488 845 222 1057 
 
5-5-5.	Patent-Approval	Linkage	
Patent linkage does not form a part of the EU-Korea FTA: It is contained in 
KORUS.1030 Despite its absence in the EU-Korea FTA, it is worth examining 
the progress of negotiation as it shows that the negotiators did not discuss the 
patent linkage in a way to mitigate its adverse effect. Rather, they approached in 
a way to provide full advantages to European patent holders or originating 
                                                      
1030 For details of the KORUS linkage model, see Section 4-6-2. 
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pharmaceutical industries. This finding also confirms that the EU has been a 
“quiet free rider” on previous US aggression regarding IP.1031 
Until later stages of talks, the EU and Korean negotiators agreed to ensure 
protection of patentees by the KORUS linkage clause in the form of a side 
letter, which states:1032 
“Where the Republic of Korea permits, as a condition for approving the 
marketing of a pharmaceutical product, persons, other than the person 
originally submitted safety or efficacy information, to rely on that 
information or on evidence of safety or efficacy information of a product 
that was previously approved, such as an evidence of prior marketing 
approval in its territory or in another territory, the Republic of Korea 
shall: 
(a) provide that the patent owner shall be notified of the identity of any 
such other person that requests marketing approval to enter the market 
during the term of a patent notified to the approving authority as 
covering that product or its approved method of use; and 
(b) implement measures in its marketing approval process to prevent such other 
persons from marketing a product without the consent or acquiescence of the 
patent owner during the term of a patent notified to the approving authority as 
covering that product or its approved method of use”.The European Union law 
prohibits linkage.1033 Article 10(1) of Directive 2001/83/EC and Article 3 (3) (b) 
of Regulation 726/2004 disallows drug approval authority to link the granting 
of marketing authorisation to the status of a patent. When Member States tried 
to introduce a back door for patent linkage, the EC took action. For instance, on 
14 March 2011, the EC commenced formal infringement proceeding against 
Italy for Italian legislative change would constitute a case of patent linkage.1034 
                                                      
1031 Drahos, 2002, p. 178. 
1032 Article 9.9.5 (Patent Linkage) of the draft text of the EU-Korea FTA reflecting 
each party’s position as of September 2008. 
1033 European Commission, 2009 – Inquiry, p. 315 (“Under EU law, linking the 
granting of marketing authorisation for a product to the patent status of an 
originator company's reference product is unlawful”). 
1034 Marchesoni, 2011. 
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Further, in 2012, the EC issued, against Italy, a formal request to remove the 
linkage between patents and generic medicines authorisation.1035 Noticing the 
possible inclusion of patent linkage in the trade pact with Korea, the European 
generic industries demanded the DG Trade to develop the pact according to the 
legal framework already established in the relevant Directives and Regulations 
of the EU.1036 The main concerns in this industry were that the European 
generic companies willing to produce and market medicines in Korea would be 
seriously hindered by the combination of European style data exclusivity and 
US style patent linkage.1037 
What the EC did was to simply remove the proposed side letter, expecting the 
MFN privilege of TRIPS. If the EU aims to implant the EU laws into the EU-
Korea FTA, there should have been discussions on waiving the MFN clause. Or 
the EU could have proposed schemes to promote generic competition or to 
encourage patent challenge of generics against a linked patent. 
5-6.	Enforcement	of	IPRs	
5-6-1.	TRIPS-plus	and	“Cut-and-Paste”	of	EU	Laws	
The structure of enforcement provisions in the EU-Korea FTA is similar to 
other EU FTAs,1038 excepting provisions for presumption of authorship and 
ownership (applicable only to civil enforcement unlike KORUS), criminal 
enforcement, and online enforcement. 
In terms of enforcement of IPRs, the EU FTAs can be divided into three 
categories: first-generation FTAs; second-generation FTAs; and post-ACTA 
FTAs. The first-generation FTAs refer to those in which the EU tried to simply 
                                                      
1035 IPWatch (2012, January 31). 
1036 European Generic Medicines Association (EGA) letter to DG Trade, dated 19 
January 2009. 
1037 EGA letter to DG Trade, dated 12 March 2009. 
1038 It begins by laying out the general prerequisites of enforcement: fairness, 
effectiveness and proportionality, followed by a definition of persons entitled to 
sue, provisions on the collection and preservation of evidence, a right of 
information for IPR holders, provisional and precautionary measures, corrective 
and injunctive measures, damages, legal costs, publicity measures regarding judicial 
decisions and border measures (Jaeger, 2014, pp. 191-192). 
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reaffirm TRIPS obligation and not to request WTO-plus provisions. Examples 
of these are FTAs with South Africa, Mexico and Chile.1039 By contrast, the 
second-generation FTAs contain a complete description of IPRs, enforcement 
measures, lists of protected geographical indications, border measures and, in 
some cases, internet provisions and protection of biological resources.1040 The 
enforcement provision of the EU-Korea FTA is a “cut-and-paste” of the EU 
Enforcement Directive.1041 
5-6-2.	Civil	Enforcement	and	Injunction	against	Intermediaries	
The civil enforcement provision of the EU-Korea FTA contains what the EU 
proposed for ACTA: injunction against intermediaries whose services are used 
by IPR infringers, excepting patent.1042 This is modelled on EU laws,1043 and 
defines the intermediary so broad as to encompass those who deliver or 
distribute infringing goods and online service providers. The injunction against 
intermediaries is allowed regardless of their secondary liability.1044 
This is in potential-conflict with the Manila Principles on Intermediary 
Liability, adopted in March 2015 by wide range of human rights advocates. 
These principles aim to encourage policy development of liability regimes that 
can promote innovation while respecting online freedom of expression and 
users’ rights in line with international human rights instruments.1045 The parent 
provisions of the EU-Korea FTA have been used in various cases to compel 
                                                      
1039 European Union, 2013-ACTA, p. 12. 
1040 Ibid, pp. 12-13. The turning point to the second-generation FTAs was the 
Strategy for the enforcement of IPR in third countries, approved by the European 
Commission in May 2005 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/december/tradoc_147070.pdf). 
1041 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights. 
1042 Articles 10.46:1 and 10.10.48:2. 
1043 Article 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Directive. 
1044 EU study on the legal analysis of a single market for the information society: 
New rules for a new age? – 6. Liability of online intermediaries. November 2009, p. 
21. 
1045 https://www.manilaprinciples.org/ and The Manila Principles on Intermediary 
Liability Background Paper (ver. 1.0 of 30 March 2015). 
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online intermediaries to block access to Internet sites and forwarding agents 
who have no general duty of care to examine handled goods.1046 This broader 
application may also cause a clash with Korean practices under the civil law 
tradition. 
Injunctive remedy varies depending on legal traditions: contributory, vicarious 
or inducement liability under US tort theory; authorization, joint-tortfeasance 
and various liability under the Common Wealth Countries; and duty of care or 
the Störerhaftung doctrine under the civil law tradition. Under which conditions 
and to which extent a non-infringing entity is liable are matters of general civil 
doctrine. Creating an exception which is only applied to a civil dispute 
involving IPRs is unfamiliar.  
The injunctive remedy rule of the EU-Korea FTA puts the principle and the 
exception into reverse by making injunctive relief against non-infringing 
intermediaries to be a principle, not an exception. The Korean IP laws allow 
injunctions against “those who are infringing or likely to infringe protected 
rights”.1047 Here, the person who is likely to infringe protected rights does not 
include the non-infringing intermediaries, in principle. As a general rule, the 
Civil Act does provide a room for the civil liability of a third party. Article 
760(3) stipulates that “instigator or accessories shall be deemed to act jointly”. 
However, the remedies against the instigator or accessories are limited to 
compensation under Article 750 providing that “any person who causes losses 
to or inflicts injuries on another person by unlawful act, wilfully or negligently, 
shall be bound to make compensation for damages arising therefrom”. 
Accordingly, the mere fact that the services are used by a third party to infringe 
IPRs is not enough to order the intermediaries who provide such services to 
take actions avoiding or preventing third party’s infringement.  
Yet, this does not mean that the injunctive relief against intermediaries is 
entirely denied under the Korean legal system. In exceptional cases, the courts 
will award an injunctive relief against a service provider. For instance, an  
injunctive relief is granted where the full recovery of injuries (such as monetary 
                                                      
1046 BGH Case Xa ZR 2/08 – MP3-player import, September 17, 2009. 
1047 Article 126 of the Patent Act, Article 65 of the Trademark Act, Article 123 of 
the Copyright Act, and Article 10 of the Unfair Competition Prevention Act. 
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compensation or recover of impaired reputation) is impossible after a right 
(personal rights in this case) is infringed and where it is difficult to expect full 
compensation of damages.1048 In connection with IPR infringement cases, the 
Korean Court held, in the Soribada case1049 that a peer-to-peer service provider 
specifically designed for MP3 music file sharing is liable for copyright 
infringement. But the court enumerates several conditions that must be met to 
find that the P2P service provider (Soribada) is liable when the intermediary: 
• Knew or should have known users’ infringement; 
• Could control illegal file sharing; 
• Planned to make profit from the service; 
• Did nothing but displayed a notice; and 
• Aided the users’ copyright infringement. 
5-6-3.	Criminal	Enforcement	and	EU-Plus	Models	
5-6-3-1. Obligations under the EU-Korea FTA 
Unlike other FTAs to which the EU is a party, the EU-Korea FTA contains 
substantive rules on criminal enforcement of IPRs. In Sub-Section B of the IPR 
chapter of the pact, there are eight Articles mandating legislative and judicial 
actions that the EU and Korea must take for the criminal enforcement against 
counterfeiting and piracy. Although the obligation is weaker than KORUS, and 
both the lower standard of “financial gain” and alien rules against counterfeit 
labels or unauthorized camcording of KORUS1050 are omitted in the EU-Korea 
FTA, it still goes beyond the TRIPS obligation. 
Criminal enforcement provisions in the EU-Korea FTA are so extensive to 
cover liability of legal person, aiding and abetting, seizure, penalties, and 
confiscation that must be applied to trademark counterfeiting and copyright 
piracy conducted “on a commercial scale”.1051 It is still unknown why the 
                                                      
1048 Supreme Court, 93Da40614, 40621, April 21, 1996. 
1049 Seoul Higher Court, 2003Na21140, January 12, 2005. 
1050 For details, see Section 4-7-4. As explained in this Section, rules against 
counterfeit labels was proposed by the EU during the negotiation of the EU-Korea 
FTA but it was removed from the FTA text by the opposition of Korea. 
1051 Article 10.54 of the EU-Korea FTA. With regard to counterfeiting geographical 
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European Parliament approved the pact in February 2011, despite their refusal 
to adopt the EC’s proposal of a Directive on criminal enforcement of IPRs for 
several years in the mid-2000s,1052 and their rejection of ACTA on 4 July 2012. 
To some scholars, such an approval of the EU-Korea FTA containing the 
mandatory criminal sanctions on aiding and abetting is extraordinary and 
surprising.1053 The negotiation history of the EU-Korea FTA and comparative 
studies on other EU FTAs and ACTA indicate that it was a strategic action of 
the EC and trade officials of the EU Member States. 
5-6-3-2. Negotiation for the Inclusion of Criminal Sanction 
Until the final round of negotiations of the EU-Korea FTA (the 8th round of 
March 23 to 24, 2009), the EU did not propose any specific provisions for the 
criminal enforcement of IPRs. The reserved provision for criminal sanctions 
was Article 9.241054 and this Article was bracketed with the phrase: “to be 
specified”. Thus, it was excluded from the official discussion for around two 
years fromMay 2007 when the negotiations of the EU-Korea FTA commenced. 
While the negotiations were undertaken, the Korean negotiators repeatedly 
asked the EU counterparts to make specific proposals on Article 9.24 for 
criminal sanctions.1055 However, the EU negotiators simply replied that it was 
difficult to do so because the proposed Directive on criminal enforcement of 
IPRs was not adopted by the European Council. Around one month later after 
the working-level discussions were officially over on March 24, 2009, the EU 
negotiators delivered their proposal on the IPR criminal enforcement via an 
                                                      
indications and designs, the criminal enforcement rules are not mandatory. 
However, both Parties have to “consider adopting measures to establish the criminal 
liability” “subject to its national or constitutional law and regulations” (Article 
10.55 of the EU-Korea FTA). 
1052 Summers, 2014, p135. 
1053 Drexl, 2014, p.274; Geiger, 2016, p. 654. 
1054 During the negotiation of the EU-Korea FTA, IPRs was discussed under 
Chapter Nine, which became Chapter Ten in the final text. 
1055 This also shows that the Koran negotiators was passive in rules on criminal 
enforcement of IPRs in the pact. As Korea signed in June 2007 the KORUS pact 
which contained extensive provisions for criminal sanctions against trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy soon after the 1st round of the EU-Korea FTA 
was ended in May 2007, they could have proposed their own provisions modeled 
on KORUS or Korean domestic laws. 
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email message dated April 20, 2009.1056 As the Korean government wanted to 
sign the pact as soon as possible, they were reluctant to discuss the EU 
proposal, and counter-proposed to put off the discussion on the criminal 
enforcement in three years from the entry into force of the FTA. This counter 
proposal was sent to the EU on May 7, 2009, presumably by an email. 
However, the chairing state of the EU (the Czech Republic) sent, on 26 May 
2009, a letter containing the EU Member States’ assertion that the criminal 
enforcement rules should be included in the final text of the EU-Korea FTA. 
The chief negotiators of the EU and Korea had a telephone conversation on 
June 5, 2009 and agreed to have teleconferences to discuss the pending EU 
proposals. After three months, in September 20009, they reached an agreement. 
The EU proposal contained ten Articles from 10.24:1 to 10 rather than eight 
Articles of the final text (Articles 10.54 to 10.61). The response to the EU 
proposals by the Korean negotiators was generally not to accept any proposals 
that would entail domestic legislative changes. They regarded the IPR criminal 
enforcement rules as something that might be internationally harmonised 
through the then-discussed ACTA. The Korean negotiators were successful in 
rejecting two EU proposals on: (1) criminal sanctions against use and 
importation of counterfeit trademark labels;1057 and (2) further review of the 
criminal enforcement rules in three years after the entry into force of the 
FTA.1058 One debated proposal was the criminal enforcement on counterfeiting 
geographical indications and design in proposed Article 10.24:2, which was 
recommendatory in nature. The Korean negotiators maintained that the 
proposed criminal procedures on counterfeiting geographical indications would 
not be capable of harmonised under the Korean legal system and suggested to 
delete the proposal because it was not mandatory. However, this proposal 
                                                      
1056 Kim, 2009, p. 164. 
1057 Korean opposition was based on the logic that the counterfeit label was a sort of 
secondary infringement of trademark right and under the Korean legal system, it 
was uncertain that the secondary infringement was necessarily subject to criminal 
sanction. Further, the “importation” written in the EU proposal was not listed as 
infringing activity under the Korean Trademark Act. 
1058 Against the further review of the proposal, Korean negotiators suggested 
discussions at the joint working group which was to be constructed according to the 
FTA and deleted the proposed Article 10.24:10. 
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survived to be Article 10.55 of the final text. The remaining proposals were 
accepted by Korean negotiators as they were regarded as already reflected in 
KORUS and Korean domestic laws. 
5-6-3-3. Struggles of the EC for Harmonised Rules on IPR Criminal 
Enforcement 
Since the 1990s, the EC has long struggled to legislate a community level 
regime for effective enforcement of IPRs. In its Green Paper of October 
1998,1059 the EC considered counterfeiting and piracy a serious threat to the 
proper functioning of the Single Market, and presented ambitious action 
plans1060 including a proposed Directive, which in 2004 became the Directive 
2004/48/EC.1061 The early draft of Directive 2004/48/EC contained provisions 
for criminal sanctions applied to all IPRs, not only counterfeiting and piracy.1062 
However, the European Parliament removed such provisions and excluded 
patents from the scope of the Directive 2004/48EC. Gibson explains the reason 
for the rejection of proposals for criminal sanctions was entirely pragmatic as it 
was uncertain whether the EC, handling economic and social policies, was 
permissible to propose them.1063 However, the Environment Framework 
Decision of ECJ1064 in 2005, opened the door for the EC to propose a Directive 
aiming at a separate Directive for criminal enforcement of IPRs.1065 This 
                                                      
1059 Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy in the Single Market COM(98) 0569 
final. 
1060 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament 
and the Economic and Social Committee – Follow-up to the Green Paper on 
combating counterfeiting and piracy in the single market, COM(2000) 0789 final. 
1061 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 
April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ L195/16. 
Seville, 2016, p. 505. For more, see Mylly, 2011, pp. 213-244.  
1062 Gibson, 2011, p. 4. Two Articles for criminal enforcement in the original 
proposals were: Article 4 providing that IPR infringement be punishable by 
penalties which were effective, proportionate and deterrent; and Article 20 treating 
all serious IPR infringement as a criminal offence. 
1063 Gibson, 2011, p. 5. 
1064 Commission v. Council and Parliament, C-176-03 [2005] 3 CMLR 20. 
1065 Proposals for a European Parliament and Council Directive on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
Brussels, 12 July 2005, COM (2005) 276 final. 
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proposal and its revised version1066 were initially welcomed by the European 
Parliament,1067 but failed to be adopted due to controversy surrounding the 
criminal law competence of the EC.1068 
Until and even after its proposal of criminal enforcement was finally withdrawn 
in 2010,1069 the EC did not stop far reaching and comprehensive attempts to 
seek harmonised enforcement rules. In 2008,1070 the EC began to consider an 
integrated strategy across the spectrum of IPRs,1071 and in 2009, it set up the 
European Observatory on Counterfeit and Piracy.1072 However, rules for 
harmonised criminal sanctions was not specifically pursued within the EU.1073 It 
was “not because of uncertainty about whether criminal law measures were 
necessary, but because it planned to achieve the same result by promoting the 
ratification of ACTA”.1074 However, ACTA was not the only vehicle for the EC 
to achieve its goal. Bilateral trade agreements, especially the second-generation 
FTAs were another attractive channel for the EC and the like-minded trade 
                                                      
1066 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, Brussels, 26 April 2006, COM (2006) 168 final. 
1067 European Parliament legislative resolution of 25 April 2007 on the amended 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on criminal 
measures aimed at ensuring the enforcement of intellectual property rights (COM 
(2006) 0168 – C6-0233/2005 0 2005/0127 (COD)), P6_TA (2007) 0145. 
1068 Summers, Schwarzenegger, Ege & Young, 2014, p. 135. The competence of EC 
to propose a Directive to criminalise IPR infringement was officially denied by both 
Chambers of the Dutch Parliament (Staten-General) on June 29, 2006 (Intellectual 
Property Rights Enforcement Directive. Retrieved from Open Rights Group Wiki: 
https://wiki.openrightsgroup.org/wiki/Intellectual_Property_Rights_Enforcement_
Directive). 
1069 Withdrawal of obsolete Commission Proposals, OJ C 252, 18 September 2010. 
1070 Green Paper, An industrial Property Rights Strategy for Europe, COM(2008) 
0465 final (16 July 2008). 
1071 Seville, 2016, p. 506. 
1072 Geiger, 2014, p. 314. 
1073 For instance, in the communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament for enhancing the enforcement of IPRs in the internal 
market of November 9, 2009, the EC simply mentioned that the Directive for 
criminal enforcement was under discussion in the Council, while emphasizing a 
legal framework to address a dramatic and damaging effect of counterfeiting and 
piracy on business, innovation, economic growth, job creation, and health and 
safety of European citizen (COM(2009) 0467 final). 
1074 Summers, Schwarzenegger, Ege & Young, 2014, pp. 135-136. 
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officials in the European member states to bypass the EU’s internal law-making 
process and seek the pan-European rules for the IPR criminal enforcement. 
5-6-3-4. Discussion and Analysis 
The EU-Korea FTA is a unique example among the second-generation FTAs, 
given that it contains, in the final text, far-reaching, extensive and mandatory 
rules for criminal sanctions. There are two FTAs that the EU was involved in 
discussions regarding around the same time as the EU-Korea FTA: India; and 
ASEAN.1075 The official negotiation of the EU-India FTA was launched in 
2007, but there were no proposals for criminal sanctions.1076 Also launched in 
2007, the talks on the EU-ASEAN FTA, which was paused in 2009, to give 
way to FTAs with bilateral pacts with ASEAN members countries, including 
Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Myanmar, did not seek far 
reaching criminal enforcement rules. In its leaked 2008 draft text regarding IPR, 
the EU-ASEAN FTA contained a provision for criminal sanctions, which was 
reserved by the EU as a future right to propose.1077 
Other second-generation FTAs were the EU-Colombia/Peru/Ecuador FTA and 
the EU-Central America FTA. Although the DG for External Policies of the EC 
categorized them as having criminal measures,1078 actual texts either do not 
contain criminal measures at all or contain much less extensive provisions. The 
                                                      
1075 As confirmed in the “Global Europe (October 2006)”, the negotiations of EU 
for bilateral trade agreements with India and ASEAN were launched as a result of 
EC’s trade policy initiatives to generate new opportunities for growth of EU by 
going beyond the level of liberalization achieved through WTO and DDA 
(European Commission, DG for Trade (2007) Invitation to tender related to one or 
several contracts to provide 4 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessments (Trade 
SIAs). Brussels: author at p. 7). 
1076 Leaked texts of July 2010 (available at 
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/ip_euindia_july2010.pdf ) and of 2013 
(available at  http://www.bilaterals.org/?eu-india-fta-ip-chapter-draft-text&lang=en) 
do not contain any provision for criminal enforcement of IPRS. Also refer to DG 
Trade, EC (2010) EU-India FTA negotiations and access to medicines: Questions 
and answers, retrieved from 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/may/tradoc_146191.pdf. 
1077 Article 26, which was blanketed, says “Article 26 Criminal Sanctions [The EU 
reserves the right to propose specific language ensuring that all intentional 
infringements of intellectual property rights, with the exclusion of patents, are 
sanctioned.  Those sanctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.]”. 
1078 European Union, 2013, p. 15. 
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EU-Colombia/Peru/Ecuador FTAs, which was signed with Colombia and Peru 
in June 2012 and joined by Ecuador on 11 November 2016 has no rule on 
criminal sanction. The EU-Central America FTA, signed on 29 June 2012, has 
only one article for criminal sanctions, which does not impose obligations on 
legal persons, aiding and abetting, seizure of documentary evidence and any 
assets, confiscation of infringing goods, materials, implements and assets.1079 
The first post-ACTA FTA was the EU-Canada FTA (CETA).1080 A leaked 
version of CETA circulated in February 2012 revealed that it contained 
provisions similar to ACTA’s. The treaty was, therefore, heavily criticized, 
especially for its chapter on criminal enforcement and internet infringements. 
After the European Parliament rejected ACTA in July, the Commission 
announced that it had requested the EU Presidency to withdraw the criminal 
enforcement provisions.1081 From then on, no post-ACTA EU FTAs have a 
provision for criminal enforcement.1082 
                                                      
1079 Article 271 saying “The Parties shall provide for criminal procedures and 
penalties to be applied at least in cases of wilful trademark counterfeiting or 
copyright piracy on a commercial scale. Remedies available shall include 
imprisonment and/or monetary fines sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently 
with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a corresponding gravity. In 
appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, forfeiture and 
destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. The Parties 
may provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of 
infringement of intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed 
wilfully and on a commercial scale”. The IP Chapter is included in Part IV (Trade), 
Title VI (Intellectual property) of the pact. Meanwhile, the EU proposal of 2008 
contained rules on “attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting”, confiscation, and 
legal persons. 
1080 European Union, 2013, p. 18. 
1081 The final EU-Canada FTA text has no provisions on criminal enforcement (at 
Chapter 20) excepting one criminal provision against camcording. 
1082 See for instance the EU-East African Countries FTA (Interim Economic 
Partnership Agreement), negotiation of which ended on 16 October 2016, having no 
IPR chapter at all (instead both Parties agreed to undertake to conclude the 
negotiation on IPRs and other issues such as services, competition policy and 
investment (Part I General Provision, Article 3 (Rendez-vous Clause); the EU-
Singapore FTA, initialed on 17 October 2014; the EU-Vietnam FTA, negotiation of 
which was concluded on 1 February 2016, having no provisions on criminal 
enforcement; the EU-Iraq FTA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed on 
11 May 2012) (Chapter III and Annex 2), having in Chapter III only one article 
(Article 60) related to IP, without referring to IPR enforcement rule; the EU-West 
Africa FTA (Economic Partnership Agreement, provisionally applied from 3 
267 / 335 
 
The criminal enforcement of EU-plus nature is problematic in itself. The FTA 
may be used by the EC in the future to drive again its failed agenda for 
harmonised criminal rules of IPR. The EU-Korea FTA may also be used by the 
Korean IP industries and their European allies for the same purposes. The 
observations above show the positive effect of leaked information, and in turn 
necessity of transparency and public participation in IP-norm setting as 
discussed in Section 3-5. When the draft of the EU-Canada FTA was leaked, it 
increased transparency and contributed public scrutiny, resulting in withdrawal 
of criminal enforcement provisions. By revealing the intention of negotiators as 
it is, the leaked text changes the power structure between the government and 
the public by removing asymmetry of information. Openness and information 
transparency serve a more democratic and human rights friendly norm setting. 
To ensure the transparency in trade talks, further studies and more information 
gathering are warranted regarding: the process in which the presidency country 
of the Council of the EU sent an email to the Korean negotiators demanding the 
inclusion of criminal enforcement rules at the final stage of talk; whether the 
decision of the Council was made independently from the EC; and why did the 
Member States draft an opinion letter in unanimously supporting such an idea. 
5-6-4.	Online	Enforcement:	Intermediary	Liability	and	Prohibition	of	
General	Obligation	to	Monitor	
5-6-4-1. Legal Framework on Intermediary Liability under the EU-Korea 
FTA 
                                                      
September 2016), having no IP chapter (instead containing Rendez-vous clause 
Article 106(2)(2)); the EU-Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
FTA (Economic Partnership Agreement, provisionally applied by signing on 10 
October 2016, with no substantive rule on the protection or enforcement of IP 
(general statement on enforcement is exclusively directed to geographical 
indications (Article 8); the EU-Thailand FTA, negotiation of which was launched in 
March 2013, having no further progress since 20 September 2013 when they 
concluded the second round of negotiation, and its leaked text of September 2013 
showing no provision for criminal enforcement (http://www.bilaterals.org/?eu-
thailand-fta-ip-chapter-draft&lang=en); and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) under negotiation and its EU Position Paper on IP dated 20 
March 2015 having no mentioning on criminal enforcement. 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153331.7%20IPR%20EU%
20position%20paper%2020%20March%202015.pdf). 
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Articles 10.62 to 10.66 of the EU-Korea FTA govern the liability of online 
service providers.1083 They are verbatim copies of Articles 12 to 15 of the EU’s 
e-Commerce Directive, 1084 and provide a legal framework of safe harbor or 
exemption from liability for intermediary service providers. The European 
proposal to include its own legal framework for intermediary liability in the 
bilateral trade pact was, without substantial discussion, accepted by the Korean 
negotiators because they viewed the proposed European model had nothing in 
conflict with the US model,1085 which was previously incorporated into 
KORUS.1086 
The two differences between the EU-Korea FTA and the e-Commerce Directive 
are the purpose and scope of application. While the objective or purpose of the 
e-Commerce Directive is “to create a legal framework to ensure the free 
movement of information society service”,1087 the FTA has an additional 
purpose of enforcing IPRs in the digital environment (Article 10.62). Whereas 
the liability exemption rule of the e-Commerce Directive applies to any illegal 
online content, including, IPR infringing material, child pornography, racist and 
xenophobic content, defamation, and illegal pharmaceutical offers,1088 the rule 
of the EU-Korea FTA is only applied to IPR infringing contents. This 
                                                      
1083 In the FTA text, the term “online service provider” is used in exchangeable with 
terms “information society service” and “intermediary service provider”, only the 
latter two terms being used in the e-Commerce Directive. Under the European law, 
the online service provider is defined so broadly as to cover wider domain of e-
commerce transaction in goods and services, including those services provided at a 
distance, electronically and at the request of a recipient of services against 
remuneration (European Commission, 2011 Staff Working Paper, p. 4). However, 
to benefit from the liability exemption, the providers should be “in no way involved 
with the information transmitted”, which is required to all service providers under 
the EU-Korea FTA (Article 10.62), while the e-Commerce Directive requires only 
for ‘mere conduit’ and ‘caching’ service providers (Recital 43). 
1084 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce). 
1085 17 USC §512. 
1086 Article 18.10:30. 
1087 Recital 8 of the e-Commerce Directive. 
1088 However, the e-Commerce Directive is not applied to those activities to be 
regulated for the proper functioning of the European internal market including 
taxation and matters related to the Data Protection Directive and gambling activities 
(Article 1(5) and Recital 12). 
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difference is due to the ISP liability rule is codified in Chapter Ten of the EU-
Korea FTA, which covers only IPRs. There has also been no evidence showing 
that both negotiators agreed to expand the liability exemption rule to trade in 
service or electronic commerce, which is dealt with in Chapter Seven of the 
FTA. 
Modelled on the e-Commerce Directive, the EU-Korea FTA sets forth material 
conditions for the safe harbor or liability exemption. The types of conditions are 
individually applied to online service providers depending on the activities they 
engage in: ‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ and ‘hosting’. Unlike the US model, the 
European model does not have an explicit safe harbour provision for service 
providers of location tools such as search engine services and hyperlinking 
services.1089 One of the challenges that Korea faced was how to combine the 
two different models and implement them with a single domestic legislation.1090 
The way Korea chose was simple: just disregarding the exemption rules 
mandated by the EU-Korea FTA. Korea codified in verbatim the safe harbour 
conditions contained in the KORUS text, despite the fact that the bill to amend 
the Korean Copyright Act explicitly indicated that its purpose was to implement 
the obligations of the EU-Korea FTA. 
5-6-4-2. Prohibition of General Monitoring Obligation 
One positive aspect of the trade-centric pact between the EU and Korea is the 
prevention of imposing a general monitoring obligation upon online service 
                                                      
1089 In the EU, the liability exemption of the location tools is a matter of national 
law. Some Member States such as Austria, Hungary, Spain, and Portugal have 
adopted specific rules for search engines and hyperlinking services (European 
Commission, 2011 Staff Working Paper, p. 26.). 
1090 The challenge stems from the difference between the safe harbour conditions 
between the two models. For instance, the financial benefit prong of the US model 
(17 USC §512(c)) is not required in the European model. The financial benefit 
standard is a legislative reaction to incorporate the principle of vicarious liability 
developed by the US courts, in particular Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association 
of Fire Equipment Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (H. R. Rep. No. 
105-551 WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation and On-line copyright 
infringement liability limitation, May 22, 1998 Part 2, at p. 54). Further, a policy 
for termination of the accounts of repeat infringers (17 USC §512(i)) and a 
requirement not to initiate the chain of transmission of copyrighted materials 
(Article 18.10:30(b)(ii)) are not conditions for the liability exemption under the 
European model. 
270 / 335 
 
providers. Both parties are banned from forcing service providers to monitor 
information that they transmit or store, or to actively seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. This is a strict prohibition as the 
language “shall not” is used instead of “may not”. 
There is neither definition nor explanation in the FTA for the meaning of 
‘general monitoring’ and ‘active seeking’. Due to the fact that the texts are a 
“copy-and-paste” replica of the e-Commerce Directive, it is reasonable to 
assume that Korean negotiators entirely agreed to interpret them under the 
meaning of the e-Commerce Directive. After the EU-Korea FTA was 
provisionally applied in July 2011, the European Court and national courts of 
Germany and France have successively interpreted their meanings in numerous 
cases. 
In the Scarlet case,1091 the European Courts held that an injunction imposed by 
the Belgian Court upon the intermediary (Scarlet, formerly Tiscali) to install a 
filtering system to prevent P2P filing sharing was requiring the intermediary to 
carry out general monitoring, which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of the e-
Commerce Directive. The Court viewed that a filtering obligation to identify 
and block electronic communications of Scarlet users, which may infringe 
copyright of musical works collectively managed by SABAM, is general in 
nature because: it applies to all of the electronic communications made through 
the network of the intermediary; there is no limitation in time; and it is directed 
at all future infringements (¶ 47). Further, the Court went on to rule that the 
general filtering obligation would result in a serious infringement of the 
freedom of the intermediary to conduct its business (¶ 48). 
This reasoning is sustained literally the same at the subsequent, similar, Netlog 
case.1092 The only difference is the type of online intermediary: a hosting service 
provider in the Netlog decision (a social networking platform, similar to 
Facebook), while a ‘mere conduit’ service provider in the Scarlet case. 
One of the central questions of the prohibition of general monitoring is whether 
ISPs are, once they were notified or had a knowledge of the existence of 
                                                      
1091 Scarlet v SABAM, C-70/10 (European Court of Justice 2011). 
1092 SABAM v Netlog, C-360/10 (European Court of Justice 2012) 
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infringing materials on their platform, obliged to take measures to prevent 
further infringement of copyright. This, called a ‘staydown’ measure as opposed 
to the ‘takedown’ measure under the US model,1093 was specifically dealt with 
by French and German Supreme Courts in July 2012. 
On 12 July 2012, the French Supreme Court, in three resembled cases involving 
Google France,1094 reversed the Paris Higher Court decisions, holding that an 
ISP had no duty to take staydown measures to prevent uploading of the same 
infringing materials by its users.1095 This ruling is highly regarded as following 
the ECJ’s principles established in the Scarlet and Netlog decisions, and putting 
an end to lower courts practices that have imposed staydown obligations. To the 
French highest court, such staydown obligations force Google to seek out illicit 
uploads, as well as implement a blocking mechanism with no limitation in time, 
which cannot be carried out without conducting the prohibited general 
monitoring.1096 
On the very same day, the German Supreme Court (BGH) applied the no 
staydown principles of the ECJ in a different way. In Rapidshare (Alone in the 
Dark) case,1097 the BGH ruled that an ISP, aware of copyright infringing 
material from the notice of right holders, could be liable when it ignored a duty 
to act reasonably to prevent harm to others. However, the BGH limited the duty 
of care to the case where such a preventive measure was reasonable both 
                                                      
1093 Carroll, 2016, p. 190. 
1094 La société Bac films vs. La société Google France and Inc (1 & 2) (Arrêt n° 
828 du 12 July 2012 (11-13.666) (This case involves a documentary film “Les 
Dissimulateurs” and hyperlinks provided by Google France to which users could 
watch the whole film in a streamed way. Upon request of the copyright holder, the 
Google France deleted the hyperlinks and later another hyperlinks for the same film 
were found); La société Bac films vs. La société Google France (Arrêt n° 831 du 12 
juillet 2012 (11-13.669) (involving another documentary film “L’affaire 
Clearstream”); and Aufeminin.com v. Google France (Arrêt n° 827 du 12 July 2012 
(11-15165; 11-15188) (involving photographic works of a singer and actor taken at 
the Marrakech Film Festival in 2001). 
1095 In another case involving a hosting service provider (DailyMotion), the French 
Supreme Court also found that the ISP only had an obligation of takedown action 
upon notice (Christian C., Nord Ouest Production v. DailyMotion, Arrêt n° 165 du 
17 février 2011 (09-67.896), cited in Ficsor, 2012, p. 39). 
1096 Angelopoulos, 2016, p. 126. 
1097 BGH, Rapidshare I, 12 July 2012, I ZR 18/11. 
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technologically and economically. According to the Court in this case, the 
reasonable measure may include: monitoring a reasonably “small number” of 
third parties’ sites providing link collections1098 that enable users’ access to 
RapidShare’s contents that may infringe computer game software “Alone in the 
Dark” of copyright holder ‘Altari’.1099 
5-6-4-3. Breach of Korea of the No General Monitoring Obligation 
The obligation of no general monitoring under the EU-Korea FTA has not been 
respected by Korea. This breach has lasted for five years, since the provisional 
application of the FTA in 2011. Nonetheless, their European counterpart has 
never called the non-compliance into question. 
In 2006, the Korean Copyright Act was revised to introduce special regulations 
against certain types of online intermediaries. By definition, the special types of 
online intermediaries are those who aim principally to enable interactive 
transmission of copyrighted works between users (Article 104). The main 
targets of the regulation are online file storage (also called “filelockers” or 
“webhard services”) and P2P service providers. The statutory obligation 
imposed upon them is filtering measures to prevent uploading and downloading 
of copyright infringing materials upon request of right holders.  
The request is different from the notice of the notice-and-takedown system in a 
sense that the copyright holder can make such a request without informing 
online intermediaries of the locations of infringing materials (e.g., URLs). 
Information on the locations are mandatory in the notice of the notice-and-
takedown model. Therefore, the filtering measures include ex ante preventions 
and the obligation is tantamount to a request-and-staydown obligation. Should 
                                                      
1098 The service of RapidShare is distinguished from conventional hosting services 
in that RapidShare does not provide a search function by which users can locate 
materials uploaded by other users. Instead, there exist third parties’ sites providing 
hyperlink collections for the uploaded materials. 
1099 Angelopoulos, 2016, p. 157. In the next year, the BGH imposed stricter 
preventive measures, after relying on different factual findings that the business of 
RapidShare significantly facilitates copyright infringement (BGH, Rapidshare III, 
15 August 2013, I ZR 80/12). Subsequently, the German lower courts, following 
the BGH rulings of RapidShare, imposed ISPs (including YouTube) an automated 
filtering obligation, which is “clearly in no way compatible with underlying EU 
law” (Angelopoulos, 2016, pp. 158-159). 
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the special intermediaries be found to have incompletely fulfilled the filtering 
obligation, they are subject to an administrative fine up to KRW thirty million. 
In total, fines of KRW 2.5 billion have been imposed on around six hundred 
intermediaries (see <Table 5-3> below).1100   
<Table 5-3> Filtering Obligation of Special Intermediaries and 
Administrative Fines (Amount: KRW Million) 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Number of 
OSPs 
80 88 56 76 0 0 0 0 0 598 
Amounts 
of Fines 
674 725 250 862 0 0 0 0 0 251 
 
Starting in 2012, the special intermediaries have faced a continuously stricter 
regulatory regime. To do business, they must register with the government.1101 
For the registration, the special intermediaries must take abundant technical 
measures including filtering software. They cannot select which filtering 
software is to be used. It must be verified by the Korea Copyright Commission 
(KCC), a governmental body, that the filtering solutions effectively block 
unauthorized file sharing. The criteria of verification are strict: the filtering 
measure must have a success ratio over 97% for audio contents and a success 
ratio over 95% for video contents,1102 and has to pass the KCC’s field test. 
Further, the special intermediaries need to apply the filtering measure 24 hours 
a day, monitoring all traffic to and from every user. In addition, at least two 
employees have to monitor copyright infringing or other unlawful information 
24 hours a day. Moreover, the special intermediaries are required to submit to 
                                                      
1100 The fines were first charged in 2008 when the revised regulation went into force 
and stopped in 2012 because of the introduction of a so-called webhard registration 
system as explained below. 
1101 Under the Korean law, the Telecommunication Business Act, the online 
intermediaries (other than key telecommunication service providers such as Internet 
connection service providers) can do their business without prior registration.  
1102 These criteria are applied to filtering solution using a fingerprint technology. 
For various schemes and vendors for content recognition technologies worldwide, 
see Annex 12A of the European Commission (2016) Commission Staff Working 
Document: Impact assessment on the modernisation of EU copyright rules (Part 
3/3). SWD(2016) 301 final. 
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the government documents explaining how they compensate the infringed 
copyright holders with its implementation plan. Furthermore, the special 
intermediaries have to keep the log records showing all incoming and outgoing 
traffic of every user for more than two years. The records include uploaders’ 
identification information, list of shared contents, and date and payment of 
every transaction.1103   
The filtering obligation of the special intermediaries is in a direct conflict with 
the EU-Korea FTA obligations in light of ECJ’s principles developed in the 
Scarlet and Netlog decisions. The filtering measure under the Korean Copyright 
Act is a prohibited, general monitoring because it requires “active observation 
of files stored by users with the hosting service provider and would involve 
almost all of the information thus stored and all of the service users of that 
provider”1104 Also, it obliges the special types of intermediaries “to actively 
monitor almost all the data relating to all of its service users in order to prevent 
any future infringement” of IPRs and “to carry out general monitoring, 
something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31”.1105 
Despite this argument, the Korean government and copyright industries have 
denied that there is a conflict on two grounds, and firmly opposed the copyright 
reform bill of 2013 that tries to codify the no general monitoring obligation and 
eliminate the filtering obligation.1106  
The first ground of their denial and opposition is the “no-duty-to-monitor”1107 
obligation under the US model. The “no-duty-to-monitor” concept is provided 
                                                      
1103 In April 2015, the mandatory filtering measure was extended to cover 
pornographic contents (not limited to child porn). Such measures also have to be 
taken for 24 hours and log records thereof have to be kept for at least two years. To 
ensure the implementation of filtering measures, the government officials have the 
power to investigate the special OSPs. 
1104 ¶ 37 of the Netlog decision and ¶ 39 of the Scarlet decision. 
1105 ¶ 38 of the Netlog decision; and ¶ 40 of the Scarlet decision. 
1106 The bill (No. 1903349, introduced on 17 January 2013) also proposed to 
modernize the Copyright Act by reflecting the balance taking clauses in other 
FTAs, which is available at 
http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/jsp/BillDetail.jsp?bill_id=PRC_R1H3I0E1O1F7M1
C8D1B2Q0S7M8U0H8. 
1107 Carroll, 2016, p. 190. 
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in the Korean Copyright Act and based on KORUS. This prevents conditioning 
an ISP’s eligibility of safe harbour on its monitoring their services or requiring 
it to affirmatively seek out facts indicating infringing activity, except to the 
extent consistent with the standard technical measures.1108 Yet, the no-duty-to-
monitor rule is fundamentally different from the “no general monitoring” 
obligation. The general monitoring is strictly prohibited regardless of the fact 
that intermediaries are liable or not for their user’s copyright infringing 
activities. Put differently, under the European model, courts cannot order even 
the liable intermediaries to monitor or actively seek infringing activities insofar 
as it is general in nature. By contrast, the US model does not entirely ban the 
general monitoring – it only prohibits attaching monitoring to eligibility - for 
the benefit of safe harbour and does not distinguish between the general or 
specific nature of the monitoring.1109  
The second ground relied upon by the Korean government and copyright 
industries stems from the misunderstanding of the concept of the “no general 
monitoring” obligation. They interpreted the meaning of “general” narrowly, as 
merely requiring online intermediaries to take filtering measures without 
request of right holders.1110 Under the Korean Copyright Act, the filtering 
obligation is triggered only when the copyright holders request the special 
intermediaries to do so, and, therefore, according to them, the obligation is 
specific, not general in nature.1111 This interpretation is groundless in light of 
                                                      
1108 Section 512(m) of the US Copyright Act and Article 18.10:30(b)(vii) of 
KORUS. 
1109 Concerning the “notice-to-staydown” measures, the legislative history indicates 
that intermediaries may be ordered to take such measures (H.R. Rep. No. 105-551 
(Part I) p. 26: “Once one becomes aware of such infringement [] one may have an 
obligation to check further”). In practice, however, the intermediaries have not been 
required to block copyright infringing material from being re-uploaded to their 
service after the material has been taken down in response to a copyright owner’s 
notice (Carroll, 2016, p. 190). 
1110 This narrow interpretation is also accepted by some lawmakers following the 
Korean Constitutional Court’s holding that the filtering obligation imposed on the 
special type of online intermediaries is a limited one. The Court did not mention a 
general obligation as opposed to the limited obligation. The Court reasoned that the 
filtering obligation is conditional on the prior request from copyright holders, and 
found it proportional and constitutional (99HunBa 13, 52 & 110, 24 February 
2011). 
1111 The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taewon Lee, a counsellor of the 
Embassy and Mission of the Republic of Korea in Brussels) officially replied to a 
276 / 335 
 
the Scarlet and Netlog decisions of the ECJ and the Google France decision of 
the French Supreme Court. 
5-6-4-4. Discussion and Analysis 
The case study on intermediary liability and the ban on general monitoring 
obligation shows that those who designed and are implementing the EU-Korea 
FTA are indifferent to the balance between IPR protection and other 
fundamental rights. As the Scarlet and Netlog decisions of ECJ show, the 
enforcement of IPRs should be carried out in a balanced way, considering other 
rights, including the freedom to conduct business, the right to protection of 
personal data and the freedom to receive or impart information.1112 The strict 
prohibition of general monitoring of online intermediaries is the central element 
for the balance striking work. Korea’s intentional ignorance of the key 
balancing element for more than five years has never attracted attention from 
IPR-specific periodic conversations  between the EU and Korea (IPR Dialogue) 
or from the EC’s annual reports to the European Parliament on the 
implementation of the FTA.  
A counterfactual analysis also supports this observation. What if the breach of 
Korea occurs with the protection of “Bordeaux” or “Münchener Beer”, 
registered GIs on Annex 10-A of the FTA, or with the criminal enforcement 
against piracy or counterfeiting? Then, the DG Trade of EC would take, without 
waiting for complaints from private stakeholders, actions against Korea. When 
the violation of the FTA has not been resolved in a short period time, the EC 
                                                      
member of European Parliament (Amelia Andersdotter) that “First of all, our 
government made a revision to the Copyright Act in order to provide for no general 
obligation to monitor in 2011. Article 102 paragraph 3 reads clearly that with regard 
to liability of online service providers, OSPs do not have liability to monitor 
possible infringements within their services and to investigate infringement 
actively. This provision is in accordance with the Article 10.66 of the Korea-EU 
FTA. Secondly, article 104 of the Copyright Act targets special types of online 
service providers not online internet service providers in general. This article 
concerns some OSPs which offer downloading or file sharing such P2P, webhard, 
etc” (An email message from Taewon Lee to Amelia, 03 October 2012). 
1112 For a critical analysis that ECJ recognized the freedom to conduct a business as 
the primary counterweight to IPRs, and the users’ privacy and freedom of 
expression as secondary, see Milly 2015, pp. 114-116 (“It is regrettable that the 
CJEU left unclear whether data protection and freedom of expression could 
independently have tilted the balance against the injunction”.). 
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would launch the dispute settlement procedures pursuant to Chapter Fourteen of 
the FTA, seeking a trade retaliation. The balance with the freedom to conduct 
business of online intermediaries, let alone with the protection of personal data 
and the freedom to receive or impart information of users has an insufficient 
gravity to attract the EC’s attention. This has been the case even when the 
European internet service providers made public the possible breach of the FTA 
by Korea.1113 
The compatibility of the filtering measure with the prohibition of general 
monitoring obligation has been sparked by the EC’s copyright reform proposal 
published in September 2016.1114 The filtering obligation proposed by EC is 
broader than the current Korean one given that the filtering or an “effective 
content recognition” technology must be taken by any hosting service providers 
“that store and provide to the public access to large amounts of works or other 
subject-matter uploaded by their users”.1115 The EC’s proposal does not require 
a prior request of the right holder for the filtering measure. Instead, it compels 
online intermediaries to conclude agreements with right holders on the 
availability of copyrighted works on their services. 
From the Korean experiences, the filtering measures by intermediaries cannot 
be taken without general monitoring. In order to filter out unwanted content, the 
intermediaries must monitor all content. Further, the effectiveness of filtering 
measures in reducing online copyright infringement and bridging the “value 
gap” between intermediaries and copyright holders has not been established by 
reliable, empirical data. Rather, the filtering obligation has created a balloon 
effect: squeezing the special types of intermediaries (P2P and webhard service 
providers) with tight controls triggered bigger piracy on the other side (torrent 
                                                      
1113 EuroISP, 2015: “The South Korean regulatory outlook is of particular interest 
to European ISPs, especially given the concern among the ICT community that 
recent amendments to the Korea Copyright Act may conflict with the Korea-EU 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Indeed, the obligation for Online Service Providers 
operating in South Korean to filter content under what is effectively a Notice and 
Staydown mechanism is contradictory to the FTA, especially in the context the 
recent EU Court of Justice rulings that prohibit the kind of general monitoring that 
a filtering obligation requires”. 
1114 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
copyright in the Digital Single Market. COM(2016) 593 final. 
1115 Article 13 of the proposed Directive. 
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sites) as shown in <Table 5-4> below.1116 
<Table 5-4> Unauthorised Materials in Intermediaries 
Year P2P Webhard Torrent Portal 
Vol.* Var.** Vol. Var. Vol. Var. Vol. Var. 
2010 442,362 -48.4% 860,379 +48.4% - - 304,884 -11.5% 
2011 245,067 -44.6% 731,532 -15.0% 525,724 - 293,981 -3.6% 
2012 209,359 -14.6% 664,758 -9.1% 745,067 +41.7% 222,704 -24/2% 
2013 183,646 -12.3% 759,241 +14.2% 874,351 +17.4% 289,316 +29.9% 
2014 215,039 +17.1% 333,942 -56.0% 772,592 -11.6% 313,235 +8.3% 
2015 196,418 -8.66% 295,423 -11.5% 598,822 -22.5% 301,233 -3.83% 
* Volume: Number of pirate materials found online by the Copyright Protection 
Center (in thousand) 
** Variation: change from previous year. 
The volume data was obtained from the Annual Reports on Copyright Protection 
(from 2011 to 2016) published by the CPC, a branch body of the Korea Federation of 
Copyright Organizations, which became a governmental body in 2016. 
 
The mandatory filtering also fuels shift in bargaining power in favour of 
copyright holders. With the filtering solution, the copyright holders can request 
preventive measures prior to infringement and may control contents to be 
shared on the service of online intermediaries. This forces intermediaries to 
accept anti-competitive terms requested by copyright holders. For instance, the 
special types of intermediaries in Korea have entered into contracts with major 
broadcasting organizations under which the copyright owners are rewarded 
77% of fees paid by download users, and users are only allowed to download 
television broadcast through wire Internet and desktop PCs, excluding mobile 
platform, streaming service and other over-the-top services. 
5-7.	Conclusion	
A close examination of the negotiation history of the EU-Korea FTA conducted 
here reveals that the traditional practice of the EU’s free riding on US 
                                                      
1116 To cope with this balloon effect, the Office of Copyright Police, a branch of the 
Korean Minister of Culture, conducted intensive crackdown on torrent sites in 2013 
and 2015, prosecuted twelve individuals who operated torrent sites and 41 
individuals who uploaded torrent seed files.  
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aggression on IP in trade agreements holds true. At the same time, how the path 
dependency, i.e., the set of decisions previously made by Korea in deals with 
the US, reinforces the IP maximalist agendas with little cost. It also shows that 
the process of negotiation and implementation controlled exclusively by trade 
officials has become a vehicle that one particular interests of society, or the 
business sectors achieve what they want for their own sake. This has left little 
room for the public interests and the human rights to science and culture to be 
taken into account. This has been demonstrated with case studies on: the 
transfer of technology clause; provisions for artists’ resale right; public health 
as related to the Doha Declaration; remuneration right of performers and 
phonogram producers; patent-approval linkage; criminal enforcement; and 
prohibition of general monitoring obligation upon online intermediaries. 
The democratic process in norm-setting and informational transparency is 
crucial to repair the broken balance of the trade-centric IP norms. The need for 
this has been demonstrated in the case studies on the procedures of negotiation 
and implementation phases of the EU-Korea FTA and in studies on the 
provisions for remuneration rights of performers and phonogram producers and 
for criminal enforcement. What if the EC’s proposals on the remuneration right 
had been made open for public scrutiny? If the draft texts for the criminal 
enforcement rules had been leaked? Then, the flawed compromise on extensive 
border measures could have been fixed, and the EU-plus model for criminal 
sanction would have been removed from the pact. The same may have occurred 
for the strict ban on retransmission of television signals over the Internet. 
The trade-centric TRIPS-plus models have been considered by scholars and 
human rights advocates as having adverse impacts on and imposing an even 
greater threat to individuals’ enjoyment of human rights and national 
obligations under the international human rights instruments. The findings of 
this Chapter show that identifying and quantifying such impacts are not always 
straightforward. Two explanations for this may be provided. The impacts 
anticipated from the theoretical analysis of legal text of the FTA appear in the 
real world in different ways depending on various parameters such as the level 
of domestic implementation and relevant social, cultural and industrial structure 
and instruments as shown in the case study on data exclusivity. More 
explanatory account for the difficulty in quantifying the adverse impact is 
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shown by the lack of empirical data and insufficient time lapse from the entry 
into effect of the FTA.  
The more important effect of the EU-Korea FTA and complex networks of 
trade-centric IP agreements would be the lock-in domestic reform and the 
prevention of policy reversal.1117 Such effect is not apparent as its causal link to 
FTAs is invisible and implicit. The more TRIPS-plus FTAs are concluded, the 
deeper the integration of IP maximalist clubs become. As domestic IP 
legislations become increasingly subordinate to legally binding international 
trade agreements, reforming IP norms is harder to achieve. 
The analysis of this Chapter confirms the hypothesis that trade-centric trend 
upholding stronger and more expansive TRIPS-plus standards is robust in the 
real world between the EU and Korea. It also shows how big is the gap between 
the trade-centric IP norms and the human right perspectives of IP. In order to 
bridge the gap and to recover the intended balance between protecting private 
interests of IPR holders and preserving public interests, fundamental reforms of 
existing IPR norms and trade policy are necessary. The human rights discourse 
discussed in Chapter 3 may pave the way for such reforms.  
                                                      
1117 Valdés & McCann, 2014, p. 39. 




The existing model of global IP regime, which is based on neo-liberal or Anglo-
American utilitarianism, is unsustainable. Altering incentives to create into 
incentives to commercialise is just one aspect. Goal of the trade-centric global 
IP regime, especially TRIPS-plus regime, is not a balance between protection 
and dissemination. It aims at providing for investors with privileges to seek 
monopoly rent. Recipients this model targets are not individuals who express 
human dignity in their creation. They are capitalistic producers. In this model, 
distributive justice is ignored. It also fails to capture the humanistic element of 
IP, or dynamics of cultural creation and circulation.1118 Can human rights-based 
approach provide a powerful counter-framework to the trade-centric IP regime? 
This is the main research question of this study. 
For seeking the counter-framework, this thesis investigated two competing, 
inter-related aspects of IP: trade; and human rights. Trade aspects of IP, 
explored in Chapter 2, refer to the centrality of trade in IP, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, rather than a mere relatedness to trade. Vital in 
understanding the trade-centrality is the fact that a logically inevitable link 
between IP and trade is lacking. Strategic use of patent by manufacturing 
industries in Europe and the US during nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
paved the way for trade-centrality by making the idea of property in knowledge 
acceptable among governments and international agreements on IP emerge 
(Section 2-2-3). From 1980s, strategic actions of US private sectors in 
collaboration with European and Japanese counterparts were decisive in 
forming the trade-central IP regime into global, which can be better understood 
from the lens of “structured agency” of a critical realism (Section 2-4). The 
present trade-centric IP model departs from policy objectives of the early trade-
related IP model: cross-border mobility of artisans; domestic innovation; 
dissemination of technologies (Section 2-2-2); international transfer of 
technology; and actual or local working of knowledge (Sections 2-2-3 to 2-2-4). 
                                                      
1118 Sunder, 2006, p. 283. 
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Chapter 2 also shows that a system for encouraging and rewarding creative 
labours can be designed in diverse ways, and a reward system based on IP is far 
from universality and cross-cultural validity (Section 2-3). 
Studies on human rights aspects of IP in Chapter 3 through the lens of long-
forgotten right to science and culture have a virtue to provide a holistic 
approach to IP and human rights. The right to science and culture, having both 
protection and dissemination sides, allows us to embrace IP as an internal 
element in the analysis of the intersection of human rights and IP. Another 
virtue is that the right to science and culture guides us to an alternative model 
for production and dissemination of creative knowledge and information. 
By closely investigating the drafting history of the ‘protection side’, i.e., Author 
Clause, this thesis maintains that an author for the protection of moral and 
material interests does not include an inventor within the meaning of the 
existing patent laws. Further finding of this study is that the scope of IP 
pursuant to Author Clause is much narrower than that found in the trade-centric 
IP regime (Section 3-3). This finding may start the ball rolling toward a 
fundamental reform of patent system. In the reformed model, an invention is 
redefined as an expression that links an inventor and his/her invention, leading 
to a new approach to the scope of patent protection. A patent right is restricted 
not to exclude an independent innovator who invented (or ‘authored’ under the 
meaning of Author Clause) the same or equivalent invention as a patent holder 
(Section 3-6-3). Protection of material interest of authors, which is neither 
equated with the monopolistic right granted by the contemporary IP laws, nor 
covers all forms of economic interests, is guaranteed by a narrower type of 
economic interests – the right to remuneration for intellectual labour (Section 3-
3-4). This calls for a change in basic design of the trade-centric IP regime, a 
shift from property to liability rules (Section 3-6-2). 
Chapter 3 also recaptured the notion of the right to science and culture, 
particularly its dissemination side, in order to make such a right operable, i.e., 
“identifiable and practicable rights and obligations” 1119 and “a decisive 
                                                      
1119 UN General Assembly Resolution 41/120, dated 4 December 1986. 
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component of the normative force of a legal norm”.1120 By taking the notion of 
‘access to knowledge’ and ‘capabilities approach’ as a conceptual subsidiarity, 
‘culture’ and ‘science’ are redefined (Sections 3-4-1 and 3-4-2), and everyone’s 
right to participate in cultural life and enjoy benefit from scientific progress 
finds its footing for active elements of the right to access to knowledge and 
information. The active elements, however, do not confer individuals an 
enforceable entitlement to claim access to or benefits from creative production 
vis-à-vis creators. Rather, they entail a right for people to demand cultural and 
scientific policies to be framed in a way to make cultural and scientific 
creations available and accessible. Therefore, enabling conditions and 
environment are crucial for the realisation of the right to science and culture. To 
ensure real opportunities and particular capabilities for everyone, two 
conditions are vital: participation in decision making process; and removing 
barriers that prevent people from accessing and using cultural and scientific 
creations. In this respect, the TRIPS-plus IP norms are in direct conflict with 
human rights as public participation in the IP norm setting process is denied and 
the barriers are stacking higher. 
The case studies conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 on two TRIPS-plus bilaterals, 
KORUS and the EU-Korea FTA, demonstrate that how far the FTAs are devoid 
of the trade concerns of early IP era, and how neglected the human rights 
dimension is in the FTAs. This may be considered as an obvious result without 
requiring further elaborations given that those two FTAs are at the apex of the 
TRIPS-plus march. However, findings of the case studies show that the 
intersection of human rights and IP is varying from provision to provision and 
differing considerable dependent upon the way the FTAs obligations are 
implemented as demonstrated with case studies on patent-approval linkage of 
KORUS (Section 4-6-2) and data exclusivity of the EU-Korea FTA (Section 5-
5-4). It also reveals that the process by which the maximalist IP agenda was 
successfully incorporated into the FTA texts was differing. The deal of KORUS 
experienced strong oppositions not only from grass roots, civil societies, 
farmers, labor unions and politicians, but also from Korean negotiators, 
especially those who were in charge of copyright policies, but was successfully 
                                                      
1120 Romainville, 2015, p. 427. 
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concluded in a short period because the negotiation process was governed by 
trade officials who were backed by top level politicians pursuing KORUS for 
highly political purpose. By contrast, the EU was relatively easy in getting what 
they wanted from Korea partly because of the path-dependency, i.e., the set of 
decisions previously made by Korea in KORUS. 
The case studies also exhibit the significance of concerns expressed in the UN 
Copyright Report 2014 and the Patent Report of 2015 on transparency and 
democratic process in IP norm setting. The negotiation and subsequent 
discussions on implementation of both FTAs were carried out behind a closed 
door without permitting public engagement and commentary. Lack of 
transparency and participatory process not only raises question on the efficiency 
of the norms and its legitimacy. It also produces a flawed compromise among 
trade negotiators, which serves to the interests of small groups of societies at the 
expense of general public (see for example a case study on the right to 
communication to the public and remuneration right of performers and 
phonogram producer of Section 5-4-3). 
6-2.	Merits	and	Limits	of	Human	Rights	Discourse	
In order to provide a counter-framework of the existing trade-centric IP norms 
on the basis of human rights, the strength and weakness of human rights 
discourse needs to be considered.   
The idea of human rights is one of the most powerful concepts to motivate 
juristic, social, political and philosophical thoughts.1121 As Jack Donnelly puts 
it, human rights are a “hegemonic political discourse” and “settled norms” of 
contemporary international society.1122 As a moral and legal norm of universal 
application, the international human rights standards have implications for 
diverse range of actors in international community, not just for the dominant 
groups. They can provide moral and political weapons for the non-dominant 
groups. For the human rights advocates, the UDHR and two Covenants became 
                                                      
1121 Rosenbaum, 1980, pp. 22-23. 
1122 Donnelly, 2003, p. 38. 
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a useful platform.1123 There are a number of cases where an appeal to human 
rights has become a successful tool for advancement of political demands by 
non-dominant groups, for example by indigenous peoples and by women’s 
movements.1124 As Keck and Sikkink (1998) observed, for many NGOs the 
international human rights norms are the main recourse in domestic political 
and social struggles.  
Domestic NGOs bypass their states and directly seek international human rights 
allies to put pressure on their states, thereby improving the poor human rights 
records, for instance, in Argentina and Mexico during 1970s-80s.1125 While the 
human right movements are mainly related to the civil and political rights, the 
issues associated with the second generation rights has come to centre-stage in 
the global engagement with human rights.1126 As an example, in 1998 the 
international human rights community took issue of the relationship between IP 
regime and right to health, 1127 which led to the High Commissioner’s issuing a 
report on the impact of TRIPS on human rights with a focus on access to 
medicines in 2001. The efforts of NGOs and international human rights 
institutions have shifted the discussions of intellectual property from traditional 
perspective of innovation, economic development and piracy to new standpoint 
of human rights. 
Some commentators explain the possible success of the human right movements 
in terms of the primacy of human rights in international and legal point of view. 
The basic principles of human rights are globally established and the 
obligations to the protection of human rights become the concerns of all 
states.1128 However, as Dommen correctly points out, on the political level, the 
human rights movements are less advanced in the dominant intergovernmental 
organisations such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and needs to 
                                                      
1123 Morsink, 2009, p. 1. 
1124 Cox & Schechter, 2002, p. 62. The authors go on to say that “[I]n this regard 
the field of human rights remains a terrain of struggle in which the notion of human 
rights continuously evolves.” 
1125 Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 12, 79-80. 
1126 Sen, 2009, pp. 380-381. 
1127 Deere, 2009, p. 130. 
1128 Donnelly 2003, p. 38. 
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contemplate how and where to raise their issues so that they get heard.1129 
At the fundamental level, it is debatable if the idea of human rights is 
philosophically justifiable for all cultures and societies having different 
religious or moral belief, and politically viable within the global power politics. 
In some areas, it is true that the international bills of human rights became a 
useful platform for the advancement of political demands by non-dominant 
groups,1130 and international human rights communities have been successful, 
from 1998, in mobilizing the UN human rights body to issue a series of reports, 
recommendations, and resolutions touching upon IP in terms of human rights. 
Such a success story of human right advocates in shifting the discussion of IP 
from traditional perspective of economic growth, innovation and piracy to new 
standpoint of human rights has its history of twenty years. Yet the human rights 
discourse is far from the dominant perspective for IP policy makers and 
practitioners, let alone scholars. 
It is required to avoid taking the validity of human right for granted or 
assuming, explicitly or implicitly, the superiority of human rights over IP 
protection. Also is important to understand that the concept of human rights and 
humanity has been socially constructed. The moral universalism of human 
rights resting upon the philosophical belief that an absolute moral order exists 
independently from contingent historical and social conditions and applies to all 
human beings at all times needs to be modified in consideration of cultural 
relative nature of human rights. We do not need to entirely reject the idea of 
universality per se, but it is required to understand such universality must be 
attained within culture, rather than be imposed from outsider.1131 The concept of 
human rights is a product of highly complicated evolution of legal, moral, 
political and philosophical motivations.1132 For making the concept of human 
                                                      
1129 Dommen, 2002, pp. 49-50. 
1130 Cox & Schechter, 2002, p. 62. 
1131 Rajagopal, 2003, p. 211. Among others, An-Na’im (2003, p. 2) holds that the 
universality of HRs should be seen as a product of a process rather than as an 
established “given” concept and specific predetermined normative content to be 
discovered or proclaimed through international declarations and rendered legally 
binding through treaties. 
1132 Menke & Pollmann, 2007. 
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rights meaningful, it needs to be redefined in light of experiences and 
circumstances of today.1133 Such redefinition requires investigation of the nature 
of trade-centrality of contemporary IP norms and their intersection with human 
rights. It also demands avoiding over-legal approach to human rights, which 
often means a narrow focus of what the law says, and focusing how to translate 
human rights into real entitlement.1134 The re-definitional work also applies to 
IP. In this work, we need to escape from the proposition that IP is about 
promoting creativity; the gist of the proposition should be insisting that IP ought 
to be different.1135 
6-3.	Limitations	and	Future	Research	
For the purpose of investigating the intersection of IP and human rights, this 
thesis conducted case studies on KORUS and the EU-Korea FTA. Case study 
on those two FTAs, given their strong TRIPS-plus nature, is particularly 
appealing. But it also presents certain limitations.  
The first limitation relates to the issue of generalisability. Findings of the case 
studies reveal that impacts of FTAs are highly dependent on the way they are 
implemented. While some TRIPS-plus obligations are over-implemented, 
others are neglected or implemented in quite different ways from what FTAs 
require. Further, as illustrated in patent-approval linkage cases, small 
institutional changes in implementing the FTA obligations lead to significantly 
different outcomes.  
The second limitation stems from the lack of reliable data for comprehensive 
human rights impact assessment. This is due to: (1) insufficient time lapse from 
the entry into effect of the FTAs; (2) unavailability of raw data; and (3) 
concealment by governments of documents and information produced during 
the negotiation and subsequent implementation phases. For these reasons, in 
certain areas, the impact is observable but in most areas comprehensive impact 
assessment is less achievable.  
                                                      
1133 Arendt, 1949, p. 34. 
1134 Chitonge, 2015, p. 15. 
1135 Drassinower, 2015, p. 151. 
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The findings of this thesis have lighted some avenues for future research. For 
example, research is needed to explore other FTAs having similar TRIPS-plus 
provisions to KORUS and the EU-Korea FTA and identify factors that 
contribute, if any, different outcomes from those of the two FTAs. It also 
necessary to find and understand, as this thesis suggests, contexts under which 
IP and human rights clash and social forces to drive and deepen such a clash. 
By knowing them, it would be possible to go beyond the binary choice between 
conflict and co-existence of IP and human rights, and to reformulate the trade-
centrality of IP regime. 
This thesis offers human rights model of IP to fundamentally reform the 
contemporary trade-centric IP norms; a new balance between protection and 
dissemination; a liability rule, rather than a property rule, for the protection of 
material interests of creators; and a conceptual shift of right to invention, which  
is based on the notion of invention as an expression and permits an independent 
invention. This model, however, firmly anchors to the premise that a personal 
link exists between creators and their scientific, literary or artistic productions. 
The personal link is a primary justification for the human rights protection of 
creators because the creative production is regarded as an expression of author’s 
human dignity. Future research needs to address the relationship of the personal 
link and the notion of romantic authorship that puts an emphasis on individuals 
in creative process and ignores commons and social nature of creation.  
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